

MILITARY SECRETS OF THE CENTURY

(1.10. Aleshkin, I.A. Vasiliev

PEASANT UPRISINGS IN RUSSIA in 1918-1922

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Aleshkin, P.F.

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This book examines the phenomenon of mass and spontaneous social and political protest of the Russian peasantry under the conditions of the policy of war communism in 1918-1921, assesses the causes and factors of the emergence of the peasant protest movement, analyzes its nature, typology, dynamics and forms of resistance. . The conditions created by the policy of war communism are considered as a factor in the generation of protest phenomena.

The nature of the peasant uprisings in 1918-1922. in Soviet Russia as a civil war in its content, prepared by the revolution of 1917, will make it possible to identify the typological commonality of the peasant protests throughout the country.

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INTRODUCTION

The concept of "people" is directly related to the definition of the peasantry as its main part, the most significant social group (as is known, until 1917 the peasantry accounted for 80% of the population of Russia). What makes us realize the past today, look for answers to the questions: what happened to the Russian people (peasantry) in this or that period of national history? Why do we get caught up in the problem of our own past? Perhaps we can talk about the dimension of historical consciousness or historical understanding, thanks to which we become aware of the existence of the past, of which we are aware of ourselves today. Thanks to historical consciousness, the knowledge of historical experience, the past becomes a reality, to a certain extent, the past is realized by a part of us.

There is a phenomenon of oblivion in the historical consciousness of Russian society. History prompts us to recognize the importance of those aspects of the past that were previously ignored. The civil war between the Reds and Whites, generated by the revolution of 1917, overshadowed the no less fierce "internal front" of the Civil War - the Peasants' War of 1918-1922. against the policy of war communism on the part of the Soviet state. The peasant protest movement in Soviet Russia in the post-

of the history of October is still an open page of the social phenomenon called the Soviet society. A powerful social protest forced the state authorities to urgently search for fundamentally new ways out of the deep social crisis in which the country found itself. The following fact is noteworthy: the State Publishing House of the Soviet Republic announced a public competition of worker-peasant essays in the Pravda newspaper on July 20, 1919. Ten topics were given, including: "Why do some peasants go against the Soviet government and what is their mistake?", "Who are the counter-revolutionaries?" Perhaps the best essay on the subject (of course, not

377

having nothing to do with the competition) was written by a wonderful writer V.G. Korolenko. A year later, in August-September 1920, during the period of the apogee of the policy of war communism, in the fifth letter to the People's Commissar for Public Education of Soviet Russia A.V. Lunacharsky's sharp writer's pen created an accurate and ironic image called "Inconvenient Position": according to Korolenko, the ruling Communist Party found itself in an "uncomfortable position" sitting on bayonets. In the countryside, such a "situation" was "downright tragic": "every now communists and commissars are brought from there, maimed and killed." The Party's response is to "burn out entire villages, both rich and poor alike" [1: 237-240].

Forgetfulness in history can manifest itself when there are reasons to deliberately forget about certain aspects of the past: for example, when the memory of them turns out to be too painful to include them in our collective consciousness. There is often a paradox of a traumatic experience that is simultaneously forgotten and stored in the memory. The latter is forgotten because they try to push it out of conscious memory. However, he is remembered because the subject of the traumatic experience left too serious spiritual wounds. The traumatic experience adjusts to the identity, just as the new identity adjusts to the traumatic experience. In such a situation, experience and identity are reconciled, creating conditions for their continued coexistence.

The topic of peasant resistance to the policy of war communism after the revolution of 1917 in the Soviet period was a closed topic. In the past of the Russian peasantry, there are many ordinary events in everyday life that can be forgotten, since they have nothing to do with the present or future identity. However, even specialists sometimes "forget" what was decisive in the past. But this happens more often not because they want to deliberately distort the past, but simply because they do not know the significance of certain causal factors. Today, one often has to read essays in which the authors focus their attention on individual facts that excite the mind, causing an emotional perception of the history of the peasant movement, but do not create a complete and objective picture. Pathos comparisons of the peasant war in Soviet Russia in terms of scope and consequences with the peasant wars that took place in Russian history (Bolotnikov, Razin, Pugachev) create nothing more than a formal

7

similarity. A superficial attitude as applied to Soviet history is expressed in Pushkin's catchphrase about the Russian rebellion - "senseless and merciless."

The tragic historical experience of the Civil War in Russia serves the perception of historical consciousness. The traumatic experience manifested itself primarily in the change in the identity of the Russian nation and people. The identity of a nation, a people is deeply rooted in their past, therefore, if we want to comprehend their identity, we should first of all turn to their history. It is history that will provide access to an understanding of one's own identity. The better we know the past, the clearer the contours of identity will become and the more adequate individual and collective actions will become in Russian society.

An example is the clarification of the causal relationship between the policy of war communism and the peasant war in Russia: it was the policy of war communism that reproduced the protest phenomena throughout the country. During the period of creation of various mythologemes, a denunciatory perception of peasant protest phenomena was formed in public opinion: this is how "Antonovshchina", "Makhnovshchina", "Mironovshchina", "Sapozhkovshchina", "Serovshchina", "Rogovshchina", "Lubkovshchina" and others appeared. (in quoted form). In a similar context, those involved in the peasant resistance became bandits, peasant uprisings - kulak, Socialist-Revolutionary and White Guard. However, today it is quite appropriate to use the above terms as symbolic phenomena denoting real social phenomena of the past (and without any quotation marks).

An objective study of the events of that time on a national scale is just beginning. This is not only and not so much about the descriptive side of individual uprisings, speeches, unrest - it is more important to explain what caused the peasant protest movement not in individual regions, but throughout the whole country. In this case, one cannot do without revealing the nature of such a phenomenon in early Soviet history as the policy of war communism.

Of undoubted interest is the typological characteristic of the peasant movement. The protest movement itself implies mass character, voluntary participation, the presence of certain political slogans, a variety of forms of resistance (both passive and active). We note in this connection that

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The social movement in the structure of the protest movement is considered as one of the forms of open armed resistance. The main part of the population of Russia, the peasantry, acted as the subject of the movement. It is impossible to rank all manifestations of peasant rebellion, due to the conditions of the Civil War, as an organized peasant movement. The content basis of the peasant movement was social and political protest, expressed in spontaneous mass forms.

Sources and notes:

Vladimir Korolenko. Letters to Lunacharsky // Freedom is the eternal threshold. L., 1990. Correspondence initiative, according to V.D. Bonch-Bruевич, belonged to V.I. Lenin: "We must ask A.V. Lunacharsky to enter into correspondence with him: it is most convenient for him as a commissar of public education, and besides, a writer" (V.G. Korolenko in the memoirs of contemporaries. M., 1962. P. 508). After a meeting on June 7, 1920, with Lunacharsky, who visited him in Poltava, Korolenko wrote six letters of polemical content, but did not receive a single answer. Lunacharsky explained the lack of answers for various reasons. Did Lenin know about the contents of the letters? According to contemporaries, he read them.

TRANSFORMATION OF PROTEST PHENOMENA INTO A PEASANT WAR

The policy of the Bolsheviks in the countryside created the conditions for protest manifestations and rejection of the policy of war communism. During the years of the Civil War, the peasantry declared itself as a subject of the historical process, which did not want to be the object of the struggle of political parties. Miscalculations in management had political consequences, undermining the support of the Bolsheviks among the people.

Hidden dissatisfaction with the food policy of the Soviet state was accompanied by a growing muffled murmur among the peasantry. After the return of soldiers from the fronts of the First World War to their native villages, the peasants became more active in expressing their demands [1]. The peasantry defended their own understanding of the rights and freedoms won during the revolution. Nothing like this has ever happened in Russia: in the pre-revolutionary past

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the peasants took up arms against the landowners, but not against the government.

According to the materials of the Cheka, in 1918 in 20 provinces of Russia there were 245 uprisings! [2: 91]. In Central Russia, in the summer months of 1918, the resistance of the peasants resulted in 130 protests against local Soviets, 154 acts of self-defense against food detachments, 73 uprisings and mass refusals of non-commissioned officers in a number of provinces (Oryol, Kursk, Voronezh) from appearing for draft paragraphs [2: 104].

In the spring and summer of 1918, the suppression of peasant unrest by the Soviet authorities, as a rule, was limited to the following scheme: an armed detachment was sent to liquidate discontent, the instigators were arrested, penalties were established (fines, requisitions) - in most cases, the matter was done without bloodshed, executions. The peasantry decided on open actions, especially armed ones, in those cases when other means were not enough to achieve their demands, or the cup of patience was overflowing. Any sane person realized what a fatal line he crossed and what the consequences of such a step could be if he decided to openly protest against the authorities. Therefore, opposition to the orders of the authorities usually did not take active forms.

Noticeable manifestations of peasant dissatisfaction with the food policy of the communists began with the harvesting period. The outbreak of peasant unrest in 12 villages in the south of the Saratov province occurred in August 1918 - a detachment of the Cheka was sent to eliminate them. The detachment disarmed the villagers, restored the Soviets, and imposed an indemnity. 36 people were shot [3: 85-86].

The performance of the peasants in the village of Kuchki, Penza province, on August 5, 1918, resulted in an armed attack on the food detachment, reprisal against the local commander. The unrest of the poor and middle peasants spread to the entire Kuchkinskaya volost, spread to neighboring volosts. With the help of armed force on August 8, discontent was suppressed, 13 people were shot [3: 306].

! According to R. Pipes, as a result of 245 uprisings, the Bolsheviks lost 875 people, the rebels - 1821. In addition, 2431 people from among the rebels were shot (Pipes R. Russian Revolution. In 2 hours. Part 2. M. ,

1994, p. 425).

The peasant uprising in the village of Kuchki and the volosts of the Penza province aroused serious concern for Lenin when he received information in a telegram from the Penza provincial executive committee. The wave of peasant uprisings at that time was only gaining strength: it is hard to imagine that every ordinary uprising in 1920-1921. telegraphed to the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars personally (they would have filled up with telegrams). The active participation in the uprisings of the "semi-proletariat", according to Lenin, probably greatly puzzled the Bolshevik leader, since it destroyed his own proof and justification for the existence in Soviet Russia of the social support of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Probably, it is this circumstance that explains Lenin's so interested attention to this event, his demands to stifle peasant unrest as soon as possible, an attempt to explain the reasons for speaking out against the policy of power by kulak intrigues [4]. The uprising in the village of Kuchki for Lenin was not an ordinary event. Otherwise, it is impossible to explain why the head of state, contrary to all the laws of government, personally dealt with the solution of a local local issue.

Lenin's ideological myth about the support of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the person of the workers and the poor peasantry as a "semi-proletariat" was refuted by the uprisings of the peasants, which coincided with the celebration of the first anniversary of the proletarian revolution. C | Until November 25, they occurred in 80 districts, covering 11 out of 12 districts in the Ryazan province, 9 - in Smolensk, 7 - in Tambov. 6 counties were involved in the uprisings in Kaluga, Kostroma, 4 - in Vladimir, uprisings took place in Moscow, Tula, Yaroslavl, Cherepovets

provinces [2: 111-112]. The uprisings were the result of the dissatisfaction of the peasants with the actions of the authorities to collect an extraordinary revolutionary tax from them, the requisitions of bread and horses for the needs of the front, and the mobilization of young people into the Red Army. In November 1918, almost the entire territory of Russia, controlled by the Bolsheviks, was covered by the peasant movement. The position of the peasantry in relation to the Soviet power in the second half of 1918 was determined by the unwillingness to shoulder the burdens of the Civil War and the food dictatorship of the Bolshevik state.

On November 4, the peasants in the village of Vys, Suzdal district, Vladimir province, opposed the seizure of grain surpluses, dispersed the committee. To pacify the peasantry, the authorities sent armed

a detachment that, without bloodshed, dispersed the crowd, arresting 12 people [5].

The peasant uprising in the Venevsky district of the Tula province began on November 7th. On the day of the anniversary of the October Revolution, a performance was going on in a local club, where almost the entire local organization of the RCP(b) was present. During the performance, information was received that the Mordves station (between Venev and Kashira) was occupied by rebellious peasants. The peasants disarmed the detachment, occupied the post office, cut the wires, blocked the railway line, after which, divided into two parts, they headed - one part to Kashira, the other to Venev. No sooner had this information been verified than the news arrived that another hotbed of unrest had appeared in the Borozdinsky volost: the peasants dispersed the volost Soviet, there were murdered communists. On the morning of November 8, a mass of peasants began to gather in Venev for the bazaar, especially from the Borozdinsky volost, as well as peasants from other volosts, in particular from Yudinsky and Klinckaya (many mobilized were noted among the arrivals). The peasants who had gathered in Venev staged a rally. The crowd was hostile towards the local authorities, military commissar Solomentsev, who spoke at the rally, was beaten. The rally was dispersed by the efforts of the local detachment of the Cheka and the Communists, after which the participants in the beating of the military commissar were executed here, on the spot. In the evening, information appeared about a number of beatings and murders of communists in the Klin volost, about the attack on Venev by peasants from the Tolstoy and Shchuchinsky volosts, then came the news of a demonstration in the Kosnev volost. The latter was stopped by sending detachments of Red Army soldiers to the main roads. On November 9, unrest in the Kurebinsky volost and an attempt to march on Venev by an armed Soviet detachment were paralyzed.

On November 10, an uprising began in the Kormovskaya volost: the defeat of the Soviet, the beating of Soviet workers, the murder of the secretary of the Soviet, Communist Govorov, another attempt to attack Venev, which was blocked by a detachment that arrived from Kashira. On the same day, the peasants of Novopribornaya, Kholtobinskaya, Spasskaya, Urusovskaya and Povedskaya volosts launched an attack on Venev, in which a number of murders and beatings of Soviet workers, communists, members of the Committee of the Poor took place.

To suppress the unrest on November 11, punitive detachments were sent to the insurgent volosts and throughout the county, which

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dealt with the instigators on the ground, imposed an indemnity on the local population [3: 101-102]. At the end of 1918, a huge indemnity in grain was exacted from the Tambov peasants for their participation in the November uprisings.

In November, noticeable peasant uprisings against the forced requisition of grain took place in the Penza province. In the village of Lada, Saransk district, a rumor spread among the population that a food detachment that had arrived in the village would take away all the bread, close the church, and take away the icons. On the morning of November 14, women began to gather in groups in the market square of the village and excitedly discuss the news. After a while, the alarm rang. An armed detachment arrested the most active instigators. By order of the Cheka were

12 people who participated in the unrest were shot. Protest actions also took place in the Pyatinskaya volost of the Samara district [3: 307-309].

In the village of Mastinovka, Penza district, on November 10, 1918, near the school building, a village meeting discussed the food issue. The gathering participants demanded that the food detachment immediately leave the village. A crowd of peasants who fled to the ringing of the local church bell disarmed the pro-Darmians, who surrendered their weapons without resistance and fled, some were arrested [3: 309].

The protest actions received a new impetus in connection with the general forced mobilization into the Red Army in the autumn of 1918. The first mass conscription of peasants into the army in the provinces of Central Russia (mobilization was postponed until autumn due to the need to complete field work) served as a pretext for peasant discontent. In the very first days of conscription, the performances of the mobilized peasants began. Active actions of the mobilized took place in the Tver and Smolensk provinces [6; 3:85]. Natives of the villages, including the former junior command staff of the tsarist army (non-commissioned officers, ensigns), who fought during the First World War, evaded the draft.

Due to forced mobilization during one December 1918, the Red Army increased by almost a quarter [7: 26]. The poor peasantry were called up to the Red Army in the first place. It was the poor peasantry, supported by the middle peasantry, who in many places raised a revolt of the mobilized. The rebels were led by front-line soldiers who had undergone military training on the fields of the First World War.

us. The movement gained a mass character: in the Mikhailovsky district of the Ryazan province it covered 20 volosts, in the Gzhatsk uyezd of the Smolensk province - 19 volosts, in the Vereisky uyezd of the Moscow province - 18 volosts with 10 thousand participants, in the Medynsky uyezd of the Kaluga province - 17 volosts with 7 - 8 thousand rebels. The rebels captured Kasimov in the Ryazan province, Shatsk in Tambov, Dukhovshchina, Gzhatsk, Porechye in Smolensk, and several settlements and stations in Kaluga.

The November-December uprisings of the peasants covered 138 out of 286 districts of the central provinces, that is, almost half of the districts that were under the control of the Soviet authorities [2: 109, 113, 114]. These uprisings were the first mass protest of the peasants against the "war communism" system.

At the end of 1918 and the beginning of 1919, the arbitrariness and violent methods of levying by the committees and local Soviets of the one-time emergency tax of 10 billion rubles introduced by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee led to the "Bakurs' uprising" of the peasants of nine volosts of the Serdobsky district of the Saratov province.

In January-July 1919, uprisings took place, according to incomplete data, in 124 districts of European Russia. In January-February 1919, uprisings took place in individual volosts of many provinces, but most of them were noted in the Tver province (in 16 volosts) [2: 123].

The peak of the resistance of the peasants was noted in March 1919. In this month, the peasants had to hand over 30% of the annual allotment. Due to the lack of seeds in the spring of 1919, the area under crops in peasant farms was significantly reduced. On the basis of dissatisfaction with the seizure of bread, uprisings took place in the Simbirsk, Penza, Ural, Orenburg and part of the Kazan province.

In the spring of 1919, peasant unrest and uprisings were noted everywhere, especially in the Vyatka province (Torialnaya volost of the Urzhum district), Kursk (Mikhailovskaya volost of the Dmitrievsky district), Samara (Sergievska-Krotovka district), Voronezh (districts adjacent to the Don), Tambov (Lebedyansky district), Smolenskaya (villages of Kalchinovka, Grigorovka, Rubanka), Kazanskaya (Spassky district), Moscow (Ruzsky district); uprisings of up to 10 thousand Cossacks in the region of Povorino-Tsaritsyno and Liski-Millerovskaya, in the villages of Veshenskaya,

Shumilinskaya, Elanskaya [8, 3: 127-129]. During the speeches, the rebels dismantled the railway tracks, shena telegraph connection.

The local bodies of the Cheka informed the center about the anxious mood of the peasants in the volosts and villages, due to dissatisfaction with the policy of the Soviets and distrust towards representatives of communist cells, who, according to the peasants, had nothing to do with communism: they were engaged in drunkenness, all kinds of unregistered confiscations from population.

Rural communists arranged "with the splendor of a landowner of Nikolaev times" weddings in clubs, were fond of card games. There were many applications and complaints that pointed to illegal actions and abuses of local authorities: wedding gold rings, silver watches and a lot of other trifles were taken away from the peasants, for non-payment of the next emergency tax, the peasant could lose his farm and the last livestock: in one case, the peasant instead of 15 thousand rubles. paid 13,700, as a result, all his property was put up for sale. The peasants complained: "All we hear is: 'We are arresting! Let's shoot!'" That is why we are afraid of the authorities, even to go to meetings and even ask them to explain more often what Soviet power is, what it is striving for, explain about communism" [3: 122-123].

Information reports characterized the attitude towards power in the peasant environment as "distrustful" (Moscow, Ryazan provinces), "hostile" (Vladimir, Tver, Kostroma, Penza), "negative" (Saratov) [3: 156-159, 162-164].

In the spring, armed uprisings by peasants began in Astrakhan, Saratov, Tambov, Voronezh, Oryol, Kursk, Penza and other provinces of Central Russia. In March 1919, in the village of B. Yazyase, Penza province, during the uprising, about 20 people were killed, about 100 were wounded [3: 118].

In the first half of 1919, in three provinces of the agrarian center (Voronezh, Kursk, Orel), out of 238 uprisings, 72 occurred on food grounds (30.25%), 51 - as a result of mobilization (21.43%), 35 - uprisings of deserters (14.7%), 34 - due to requisitions (14.29%), 17 - due to agrarian disputes (7.14%) and 6 - on a political basis among the Red Army units (2.52 %) [2: 128-129].

According to incomplete data, 99 uprisings took place in the first half of 1919 (a total of 344 uprisings in a year and a half). However, according to other sources, only in three provinces of the country - Voronezh, Kursk and Oryol - during the first half of 1919, 238 peasant uprisings took place [2: 91]. In the summer, the peasant movement in the center of the country

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has turned into a real war. As early as 1919, the Civil War between the Reds and the Whites took place in parallel with the war of the peasantry against the policy of "War Communism". Peasant revolution of 1917-1918 transformed into a peasant war with communist power. The place of the former eternal enemy - the landowner - in the peasant perception was taken by the state, which took possession of the land.

By a resolution of the Council of Workers 'and Peasants' Defense of May 28, 1919, all special forces that existed under the People's Commissariat of Food and other people's commissariats and departments, with the exception of the railway and border troops, came under the control of the NKVD through the headquarters of the Cheka troops and were renamed troops Internal Guard of the Republic (VOHR).

The headquarters of the Cheka troops was reorganized into the headquarters of the VOKhR. The main task of these troops was to protect the rear of the country. The troops of the VOKhR were intended to perform the following functions: armed struggle against rebellions and uprisings, protection of state institutions, structures, protection and defense of railway and military communications, combating

bagging, protection of food warehouses, control and accounting of agricultural products. The general command of the troops of the VOKhR was carried out by the military council of the troops chaired by F.E. Dzerzhinsky.

Peasant resistance took shape in a specific form of struggle—the “green” movement. During the Civil War in Russia, “greens” were those who shied away from military service. They, as a rule, hid in hard-to-reach places - in forests, mountains. Basically, the Green detachments consisted of deserters or those who had evaded mobilization both in the Red Army and in the White Army. The Greens acted against both the Reds and the Whites: both opposing sides were hostile to the Greens. The essence of the green movement was reflected in the folk art of the Civil War period: “Oh, apple, ripe colors. Hit the red on the left, the white on the right”; “The steamboat is passing by the pier, We will feed the fish with communists. Oh, the ship is coming - the waves are billowing, We will feed the fish with the generals!

The green movement actively manifested itself already in 1918. The unwillingness of the population to participate in civil strife was evidenced by the failure of mobilization into the People's Army of Komuch in the autumn of 1918: in the Middle Volga region, anti-Bolshevik forces managed to attract

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it has only 2.5% of able-bodied men. The summer of 1919 was marked by an intensified growth of the Green movement, associated with an increase in desertion. One of the main reasons was the numerous mobilizations. The opposing sides in the Civil War were relatively loyal to the prisoners from among the forcibly mobilized. Many had mobilization certificates issued by both the Reds and the Whites. Cases were noted when the mobilized managed several times to be in each of the hostile armies.

In the conditions of a fierce Civil War, both opposing sides, often repeatedly in the same localities, used in the controlled territories the same methods of forced mobilization of the local population into the army, confiscations and requisitions of property, horses, food, imposed indemnities, carried out arrests and executions. Looting and looting in the frontline zone has become commonplace. Deserters from both opposing armies, as a rule, soldiers with combat experience, created armed formations, the basis of which was the population from the places occupied by the warring armies. Detachments of the greens waged an armed struggle by guerrilla methods against the authorities that existed in this territory.

The Green detachments were heterogeneous in composition, consisting mainly of the peasantry. The green movement was a specific form of peasant resistance. The “genuine” (“true”) Greens consisted of peasants deprived of power by the authorities, connected with the local population, they enjoyed its help and support. The Greens performed the functions of a peasant militia, self-defense detachments to protect villages from robbers, food and punitive detachments. They, as a rule, did not occupy settlements in order to prevent repressions against the villagers. The Greens staged attacks on weapons depots and bulkheads. In the summer of 1919, the Greens captured Yuryev-Polsky in the Vladimir province with an artillery depot located there. In July 1919, the Poshekhonsky district of the Yaroslavl province was completely engulfed by the Green uprising. In some cases, the Greens even had artillery and machine guns.

The Greens took an active part in the peasant insurrectionary movement in 1918-1922: the Makhnovshchina, the Antonovshchina, the rebellion in southern Russia and Siberia. However, it is unlawful

identify

the phenomenon of the green movement with the peasant protest movement: the green movement was only part of the peasant protest. It had no political goals, did not seek to seize power. The green movement was based on pacifist slogans. The Greens preferred to be guided by the principle “you don’t touch us, and we won’t touch you” and hoped for

favorable change of situation. A separate part of the greens were deserters engaged in outright robberies and looting. However, most of the Greens rejected criminality and sought support among the peasantry.

According to the direction of current actions, the greens were defined as "red-green" and "white-green". The partisan detachments formed by the opposing sides behind enemy lines can only conditionally be classified as red-green or white-green. It is believed that the white-greens consisted mainly of deserters of the Red Army or those who evaded the mobilization by the Reds, the red-greens consisted of deserters or those who evaded the mobilization of the Whites. Depending on the specific situation of the Civil War, their cardinal transformation often took place: "bandits" became "partisan-allies" and vice versa. The actions of the Greens introduced serious complications into the strategy of the fighting parties, introducing chaos in the rear and diverting troops from the front. The green rebellion was a positive factor for the red or white command if it was based on the territory occupied by the enemy, but it also turned into a negative factor when the territory passed into the hands of its troops: recent partisans were declared bandits.

The red-green movement took shape in the summer of 1919 on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus. The peasantry of the Sochi, Tuapse and Novorossiysk districts avoided being drafted into Denikin's army and hid in the forests of the coastal slopes of the Caucasus Range. Organized actions of the green army on a large scale, however, did not begin until January 1920, when the white front retreated to the sea. The Green Army liberated almost the entire northeastern part of the Black Sea coast. When meeting with the advanced units of the Red Army, the main forces of the Green Army merged into its composition. The Novorossiysk catastrophe of the White troops was the reason for the emergence of the White-Green movement in the south of Russia.

It is not uncommon for the green movement to be broadly used as a term for a "third force" in the Civil War. However, according to

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such an interpretation seems untenable. A third force without its own ideology and political program could not compete with either Bolshevism or restoration. The Greens themselves did not think about creating a "third force" government. Local, disparate, heterogeneous, unstable formations of greens were not an independent force. Moreover, it is impossible to unite in a single movement of opponents - red-green and white-green.

The Socialist-Revolutionary Party positioned itself as a "third force". The position of the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the role of a "third force" was consolidated by the IX Party Council in June 1919. The Socialist-Revolutionaries tried to counter the opposing sides in the Civil War - Bolshevism and restoration - with the "labor democracy of the city and countryside" (the peasantry in the first place) as a "third force". In this regard, the green army was seen as a "third force" to fight against both dictatorships. However, the attempt to create a democratic alternative in the face of a struggle on two fronts was doomed to failure. The Social Revolutionaries were in a state of deep crisis: there was no single center, grassroots organizations were crushed. The union of the green movement with the socialist revolutionaries did not work out.

Desertion from the army was widespread. In July 1919, there were 266,000 deserters in the European part of Russia; in August, 284,000; for the entire second half of 1919, 1,545,000 [2: 133]. In 1919, the desertion of peasants from the Red Army became widespread. In June 1919, it spread in the Pskov, Tver, Yaroslavl, and Kostroma provinces [9]. In Moscow. provinces, Mozhaisky, Volokolamsky, Moscow and Zvenigorodsky were among the unreliable regions. In June-September, there were 16,310 deserters registered in the Kaluga province, 29,147 in the Nizhny Novgorod province, and 80 thousand in the Tambov province [3: 189-193, 195-196].

In the Smolensk province alone, from March 1 to August 8, 2,295 people deserted, and 20,606 people did not appear at the call. In total, 9604 people were listed as deserters in the province.

Repeated (malicious) desertion flourished. During the specified period, 4468 deserters were detained in the Smolensk province by raids. By the end of the summer, up to 30,000 deserters were registered in the Smolensk Governorate, and entire volosts in the Yaroslavl Governorate [3: 171-174, 176-185].

The authorities took decisive and tough measures in the fight against desertion. At the beginning of 1919, in accordance with the resolution

Council of Defense on December 25, 1918, the country created the Commission to combat desertion from the Red Army. According to this decree, the Central Commission for Combating Desertion was established from representatives of the military leadership, military commissars, and provincial commissions for combating desertion were created locally.

On March 29, 1919, the provincial commissions for combating desertion were granted the right to consider cases of desertion with the imposition of penalties and penalties. Measures of punishment for desertion were introduced (from conditional imprisonment up to execution). The commissions received the right to carry out full or partial confiscation of property and transfer the land allotments of deserters and their harborers for temporary use to the families of Red Army soldiers.

The main part of the deserters were villagers - middle peasants. The peasant population was sympathetic towards deserters: deserters in the spring, summer and autumn periods were explained by the need to perform urgent agricultural work, sowing campaigns and timely harvesting during the field season. Many families of Red Army soldiers had no one to help. The insecurity of the families of the Red Army was a significant reason for desertion. It is no coincidence that the mass capture of deserters was practiced precisely during agricultural work, in the field.

In connection with the growth of the fronts of the Civil War, conscription into the Red Army increased sharply. In the middle of 1919, its quantitative composition totaled 1.5 million people - within six months the army more than tripled [7: 26].

On June 3, 1919, the Labor and Defense Council adopted a resolution on measures to eradicate desertion. With a voluntary appearance in the military commissariats within a week from the date of publication of the decision, deserters and persons who evaded mobilization were exempted from trial and punishment. The commissions for combating desertion received the authority to carry out full or partial confiscation of property and to transfer land allotments for temporary use to the families of Red Army soldiers. The same measures could be applied to the harborers of deserters.

The authorities applied repressive measures to the families of deserters, used the principle of mutual responsibility, establishing contributions to entire villages for deserters, primarily grain, various types of fines. Demonstrative executions of deserters became a practice.

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In the summer of 1919, unrest was noted in many Smolensk villages and farms: Glushevka, Karabanovo, Antsiferovo, Smolyaki, Veliko and Velivko of the Katyn volost, Ananyenka, Teteri, Bolshoi and Maly Oburokh, Okhotnoe of the Rudnyanskaya volost. Among the organizers were peasants Nikolay Gorbachev, Fyodor Leontiev, Pavel Malashenkov, Leonty Ivanov, the Karposhkin brothers, Andrey Grigoriev, Fedor Stepanov, Mikhail Kachaev, Dmitry Lavrenov, Roman Menichkin, Andrey Zaitsev, Zakhar Muravyov [10].

In July 1919, with the participation of deserters, uprisings took place in the Moscow province (Mozhaisk and Volokolamsk districts), Tver (Vyshnevolotsk district), in all districts of the Yaroslavl and Kostroma provinces, in Vladimir (Yuryevets district - "Ankovskoe uprising", Aleksandrovsky district), Vologda (Vologda, Gryazovets, Kadnikovskiy districts), almost all districts of the Tambov province [11].

In the Tambov province in the summer of 1919, out of 14,785 people to be mobilized, only 3,108 (21%) came to the recruiting stations. On July 20, there were 48,572 deserters in the province. In Tambov uyezd, armed protests by deserters took place in four volosts, in Kirsanovsky uyezd, in the Inzhavino region.

In 1919, a surplus appropriation of 27 million poods was established for the province. But the year was uneventful. The peasants hid the meager remains of last year's bread. In June it became clear that there would be no voluntary surrender of bread. On June 20, the Tambov provincial executive committee stated the complete cessation of the delivery of bread by the peasants. On July 3, martial law was introduced in eight counties to break the resistance of the peasants. Against the background of mass desertion, the use of the armed forces of food detachments to collect grain only exacerbated the situation. On July 26, the Kirsanovsky Uyezd Military Revolutionary Committee recognized the impotence of the authorities in the fight against deserters, whose hostages were the Communists and workers of the village Soviets. The Military Revolutionary Committee ordered the volost executive committees, military commissars and cells of the RCP(b) to take hostages from the kulaks, harborers of deserters, moonshiners and others, so that they would answer with their heads for every killed communist and any resistance of the peasants [2: 129].

In August, in the Kazan province, unrest broke out simultaneously in five volosts, liquidated by a detachment of the gubchek. Result: two executions and, as a measure of punishment, a fine of 760,000 rubles imposed on recalcitrant 18 villages.

In the Kostroma province, armed detachments, engaged in the suppression of uprisings in the Krasnoselskaya, Semenovskaya, Bygizinskaya and Miskovskaya volosts, made illegal requisitions of products, the requisitions were accompanied by the murders of local residents [3: 181, 12].

At the same time, an uprising took place in the village of Bolshoye, Livensky district, Oryol province. The spontaneous peasant protest was caused by the execution of a group of villagers, harassment and threats from the local authorities, bribery, drunkenness of its representatives, and extortion. A few days before the uprising, a rumor spread, initiated by one of the members of the committee, that the peasants in the Bolshoi would soon be shot — the population became agitated. The blows of the tocsin gathered the people of the entire volost, the military commissar sorted out rifles. The head of the committee was arrested and killed, after which a detachment was created. After the liquidation of the uprising, 11 peasants were arrested by a special department, including Rudnev Fedot, a member of the RCP of the Livny organization, declared the instigator, Podoprikhin Andrey Arsentievich, 70 years old, accused of preparing an uprising [13].

Dissatisfaction with the arbitrariness of the food detachments, natural and labor service led to unrest and uprisings in the Samara province in September 1919 [21: 167].

During the suppression of uprisings, a whole arsenal of means was put to practical use: shelling forests and swamps with guns and machine guns, confiscation of property of participants in protests, robberies of the population declared to be accomplices of bandits, taking hostages - parents, relatives. In the Novokhopersky district of the Voronezh province, the village of Tretyaki was burned by bombs from an airplane [14].

The fluctuations of the peasants in the conditions of the Civil War led to a change in the front lines. The armed detachments of the opposing sides (white, red, green), often passing through the same villages several times, brought the peasants to complete ruin. The uprisings of the peasants in the agrarian provinces of the Center contributed to the breakthrough of the White Guard cavalry of General Mamontov of the Southern Front and the raid on the rear of the Soviet troops in August September 1919. The peasant uprisings facilitated the advance of Denikin's army to Moscow.

It is characteristic that in the summer and autumn of 1919, with the approach of the front in the front line, the mood of the peasantry changed sharply in the direction of Soviet power and the condemnation of desertion: such measures

tamorphoses were noted in Tambov, Samara, Yekaterinburg, Tobolsk provinces [3: 185, 211, 213]. The danger for the peasantry of the restoration of the old government and the return of the landlords

outweighed the dissatisfaction with the policy of the Soviet government and led to the support of the peasantry of the Soviet government at a critical moment in the struggle against the Whites [15].

In the territories occupied by the Whites, the former landowners returned to their estates and put things in order, punishing the peasants for arbitrariness. The Whites gave the former landlords and land owners the opportunity to take away the land transferred to them from the peasants, to take away the peasants' bread. Such a policy caused rejection on the part of the peasantry in relation to the White Army. The following fact is noteworthy: after the liberation of the Ekaterinburg province from the power of Kolchak, the mobilization of peasants into the Red Army gave over 10 thousand volunteers. A similar situation has developed in the Tobolsk province [3: 32].

With the removal of the front of hostilities, the public mood among the peasantry again returned to its usual course: in October-November 1919, the attitude of the peasantry to power on the territory of the Soviet Republic was characterized as "unfriendly" (Tula, Yekaterinburg provinces), "negative" (Yaroslavl, Novgorod), "hostile" (Perm, Pskov, Vyatka, Tambov) "unfriendly", "murmur" of the population (Nizhny Novgorod) [3: 209, 211-212, 217-219, 222-223]. The unity of aspirations of the peasantry and the Bolsheviks coincided within the framework of the direct struggle against the White Army, but with the elimination of the White danger, objective contradictions arose again. The peasants and the Bolsheviks, in fact, were not allies - taking into account the target settings, it is more logical to characterize their relationship as the relationship of fellow travelers connected by tactical interests; in strategy, these interests diverged.

The defeat of Denikin and Kolchak did not alleviate the situation of the peasants - moreover, state oppression intensified. All this happened against the backdrop of the difficult economic situation of the village. Malnutrition has become commonplace. Acute shortages of basic necessities—salt, kerosene, soap, matches, and other commodities—have become chronic. There was a shortage of agricultural equipment (scythes, sickles, separators) and production tools (scythes

lok, winnowing machines, threshers).

Food allotment, forced mobilization into the Red Army, labor conscription gave rise to peasant uprisings, created fertile ground for the expansion of the insurrectionary movement on the territory of all regions of Soviet Russia. At the end of 1919, in the uprisings of many thousands, the main part of the rebels was the peasant poor [3: 412]. The most "unreliable" provinces again became the Volga and Ural regions.

Due to the need to harvest the crops and perform urgent agricultural work, desertion increased sharply. In the first half of October 1919, 47,745 deserters were detained on the territory of the Soviet Republic as a result of raids; in the second half of this month, according to incomplete data, 73,025 people (Kursk, Orel, Penza, Orenburg and Ural). In addition, as a result of the verifications carried out, at the beginning of November, 123,893 people who evaded mobilization were identified. As of November 1, there were 24,685 deserters in the Moscow province, of which 15,727 were detained, 8,558 voluntarily appeared [3: 211-212, 215-216, 220]. In the Tambov province, the number of deserters increased to 120,000 by the end of the year [2: 129].

According to the Central Commission for Combating Desertion, in the last two weeks of 1919, 75,352 deserters were detained. A fine of 22 thousand rubles was imposed on two villages in the Kashirsky district of the Tula province for harboring deserters. In the Tver province, ten families of deserters were fined 52,500 rubles. In the Moscow province, a fine of 190 thousand rubles was imposed on the Timonovskaya volost. In the Nizhny Novgorod province, 12 villages were fined. In the Saratov province, 60 families of deserters were fined 475,500 rubles. In the Petrograd province, 41 families were fined 458,146 rubles. In the Cherepovets province, 139 people were involved in public works for harboring deserters, in the Pskov province - 150 people. Five families in the Vladimir province were fined 29,000 rubles. [3: 230-231].

The Soviet authorities increased penalties not only against deserters, but also against the population: fines for harboring increased, the practice of imposing penalties on entire villages expanded, involving harborers in public works, depriving them of allotments, confiscation of horses, cows and horses for harboring other workers and livestock.

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The peasantry did not protest against the surplus appropriation as such. In regions where the harvest was better, it was easier for the peasantry to fulfill the state apportionment - accordingly, this affected the mood of the peasants. The opposite picture was observed in the provinces, where the harvest was poor. In such areas, food detachments ruthlessly swept everything to the grain. It often happened that the established apportionment turned out to be significantly higher than the indicators presented by local authorities [3: 225].

There were numerous and widespread unrest of the peasants, outraged by the food policy, armed clashes with Soviet troops, accompanied by casualties.

At the beginning of autumn, an uprising broke out in the Izvolskaya, Kamenskaya, Voronets volosts of the Oryol province with the number of participants in 15-20 thousand. deserters. They disarmed the food detachment and held re-elections of the executive committee. The uprising was liquidated by a detachment of the Cheka, 65 people were arrested. Peasant unrest engulfed the Ostrovskaya and Karpinogorskaya volosts of the Malovishersky district of the Novgorod province: these volosts refused to give cattle for the Red Army. Volosts were declared under martial law [3: 207, 216].

In 1920, the fire of the peasant war flared up with a bright flame. The following fact is noteworthy: at a time when there were no interventionists and white armies on the territory of Central Russia, the Volga region, the Urals, Siberia, martial law was maintained in 36 provinces - the struggle against the peasant movement was still going on.

The dissatisfaction of the peasantry with regard to the authorities intensified from the beginning of 1920 in connection with labor service. The peasants of the Litvinovsky volost, Venevsky district, Tula province, refused to carry out the burdensome horse-drawn duty for the removal of firewood, after which the entire volost was declared counterrevolutionary by the emergency fuel commission, until the execution of the order for the delivery of firewood. Arbitrariness on the part of the food detachments did not stop.

Complaints about the rude and illegal actions of the food workers came from everywhere. Dissatisfaction was also caused by the activities of many representatives of local authorities. Thus, in the village of Kopaevka, Pugachevsky district, Samara province, the chairman of the committee and the volost executive committee, Tarasov, ignored the laws, while he himself demanded

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he used to execute them accurately: he ground 28 poods of grain at a local mill without the permission of the village council; The deputy chairman of the cell and the chairman of the village executive committee, Trukhanov, arranged personal requisitions of sheepskins, glass, appropriated planks intended for the construction of a people's house. Commissar Gushchin confiscated four pairs of felt boots and 8 pounds of wool from the peasants. Kuranov, a member of the cell, provided favorable conditions for a group of wealthy citizens to make felt boots, for which he received a generous reward in the form of wool. In the Orenburg province, according to the survey, no more than 17% of the peasants expressed their approval of the Soviet food policy, while the rest turned out to be hostile [3: 226-229].

At the beginning of 1920, the main territory of Siberia was liberated by the Red Army from the power of the Whites as a result of the defeat of Kolchak's army.

In the information report of the Tomsk gubchek under the letter "A" on the situation in the province, it was noted: the peasants express dissatisfaction with: an exorbitant and heavy burden for performing natural duties - for transporting firewood, bread, for meeting the needs of military units, cleaning roads and railway stations. paths from snow; low fixed prices for bread; lack of basic necessities; uneven distribution of surplus appropriations and arbitrariness in the seizure of grain surpluses from the population; illegal actions of police representatives; red tape and bureaucracy in Soviet institutions, especially in the provincial food committee.

Peasants complained that they had to waste a lot of time getting all sorts of certificates and permits, running uselessly from one institution to another and often to no avail. Thus, peasants, members of a rural communal society, petitioned the regional food committee for the issuance of seeds for sowing fields, drawing attention to the proximity of spring thaw and the need to urgently obtain seeds. For a long time there was no answer - permission to export seeds from the nearest dumping point was received only when the road had already deteriorated and it was not possible to export the seeds. The Chekist report ended with obvious pessimism: "As before, the village is immersed in hopeless darkness, having settled into a new life and order, it again begins, almost without exception, distillation of moonshine and its extermination" [3: 256].

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The messages of the Cheka authorities still recorded the hostile attitude of the peasantry towards the food policy of the authorities (Vladimir province), "bad" (Tverskaya), "repressed" and "deadly hostile" (Ryazanskaya), "the most undesirable" (Voronezhskaya), "negative", "deaf hidden murmur" (Yaroslavl, Tambov provinces), "unreliable" (Vyatka) [3: 238, 16].

Reports of peasant resistance in the spring of 1920 came to Moscow from all sides—from Vyatka, Voronezh, Kursk, Oryol, Penza, Smolensk, Tula, and other provinces. Peasants of the Ufa, Vyatka, Perm, Yekaterinburg provinces were in the first place in terms of the activity of the struggle, where the bread was swept under the broom. The wave of desertion rose again, giving 1093 thousand people in January-June 1920, and the voluntary turnout of deserters decreased by half [2: 137, 138].

According to the Central Committee for Combating Desertion, in the first two weeks of 1920, 36,097 deserters were detained, 29,871 voluntarily appeared. deserters. At the beginning of summer, there were 8.5 thousand deserters in the Tver province, and 35 thousand in the Tambov province [3: 230-231, 233, 272].

The wave of uprisings grew. In February-March 1920, uprisings broke out in the Tula province (Krapivensky, Bogoroditsky, Chernsky districts), Voronezh (Ostrogzhsky, Alekseevsky, Bogucharsky, Pavlovsky, Kalachsky, Valuysky), Samara (Abdulino, Glukhovskaya, Pokrovskaya, Novotroitskoye, Turaevo, Baktashevo), Penza (Izhmorskoe, Ushinsky), Ufa provinces [3: 243-252].

It only took one spark to start a riot. In the village of Bolshiye Izhmory in the Penza province, the reason for the uprising was the mobilization of carts to transport firewood to the railroad. On February 22, 1920, in the villages of Izhmora and Ushinkovo, the peasants disarmed a detachment of 35 Red Army soldiers, seized machine guns, plundered the filling stations, and killed the regional food commissar and one of the representatives of the local authorities. The brigade commander of the 11th brigade was sent to liquidate the uprising with a detachment of 400 bayonets, 26 sabers, and three machine guns. An additional detachment of 142 bayonets was sent from Troitsk. Any occasion could be the last straw of peasant patience. So, in one case, the pro-Darmeians took away bread and dumped it in a pile on the snow in front of their eyes.

peasants, which caused strong indignation and served as a signal for action [3: 244, 235].

In many regions there were performances by women, especially the wives of the Red Army. In the village of Ostrogovka, Marksstadt Uyezd, German Volga Region, on March 25, the wives of the Red Army men gathered for a gathering demanded the release of textiles from the shop of the Ostrog cooperative and chose a delegation for a trip to the district food commissar. At this time, a detachment of Red Army soldiers arrived in the village to catch deserters. An angry mob of women surrounded the detachment. The commander of the detachment and two Red Army soldiers were killed and lowered into the hole, the rest of the Red Army fled. In the villages of Rosenthal and Hofenthal of the same Marksstadt district, on May 23, a women's riot took place with the demand that bread and seeds be left in the village at the norm for one year due to drought and a poor harvest forecast. The villages were declared under martial law. Gunfire was opened in the village of Gofenthal, resulting in female casualties. The assumption that the reprisals against women cannot be as merciless as the actions of men were suppressed, in the conditions of civil confrontation turns out to be erroneous.

In another part of the country, the Altai province, an uprising of partisans took place, which spread to the borders of the Shcheglovsky and Kuznetsk districts of the Tomsk province. The partisan movement was held under the slogan "Down with priests, communists, Soviets, long live the Bolsheviks!" [3: 270-271].

While the most conscious and ideological part of the rural communists went to the front, died in battles with the whites, in the far rear, especially in the countryside, many local Soviet and party workers, who did not stand out for their level of education and ability to manage, formed in the peasant negative moral image of the representative of the new government: they drank and led a wild life, extorted money and food from the peasants, took bribes.

In July-August 1920, on the basis of dissatisfaction with the surplus appropriation, an uprising of peasants and Cossacks of the Bukhtarma region of the Semipalatinsk province took place under the slogan: "Down with the communists! Long live Soviet power! Long live free trade!" The uprising was brutally suppressed by Soviet detachments [17: 404-456].

The difficult food situation was aggravated by natural disasters - the hot dry summer of 1920 led to fires,

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covering most of Russia in July-August. As a result of the natural disaster, the country suffered huge losses: entire villages and vast areas of forest were destroyed by fire. Tver, Moscow, Novgorod, Kaluga, Yaroslavl, Vologda, and Nizhny Novgorod provinces were especially affected. In a number of places, the official authorities tried to attribute the damage to the intrigues of the kulaks, deliberate arson, but such an accusation sounded frivolous: it was the peasants, not relying on the help of the authorities, who selflessly, sometimes risking their lives, defended their native lands and their own property from whims nature.

By the autumn of 1920, against the background of growing social and political tension in the country, the negative mood of the peasants in relation to the authorities increased even more: "hostile" (Omsk, Voronezh, Vyatka, Chelyabinsk, Tomsk, Tobolsk, Irkutsk provinces), "unsatisfactory" (Astrakhan, Orenburg), "unfriendly" (Kazan, Samara), "indefinite" (Ufa province).

The dissatisfaction of the peasants was explained by low (fixed) prices, the absence of commodity exchange, an acute shortage of essentials (salt, matches, kerosene, textiles), and "pumping out of bread" [3: 295-296, 348, 354, 355].

According to the assessment of the situation by the local bodies of the Cheka, the peasants did not want the restoration of power like Kolchak, against which they themselves fought, but they wanted the representatives of the Soviet government to be true representatives of the people.

Appealing to the authorities, the peasants declared: "We see you when you need bread and soldiers. and if not, then send a punitive expedition" [3: 334].

In the countryside, the dissatisfaction of the peasants with the ongoing Civil War and the policy of the Soviet government grew. To a certain extent, the tension was restrained by the expectation of victory over Wrangel, the end of the war and the onset of peaceful life: the peasants grumbled, but patiently endured the allocation and duties, hoping for a fair life in peaceful conditions.

In addition to bread allocations, allocations were made for meat, butter, eggs, milk, potatoes and other products. All types of production in agriculture are interconnected: it is impossible to produce meat, milk, eggs, butter, if there is no fodder and nothing to feed domestic animals. The authorities did not care about this objective factor. Norms

obviously insufficient, half-starved were established to feed the peasants, as well as domestic animals, but the peasants had to do heavy physical labor, exploit draft animals. The authorities could not ensure the safety of food at bulk points, there was no necessary transport for export. Process workers in procurement offices and sacking points practiced body kit, setting, for example, a high percentage of weediness in the delivered product.

The apportionment, in turn, is associated with labor service: to fulfill the latter, not only draft animals are needed, but also carts, fodder, and inventory. The costs of the food policy of the Soviet state had a negative impact on the peasantry. The setting of the People's Commissariat of Food was the following: the allocation plan must be carried out at any cost. If a peasant does not have bread or other products, get it in any way.

1920 turned out to be a lean year. In order to carry out the surplus appraisal, the latter was selected, regardless of the crop failure. Arbitrariness on the part of the food detachments in relation to the peasantry, which entered into practice, had its own explanation: the center demanded that "inhuman measures" be taken to seize grain surpluses - in order to fulfill the task, the food detachments used a whip. There were numerous cases of crimes committed by food detachments for mercenary purposes [3: 283, 320].

The Penza Chekists reported: "Peasants are often driven out to carry bread, and as a result they have to put other products, like straw, for which the peasants were not prepared at that moment, they come to complete the order, and they are told to wait for several hours and freeze in the cold, when receiving products from them, the receivers measure them and weigh them, treat them roughly, find fault, find a lot of weediness or poor quality, the district food committees promise to give out salt or other products after the apportionment is completed, and as a result they usually deceive or give them out with great delay; when a forest is divided, for some reason villages are allotted plots just in distant places, although there is a forest near the village and is also cut down. Now the peasants need horseshoes and nails, but they are not given this, and carts are driven every day, some specialists still laugh in the face and advise making horseshoes and nails themselves from wood, with large outfits, the Red Army soldiers drive out even pregnant women to work, and in addition they still beat for refusal, the apportionment is distributed according to

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evenly, both on the rich and the poor, but the rich will always be able to pay off, so that his share will again fall on the neck of the poor and middle peasants" [3: 362].

In the autumn of 1920, by decision of local Soviet authorities, the so-called grinding system was introduced, which provided for the receipt by peasants of special grinding tickets for the right to grind grain in mills. In a similar way, the local authorities hoped to take control of the grain collected by the peasants in order to requisition it at the expense of food distribution.

In addition to crop failure, an objective factor in the non-fulfillment of the surplus appropriation was the massive shortage of agricultural machinery for most peasants - threshers, winnowing machines, mowers, separators. So, due to the lack of separators, the peasants could not carry out the oil appraisal.

In the Omsk province, the apportionment for volosts in the autumn of 1920 was set arbitrarily. For the Borisov volost of the Omsk district, grain was distributed in the amount of 314 thousand poods. Gubprodkom was sent information in a timely manner about the area under crops. But it turned out that 35 poods had to be collected from each tithe in order to carry out the apportionment—the volost was not in a position to do this: in other volosts, 18 poods of apportionment accounted for the tithe. What was the gubernatorial food committee guided by when determining the twice overestimated plan for the Borisov volost? It turned out that, despite the data of the volost leadership, the provincial district set up a distribution on the basis of information from 1917, but over the past three years, Bogolyubovskaya and Maksimovskaya volosts separated from the Borisovskaya volost. The leaders of the Borisov volost appealed to the regional food committee about a misunderstanding with the calculation of the apportionment, but they did not pay any attention to this petition. Having established an unrealistic plan in advance, the volost was deliberately deprived of the possibility of obtaining the so-called commodity ration - industrial goods for the population. The provincial authorities limited themselves to a brief explanation: the apportionment is carried out on the orders of Comrade Lenin, and since Comrade Lenin ordered, it means that it must be carried out.

The share of the Omsk district was assigned to the following meat procurement: cattle in the amount of 6031 heads, sheep - 257 595 heads, pigs - 4667 heads. Delivered to the procurement centers of cattle in percentage terms: cattle in the amount - 30%, sheep - 11, pigs - 5%.

The Petropavlovsk Uyezd was set up to harvest 1,857 cattle, 762 young animals, 7,223 sheep, and 1,075 pigs. It turned out to be fulfilled in percentage terms: cattle - 50%, young animals - 25%, sheep - 8.7%, pigs - 0.5%. The grain allocation for the Petropavlovsk district was established in such a way that only 5-7% of the grain was delivered to the bulk points.

There were cases when food workers refused to accept brought grain at exile points. As a result, most of the peasants standing in line were forced to dump grain and go home for field work that had begun. Unaccepted and abandoned grain was stolen. The result of a short-sighted food policy was that in September 1920, in the Petropavlovsk district of the Omsk province, peasants protested against the food detachments [3: 328, 288-294]. The unrest seized the poorest peasantry, which was more affected by the crop failure.

In the fall of 1920, the Penza Provincial Cheka reported to the center: "The apportionment is carried out quickly and drastic measures are applied, but in connection with this speed and swiftness, complaints are heard from all over about massive irregularities, causing strong feelings of indignation among the offended, especially among families Red Army soldiers. The apportionment that was imposed on certain products, like cabbage, in certain areas, even according to the regional food committees themselves, was so arbitrary and exaggerated that it was without a doubt unfeasible, and the fact that accounting secondary products was carried out extremely incorrectly and negligently.

From the views and conversations with the peasants, it is clear that they are not so much dissatisfied with the apportionment itself, as with the fact that the apportionment is divided and laid out incorrectly, no open complaints are heard from the peasants, since the peasants know the result in practice and have given up on everything.

Many volosts carried out the apportionment on their own without detachments, which they are very afraid of last year's experience. The tricks of the food detachments and local authorities on food grounds are still going on" [3: 348].

It is noteworthy that in the report of the secret department of the Cheka on the insurrectionary movement at the end of 1920, it was emphasized that it is difficult to distinguish where banditry ends and where the insurrectionary movement begins.

[3: 369].

Let's take an illustrative example. The report of the Penza Gubchek noted that in 1918-1920. The Cheka arrested 5,520 people, including 1,939 peasants (that is, 35%), 227 kulaks (4%, or 10.5% of the total number of arrested peasants). Most of the arrests took place in 1918 (for example, this year 147 kulaks were arrested, that is, 65% of all kulaks arrested in three years). 244 peasants were arrested on charges of participating in uprisings: in 1918 - 41, in 1919 - 101, in 1920 - 102. - 14. In 1920, 516 peasants were arrested, 6 kulaks (1% of the entire arrested peasantry). Even Cheka employees were arrested more - 9, communists - 27 [3: 313, 316].

In one of the KGB reports, a curious fact was recorded: in the subbotnik for loading grain into wagons, arranged by a group of communists at the Marianovka station in the Omsk province on August 8, 1920, kulaks, who came to help the communists and worked together with them, took part voluntarily [3: 313-316, 290].

The lack of understanding by the peasants of the goals and tasks of the Communist Party was due to their political illiteracy. The attitude of the peasants towards the Communist Party was determined at the ordinary level by a negative assessment of the role of the Communists in the implementation of the food policy of the Soviet government. The policy of the communists ruined peasant farms and doomed peasant families to a half-starved existence - accordingly, the attitude towards the communist party among the peasants became negative [3: 33]. Especially if the situation was aggravated by party members vested with official powers in the power structure, often discrediting it with their actions and moral character. Disappointment in the Communist Party and its policies gave rise to a withdrawal from its ranks. Often, upon arrival home, the Red Army hid their party membership.

In the KGB reports on desertion, it was noted that among the deserters there is no political attitude not to serve the Soviet government, but the prevailing opinion is not to serve anyone. During the first half of October 1920, 47,745 deserters were detained [3: 334, 351].

Most of the rebellious peasants put forward the slogan "For Soviets without Communists." Often the rebels declared their own position as "Down with the communists, long live the Bolsheviks!" —

this phenomenon reflected the conflicts of peasant psychology. It was believed that the Communists and the Bolsheviks were not the same thing: the Bolsheviks gave the peasants the right to land, and the Communists take away this right and engage in violence, establishing predatory food requisitions, duties, and mobilizations. In the everyday life of the insurgent resistance, even a peculiar, but characteristic of peasant psychology, appeal appeared: "Kill the communists, down with Trotsky! Long live Lenin and the Constituent Assembly!" [3: 347].

Peasant unrest spread to the Urals and Siberian territories. In the Tomsk province, riots and uprisings engulfed the entire province. The rebels captured the city of Kolyvan. Tomsk Chekists reported: the word "communist" became hated by the peasants: during the speeches, all the communists and their families with small children were cut out, the beatings of the communists swept through the villages. Active dissatisfaction was expressed by dozens of Siberian Cossack villages. In the Orenburg province, the rebels occupied the area west of Verkhne-Uralsk. The fighting forces of the rebels, led by the headquarters, united five regiments, including the Cossack. The rebel units numbered up to 5 thousand Bashkirs. In the Bashkir province, the number of rebels reached 1,500 people. The slogans of the rebels were: "Beat the communists! Long live Soviet power, free trade and small property!" [3: 296, 337].

In the autumn of 1920, a number of small and scattered peasant uprisings broke out in the Yenisei province due to dissatisfaction with the surplus appraisal, labor duties, and the mobilization of new recruits and, at the same time, non-commissioned officers of the old army into the army. The Golopupov uprising (from the beginning of October to November 19-20, 1920) covered six volosts of the Kansk district and, according to incomplete data, had more than 500 participants. Approximately the same number of peasants from six volosts of the Krasnoyarsk district took part in the Zeledeevsky uprising (October 12–13–November 1920). The Serezha rebellion, which was notable for the particularly violent actions of both sides from November 1 to November 5, 1920, spread to the territory of five volosts of the Achinsk district and consisted of over 600 participants. At the same time, the rebels, whose number was not constant, putting forward various slogans, mainly advocated for the Soviets, but without the communists.

During the suppression of the Golopupov and Seryozhsky rebellions alone, 230 peasants were killed, 293 people were taken prisoner. The Soviet troops lost 34 killed and 59 wounded Red Army soldiers.

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85 rebels were sentenced to death in these cases. In February-March 1921, the remnants of the Serezhsky and Zeledeevsky rebels who tried to break into Uryankhai were liquidated on the territory of the Minusinsk district. The participants in these uprisings, having created small detachments of Vinogradov - Salomatov, Dregol (Drugol) - Samkov, Mosin - Yurkov - Karelin and Maryasov, continued to act, sometimes brutally cracking down on the communists, in the Achinsk and Krasnoyarsk districts until the autumn of 1922 [18 : 108-109].

Armed protest against the authorities was demonstrated by the members of the Siberian and Ural partisan detachments who fought in 1918-1919. against the White Guard troops and the Czechoslovak corps [19]. Attempts to influence the peasants through partisan leaders came to nothing. Thus, the popular former commander of the partisan detachment of anti-Kolchak resistance, Pyotr Kuzmich Lubkov, remained silent, and then unexpectedly raised the former partisans to an uprising in the Mariinsky district of the Tomsk province. The impetus for Lubkov's speech was a large rally at the Taiga station, where the performance of the former partisans met with warm sympathy from the peasantry, who were dissatisfied with the food distribution. Lubkov's appeal to the population of the Mariinsky district of September 21, 1920, outlined the reasons and purpose of the uprising as follows: “The Communist Party alone seized power and, by its inept rule, forced us to starve and walk around naked. It is impossible to live like this any longer, so the entire peasantry has risen up and is joining the People's Army under the command of Comrade. Lubkov and asks everyone to join her. Everyone will be given life and freedom, and together we (can) overthrow the communists from power” [17: 465; 3: 761].

Lubkov mobilized the male population into the People's Army from 17 to 60 years old. On September 21, Lubkov's detachment suddenly swooped down on the village of Pochitanka, where all the members of the Komichek were arrested and the secretary of the executive committee and a policeman were shot. Lubkov, speaking at village meetings against the communists, called himself the commander of the workers' and peasants' army. The main center of agitation of the insurgents was directed against the communists as the perpetrators of the ongoing war. The detachment quickly grew to 1.5 thousand people, organized into two battalions in the amount of 17 companies, with command staff, headquarters. A significant part of it was made up of representatives of the Tatar population who voluntarily joined the detachment. The forces of the rebels at the height of the uprising reached 10-20 thousand people.

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Lubkov and his rebels repeatedly carried out raids on the railway line. On September 22, there was an attack on the Izhmorka station, where the train was detained, but after a shootout with the train guards, the rebels retreated. On the same day, a detachment of up to a thousand people fired at the station, but after the approach of an armored train, the rebels left and settled down near the village of Pochitanka.

Near the village of Tavlinskaya, one of Lubkov's battalions was defeated by punitive Soviet units. At the end of September, a decisive battle took place near the village of Mikhailovka, as a result of which up to 500 killed Lubkovites remained on the battlefield, not counting the wounded. Lubkov was left with a small detachment of his former partisans [3: 336-337].

In the summer and autumn of 1920, the Don and Kuban Cossacks were worried. On the Don, there were open actions of the Cossacks of the Upper Don, Don, Khoper districts. Unrest swept several thousand Cossacks in the villages of Elizavetinskaya, Grigoripolisskaya, Bogaevskaya, Manychskaya, Olginskaya, Khomutovskaya, Kagalnitskaya, Mechetlinskaya, Gorlinskaya and many other villages. To eliminate the unrest, regular Red Army units, machine guns and artillery were used.

Rebellions broke out in many Cossack villages of the Kuban region: Novo-Troitskaya, Novo Aleksandrovskaya, Karmalinovskaya, Nevinnomysskaya, Yegorlyk, Temikhebetskaya, Field Marshalskaya, Temnolasskaya, Voznesenskaya, Vladimirskaia, Lariyskaya, Kubanskaya, Absheronskaya, Chelykskaya, Labinskaya. The number of rebels, according to incomplete information, reached a total of up to 8 thousand people, most of whom were cavalry. Red Army punitive detachments were sent to the insurgent villages, which carried out unauthorized searches and confiscations of the property of the insurgents; during the searches, everything that came to hand was taken away: Circassians, beshmets, hats, hoods, peaked caps [3: 300, 302, 321-322].

On September 1, 1920, the troops of the Internal Guard of the Republic (VOHR) became part of the newly formed troops of the Internal Service (VNUS), along with guard units, defense troops of the railway front line, and transport police. The VNUS troops were subordinate to the NKVD and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The supreme body of their control is the headquarters of the VNUS troops.

The peasantry and the Cossacks became rebels not only in their native villages and villages. The rebellion of F. Mironov and Sapozhkovism became precedents for major rebellions in the Red Army, which marked the beginning of a series of such uprisings. The mood of the villagers who were in the Red Army was reflected in the state of military units: the social composition of the Red Army was 75% represented by peasants [20: 498]. Peasants and Cossacks dressed in Red Army uniforms, made up the bulk of the insurgents in the Red Army formations.

The commanders of the Red Army became the head of the rebels. The insurrectionary movement became especially active as a result of the beginning of demobilization (by the end of 1920, the Red Army numbered about 6 million people) [21: 136]. After the victory of the Red Army over General Wrangel in the Crimea, the military confrontation with the White movement ended.

In 1921, drought hit the Volga region, the Ural River basin, the middle course of the Don, part of Kazakhstan and Western Siberia, the southern regions of Ukraine and the Black Earth Center, resulting in a terrible famine. In March 1921, information appeared about the facts of starvation of peasants in the Volga region.

At the same time, unrest began associated with the growing famine in a significant part of Russia, especially in the Volga region. Drought, undersowing, fires of the previous year led to the fact that the peasants slaughtered working and domestic livestock, dogs and cats were used for food. They ate bread with moss, acorns, cake, chaff and other surrogates, as well as grass, quinoa, and roots. Bark and sawdust were also eaten.

From everywhere came information about the facts of starvation, suicides on the basis of hunger. Numerous cases of cannibalism were recorded, the corpses of the dead were pulled out of the graves [3: 455, 457, 463, 560-562, 567, 568, 573, 575, 592, 595, 597, 598, 612, 614, 616, 626, 627]. Famine began to flee to more prosperous areas - to Turkestan, to Ukraine. In total, in the hungry years of 1921-1922. officially there were 1.5 million refugees. In 1921-1922. more than 30 million people starved, from 1.5 to 2 million people died of starvation. By the summer of 1922, 3.5 million people were starving in the Samara province, 2 million in the Saratov province, and 2 million in the Yekaterinburg and Chelyabinsk provinces.

- about 1.6 million people, in Ukraine - more than 2 million, in Ufa - 1.5 million, in Simbirsk - 1.2 million, in Kazakhstan and

Stavropol province. - 1 million people. Millions of people were starving in the Penza, Omsk, Voronezh provinces, in the Crimea and the North Caucasus [3: 42, 49].

Simultaneously with the famine, epidemics among the population spread across Russia: typhus, cholera, plague, scurvy, scarlet fever, anthrax epidemics in livestock. The famine became the cause of mass destruction by the peasantry of dumping points, mills, and public selling-bars. The participants in such actions were mainly poor peasants [3: 421, 425, 436, 438, 445, 449, 451-460, 468, 491]. The plundered seed grain was immediately sown so that they would not have time to withdraw it. It was the poorest rural population who did not allow grain to be exported outside

their villages.

In March 1921, most of the Samara province was engulfed in peasant uprisings. In April, a Cossack uprising broke out in the Labinsk district of the Kuban region under the slogan "Down with the communists, long live the real Soviet power!" — over a thousand participants. At the same time, in another part of the country - in the Irkutsk province - an uprising broke out under the slogan "Soviet power without communists!" [3: 387, 417-418, 419].

The peasants put up serious resistance to the measures taken by the Soviet authorities—the collection of taxes in kind, the fulfillment of labor conscription. It is no coincidence that in 1922 the rebel movement not only did not stop, but in a number of areas it intensified even more (Altai province, Siberia, Ukraine). The key figure in the rebel movement in Altai is A.P. Kaigorodov. In 1921, having received information about the growing dissatisfaction of the peasants on the basis of the apportionment, he mobilized the Russian population in Mongolia, gathered detachments up to | thousand people and moved to the Altai with the aim of overthrowing the Soviet regime. Kaigorodov declared himself the head of the liberation movement in the mountains. By 1922, Kaigorodov's associations, called the "Free Russian-Alien Partisan Detachment", reached the number of 4 thousand people. A political program was developed (without communists, for free labor

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At meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) daily on January 27-31 and February 2, 1922, specially issues related to the phenomenon of cannibalism in the starving regions were considered, including the limitation of materials in the press (the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) - VKP (b). Agenda days for

sedans. T. 1. S. 150).

and entrepreneurship, for the Constituent Assembly), created its own court-martial and counterintelligence.

From January 1922, Gorny Altai was declared in a state of emergency, and punitive measures were taken against sympathetic rebels. As a result, the influx of people and aid stopped. In January 1922, from the remnants of several detachments, Kaigorodov created the 2nd people's division - the Chui regiment of 130 people and the 1st regiment of 80 people. On April 10, 1922, the detachment of Kaigorodov was overtaken by a fighter detachment near the village of Katanda, up to 500 rebels were hacked to death and taken prisoner, Kaigorodov himself and his headquarters were destroyed [3: 796].

According to the data of the GPU authorities, in 1922 over 300 so-called bandit formations were registered, which consisted in the overwhelming majority of peasants [3: 50]. Separate detachments numbered several hundred, and even thousands of people. Sometimes detachments of the Red Army went over to the side of the rebels. Of course, there were also criminal gangs engaged in robbery and robbery, but the bulk of the rebels were peasants who were dissatisfied with the actions of the authorities. Often the peasants helped the rebels with food and fodder.

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) in 1922 repeatedly considered issues of combating banditry. In the territories covered by the insurrectionary movement, the gubchek was allowed to impose capital punishment without the approval of the Cheka [22: 150, 164].

We note an important circumstance: the leadership of the insurrectionary peasant resistance by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and other non-Bolshevik parties in the conditions of that time is an ideological myth. In 1919-1921. Members of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party took part in the peasant movement as ordinary participants, and sometimes as organizers of peasant uprisings and insurgent detachments. However, the real influence of the Social Revolutionaries on the peasant movement during the years of the Civil War, for objective reasons, could not have been significant. The peasant movement was a spontaneous, independent movement, developing independently of the non-Bolshevik parties. The control of the authorities over the surviving fragments of various parties has increased. In each province, representatives of non-communist parties were registered with the Cheka. So, in September 1920, in the Tyumen Gubchek, 128 Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were registered [3: 318]. In addition, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party was categorically against the creation and activities of peasant

unions. The position of the party was based on the premise that the organization of the peasantry should be based on a political program, and not on the basis of professional peasant interests. Peasant unions were created without the participation of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party [23].

The directive of the Central Committee of the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries to the local party organizations of the Socialist-Revolutionaries on February 25, 1921, gave the following instructions: to warn the peasantry against scattered spontaneous actions, explaining their practical inexpediency; prevent the possibility of outbreaks on the basis of individual armed clashes between the peasantry and food detachments, punitive detachments and representatives of the communist government, since such local outbreaks damage the general movement. The leadership of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party considered as an objective necessity the existence of a long period of formation of the class self-consciousness of the peasantry. Adopted on March 11, 1921, the Instruction of the Central Committee of the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries to the local party organizations of the Social Revolutionaries determined the slogan of the current work: the election of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly to establish the basic laws of the Republic and consolidate the social gains of the revolution [24].

Another myth is the characterization of the insurrectionary peasant movement as a result of conspiracies and the leadership of the White Guard officers.

We list some of the leaders of the rebels. Averin I.S. - a native of the village of Bolshaya Izhmora, Penza province. During World War I, he rose to the rank of second lieutenant. After the war, he worked as a farmer. During the uprising on February 23, 1920 in his native village he was appointed head of the village defense.

Efremov I.S. - a native of the village of Bolshaya Izhmora, Penza province. During the First World War - non-commissioned officer. After the war, he was a Red Army soldier, engaged in peasant farming, and was chairman of the village council. During the uprising on February 23, 1920, in his native village, he was elected chairman of the "new government", one of the leaders of the village's defense.

Gorin E.I. — a peasant of the Pugachevsky district of the Samara province. Non-commissioned officer in the tsarist army. In 1921, he led an insurrectionary detachment of peasants from his county.

Dalmatov F.I. - a native of the village of Orlov-Gai, Novouzensky district, Saratov province. Served in the Life Guards Grenadier

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shelf. Member of the RCP(b). Commissar of the 7th Cavalry Regiment of the 2nd Turkestan Division Sapozhkov. Serov's detachment included the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council and the head of the political department.

Eliseev I.V. - a native of the village of Petropavlovka, Novouzensky district, Saratov province. In the tsarist army - the commander of a machine-gun team, an officer. In 1922, he was an assistant to the commander of Ivanov's rebel detachment, which operated in the Saratov and Ural provinces.

Kolesnikov L. - from the peasants of the village of Telezhikha, Biysk district, Altai province. In the tsarist army - non-commissioned officer. Squadron commander in the partisan division of anti-Kolchak resistance. In 1921, the commander of the 4th Insurgent Liberation Regiment, Kaygorodov's deputy for mobilization, after the death of the latter, declared himself his successor.

Orlov (Turkin) P.S. - from the peasants of the village of Kukuya, Oirod region, Altai province. Former non-commissioned officer. He headed the "Bart detachment", assistant commander of the 1st Siberian rebel cavalry regiment.

Pyankov A.M. - a native of the village of Tourak, Biysk district, Altai province. In the tsarist army - non-commissioned officer. In 1919 he served in Kolchak's army, in 1920 - in the Red Army. In 1921-1922. commander of the "Bart Detachment" of the rebels as part of Kaigorodov's detachments in the Altai province.

Yakovlev-Sarafankin S.N. - a peasant from the Balashevsky volost of the Dergachevsky district of the Saratov province. Non-commissioned officer of the tsarist army. He served in the 25th division of the Red Army. The commander of the rebel cavalry squadron in the Serov detachment, then the commander of an independent detachment, acted in the Novouzensky and Dergachevsk districts of the Saratov province [3: 781, 787-789, 792, 799, 801, 810].

The above list shows that the old army prepared talented organizers and leaders of the peasant war in the countryside. In addition, disappointment in the policy of the Soviet government led to the fact that often the recent commanders of the Red Army became the head of the rebels. The broad masses of the peasantry were ready to sacrifice their lives in the struggle for their rights, won during the years of the revolution and protected in the Civil War with the landowners, the embodiment of which for the peasants was the White Guard, the backbone of which was officers.

Sources and notes:

1. RGVA.F. 1. Op. 1. D. 138. L. 20.

2. Osipova T.V. Peasant Front in the Civil War // The fate of the Russian peasantry. M., 1996.

3. Soviet village through the eyes of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD. Documents and materials. T. 1. 1918-1922.

4. August 9, 1918 Secretary of the Penza Provincial Executive Committee E.B. Bosch, in her telegram to Lenin, reported on the events in the village of Kuchki. On the same day, Lenin sent a telegram in response, in which he demanded that "merciless mass terror be carried out against the kulaks, priests and White Guards, who are dubious to be locked up in a concentration camp outside the city" (see: Lenin V.I. Poln. sobr. soch. Vol. 50 pp. 143-144). On the night of August 10-11, 1918, Lenin approved the written by the People's Commissar of Food A.D. Tsuriupa telegram to Penza instructing the local authorities to make every effort to suppress the peasant uprising in the five volosts of the province, to take all measures to seize the surplus grain from the peasants, appoint from them for each volost for hostages, who will be charged with the duty to collect all the surplus grain and take it out to the filling points, to issue a special appeal to the population explaining the essence and objectives of this measure as necessary to suppress the kulak counter-revolution (Soviet village through the eyes of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD. Vol. 1, pp. 759-760).

Within one day, on August 12, 1918, Lenin sent three telegrams to the Penza Provincial Executive Committee at once, in which he again demanded the use of decisive measures against the peasants. "I received your telegram," he replied to E. Bosch. "I am extremely surprised by the lack of reports on the course and outcome of the suppression of the kulak uprising ... I don't want to think that you showed delay or weakness in suppressing and exemplary confiscation of all property and especially bread from the insurgent kulaks" (see: Lenin V.I. Complete collection of works, vol. 50, p. 148).

In a telegram to Minkin, Chairman of the Penza Gubernia Council of Deputies, Lenin stated: "I have received your telegram about the suppression of the revolt of the kulaks. It is necessary to strike while the iron is hot, and for this use the suppression of the kulaks for the ruthless suppression of speculators everywhere.

bread, for the confiscation of bread from the big rich and for the mass mobilization of the poor, endowed with bread. Wire the execution. It is necessary to consolidate the power of the poor in the front line once and for all" (V. I. Lenin, Poln. sobr. soch. Vol. 50, p. 148). In the third telegram to the Chairman of the Penza Gubernia Council of People's Commissars Kuraev

he demanded to collect information about the participation of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in peasant uprisings and to take appropriate measures against them in this regard (see: V. I. Lenin, Poln. sobr. soch. Vol. 50, p. 148).

On August 19, 1918, Lenin sent two telegrams to Penza in connection with the uprising in the Chembarsky district. In the first of them, transmitted by direct wire, he called on the members of the executive committee and all communists to "ruthlessly suppress the kulaks and confiscate all the bread of the insurgents." Lenin pointed out: "I am indignant at your inactivity and weakness. I demand detailed reports on the execution of all my orders, and especially on measures of suppression and confiscation "(see: V. I. Lenin, Complete collection of works, vol. 50, p. 156). Lenin's indignation was also heard in the second telegram: "I am extremely indignant that there is absolutely nothing definite from you about what, finally, serious measures of merciless suppression and confiscation of bread from the kulaks of five volosts have been carried out by you. Your inaction is criminal. It is necessary to direct all the forces to one volost and clean up all the surplus grain in it. Telegraph performance "(Lenin V.I. Complete collection of works. T. 50. P. 156).

Another telegram was sent by Lenin to the Penza Provincial Executive Committee on August 20, 1918. In it, he again repeated his earlier position: "I have now read your memorandum. I repeat the order to the Latvians who arrived with the expedition to remain for the time being, until a new order, in Penza. Select the most reliable of your eight hundred soldiers and act mercilessly - first against one volost, bringing the matter to the end. Send an accurate report about Chembarsky. Until now, you have obviously had not only a lack of strength, but also a lack of energy, because you could still suppress the uprising of five volosts, which means you could have brought it to the end in at least one volost. If necessary, we will send more forces, telegraph in more detail and more precisely where you are busy, where, where, what help is needed "(Lenin V.I. Poln. sobr. soch. Vol. 5. P. 161. C 759-760).

5. RGVA.F. 16011. Op. 1. D. 2. L. 17.

6. RGVA.F. 16011. Op. 1. D. 2. L. 14.

7. Kakurin N.E. How did the revolution fight? T. 2. M., 1990.

8. RGVA.F. 33987. Op. 3. D. 32. L. 13, 26-27, 32.

9. RGVA.F. 33987. Op. 3. D. 32. L. 79, 104-105.

10. RGVA.F. 6. Op. 12. D. 13. L. 214-216.

11. RGVA.F. 6. Op. 12. D. 13. L. 214-216.

12. RGVA F. 198. Op. 5. D. 14. L. 79.

13. RGVA.F. 198. Op. 5. D. 14. L. 79.

14. RGVA.F. 33987. Op. 3. D. 32. L. 74-75.

15. Western researcher O. Figes argues that the peasants, having destroyed in 1917-1918. institutions of the former regime in the countryside, above all wanted to be left in peace. They were more afraid of the restoration of the old order than the Bolsheviks, therefore, as long as the White movement and the danger of restoration existed, their opposition to the new government remained hidden. Only after the defeat of the Whites did the peasants embark on a series of bloody, desperate, but ultimately doomed anti-Bolshevik uprisings (E12e5 O. Peasapia Kissia, SUP \ Mag. OxYuga, 1989).

16. RGVA.F. 33987. Op. 2. D. 74. L. 7-8.

17. Shishkin V.I. Siberian Vendée: armed resistance to the communist regime in 1920. Novosibirsk, 1997. |

18. Questions of history. 2006. No. 2.

19. The partisan movement in Siberia was born at the end of the summer - in the autumn of 1918 after the capture of Siberia by the White Guard and White Czech troops. From the summer of 1919 it took on a mass character. The bulk of the partisans were Siberian peasants, dissatisfied with robberies, requisitions and forced mobilization into the Kolchak army. According to incomplete data, there were 140-150 thousand fighters in the partisan detachments of Siberia. They provided significant assistance to the Red Army in the liberation of Siberia from the White Guards and foreign invaders. The partisans destroyed the enemy's communications, disorganized his rear, and chained significant forces of the Kolchak army to themselves. After the defeat of the Kolchak troops, part of the former partisans, taking advantage of anarchy, took up robbery and self-sufficiency. They were extremely dissatisfied with the food policy of the Soviet government [3: 757-758].

20. The officer corps in the political history of Russia: Documents and materials 1920-1925. T. 3. Kaluga, 2003.

21. Kakurin N.E. How did the revolution fight? T. 1. M., 1990.

22. Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) - VKP (b). Meeting agendas. 1919-1952: Catalog / T. 1. 1919-1929. M. 2000.

23. In the spring of 1920, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party decided to create peasant unions and unexpectedly found them existing in the localities. But, remaining on the platform developed back in 1917, the party began to create other, parallel ones. When in the spring

In 1921, information appeared in the press about the leadership of the Tambov uprising of the peasant union, the official organ of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party in exile - the newspaper "Will of Russia" - published a special explanation that in the Tambov province there are two different peasant unions: the Socialist-Revolutionary and the independent ; the Social Revolutionary has nothing to do with the uprising, but the uprising is led by an independent union and its leader A.S. Antonov, who in the summer of 1919 was disavowed by the Socialist-Revolutionaries for killing communists (after the establishment of Kolchak's dictatorship in Siberia, the start of the offensive of Denikin's army from the Kuban and the Don, by decision of the IX Congress of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, held in Moscow on 18- On June 20, 1919, the armed struggle against the Bolshevik government ceased: it was required to wage a political struggle with the communists, and an armed struggle with the White Guards) (Anthology on the history of Russia. M., 2004. P. 444-445).

24. Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI). F. 17. Op. 84. D. 273. L. 4, 25.

ANTI-RELIGIOUS POLICY OF THE SOVIET STATE: CAUSES AND FORMS OF RESISTANCE

Dissatisfaction with the policy of war communism among the peasantry was intensified by the anti-religious policy of the Soviet state. The Church, as the most massive organization in a vast peasant country, was perceived as a serious threat to the new system, so the Soviet government waged a merciless struggle against it. Having proclaimed in 1918 a policy of separating the church from the state, the Soviet government embarked on the path of confrontation with respect to the Russian Orthodox Church. The closing and destruction of churches, the arrests and persecution of the clergy, the opening of relics, the desecration of holy places, the liquidation of monasteries and other similar measures taken by the Soviet authorities not only alienated the population, but also aroused indignation. Religion and the church continued to occupy an important place in the life of the peasants. In the villages, the figure of the village priest enjoyed authority.

The Decree of January 23, 1918 "On the Separation of Church from State and School from Church" proclaimed the principle of complete deprivation of religious organizations of any property: no church and

religious societies did not have the rights of ownership of property and the rights of a legal entity. Church property was subjected to "nationalization" by one decree: churches and monasteries, without their knowledge, turned out to be not owners, but only users of property accumulated over decades and centuries, mainly at the expense of parishioners.

Characteristically, the commission created in the People's Commissariat of Justice in April 1918 to implement the decree on the separation of church and state began to be called "liquidation". The instruction of 24 (30) August 1918 on the procedure for applying the decree provided for a set of harsh confiscation measures, including the seizure of capital, valuables, and other property of churches and monasteries. All church property was transferred to the balance of local Soviets [1: 21].

However, it turned out to be impossible to immediately expropriate church values. In rural regions of the country, the majority of the population belonged to believers of various denominations, mainly professed Orthodoxy. In the village, they reacted negatively to civil metrication, to the removal of parish registers from churches. For refusing to give out books, village priests were arrested and put on trial.

Believers refused to draw up agreements with the Soviet authorities ("on the transfer for use ...") and inventory of church property. Such cases occurred in the Tver province (Tatarkovskaya volost, Staritsky district), in the villages of Medvedevo and Zboevo of the Rzhevsky district, the peasants beat up representatives of the executive committees who came to them to explain the meaning and purpose of the decree. In both cases, the Bolsheviks accused "churchmen of counter-revolutionary agitation." In the Poshekhonsky district of the Yaroslavl province, in connection with the unrest, about 100 people were arrested right at the church, three were shot without trial, 56 people ended up under a revolutionary court [2: 231].

If in the cities the seizure of church property proceeded quickly, in the villages it dragged on. In comparison with church property in cities, rural parishes, as a rule, were distinguished by poverty. Soviet authorities received numerous petitions (resolutions of village meetings, sealed with hundreds of signatures of peasants) not to touch monasteries and churches, church property - as donated by believers. The peasant population reasoned as follows: since the church inventory, like the church buildings themselves, were purchased with donations from many generations of rural parishioners, therefore they should get them: if you sell

property, then not in favor of the state. The nationalization of church property evoked fierce protests from believers.

In the Kostroma province in the village of Krasnoye on February 13, 1918, a strong peasant uprising took place. In the spring of 1918, in the Raifa hermitage of the Solovetsky district, a crowd of peasants threw six communists into the fire, who had come to nationalize church property. In the village of Blagoveshchensky (Murom district, Vladimir province), women learned that the Bolsheviks wanted to take away the local church for the Soviet. The news quickly spread around the village, the women rushed to the meeting of the cooperative meeting, dispersed the presidium, and tore the papers and protocol into small pieces. In October 1918, the believers of the Oryol region came out with sharp resistance to the Soviet decree [2: 231, 237].

In an address to the Soviet government on October 13, 1918, Patriarch Tikhon wrote: "First, under the name of 'bourgeois', wealthy people were robbed, then, under the name of 'kulaks', they began to rob even more prosperous and industrious peasants, thus multiplying beggars, although you cannot fail to realize that with the ruin of a great number of individual citizens, the wealth of the people is destroyed and the country itself is ruined. By tempting the ignorant and ignorant people with the possibility of easy and unpunished gain, you have befogged their conscience and drowned out in them

consciousness of sin, but no matter what names the atrocities are covered with, murder, violence, robbery will always remain serious and crying out to heaven for vengeance by sins and crimes" [3: 72].

A significant number of performances on religious grounds were noted in the Tambov, Voronezh, Kursk provinces, in the Vereisky, Ruza districts of the Moscow province, in the Varnavinsky district of the Kostroma province [4: 129]. There were many examples of unrest and actions of the peasantry related to religious reasons. Among them: the uprisings in the village of Bolshoy Azyas, Krasnoslobodsky district, Penza province in March 1919, in the Pokrovskaya volost, Narovchatovsky district, Penza province, in January 1920, and in the Nizhnedevitsky district, Voronezh province, in July 1920. from mobilization for religious reasons.

In March 1919, an uprising took place in the N.-Matrenskaya volost of the Usman district of the Tambov province on religious grounds. Members of the Village Council of the village of Plastinok tried to take the metric

books — there was a rumor that drunken village Soviets were taking away holy objects in churches, crosses, the Gospel, someone struck a bell, a crowd gathered, drove the Council out of the church and beat some of them. Several people were arrested by the summoned detachment [5: 121-123].

On November 22, 1919, in the village of Kazanka, Skopinsky district, Ryazan province, an uprising took place among the peasants, generated by rumors that the local bell tower was closed [5: 223]. In May 1920, the peasants of the village of Yarul, Kansky district, Krasnoyarsk province, opposed the attempt of the local authorities to arrest the priest, sounded the alarm, dispersed the police and the volrevkom [5: 297].

One of the reasons for the "fork uprising" in January-March 1920 in Kazan, Ufa, Samara, Simbirsk provinces was the dissatisfaction of the peasants with the anti-religious policy of the Soviet government pursued in the countryside, accompanied by the closure of churches and mosques, and violence against the clergy. In the Tatar villages, the mullahs were forced to be mobilized, they were taken as hostages for failure to fulfill state duties, and the bazaars were closed [5: 756].

Nevertheless, religious uprisings in the countryside directed against the Bolshevik authorities were of a local and secondary nature: land and bread were the main object of the struggle in the countryside, alienating the peasant population from the interests of the Soviet state.

The clergy, for objective reasons, could not be an active supporter of the Bolshevik state. Many of the rural priests took part in the peasant uprisings, not only as ordinary participants, but also as leaders. Monasteries, churches and ecclesiastical premises often became places of storage of weapons and a refuge for the insurgents. The priests were active in agitation, covert or overt, against the Soviet regime. They considered Soviet power a product of the Antichrist and therefore illegal. The reason for such a position of the clergy was the policy of the Soviet authorities in relation to the church. For the most part, rural priests reacted negatively to the Bolshevik decrees on freedom of conscience and religion and on the separation of church from state and school from church. This topic was constantly heard in anti-Soviet sermons and agitation of the clergy. The policy of the Bolsheviks in relation to the church caused discontent among the peasants, often becoming one of the causes of mass peasant uprisings.

ny. But the opinion that the clergy was a reactionary mass opposed to the revolutionary construction of Soviet power is incorrect.

In 1920, as the positions of the Soviet power strengthened, there was a change in the attitude towards power on the part of the rural clergy. Moreover, the priests loyal to the Soviet government were attracted by the VChK bodies to cooperate and carried out their instructions [5: 35]. Thus, the Kursk Chekists in 1920 reported that in the province among the clergy there was a

direction, which can be called "Soviet". This part of the priests tried, it was noted in the text of the message, to explain to the dark masses about the benefits of the policy pursued by the Soviet government [5: 271]. The facts of voluntary registration of priests for public works were noted.

An illustrative example is the Penza province. In 1918-1920. The Penza Gubchek arrested a total of 5,520 people, including 59 members of the clergy. The main arrests occurred in 1918 - 35 clergymen, of whom 14 were shot. In 1920, only 8 representatives of the clergy were arrested;

In the information bulletins, local bodies of the Cheka reported: the clergy do not speak openly, the competent authorities monitor every step of the priests, but the attraction of the peasants to the church is still significant. An interesting example: the peasants of the Pokrovsky parish of the village of Sokolovskoye, Tyumen province, decided at a village meeting: "To dare to kneel to ask the people's power not to allow violence against the Orthodox clergy, which we need" [5: 318].

The natural disaster that hit Russia in 1921 — a massive famine in the Volga region and other regions — was used to conduct a large-scale nationwide campaign to seize church property. The purpose of the withdrawal for the population was declared as the need to obtain funds to help the starving. However, in addition to this, this action had other sides: the creation of a material fund to strengthen the state, as well as the opportunity to undermine the foundation of the power of the Church.

The traditional cause of famine - drought - became aggravated and intensified by the state of devastation associated with the devastating Civil War, with the disastrous economic experiments of "military

new communism", with the bloody suppression of peasant unrest and uprisings against these experiments in the most grain-producing regions of the country. Characteristically, the state authorities of the country clearly could not cope with famine as a natural disaster.

The first news of the outbreak of mass famine caused a significant social movement to help the starving. One of the first to respond to the disaster was the Russian Orthodox Church. On August 22, 1921, Patriarch Tikhon issued an appeal "On Help for the Starving," in which he called on all believers and the clergy of fifty thousand Orthodox parishes in the country to make voluntary charitable donations to help the starving. In July-August 1921 and later, the patriarch repeatedly appealed from church ambos with calls to collect money and food and send them to the population of the Volga region dying of hunger. At the same time, the All-Russian Church Committee for Assistance to the Starving was founded, and in all churches and among believers began collecting money to help the starving. Thus, the church council of the Leninsky district of the Tsaritsyno province decided to donate church valuables in favor of the starving. The peasants supported the council's decision. The clergy in the Belozersky and Kirillovsky districts of the Vologda province issued an appeal to the faithful about the collection of church valuables [5: 589].

But the church initiative was recognized by the Soviet government as superfluous and all the money collected by the church, at its request, was handed over to the government committee.

Patriarch Tikhon proposed to the leaders of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to recognize the created Church Committee for the Relief of the Starving and allow it to carry out charitable work. The leaders of the country from the central party bodies did not express a desire to make such a "concession". The solution of an urgent problem dragged on for months, the desire to help the trouble was qualified as a trick of the class enemy. Instead of the All-Russian Committee for Assistance to the Starving with a broad representation of the public, the Central Commission for Assistance to the Starving (Pomgol) was eventually created under the All-Russian Central Executive Committee as an organ of the party and Soviet apparatus, and m

members of the All-Russian Committee were repressed. Led by M.I. Kalinin Pomgol was now strictly controlled by the Cheka-GPU and the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b).

Only on December 8, 1921, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee finally allowed religious organizations, but only under the leadership of Pomgol sobi

Raise funds to help the hungry. The Church expressed its readiness to immediately begin this work, but it turned out that we should expect the appearance of instructions and regulations on the procedure for implementing this permit. The corresponding provision, which was deliberately prepared slowly, was approved only on February 1, 1922. The reasons for such slowness were the fear of party leaders to give at least some legal field of action to non-Bolshevik social forces, as well as ongoing disputes about methods for eradicating religiosity and churchism in a huge peasant country.

The Church, having received permission to participate in helping the starving under the leadership of the Soviet body (Pomgol), intensified its legal practical work. On February 6, 1922, Patriarch Tikhon addressed the faithful with a new appeal for help to the starving. It was drawn up as soon as the patriarch received the "Regulations on the possible participation of the clergy and church communities in helping the starving" approved by Pomgol. On February 14, 1922, the patriarch's appeal was published, with the permission of the government, in the mass press. The Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church announced the permission for the clergy and parish councils, with the consent of the communities of believers who were in charge of the temple property, to donate precious things that do not have liturgical use for the needs of the starving, to help the starving: pendants in the form of rings, chains, bracelets, necklaces and other items donated to the church to decorate holy icons, gold and silver scrap [1: 8, 11].

The leadership of the Church considered church donations as purely voluntary, insisted that the process of collecting these donations, their concentration and direction to the starving people should be under the constant control of the church organization at all its levels, from the church elder and priest to the bishop and patriarch. Such an approach would help to implement a real agreement between the state and the church on joint, conflict-free work to collect church funds to help the starving.

However, the Soviet side did everything differently. On February 16, 1922, the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee demanded that the local Soviets immediately withdraw all precious items made of gold, silver and stones and transfer them to the bodies of the People's Commissariat of Finance with a special purpose in the Pomgol fund. Church valuables were subject to seizure, the absence of which should not "significantly affect the interests

the cult itself. To implement this action, special commissions were created in each province [6: 16].

The Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of February 16 (23), 1922, by its nature, resembles the methods of centralized state surplus appropriation. This document reflected the experience accumulated by the Soviet government during the times of "war communism". It was he who created the legal basis for a large-scale campaign to plunder churches and monasteries, in parallel - to destroy the Russian Orthodox Church. By this decree, the center of gravity was resolutely shifted from voluntary church donations to the forcible seizure of church valuables by the authorities. In practice, the main task was not to save the lives of the starving, but to accelerate the liquidation of the church as such. All precious church items, including liturgical church items, were subject to confiscation from churches. From the point of view of the Church, such an act was regarded as sacrilege. Through the mouth of its patriarch, the Russian Orthodox Church did not approve the removal of sacred objects from churches, including voluntary donations [1: 113-114].

The instruction of the Central Committee of Pomgol established the procedure for the seizure of church valuables. It was emphasized that all values were not the property of believers, but were in their use. Mandatory submission of an old, before 1917, church inventory or inventory book was required.

(Note that the absence of a pre-revolutionary register or inconsistency with it made it possible to accuse the clergy of theft and robbery: the missing items were recorded in a special protocol, which was handed over to the investigating authorities to bring the perpetrators to justice). Believers were only given the right to enter comments and objections regarding objects of liturgical use in the protocol of withdrawal. The seized property was to be sent to the provincial or district financial departments to be sent to the Gokhran. Pomgol's instruction categorically forbade the realization of values on the ground. The confiscated items were counted by weight (gold and silver) or in pieces (precious stones) [6: 21-23].

The GPU controlled the reaction of the population to the seizure of church valuables - this was specifically done by the Secret Department of the GPU. The information reports of the GPU give an idea of the widespread dissatisfaction of the peasantry with the seizure of valuables, forms of peasant resistance. In the starving provinces, both the clergy and the peasants were more loyal to the seizure of church valuables.

In the reports of the GPU for the first half of March 1922, the attitude towards the seizure campaign on the part of the peasantry in Petrograd, Novgorod, Cherepovets, Severo-Dvinsk, Vladimir, Kaluga, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Kostroma, Bryansk provinces was characterized as "hostile" (in Tikhvin district of the Cherepovets province, even "alarming"). In many places there were cases when commissions were not allowed to work. In the Nizhny Novgorod province there were mass protests against the seizure of valuables. |

In the Arkhangelsk province, crowded assemblies of believers spontaneously gathered, the majority were women. At meetings in the province, the following decisions were made: to turn to foreign countries with a request to give bread on the security of church valuables, while the latter should be left for

place.

In the Tarusa district of the Kaluga province in one of the volosts there were , place open performance peasants, to suppress which the authorities sent an armed detachment. In Likhvinsky district, one of the communities offered bread at a market price in exchange for church valuables - the petition was rejected by the provincial commission. In the Liebknekhtov volost of the same county, the peasants staged a lynching of a commission commissioner and a policeman. In the Borovsky district, the believers did not allow the commission to start work - a detachment was sent to the district.

The most unsatisfactory mood of the peasants in connection with the decree on the seizure of church valuables turned out to be in the Tambov province. In the Usman and Kozlovsky districts, the peasants refused to give up the valuables from the churches. In one of the villages of the Elatonsky district, the commission for accounting of church property was dispersed by the peasants. In another village, peasants almost killed the chairman of the commission for the seizure of church valuables. In the Lipetsk district, the peasants demanded that the collected church valuables be handed over to the patriarch or that a special commission be organized to exchange church valuables for bread and distribute them among the starving. Rumors spread that church valuables would be distributed among the communists. In the Shuisky district of the Ivanovo-Voznesenskaya province, the population interfered with the work of the commissions for the seizure, especially actively in the Teikovsky district. In the Lezhnevsky district, the peasants beat the chairman of the volost executive committee [1: 31-34; 6: 84-89].

Widespread protests against the urgent and violent seizure of church valuables forced the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on March 19, 1922

announce a temporary suspension of the seizure of valuables - a telegram was sent to the provincial and regional committees of the party regarding the suspension of the seizure "due to complications".

The requests of believing parishioners to replace church valuables with bread, food, and money for the starving were categorically rejected by the authorities — the local authorities received such an instruction from the center. A delegation from the Tver province went to Moscow to Kalinin to get permission. Khodokov took over chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and deputy. Chairman of the Central Committee Pomgol Smidovich. Deputy Kalinin popularly explained to the walkers: the state does not need bread, but

gold [6: 57]. On March 13, the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee allowed the Central Committee of Pomgol to replace "in exceptional cases" church valuables with an equal weight of gold or silver in other items or ingots. On March 23, the chairmen of the provincial executive committees received a telegram from Kalinin and a member of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee Sapronov with a stern warning: the petitions of the provincial commissions to replace church valuables with gold in each specific case are considered only by the Pomgol Central Committee [6: 53, 93].

During March-April 1922, the campaign to confiscate valuables, according to its organizers, was slow and sluggish. A similar picture was observed in Yekaterinburg, Vologda, Kazan, Tambov, Ryazan, Penza, Ufa, Astrakhan, Tyumen, Tsaritsyn provinces, as well as in the Mountain Republic, the North Caucasus and the Don [1: 177-178, 180]. The pace of withdrawal was delayed by the sowing campaign and the main Orthodox holiday - Easter.

Directives were constantly coming from above demanding to speed up the seizure of valuables. On May 9, Kalinin sent a cipher telegram to the provincial party committees and provincial executive committees, in which he announced that the directive of the center had not been carried out: the seizure of church valuables was to be completed in the European part of the country by May 1, in Siberia - in the second half of May. A new deadline for completing tasks was set - until May 20, for Siberia - | June. Provincial party and Soviet leaders were warned about bringing to party and Soviet responsibility in case of non-compliance [6: 232-233].

On April 2, the Central Committee of the RCP(b) sent a cipher telegram to the provincial committees and provincial executive committees, in which it was required to oblige priests in the first place to be responsible for the theft of church valuables - to arrest and bring them to justice in such cases [1: 169-170].

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Numerous cases were noted when peasants defended their parish priests. One such example is associated with the name of the priest John from the village of Palekh, Shuya district, Ivanovo-Voznesensk province. Father John (I.S. Rozhdestvensky) was arrested on charges of participating in the struggle against the seizure of church valuables (in the case of the events in Shuya).

On April 18, 1922, the village assembly of the village of Palekh sent a petition to the Supreme Tribunal under the All-Russian Central Executive Committee for the release of priest John: "... Taking into account the fact that Fr. John Rozhdestvensky many. worked, as a socially progressive figure, for the benefit of his native parish and the entire Palekhovsky district and won universal respect for himself - we, the assembled, cannot remain indifferent when he is accused of agitation in preaching against the Workers' and Peasants' power. In order not to be unfounded in the statement for Fr. John of the reputation of a progressive public figure - we consider it necessary to bring to the attention of the Revolutionary Tribunal at least that, thanks to the labors and energy of Fr. John in the village of Palekh at different times, the following socially useful institutions were opened, such as: 1) Palekhovsky Society of Consumers, 2) Palekhovsky Library Reading Room, which still exist, and Palekhovsky Credit Association. Father John greatly contributed to the spread of enlightenment among the peasantry; The Palekhov school of the 2nd stage, a hotbed of knowledge for several volosts of the county, owes its discovery more than anyone else - all to him, Fr. John. These are only his main services to the state and the local peasant population. Serving the interests of the peasantry in word and deed, Fr. John could not call, and did not call for non-execution of the orders of the authorities, the authorities of the peasants and workers" [1: 190].

However, the peasant petition did not achieve the desired result: on April 25, the visiting session of the Supreme Tribunal in Ivanovo-Voznesensk sentenced the priest Rozhdestvensky to be shot. True, on April 26 the Supreme Tribunal received a telegram from Kalinin and the secretary of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Yenukidze, with a proposal to suspend the execution of Rozhdestvensky's death sentence. On May 5, the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee considered the petition for clemency for Rozhdestvensky - the verdict of the Supreme Tribunal of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee upheld. May 10 at 4 am

followed by a secret report to the Supreme Tribunal on the execution of Rozhdestvensky's death sentence [1: 204, 206, 232,

236]. "2

The leadership of the entire campaign to confiscate valuables was carried out by the leaders of the Bolshevik Party. The ideological inspirer was V.I. Lenin. Indicative in this regard is Lenin's letter to the members of the Politburo on policy towards the church on March 19, 1922, which contains the ideological directives of the communist party. Lenin wrote: "For us, it is precisely at this moment that it is not only an exceptionally favorable, but in general the only moment when we can 99 out of 100 chances of complete success to crush the enemy on the head and provide for ourselves the necessary position for us for many decades. Precisely now, and only now, when people are being eaten in hungry areas, and hundreds, if not thousands of corpses are lying on the roads, we can (and therefore must) carry out the confiscation of church valuables with the most frenzied and merciless energy and without stopping to suppress what any resistance. Precisely now, and only now, the vast majority of the peasant masses will either be for us, or at any rate will not be able to give any decisive support to that handful of Black-Hundred clergy and reactionary urban philistinism who can and want to test the policy of forcible resistance to the Soviet decree.

We must, at all costs, confiscate church valuables in the most resolute and quickest way that we can secure for ourselves a fund of several hundred million gold rubles (we must recall the gigantic riches of some monasteries and laurels). Without this fund, no state work in general, no economic development in particular, and no defense of one's position in Genoa, in particular, are completely unthinkable. We must take this fund of several hundred million gold rubles (and perhaps several billion) into our own hands at all costs. And it is possible to do it with success only now. All considerations point to the fact that later we will not be able to do this, because no other moment, except for a desperate famine, will give us such a mood among the broad peasant masses, which would either ensure us the sympathy of this mass, or at least ensure If only we could neutralize these masses in the sense that victory in the fight against the seizure of valuables would remain unconditionally and completely on our side.

If it is necessary to resort to a series of cruelties in order to achieve a certain political goal, then we must carry them out ourselves.

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energetically and in the shortest possible time, for the masses of the people will not endure the prolonged use of cruelty. It is precisely at this moment, precisely in connection with the famine, that we will carry out with maximum speed and ruthlessness the suppression of the reactionary clergy.

Therefore, I come to the unconditional conclusion that we must now give the most decisive and merciless battle to the Black Hundred clergy and crush their resistance with such cruelty that they will not forget this for several decades. The very campaign of this plan I imagine as follows:

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Officially, only comrade should come forward with any kind of measures. Kalinin, "never and in no case should Comrade. Trotsky.

A telegram already sent on behalf of the Politburo on the temporary suspension of seizures should not be cancelled. It is beneficial to us, because it will sow in the enemy the idea that we are hesitating, that he has managed to intimidate us (06 to this secret telegram, precisely because it is secret, the enemy, of course, will soon find out)" [1: 141-142].

Lenin proposed at the party congress to hold a secret meeting of delegates on this issue together with the chief officials of the GPU, the People's Commissariat of Justice and the Revolutionary Tribunal. The purpose of this meeting is to adopt a secret decision of the congress that the seizure of church valuables should be carried out with "ruthless determination, without stopping at anything, and in the shortest possible time." The more members of the clergy could be shot on this occasion, Lenin insisted, the better. It was necessary "just now to teach this public a lesson so that for several decades they would not even dare to think about any resistance." With the aim of "the fastest and most successful implementation of these measures", it was proposed at a secret meeting of the party congress to appoint a special commission with the participation of Trotsky and Kalinin, without publishing any information about this commission, so that the leadership of the commission "of all operations" would be carried out not on its behalf, but "in the all-Soviet and all-party order" [1: 143].

A special organizational role was assigned to L.D. Trotsky. It was he who became the main organizer of the campaign. All issues were discussed and resolved at the highest level - in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). On March 12, 1922, Trotsky sent a note to the Politburo. Author

forces to the main party body proposal: to allow representatives of the "Soviet" part of the clergy to the bodies of Pomgol. Trotsky's strategy was designed to split the clergy through a specific issue - the removal of valuables from churches. Trotsky argued that since the issue of expropriation is an acute one, the split on this ground should also take on a very acute character, as a result, a part of the clergy who will speak out in favor of the expropriation and help the expropriation will be opposed to the supporters of Patriarch Tikhon. It was proposed to establish cooperation with the loyal ("Soviet") part of the clergy, and even before they were introduced into the Pomgol's bodies. Such a step made it possible, according to Trotsky, to refute widespread suspicions and doubts about the fact that the valuables seized from churches are not spent on the needs of the starving [6: 51].

On March 17, 1922, Trotsky prepared a new letter for the Politburo with proposals to organize the seizure of church valuables. The gist of the proposals was as follows. In the center and in the provinces, create secret guiding commissions for the seizure of valuables. Appoint Kalinin as Chairman of the Central Commission. In gubernias, commissions should include military representatives—commissars of divisions, brigades, or heads of political departments. Secret commissions for organizing the seizure of valuables should exist under the guise of official commissions or departments under committees to help the starving for the formal acceptance of valuables, negotiations with groups of believers. Agitation should be given a character aimed at helping the starving, while outwardly distracted from the struggle against religion and the church. At the same time, to bring about a split in the clergy, showing initiative in this regard, to take under the protection of the state power priests who openly speak in favor of the removal. Prominent representatives of the disloyal clergy should not be touched until the end of the campaign, but behind the scenes (through the competent authorities) and officially (on receipt) warn them that in case of any excesses they will be the first to respond. Work on the seizure of valuables to carry out as soon as possible. Seizures in each district begin with a church headed by a loyal priest. There should be a reliable military unit nearby, preferably a CHON detachment [1: 134-135]. On March 20, the Politburo approved Trotsky's proposals as a political directive.

In accordance with the instructions of Lenin and with the direct participation of Trotsky, a central commission was created on questions

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seizure of church property. It received a peculiar name - the Commission for the Accounting and Concentration of Values (Trotsky, Kalinin, Saprnov, Unshlikht, Medved, Beloborodov, Krasikov, Steklov, and others sat in it). The commission had a "strictly conspiratorial character." Address, composition was not advertised. The minutes of the meetings of the Commission were printed in one copy and were stamped "Archi-secret. Keep confidential. The Commission made decisions that

served as directives for Pomgol. On March 20, 1922, the Commission for the Accounting and Concentration of Values determined a remarkable directive: to treat churches in peasant parishes "with caution and carefully ascertaining the whole situation" [11: 40, 77].

Trotsky's proposals for specific political measures were received by the members of the Politburo on March 23 and approved. A few days later, on March 26, Trotsky submitted a letter to the Politburo proposing additional measures. Trotsky's attitude boiled down to the following: "Priests should not answer the question of whether it is necessary to help the starving, but should directly and accurately call for the execution of the decree" [1: 153, 156, 160].

Finally, on March 30, 1922, another note by Trotsky appeared in the Politburo about the policy towards the church. Trotsky stated the presence of two directions among the clergy: counter-revolutionary and "Soviet". The ideology of the latter was defined "like Smenovekhov's". "Smenovekhi clergy" was proposed to be regarded as "the most dangerous enemy of tomorrow". But at the current moment, involve them in order to eliminate the counter-revolutionary part of the clergy, who actually controlled the church. In this struggle, it was proposed to tactically "lean on the Smenovekhi clergy, without engaging politically, and even more so in principle." Forcing the campaign, according to Trotsky, will not allow the "Smenovekhi leaders to come to their senses" and make an attempt at a bourgeois reformation of the Orthodox Church under the "Soviet" banner.

The campaign against the famine, Trotsky emphasized, was extremely beneficial for this, since it focused all questions on the fate of church values. The task was twofold: firstly, to force the "Smenovekhi priests" to openly link their fate with the issue of seizing valuables, and secondly, to force them to bring this campaign within the church to a complete organizational break with the church leadership, to convening their own new church council and new elections hierarchy. "There is no more rabid scolder than oppo

positional pop" [1: 162-163] - this phrase of Trotsky is worthy of a collection of winged sayings.

In a similar spirit, Trotsky prepared proposals for the Party Gubernia Committees and Provincial Executive Committees. The essence was as follows: split the clergy, deal with the "Black Hundred priests", unofficially support the "Smenovekhi priests", and at the same time take them into account. On March 30, the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Central Committee of the RCP(b) sent a cipher telegram to the provincial executive committees and provincial committees with a directive to support "loyal clergy." The loyal included the clergy, who "exactly and directly calls on the faithful to fulfill the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the seizure of valuables" [1: 164, 165].

Trotsky prepared instructions for publication with the main goal: to split the clergy. A struggle was declared against the "princes of the Orthodox Church". It was proposed to compromise them on the issue of helping the starving, denouncing their "stinginess, hardheartedness", and then showing them the "harsh hand of the workers' state" [1: 251; 6:40]. Especially for the Politburo, Trotsky prepared on May 10 a draft appeal by a group of representatives of the "majority of the rank-and-file clergy."

The original version was read by Stalin, Kamenev, Tomsy, Rykov, Molotov, Zinoviev. Regarding the appeal, Trotsky telegraphed to the editorial offices of the newspapers Pravda and Izvestia on May 14: to inspire confidence in the loyal clergy that "the state will not let them be offended", to raise their spirit, as a result, to enable the struggle of the clergy to unfold "in in the most striking and resolute form," while "not pushing the position of the Bolsheviks in relation to religion to the fore in the near future." On May 16, Stalin invited all members of the Politburo to approve Trotsky's proposal "as directives of the Central Committee to the newspapers." All members of the Politburo supported the proposal. Lenin also responded: "Trotsky pressed, we do not dispute" [1: 312, 314-315].

On May 24, in another letter to the Politburo, Trotsky insisted: "There is no need to be biased, even unofficially. It is more beneficial if an internal church struggle flares up" [1: 181]. The resistance of the believers themselves did not allow the destruction of the church, as a result of which the stake was placed on

organization of a split within the Church through the so-called renovation movement that began in Russia after October 1917. The Bolsheviks, primarily Trotsky, headed for the creation of a "Soviet Church", the first attempts were made

by the end of 1919

The renovationist movement took organizational shape in 1922. The renovationist church groups included the Living Church, Renaissance, the Old Apostolic Church, and the Free Labor Church (the slogan of the latter was "Down with the bourgeois from churches"). The ideologists of Renovationism preached "communist Christianity", advocated a return to the so-called democratic order of early Christianity, and sought to identify communism and Christianity. The Renovationists introduced a number of changes in the church structure, cult and life of the clergy (higher church administration, democratization of the parish, services in Russian). The activities of the Renovationists were aimed at confronting the old church hierarchy headed by Metropolitan Tikhon and contributed to the evolution of the Russian Orthodox Church towards loyalty to the Soviet regime.

The churches of the renovationists were painted red. At the October festivities, the Renovationists proclaimed toasts: let there be Soviet bell ringing, many years of the Communist Party. In the Yekaterinburg province, at the May Day holiday in the village of Novoplastunskaya, a local priest declared that with the victory of the Russian revolution "over the black reaction", the teachings of Christ were put into practice, since Christ was also a revolutionary who suffered for the ideals of the working people [7: 30 , 31].

The reports of local authorities to the Secret Department of the GPU demonstrated the special attention of the GPU to the creation of the "Living Church" groups in each province. The order of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to the Don Executive Committee on August 15 also focused on the "particularly attentive and delicate attitude" to the needs of the "Living Church" on the part of the Soviet government, as a loyal government. The All-Russian Congress of the Clergy "The Living Church" in August 1922 adopted a resolution on the transformation of provincial monasteries into labor communes [6: 310; 1: 316]. The peasants, for the most part, treated the renovation movement with indifference or condemnation.

The nature of the large-scale all-Russian campaign for the seizure of valuables, set by the supreme body of the ruling Communist Party, determined the mass seizure of valuables on an urgent basis, as a rule, without any expertise. The result of the work of the commissions for accounting and concentration of valuables was measured by a specific amount of confiscated items in kilograms, pieces. Local authorities often practiced secondary seizure of valuables. To the saboteurs

severe penalties have changed. Since the criteria for punishment were not defined, different punishments were imposed on the ground for the same acts. The Supreme and Provincial Revolutionary Tribunals passed numerous death sentences. Thus, by decision of the Vyatka Provincial Revolutionary Tribunal, they were sentenced to capital punishment "for campaigning against the seizure of church property, preparing and organizing an uprising on May 2 in the village of Podzhernovo on the basis of the seizure, accompanied by the destruction of the agricultural commune and the murder of two policemen" : Polyakov Ivan Alexandrovich, 50 years old, priest; Semushkin Mikhail Alexandrovich, 58 years old, church warden, peasant; Shirokov Semyon Mitrofanovich, 44 years old, peasant, chairman of the peasant community [1: 248].

In the forced "concentration" of values, factors such as storage conditions, proper packaging, evaluation, and transportation were of secondary importance. The financial value of the seized items was of a priority nature, the artistic value was of secondary importance. As a result, the confiscated valuables often came to the Gokhran through local financial departments (in accordance with the instructions of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee) in a destroyed or damaged form. The barbaric methods of seizure of valuables were reported to the Bureau of the Central Commission for the seizure of church valuables by none other than N.I. Trotskaya (wife of L.D. Trotsky), who held the position of head of the Main Museum of the Narkompros [6: 228-230].

Even Trotsky himself was indignant at the practice of confiscating valuables. In a telegram to the chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Central Committee, Pomgol Kalinin, and a member of the Bureau of the Central Commission for the confiscation of church valuables, Beloborodov, on April 5, 1922, Trotsky wrote: even the altars are smoked. Icons, when removed, are placed on the floor, and the floor is often very dirty. All this irritates the population... Are such outrages allowed? It would be necessary to catch in at least one case and bring to the tribunal. It is necessary to teach to spare the feelings of believers and not to be outrageous" [6: 140].

Despite the prohibitions of the authorities, the peasant population hoped to preserve the values of rural churches in exchange for bread and food for the starving. In one of the petitions addressed to Lenin on July 16, the parish community of the village of Barait, Krasnoyarsk district, Yenisei province, in the amount of 6 thousand parishioners, asked to replace the seizure of a few church valuables from the village church of the local

a poor income of food in the amount of 150 pounds of bread, 75 pounds of meat, 15 pounds of butter. The Central Committee of Pomgol refused the petition, explaining that only gold and silver could be replaced [6: 306-307].

The peasant population, for the most part believers, was perplexed: why only church gold, silver and other valuables were needed to help those dying of hunger in the Volga region, Ukraine, and the Urals? It took time to exchange valuables abroad for food. Everyone knew that the state of transport did not allow prompt delivery of food purchased abroad to the starving people in the Volga region and other regions from the ports.

The clergy actively opposed the plunder of valuables,

use them not for the starving, but for other purposes!. This circumstance was often interpreted by the authorities as counter-revolutionary appeals and used to persecute objectionable clergy.

By November 1, 1922, the following amount of church valuables was seized (according to the statement of the Pomgol Central Committee): gold - 33 pounds 32 pounds, silver - 23,997 pounds 23 pounds, diamonds - 35,670 pieces, other precious metals - 71,762 pieces, pearls - 14 pounds 32 pounds, a gold coin - 3115 rubles, a silver coin - 19,155 rubles, various precious stones - 52 pounds 30 pounds. The cost of all seized

' There were serious grounds for such doubts about the misuse of church property. Valuables were sold abroad at dumping prices. This was done not only by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, but also by other departments, as well as individuals. The following examples are noteworthy: L. Kamenev was approached by a certain citizen Shor, who offered to quickly sell the valuables seized from the Jewish synagogues: they are issued from the Gokhran to a group of people representing a religious trend in Judaism, this group reimburses their value with metal currency, then realizing the valuables abroad (in America). Another example is related to the proposal of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine H. Rakovsky to Trotsky: to pawn the seized valuables abroad in order to obtain a more significant target loan (seizure of stones and precious metals from antiques sharply lowered their market price). N. Trotskaya proposed not to let valuables made of gold, silver and other precious metals into an alloy, but to sell some of the valuables as sought-after art and antiquities in the Middle East and Western Europe. As a result, the amount of foreign exchange earnings increased sharply. For this, it was necessary to organize the selection and examination of objects of artistic and historical value for sale on the foreign market [6:250, 252, 272.273].

was estimated at 4,650,810 rubles. 67 kop. In addition, 964 pieces of antique items were confiscated [1: 183-184]'.

The anti-religious campaign in the Soviet Republic largely solved the problem of replenishing the fund of material resources of the Soviet state. However, the doctrinal orientation of the Bolshevik Party, connected with the elimination of religion and the church in the course of building socialism, remained unresolved. Soviet power, declared as the power of workers and peasants, faced massive and widespread protests from its own people.

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MAKHNOVSHCHINA: A DREAM OF A FREE PEASANT PARADISE

Makhnovshchina is a peasant movement in the South of Russia and Ukraine in 1918-1921. [1]. Nestor Ivanovich Makhno (Mikhnenko) became a symbol of this movement. Lenin was wrong when he considered it possible to include in the support of the dictatorship of the proletariat those whom he called "semi-proletarians".

Another estimate of the seized is also given: almost 7 billion rubles, including church silver in the amount of 6624 thousand rubles, gold in the amount of 260 142 rubles, precious stones (Kristkaln A.M. Famine of 1921 in the Volga region: the experience of modern study of the problem, abstract of diss., Candidate of Historical Sciences, Moscow, 1997.

S. 29).

atom, "Makhno came from this particular social stratum: his father was a farm laborer, groom, coachman, and Nestor himself, the fifth son in the family, began as an agricultural worker in his youth.

The movement covered Yekaterinoslav, Kherson, Tauride provinces. The main centers of the Makhnovist movement were the districts of Novomoskovsky, Pavlovsky and Aleksandrovsky of the Yekaterinoslav province, Konstantinovsky and Kremenchugsky of the Poltava province, Izyumsky, Kupyansky, Starobelsky of the Kharkov province. The geography of the Makhnovshchina also extended to the Don, Kuban, Voronezh, Tambov, and Saratov provinces.

According to the operational data of the Soviet military command, in May 1919 Makhno's insurgent division numbered 20,000 bayonets and 2,000 cavalry. Makhno himself, as of June 1919, estimated its strength at 27,000 fighters [2: 145, 228]. In the autumn of the same year, the number

Makhnovists amounted to 30-35 thousand 1 [3: 118, 142; 5:757]. Makhno was in a state of agreement with the Soviet authorities three times.

In 1918 - early 1919? Makhno fought against Hetman Skoropadsky, Petlyura, and the Volunteer Army. In June 1918 he met in Moscow with Sverdlov and Lenin. In February 1919, the Makhnovist army became the third brigade of the Soviet Zadneprovskaya division,

Makhno - brigade commander of the Red Army. In May 1919, the brigade was transformed into a division ("First Ukrainian Insurgent Division") under the command of Chief Division Makhno.

At the end of 1919, the Makhnovists fought against the White Guard army of Denikin, who captured the whole of Ukraine and the South of Russia and reached Tula. According to the commander of the Armed Forces in the South of Russia, General A. Denikin, Makhno's actions in the autumn of 1919

' In a book published in 1925 by a prominent Soviet military specialist N.E. Kakurin, which was kept in a special store for many years, it was noted that by October 20, 1919, Makhno's forces amounted to 28 thousand bayonets and sabers with 50 guns and 200 machine guns (Kakurin N.E. How the revolution fought. T. 1. 1917-1918 M., 1990. S. 103). Similar data was given by the modern researcher of the Makhnovshchina V.V. Komin, however, increasing the number of machine guns to 500 (Komin V.V. Nestor Makhno: myths and reality. M., 1990, p. 42). The quantitative indicators of the Makhnovshchina in some publications are brought up to 40-50 thousand participants [7:217, 321].

2 In February 1919, Makhno sent as a gift to the starving Moscow and Petrograd workers and peasants 3 trains (90 wagons with 90,000 poods of wheat flour) obtained in battles with Denikin's army [2:66].

assumed such wide proportions that they upset the rear of the whites and weakened the front in the most difficult time. Makhno was estimated by Denikin as a legendary person, "a brave and very popular robber and talented partisan" [4: 75, 139].

In October 1920, Makhno concluded a third agreement with the Soviet authorities - against the White Russian Army of General Wrangel. It is noteworthy that Wrangel, hoping to involve all non-Bolshevik forces in the struggle against the Bolshevik power, repeatedly made attempts to enlist the support of Makhno. In particular, in June 1920, on behalf of Wrangel, an envoy came to the camp of Makhno with a letter from headquarters proposing to unite in a joint struggle against the communists: "The Russian army goes exclusively against the communists in order to help the people get rid of the commune and commissars and assign state, landowner and other privately owned lands to the working peasantry. The latter is already being implemented. Russian soldiers and officers are fighting for the people and their well-being. Everyone who goes for the people must go hand in hand with us. The High Command will do its best to help you with weapons, equipment, and specialists. Send your confidant to the headquarters with information that you especially need, and for coordinating military operations. The letter was signed by the chief of the Wrangel staff, General Shatilov [4: 77].

By order of Makhno, the White Guard officer was publicly shot, the message about this and the text of the letter were published in the Makhnovist press [5: 162].

The peasantry, which formed the basis of the Makhnovshchina, united with the Reds the presence of a common enemy - the White Guard, who tried to

become hated for the peasantry by the landlord Russia". For the peasant, the main enemy was the landowner and his defender - the Volunteer Army. In the peasant consciousness, the White Guards were associated with the former oppressors, dressed in officer uniforms,

' Let us note the following circumstance: the Makhnovists severely punished the former Makhnovists who joined the Russian army of Wrangel. So, the commander of a partisan detachment in the Russian army of Wrangel A. Savchenko, the former commander of the Makhnovist battalion, was shot by the Makhnovists for treason in October 1920. G. Yatsenko, company commander, hundreds of the Makhnovists, later commander of a partisan detachment in the Russian Army, in October 1920 was also shot

Liang Makhnovists for treason.

who dreamed of the restoration of the former great, united and indivisible Russia. In addition, the Denikin government did not try to win the peasantry over to its side, even with promises - the solution of the land issue was related to an indefinite future.

The impulsive attempts of land reforms by the last white ruler, General Wrangel, had a certain orientation towards the prosperous farmer.

Makhno's agreements with the Soviet government objectively could not have a permanent and stable character: a temporary alliance was determined by a common interest - the fight against the Whites. The "free Soviet system" of the Makhnovist movement was in its content incompatible with the dictatorship of Soviet power. The double standard that determined Makhno's revolutionary tactics was underestimated by representatives of the Soviet leadership - Antonov-Ovseenko, Kamenev, Voroshilov. The Extraordinary Commissioner of the Council of Labor and Defense, L. Kamenev, expressed confidence in Makhno's loyalty: "The rumors about Makhno's anti-Soviet and separatist plans are groundless." Antonov-Ovseenko, in a report to the Soviet leadership of Ukraine on May 2, 1919, extolled the positive achievements in the Makhnovist regions: the creation of children's communes, schools, and three secondary educational institutions in Gulyai-Polye. The commander assured: "Makhno will not oppose us, it is necessary to stop the persecution of Makhno" [2: 129-130, 136].

The peasant revolution in the countryside, based on the ideal of egalitarian justice, was at odds with the policy of the Bolshevik government. The new government was perceived as a government in general, which robs the worker with taxes, recruits recruits for the army, forces them to perform labor duties, distracting the peasant from urgent agricultural work on his own farm.

The resolutions of the 2nd Gulyai-Polye district congress of front-line soldiers, Soviets, departments and sub-departments of the military revolutionary headquarters of the region, held on February 12-16, 1919, which was attended by representatives from 350 volosts, testified to the conscious expression of peasant demands. Nestor Makhno in his speech

! After the break of Soviet power with Makhno, Antonov-Ovseenko, in a report to the Central Committee of the RCP (b), dated July 18, 1919, wrote: "Makhno, a convinced anarchist, personally honest, behind whose back every dirty trick was committed, could be perfectly used by us .. ." (RGVA. F. 33987. Op. 2. D. 132.

L. 87).

In captivity at the congress, he declared: the brutal violent power of the Bolsheviks over the working people cannot continue for a long time - the patience of the people from the "party yoke of the Bolsheviks" has come to an end. The working people managed to hold the government of the state in their hands in the form of freely elected Soviets, but they did not last long - the Bolshevik Party declared its monopoly on them: the non-Bolshevik was removed from the Soviets as an enemy of the people [2: 80]. Anarchist representative Baron! called on the peasants to create their own free, elected, powerless Soviets in every village as a "truly labor Soviet system", since only they can satisfy all the needs of the people, organize economic life and protect the interests of workers without the intervention of party commissars who impose from above their party dictates [2: 84].

In a resolution on the current situation, adopted by the congress on February 15, the Soviet Bolshevik government was accused of striving at all costs to deprive the local Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies of their freedom of independent activity: - the missars observe every step of the local soviets and mercilessly crack down on those comrades among the peasants and workers who come out in defense of the people's freedom against the representatives of the central government. The governments of Russia and Ukraine, which call themselves the workers' and peasants' governments, are blindly following the lead of the Communist-Bolshevik Party, who, in the narrow interests of their party, carry out vile, uncompromising persecution of all other revolutionary organizations. Hiding behind the slogan of "dictatorship of the proletariat," the Communist-Bolsheviks declared a monopoly for their party, considering all dissenters to be counter-revolutionaries." The Soviet government, emphasized in

resolution of the congress, by their actions created a serious threat to the development of the workers' and peasants' revolution.

The congress declared the emancipation of the working people the cause of the working people themselves, appealing to the peasants and workers not to entrust the emancipation of the working people to any party or central government: "Let there be various revolutionary organizations, let them freely preach their ideas, but we will not allow

Baron Senior (Kantorovich Aron) - member of the secretariat of the Kharkov anarchist confederation "Nabat", delegate of the 2nd Gulyai-Polye district congress.

3-4735

one of them to declare himself in power and make everyone dance to his tune. The right of local free Soviets of peasants and workers to build a new free society was declared "without violent decrees and orders, in spite of the tyrants and oppressors of the whole world, without lords-pans, without subordinate slaves, without rich and without poor." The resolution ended with the slogans: "Down with the commissar power and appointees! Down with the Chekas - modern Okhrana! Long live the freely elected workers' and peasants' Soviets! Down with the one-sided Bolshevik Soviets!" [6].

Similar slogans formed the basis of the resolution of the 3rd district congress of representatives of the volosts and uyezds of the Yekaterinoslav province, insurgent front-line units in support of Makhno's actions on April 10, 1919. Representatives from 72 volosts of Aleksandrovsky, Mariupol, Berdyansk, Bakhmut and Pavlograd counties. The resolution of the congress stated the seizure of power by the political party of the communists, "which does not stop at any measures to retain and consolidate state power, and from the center, by armed force, is pursuing its policy that is criminal in relation to the social revolution and the working masses." The congress decided: the only true expression of the will of the working people can be a congress of workers, peasants and Red Army deputies, which does not recognize any violence.

The Peasants' Congress protested against the policy of the Bolshevik government, pursued by the commissars and extraordinary commissions, which, according to the definition of the Makhnovists, turned into a weapon in the hands of the Bolsheviks to suppress the will of the working people. Demands were put forward for the socialization of the land, a "radical change" in food policy, the replacement of requisitions by a system of commodity exchange between town and country and the creation of a wide network of consumer societies and cooperatives, the abolition of private trade, complete freedom of speech, press, and assembly by all political left parties and groups [2: 111-112].

The peasantry expected from the new government the promised solution, in the spirit of the Decree on Land, of the land issue. It assumed that the slogan "land to the peasants" should be allowed on the following grounds: all land should go directly to the producer - the working peasantry. Based

the principle that "no man's land" and only those who work on it can use it, the land should be transferred to the use of the working peasantry according to an equalizing labor norm, that is, to ensure the possibility of obtaining a consumer norm on the basis of one's own labor. The peasant, having seized the land, came to the conclusion that the peasantry did not need the state at all. Such sentiments about the attitude towards the state among the peasants were fueled by a psychological sense of their own strength: a peasant soldier returned to the village from the war, as a rule, with weapons and the confidence of a recent front-line soldier.

The peasantry reasoned as follows: the Soviet government gave the peasants land - the Bolsheviks did it. And the government that introduced the surplus appropriation, did not give all the landlords' land to the peasants, but organized state farms, communes on it - this is the power of the "commune", the power not of the Bolsheviks, but of the Communists. Such a peasant mood was expressed in the political formula: "For the Bolsheviks, but against the Communists." Peasants often declared themselves one

temporarily Bolsheviks, but enemies of the communists: the peasant was a supporter of the anti-landowner "expropriation of the expropriators" (which increased the popularity of the Bolshevik promises of the socialization of the land), but protested against the methods of the military-communist policy - food dictatorship, food requisitioning, the Cheka, the organization of socialist land management in the form of state farms and communes, what entered the consciousness of the peasant as the creation of a "communist" and not a Bolshevik - the idea was created that the Bolsheviks were one thing, and the communists were another. Communists were perceived as enemies of labor.

The peasant element in the spirit of "plunder the loot" was opposed by the principle of the Soviet state seizing part of the land and all the landowners' inventory, which the peasantry considered their own, to organize a public economy. The proletarian revolution in the countryside gave rise to a new leveling wave associated with the redistribution of the lands of the wealthy peasants.

It is also impossible not to take into account the psychological factor associated with the desire of many members of the poor to rise out of poverty and become independent owners through an egalitarian redistribution. The village laborers, like the poor, also strove to become independent masters. The farm laborer's desire to get his own acres of land outweighed the prospect of working in the Soviet era.

economy. By the middle of 1919, the population of the Ukrainian countryside in all its strata was dissatisfied with the policy of the Soviet state.

Nestor Makhno was a spokesman for peasant sentiments. In the countryside, the peasant demanded the socialization of the economy, not wanting to give the surplus to the city. He could not come to terms with the low price of bread established by the state, the low norms of grain left for the economy, especially for the maintenance of working livestock. According to Soviet leaders, in the Makhnovist movement it was difficult to distinguish where the poor began, where the fist ended - this was evidence of a mass peasant movement [7: 94]. The Makhnovist army to a large extent consisted of poor youth who, with their peasant minds, believed in the ideal of egalitarian socialism, ready to die for the "liberation of the working people." The kulaks to the Makhnovists, according to the testimony of Soviet agents

data, treated very unfriendly or hostile [8] ?.

In the reports of the special department of the Cheka, special attention was paid to the fact that the main part of the Makhnovist army was the poorest peasant youth, to whom the Soviet government was unable to give anything but a formal right to land [9]. The Soviet leadership was aware that the departure of the peasant poor to the Makhnovists was the result of miscalculations by the authorities, who did not provide for

shields of interests of the poor [10: 260] 3.

The social meaning of the slogan "For Soviet power, but against the communists" was that the peasant supported the stage of the revolution associated with the declaration of peace, the liquidation of landownership, the brutal Civil War against the landlords.

Arshinov insisted on the assertion: Makhno is a defender of the interests of the poorest peasantry, fanatically devoted to the poorest peasantry. Makhnovshchina was defined as a grass-roots movement of peasants, and the movement of mainly the poorest sections of the peasantry of all nationalities [5: 79, 193, 194, 204, 209].

> Illegal assertion of the researcher of the Makhnovshchina V.V. Komin that the kulaks were the main support of Makhno (Komin V.V. Decree. Op. P. 52, 65).

3 According to the modern researcher of the Makhnovshchina A.V. Shu-bin. The anti-kulak orientation of the Makhnovshchina attracted the middle and poor peasants to it (Shubin A.V. Makhno and the Makhnovist movement.

M., 1998. S. 66).

ka and interventionists. But the peasant protested against the established war communism.

The disagreements between the Makhnovist peasantry and the policy of the Soviet state on the land issue were reflected in the decisions of the 2nd Congress of the rebel front-line soldiers, the soviets of the Gulyai-Polye region in February 1919. on the following grounds: in the interests of socialism and the struggle against the bourgeoisie, all land must pass into the hands of the working peasantry. Based on the principle that "land is no one's land", and only those who work on it and who cultivate it can use it, the land should be transferred to the use of the working peasantry free of charge according to the equalizing labor norm, that is, to ensure the consumption norm on the basis of the application. niya own labor. The solution of land problems was entrusted to local volost land committees with the assistance of the county land committee. The distribution of live and dead inventory was transferred to the jurisdiction of the county council. The congress expressed the wish that the local land committees immediately take into account all the landlords', appanage lands and distribute them among the landless and land-poor peasants, providing them and all citizens in general with seed materials.

At the same time, a protest was expressed against the communist policy: the Soviet government "refused to satisfy the demands of the working peasantry: to replace the nationalized and privately owned land with socialized land, to promote the free distribution of collective cultivation of the land, to ensure both the collective and labor individual farming of the village with seeds, technical forces and agricultural tools necessary for the conduct of public and individual labor economy. Cultural agricultural holdings (experimental, demonstration fields, apiaries, orchards, nurseries and forests) were declared the property of all working people [2: 90-91]. The protest was a response to the decrees of the Soviet state, which announced that all large and cultural farms that previously belonged to the landowners were assigned to the state for the organization of state farms. So, in the decree on the nationalization of sugar factories it was said: "All lands, with the exception of peasants, in the crop rotation of which was included in any of the last 5 years,

those. from 1913-1914, sowing sugar beets, in full force, with all lands, forests, peat bogs and other minerals, waters, etc., with all structures, buildings, inventory, living and dead, regardless of whether whoever they belong to, they are recognized as an inviolable fund of nationalized sugar factories. The same applied to distilleries: "All owned by the owners of the distilleries, as well as lands subject to confiscation, in the crop rotation of which, from the last 4 years since 1915, lands, other years, the sowing of potatoes and bread intended for distillation, in full force, with all forests, peat bogs, minerals, waters, with all structures, buildings, inventory, living and dead, are recognized as the inviolable fund of nationalized distilleries" [7: 85].

Local government bodies were obliged to take measures to return illegally seized live and dead equipment, other property of former non-working farms, especially with regard to the return of breeding and working livestock, complex machines and their parts (locomobiles, steam plows, threshers, reapers, seeders and winnowers, mechanical rakes, etc.). According to the decree of the state, inventory from rental points was provided first of all to land users who formed a partnership (commune, public cultivation of land, labor artel), and only in the second place - to individual farms [7: 86].

By the middle of 1919, the different attitude of the Soviet state and the peasantry was determined not only in the organization of land ownership in the countryside, but also in relation to the use of the received harvest. In the former estates, state farms were established - state enterprises, as well as communes. State farms were created according to the type of urban nationalized industry,

whose products were to be placed at the disposal of the state. This caused dissatisfaction with the manufacturer. Among the peasantry, the Soviet economy began to be perceived as a new form of exploitation, when the place of the former owner was taken by a new owner in the person of the state.

Initially, the peasantry was actively engaged in the creation of communes. In April 1919, a few versts from Gulyaipole, in the former estate of the landowner Klassen in the village of Pokrovsky, a commune named after Rosa Luxembourg appeared. The anarcho-communist ideal of a self-governing commune, close to peasant interests, since

fought against the prose of life when the communists expressed their demands on the result of the work of the newly minted communards - the harvest. The existence of communes under conditions of a grain monopoly, especially a food dictatorship, a food allotment, turned out to be meaningless. But the peasantry, involved in communes and state farms, did not want to give away what they had grown by their own labor. Stocks of grain, which the organs of the People's Commissariat of Food did not have time to take out, were seized by the peasants. In the middle of 1919, the Makhnovshchina opposed the communes and state farms.

The appeal of the Makhnovists in August 1919 contained the following provisions: no political party and state power can create, establish and strengthen a rational economic (economic) life; no power can restore the destroyed production, create a social organization of labor, lead to social stability. The need was expressed to renounce all power and start building a new life on the basis of a free, powerless, non-party, economic (and not political), united from below (and not from above), organization of the working people—workers and peasants. It was proposed to achieve such an organization through the Soviets as non-party labor bodies for the organization of a just and free life. The organization of economic, social and cultural life without parties and without state political power, with the help of worker-peasant organizations and Soviets—such an approach expressed the essence of the Makhnovist program.

The protest of the Makhnovists was directed against the policy of the communists: "The party and power of the Bolshevik-Communists, being powerless in the matter of social and economic construction, only again opened a wide road for the enemies of the revolution and prepared new ground for reaction. Guided by the communists on a false path, the revolution has reached a dead end, and, having struggled in it, is turning back. The communists were subjected to obstruction due to the involvement of these organizations on a false path: "The Party has replaced the free economic work of these organizations with the impotent work of its government and its state officials."

The Makhnovists urged the peasants in the regions liberated by the insurgents from all political power, under their protection, to restore free Soviets and start building a new life.

[2: 289]. "1/7

In the leaflet "What are the Makhnovists fighting for?" it was proposed to create nationwide federations — free associations of workers' and peasants' unions and associations for various types of production, without political overtones, as economic regulatory bodies in the sphere of production, commodity exchange, distribution and transport [11].

Not only the wealthy part of the peasantry, but also the poor suffered from the surplus. The Soviet government could not give anything to the peasant. The state failed to collect the required amount of products - they collected much less than the established plans. Bread was taken away from a strong owner, leaving a minimum ration for food (livestock was also given a meager ration). The surplus was sent to the city. After the requisition, the prosperous peasant's subsistence rate remained. The poor man, on the other hand, had to receive this norm from the bodies of the People's Commissariat for Food, but by no means always could get his share. The huge apparatus for collecting surplus appropriation, the prodarmium, could not cope with the collection of products, transporting and guarding it by rail to the city (this was especially true for the procurement of livestock: during the move

a significant percentage of livestock died). There was not enough transport to deliver bread to bulk points. There was no transport to bring urban goods to the countryside.

The policy of the state to limit the peasantry in the field of land use, which affected the poor peasantry, was supplemented by the costs of supplying them with food. The poorer the area was, the more painfully the surplus was reflected on the peasantry. The lack of incentive for representatives of the committees (komnezams) to actively assist the food agencies was intensified by the fear of Makhnovist revenge. This was the reason for the slow expansion of the network of commanders over the vast territory controlled by Makhno. In Makhno's order, it was required to stop the organization and activities of komnezams, disperse and destroy food detachments [7: 193; 12]. In the vast sphere of influence of Makhno, the export of grain was blocked, the mobilization of young people into the Red Army, the committees (or committees of impossible villagers) were liquidated, food detachments and food workers were destroyed.

The peasant masses saw in the revolution a means of getting rid of the oppression of the landowner and the kulak, as well as political and administrative power from above. The slogans "For Soviets without communi-

"Chr

stov" ("For Soviet Power, but Against the Communists"), "For Free Soviets", "Away with the Communes", "For True Soviet Power".

The power of the Soviets in the peasant consciousness was identified directly with the will of the working people themselves. The people's will was to be manifested in the electiveness of the soviets from top to bottom, insubordination of the soviets to commissars appointed from outside. The soviets were not perceived by the peasantry as political institutions alien to them, through which the power of political parties is exercised.

On April 19, 1919, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front G.Ya. Sokolnikov sent a telegram to Lenin, informing him that the right moment had come to "remove Makhno" [13]. This document can serve as evidence that the decision regarding Makhno has already matured in the top Soviet leadership. It is no coincidence that local emergency commissions, ordered from above, launched an intensified struggle against the Makhnovists in March-April 1919 [14]. Perhaps there were tactical differences: the "inspections" of Voroshilov and Kamenev in Gulyai-Pole took place on May 4 and 7, 1919, respectively.

Subsequently, the initiative was taken over by the Pre-revolutionary Military Council of the Soviet Republic L. Trotsky, who, as always, acted decisively and unwaveringly. On May 28, Trotsky sent a telegram to the Soviet and military leadership of Ukraine (Rakovsky, Podtroisky and Antonov-Ovseenko) demanding that they immediately launch a press campaign against Makhno in order to eliminate the Makhnovshchina [15]. On June 2, 1919, in the newspaper "On the Way", published on Trotsky's train, his article appeared under the title "Makhnovshchina". The chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic announced that "a certain Makhno" was rebelling against the Soviet regime. The pejorative term ("someone") for Makhno did not mean that Trotsky was not aware of the Makhnovist movement. But another fact is more important: it was Trotsky who began to inflate the myth about the anarchist nature of the Makhnovshchina in order to obscure its popular peasant content. Trotsky's main argument: the Makhnovists, as anarchists, deny state power, therefore they are enemies of Soviet power as the state power of workers and laboring peasants [2: 162].

On June 4, 1919, the order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic announced the severance of relations with Makhno, it was forbidden to hold the next congress of representatives of districts appointed by the Makhnovists for June 15 in Gulyaipole, participation in it was defined as treason against the Soviet Republic, delegates to the congress were subject to

arrest and trial by the tribunal [16]. Trotsky's order of June 6, 1919, "executive" in content, consisted of frightening formulations: the Makhnovists must be mercilessly crushed, there will be no mercy, the authorities will burn out the ulcer of the Makhnovshchina with a red-hot iron. The Makhnovshchina was considered on the same plane as another phenomenon, the "Grigorievshchina" [17].

The last statement cannot be perceived otherwise than as the completely conscious creation of another ideological myth by Trotsky. The Makhnovists themselves assessed the "Universal" of Ataman Grigoriev, who had raised a rebellion against the Soviet regime, as a sermon of nationalism, anti-Semitism, and national enmity between the working people [5: 105]. By order of Makhno, Grigoriev was killed by his inner circle, and this happened already after the break in relations between Makhno and the Soviet authorities (Makhno telegraphed Moscow about the event).

P. Arshinov substantiated the attitude of the Makhnovist leadership towards "Grigorievism". He stressed that a movement like Grigoriev's posed a threat to the freedom of the working people and was therefore just as hostile to the Makhnovshchina as Bolshevism. The Makhnovshchina could not unite with individual anti-Bolshevik actions on the sole ground that the Makhnovshchina itself opposed Bolshevism. According to Arshinov's figurative description, "a new predator has arisen in the person of ataman Grigoriev, who, croaking to the people about his disasters, labor and oppression, actually carries the old robbery order, under which the labor of the people will be enslaved, their disasters will increase, bondage will be fixed, rights will fall" [5: 108, 109].

8 As a counterbalance to Trotsky's assertions, Arshinov accused the communist government of causing the phenomenon of Grigorievism. The gist of his reasoning was as follows. The Bolsheviks established the dictatorship of their party as a state party to govern the people. As a result, a situation was created in which the working people fell under the supervision and control of authorities alien to the working people, who used methods of arbitrariness and violence. The dictatorship of the Bolshevik Communist Party gave rise to anger, protest and hostility towards the existing order among the masses of the people. Grigoriev took advantage of this in his adventure. Grigoriev is a traitor to the revolution and an enemy of the people, but it was the Bolshevik Communist Party that, by its irresponsible dictatorship, created anger among the masses, which he took advantage of (similar to the data of the situation

another adventurer can use the authority). Blaming Grigoriev for betrayal, Arshinov at the same time considered it necessary to blame the Communist Party for the appearance of the Grigoriev movement [5: 111-112].

On June 9, 1919, the Revolutionary Military Councils of the armies of the Southern Front received a telegram from Trotsky indicating the liquidation of the "Makhnovist Gulyai-Pole conspiracy", demanding that all cases be transferred to an emergency tribunal [18].

As a protest against these actions, Makhno sent a telegram on June 8, 1919 to the leadership of the Soviet Republic with a statement: the inalienable right of the peasants to convene congresses to discuss topical issues is the conquest of the revolution, therefore the ban on holding congresses is a violation of the revolutionary rights of the people [19].

The congress of peasants, workers and insurgents of the revolutionary insurgent army of Ukraine (Makhnovists), convened in the city of Aleksandrovsk on October 28-November 2, 1919, announced the creation of free peasant organizations throughout the Makhnovist territory, their congresses (local and regional) for solution of pressing issues of social construction. Free social and economic organizations at the local level were proposed to unite with each other [2: 231, 235].

None of the Makhnovists definitely understood the meaning of the second term from the phrase "free powerless Soviets", but the first was perceived positively: in practice, many have already learned what the Soviets are like under the Bolshevik Revolutionary Committees, White Guard and Petliurist commandants [3: 148].

The "free Soviet system" meant in the peasant's perception the rejection of the tax on the maintenance of the state, the city, which could not give anything in return for rural products. The slogan of "free soviets" protested both against the remnants of serfdom and capitalism, and against war communism. The idea of a "free Soviet system" assumed the organization of a new economic and social life of free peasants, the organization of which was declared on the basis of social equality and justice with the elimination of classes, political parties, and national inequality.

The revolutionary banner of Nestor Makhno personified not so much the banner of anarchy, as is often imagined, but the people's movement.

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movement for justice, aimed at solving urgent social issues - the liberation of workers, the creation of a life order without the oppression and arbitrariness of the authorities. The anarchist speculative theory, like other radical revolutionary ideologies, turned out to be far from the true interests of the working people, whom they supposedly intended to "liberate". Makhno had practically no peace time for social construction: anarchist methods were tested in combat conditions. The Makhnovist movement arose on its own soil, developed as an independent peasant movement with conscious goals. It did not come to anarchism, but a group of anarchist-communists joined the peasant movement as political workers. The Makhnovshchina absorbed elements of anarchism that could help achieve the goals of the mass peasant movement. The protrusion of the anarchist shell of the Makhnovshchina, attempts to define the typology of this mass peasant movement as an anarchist one are often supported by references to Makhno's memoirs. Whether the illiterate ataman himself could write his memoirs, or whether the text was composed by others, is a debatable question. From his youth, Makhno fell under the influence of the Yekaterinoslav anarchists, then mastered it during his many years in the Butyrka hard labor prison, where the anarchist Pyotr Arshinov acted as a mentor to the young Makhno. Life universities forged in "Modest" (nickname Makhno from the time of hard labor) anarchist will and cruelty. Being in your sights at

an adherent of anarchism, Makhno did not understand the theory very well!. Makhno remained faithful to the ideals learned in his youth - the idea of universal redistribution and equality, the omnipotence of the working people, the desire to make the poor happy. Freedom, free labor, equality and solidarity were called upon to triumph over slavery under the yoke of the state and capital. The anarchists, while rejecting the dictatorship of the proletariat, understood the social revolution as the transfer of the means of production to the disposal of the worker-producer. For the anarcho-communists, the enemies of the working people were not only the landlords, but also the kulaks as the oppressors of the working people.

Makhno's anarchist mentor, Pyotr Arshinov (Marin), noted Makhno's lack of knowledge (theoretical, historical, political), as a result of which Makhno "often lost sight of theory" (5: 210).

Makhno's inner circle consisted of his compatriots who had mastered basically the primary educational level (one-two-year schooling), including the most illiterate "semi-proletarian" Makhno. It can be assumed that they hardly studied the anarcho-communist writings of Kropotkin, but believed in egalitarian socialism. For the Makhnovists, the language expressed in one of the leaflets of the Makhnovist headquarters was more understandable: "The insurgent army considers it its sacred duty to defend the interests of the working peasantry against the attempt of the communist gentlemen to harness the working peasantry into their yoke. The insurrectionary army is a sword in the hands of the working people, it calls on you, comrade peasants and workers, to take into your own hands both the further construction of your happiness and your people's labor wealth without the help of party officials, prophets and Bolshevik charlatans who are worthy of death. like vile thieves, cowards and robbers in front of the working people, in whom they find only "human material" and cannon fodder" [2: 337].

To characterize the social composition of the Makhnovist army, we will cite a group of Makhnovist commanders who were among Makhno's closest associates: Vasily Kurylenko, a native of the family of a farm laborer in the Mariupol district, was a regiment commander, a member of the headquarters of the insurgent army, was presented for awarding the Order of the Red Banner for capturing Mariupol; Petrenko Petr — from a family of laborers — full cavalier of St. George, ensign, regiment commander, strike group commander, chief of staff of the Azov group of the rebel army; Truth is, from a farm laborer's family in Aleksandrovsk district, he was a commander of a detachment, a regiment, a head of an infirmary, an army convoy; Troyan Gavriil - a farmhand from Gulyaipol, Makhno's adjutant, secretary of the Military Revolutionary Council of the Makhnovist army, commander of a special regiment, a special group under the commander; Karetnikov (Karetnik) Semyon - a landless peasant, a laborer in the Gulyai-Polye volost - regiment commander, assistant commander (deputy Makhno), acting. commander of the rebel army (Makhnovists), commander of the special Crimean group of troops of the Makhnovists; Shchus Fedor - a poor peasant in the village of Bolshaya Mikhailovka, Aleksandrovsky district - head of the Makhnovist cavalry, member of the headquarters of the insurgent army, deputy to Makhno; Belash Victor - a native of the village of Novospasovka, Berdyansk district, Tauride province, a working engine driver of a steam locomotive - head of the operational department of Makhno's h

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Deputy Chairman of the Council of the Revolutionary Insurgent Army of Ukraine (Makhnovists); Vasilevsky Grigory - a peasant of Gulyaipol, from a poor family - Makhno's personal friend and ally, often played the role of his deputy, at the end of 1919 - January 1920 - Makhno's adjutant; Vdovichenko Trofim, a native of a farm laborer's family in the village of Novospasovka, Berdyansk district, participated in the First World War, ensign, full St. corps of the Makhnovist rebel army, from May 1920 to May 1921 - commander of the Azov group of the rebel army; Veretelnikov Boris - a peasant from Gulyaipol, worked as a foundry worker at the Krieger plant and at the Putilov plant in Petrograd. At the beginning of 1919, he was the chief commissar of the Military Revolutionary Field Headquarters of Gulyaipol, in May 1919, he was a senior assistant to the chief of staff of the 3rd Zadneprovskaya division; Marchenko (Shevchenko) Aleksey - a native of Gulyaipol, from a poor family - 'junior non-commissioned officer of the tsarist army, member of the Council of Revolutionary Insurgents, in late 1919 - early 1920 - corps commander, commander of the entire army cavalry, from June 1920 - commander of the cavalry group [2: 886-890, 897, 901, 905, 911-912, 917, 920-921]. The above Makhnovist commanders, who played a prominent role in the peasant movement, came from the poor, had basically an education no higher than

initial.

Makhno adopted the anarchist denial of nationality as such and the rallying of the working people on an international basis: he fought against independent nationalists, opposed anti-Semitism

ma'. The anarchists in the environment of the ataman were mostly Jews. The Makhnovist detachments that fought against the hetman and Denikinism, later against the Soviet regime, included a special Jewish battery (its entire composition, rebels and commanders, were exclusively Jews). Makhnovskaya counterintelligence was headed by Lev Zadov (Zin-

' One of the reasons for the murder of Ataman Grigoriev by Makhno's entourage was anti-Semitic pogroms. Grigoriev's "pogrom universal" published on May 7, 1919 in Elizavetgrad (Kirovograd) "To the Ukrainian people [Its beginning]" said: "The Ukrainian people. The people are exhausted! You are forcibly forced to impose a commune, a clerk and commissars from the Moscow "glutton" and the country where Christ was crucified..." [2:860].

kovsky). Max Chernyak, a Vakhodian from a poor Jewish family, at various times held the positions of regiment commander, head of the Berdyansk counterintelligence (1919), head of the Makhnovist counterintelligence in early 1921 [2: 919-920].

Almost the entire "revolutionary military council" created under the ataman, following the example of the Bolsheviks, consisted of Jews. It included, in addition to the senior mentors of Makhno P. Arshinov and V. Volin, the anarchists I. Teper, I. Emigrant, Ya. Aly, A. Baron. At the beginning of 1919, the executive committee of the Military Revolutionary Council, in an appeal to the workers, peasants and rebels, announced a sharp condemnation of the Jewish pogroms [2: 64].

The 2nd congress of the Gulyai-Polye district congress of front-line soldiers, Soviets, departments and sub-departments of the military revolutionary headquarters of the region in February 1919 in a special resolution "against robberies, violence and Jewish pogroms perpetrated by various dark personalities, hiding behind the name of honest insurgents", announced: the enslaved of all nationalities — Russians, Poles, Latvians, Armenians, Jews, Germans — must unite into one common friendly family of workers and peasants in order to "throw off the chains of economic slavery and spiritual entrenchment". All persons who took part in such atrocities and violence were declared enemies of the revolution and the working people and were to be shot at the scene of the crime [2: 88-89].

Possessing a natural pragmatic mind, Makhno could not help but realize the discrepancy between anarchist ideas and their real implementation. The anarchist movement, full of revolutionary pathos, played a prominent role in the revolutionary social breakdown. In accordance with the anarchist doctrine, the Makhnovists destroyed and blew up prisons in occupied cities - they gave people freedom. But anarchist dreams and ideals were shattered by a collision with life's realities. Anarchist theorists could not come up with concrete ways to translate their own ideas into the practice of building a new society.

The anarchists expected that their theoretician Kropotkin would point out concrete ways for organizing the peasant movement in the countryside, explain how the worker could take possession of the land without power over himself. On May 30, 1919, Makhno wrote a letter to Kropotkin from Gulyaipol, in which he informed about the sending of food for the anarchist theorist and asked him to send an article "on social construction in the countryside" to the Makhnovist publication, which, in his words, "would be very important for peasants" [20: 530]. In the summer of 1918, Makhno met with Kropotkin in Moscow. But the expectations were not met. The idealist dreamer Kropotkin did not answer these questions. Anarchists in the Makhnovshchina independently tried to create an image of the peasantry as the creator and bearer of the revolution in the countryside.

Life practice destroyed the anarchist ideal theories. The idea of making the Makhnovist Insurrectionary Army the World Insurrectionary Army [2: 337] was an anarchist dream. The doctrine of anarcho-communism rejected the state, but practice forced Makhno to take up the foundations of state building: the new "state" (Makhnovia) had its capital - Gulyaipole, had to create state bodies - councils ("free" and "powerless" in name), to engage in daily organization of the life of the population.

The Makhnovist Revolutionary Military Council in its resolution proclaimed the anarcho-communist principle of the free exchange of labor products, mainly between workers. But the attempt to implement this Kropotkin idea about the direct exchange of goods between the countryside and the city, without the participation of an intermediary in the person of the state, failed in practice. An attempt to set up free communes proved unsuccessful when the state claimed its rights to the result of the work of "free" communards. The resolution of the VRS established the circulation of various types of money - Soviet, Ukrainian and others [2: 323]. But anarchist dogmatism, expressed in the circulation of all types of banknotes (from the tsarist to the Soviet and Deniskin), led to complete chaos of the financial market in Makhnovia.

The anarchist theoreticians, speaking on behalf of the popular national ataman, did not find a common language with the peasant masses. It is no coincidence that there were sentiments among anarchists that the Makhnovshchina was "not in harmony" with the ideological foundations of socialism [2: 602]. The interests of the peasants did not contradict spontaneous anarchism, but anarchism was not perceived as a political doctrine. The psychology of a small owner, combined with natural individual anarchic egoism, demonstrated the unwillingness of any power over oneself. Community support

The Makhnovshchina (replenishment, concealment) was determined by the need for protection from the predatory policy of power, self-government, as well as the opportunity to take advantage of the material benefits of anarchy (refusal to pay taxes and perform duties, seize land, military booty).

The resolution of an emergency meeting of active workers of the Nabat anarchist confederation in March 1920 contained the following provisions: "Since this movement manifests the desire of the lower classes for self-liberation, it is the duty of every anarchist to actively help him in the fight against state. But the Makhnovist army is not an anarchist army. The Makhnovist army is an intertwining of revolutionary devotion, courage, self-sacrifice with the prejudices of the average village dweller... about the anarchist ideal. Therefore, the meeting of the Nabat confederation reminded its supporters: one must not confuse the Makhnovist movement with the anarchist movement, let alone substitute one for the other. The task was set "of the most conscious part of the Makhnovist rebels to make an advanced ideological anarchist vanguard" [21: 388-389; 2: 332-333].

An objective assessment of the relationship between anarchism and the Makhnovshchina was given by P. Arshinov. According to him, the Makhnovshchina originated and developed independently, without influence from anarchist organizations. Anarchists entered the movement with a huge delay, when social construction was interrupted by hostilities. Anarchists found themselves in a situation of hostilities. Arshinov regretted the untapped potential of anarchism, which, in his opinion, was the only worldview on which the Makhnovshchina could rely in the fight against Bolshevism [5: 225, 227, 228].

Noteworthy is the opinion about the influence of anarchism on the Makhnovshchina, expressed by the anarchist D.I. Popov: attempts by both the party and various anarchist groups were made repeatedly, but they were not successful. Popov argued his own assessment: "It is necessary, stating the unpreparedness of the working masses, to say that mass anarchist construction is impossible, and, consequently, an attempt to start a campaign among the masses now for the destruction of the existing state communist apparatus of Soviet power would be an attempt in the highest degree. thoughtless and, undoubtedly, to the detriment of the interests of the revolution. Suppose that in a short period of time, to some extent, it would be possible to destroy the state apparatus, but, undoubtedly, absolutely nothing would be possible to replace it. Hence the short rest intended to strengthen the revolutionary forces given by the struggle and

brittle, would completely weaken and shake the already exhausted organism of the revolution. If we destroyed the state communist construction, although existing with great shortcomings, we would be left with nothing: incapable of even the slightest rebuff to the advancing reaction. Consequently, for me, as for an anarchist-communist, who ideologically rejects statehood in principle, the least evil is not the destruction of the state apparatus of power at the given moment, but its preservation, since it is the only apparatus for establishing and strengthening revolutionary power at the given moment. the relics of peasants and workers" [22].

The Makhnovist Anarchist Revolutionary Military Council organized rallies, trying to explain the foundations of anarchist doctrine, published leaflet newspapers with rebellious titles "Nabat", "The Way to Freedom", "Free Rebel", the content of which was overflowing with anarchist demagoguery. Who read anarchist publications? An illiterate peasant mass?

The Revolutionary Military Council had no power. Makhno's headquarters kept him under tight rein. The group of the Makhnovist army of the Crimean direction, by the decision of the head of the corps, even organized its own VRS, which was not subordinate to Volin's VRS. The following event is indicative. On November 20, 1919, at a joint meeting of the Military Revolutionary Council and the command of the Makhnovist Insurgent Army, the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, Volin, in response to Makhno's statement

that "the Council is doing nothing," declared: the Council is straining all its efforts, but it is not taken into account, as a result, the decisions of the Revolutionary Military Council remain only on paper - the decisions and instructions of the Council are not carried out. The commander, Wolin lamented, rarely attended meetings of the Revolutionary Military Council. Volin turned to Makhno with a request to issue a special order for the army, in which he demanded that the commanders comply with all decisions of the VRS. An attempt by the Revolutionary Military Council to intervene in the affairs of the Makhnovist counterintelligence received an immediate rebuff from the head of counterintelligence: "We do not recognize any commissions over ourselves. We work in the way that shows us what is necessary for the benefit of the working people." Even the consideration of the issues of the sanitary commission ended with a decision: to ask Batko Makhno to fulfill this promise in relation to the sanitary commission [2: 279-281, 285].

The anarchist commissars Makhno formulated the need for the so-called "voluntary mobilization" - a vivid

evidence of how anarchist dogma diverged from real life. The term "mobilization" implies the forced conscription of the population into the army with severe punishment for evasion. But in theory anarchists were against coercion. So they came up with something like the development of anarchism through a similar phrase. Initially, in February 1919, the 2nd congress of the Gulyai-Polye district congress of front-line soldiers, Soviets, departments and subdivisions of the Military Revolutionary Headquarters of the region announced mandatory general mobilization. The interpretation of the resolution on this issue is bewildering: mobilization was defined, on the one hand, as non-coercive - rejecting the principle of pressure from above by violence and orders, but, on the other hand, as mandatory: every peasant capable of bearing arms was asked to realize his own duty to protect the interests of all the working people and join the ranks of the rebels [2: 89].

The congress of peasants, workers and insurgents of the revolutionary insurrectionary army in Aleksandrovsk on October 28-November 2, 1919 adopted a decision on "voluntary mobilization" into the Makhnovist army. The resolution on the organization of military insurgent forces established the voluntary equalization mobilization of men in the age category over 30 years old, from 19 to 48 years old, on the territory liberated by the insurgent army (Makhnovists). The formation was carried out according to the territorial principle - by villages, volosts and counties. The special instruction on the formation of a revolutionary voluntary insurrectionary army from the working people explained that "the entire male population, from 19 to 48 years of age inclusive, in accordance with the voluntary egalitarian mobilization and with the consent of each that he goes voluntarily into the ranks of the Insurrectionary Army to protect the interests of the working masses from capital, is taken into account and divided into the following separate categories: a) from 19 to 28 years old inclusive; b) from 29 to 38 years; c) from 38 to 48 years. Accounting for each individual category was divided according to military specialty: infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineering units, from which the formation of the Insurgent Army into combat units was carried out: squads, platoons, companies, etc. The election of commanders was subject to restrictions - up to and including the regiment. The implementation of the instruction was entrusted to the local military departments of the volost Soviets, in case of their absence, to the volost Soviets. The commanders of large formations - brigades, divisions, corps - were appointed

army headquarters and the Military Revolutionary Council. To establish "steel comradely discipline" in the ranks of the Insurrectionary Army, it was required to create comrades' courts [2: 232-234].

Of course, the creation of "comradely courts" in the military army, in the conditions of the Civil War, is nonsense in itself. For this purpose, other bodies are being created - military and field courts, tribunals. The anarchy of a "free powerless army" did not exist in the Makhnovshchina. The anarchist "election of command staff" could not replace the principle of appointment and unity of command: the commanders of units and subunits (not only large formations, as was written in the above instructions) were appointed by Makhno himself or his associates.

In accordance with the doctrine of anarchism, which denied the power of the state, the bearers of the theory were not supposed to recognize the obligatory state attributes - armed and police officers.

strength. But on this issue, too, anarchist theory ran into a contradiction in practice: Makhno's "powerless" power allegedly established anarchy by force of arms - a rifle gave birth to power. The anarchist denial of laws gave rise to arbitrariness.

The peasant movement found its organizational expression in the Makhnovist rebel army. Makhno's insurrectionary army took shape in the spring of 1919. Makhno's orders for the Revolutionary Insurrectionary Army (Makhnovists) required the introduction of "brotherly, reasonable discipline" in units, quite in an anarchist spirit [23]. In a telegram dated January 29, 1919, addressed to the Soviet command, Makhno assured that the most stringent measures were taken to stop robberies, murders, requisitions and confiscations - if something like this happens anywhere, then only provocateurs [24]. However, the condemnation of the robberies could not stop them, even by the method of demonstrative executions of the Makhnovist robbers: the executions that were carried out by the Makhnovist army, including directly by the Old Man, cruel reprisals, robberies and confiscation of property, the horrors of the Makhnovist counterintelligence became commonplace. In all types of "revolutionary violence" Makhno himself took a direct part.

Black anarchist flag! above the mass peasant movement was only the outer shell of the Makhnovshchina.
Peasant

'
Along with black ones, red flags were encountered in the Makhnovist detachments.

[2: 621].

freemen with weapons in their hands defended the independence of their native villages. In the conditions of the Civil War, when death began to be perceived as a common thing, the peasants firmly grasped a simple truth: their chieftain against the Reds with their food requisitions and against the Whites with their requisitions - both were perceived as robbery. Therefore, the peasantry supported Makhno, who defended them with his combat detachments.

The basic principles of the organization of the army, according to an anarchist speculative construction - volunteering, elective principle, self-discipline - in fact turned out to be nothing more than a decorative facade of the real construction of the armed Makhnovist army. The revolutionary insurrectionary army of the Makhnovists basically copied the organization of the Red Army. The infantry was divided into brigades, regiments, battalions, companies, platoons, squads.

Order No. 2 for the Insurrectionary Army in October 1919 demanded the introduction of the strictest discipline in the units, an end to the unauthorized confiscation of horses, chaises, and robberies "to nip in the bud." In orders to units of the Makhnovist army, the commanders threatened severe punishment for unauthorized requisitions and indemnities, drunkenness, engaging in "revelry and debauchery", violence and "insidious treatment of civilians" [25; 2: 286, 287, 299].

One of the first holders of the Soviet Order of the Red Banner (according to his wife G.A. Kuzmenko, no other documentary evidence has been preserved), Makhno created and skillfully used the tactics of guerrilla warfare (including against the Red Army). The commanding staff of the Makhnovist army consisted of former non-commissioned officers of the tsarist army with good combat training and accumulated experience of partisan warfare during the years of the insurrectionary movement [26]. The rules of staff work established by the headquarters of the insurgent army were manifested in the tactical clarity and elaboration of the organization of military operations by the Makhnovist headquarters and unit commanders, based on information obtained from undercover data.

The intelligence of the Makhnovists was clearly debugged: the orders of the headquarters were based on accurate intelligence information obtained with the help of the population: the movement and arrival of Soviet military units was monitored (indicating the specific unit, purpose of arrival, movement routes). It should be noted that the Soviet military leadership highly appreciated the results of Makhno's reconnaissance not only in the villages, but also at the level of counties and volosts [27].

The lack of military order and forces was made up for by mobility, swiftness, surprise and courage of actions. For the transfer of infantry, machine guns, ammunition, carts were used -

it is the Makhnovists who have the priority of using carts (light spring carriages) for the rapid transportation of infantry and machine guns! The speed of movement was achieved by replacing horses with the local population. Makhno demanded in exchange for fresh horses to give away the tired ones, and also to pay in money. Traveling almost a hundred miles in a day was not uncommon for them. Makhno and his staff were elusive for a long time. Weapons, ammunition and equipment were replenished from among the trophies. The losses of the Makhnovist personnel were replenished by new young recruits.

Makhno invented flexible tactical schemes. Leaving a small detachment for bait, he could quickly retreat, trying to lure the enemy, and then quickly and imperceptibly enter his rear and flanks. As a result, the enemy suffered defeat from such unexpected and swift raids, blows from the rear. Another tactic of partisan tactics was as follows: when surrounded, the Makhnovists dispersed into small groups, infiltrated through the encirclement ring, and then united again to strike from the rear. If necessary, groups of Makhnovists went in different directions, confusing the enemy. Makhnovist partisan detachments dissolved in the steppe expanses, burying their weapons in the ground, and turned into peaceful villagers. Subsequently, at the agreed signal, they again united in an organized manner into a single fighting force.

The large-scale liquidation of the Makhnovshchina began immediately after the victory of the Soviet troops over Wrangel. The last - the third in a row - temporary alliance of the Soviet government with Makhno, due to

' Creation of the legend about the priority of the 1st Cavalry Army S.M. Budyonny in the use of a cart for transporting machine guns and infantry belongs to I. Stalin. At a solemn meeting at the Military Academy on November 17, 1923, on the occasion of the anniversary of the creation of the 1st Cavalry Army, Stalin announced: "The most characteristic page in the history of the Cavalry Army is that in the summer of 1919 the cavalry turned into a combination of a mass of cavalry with a mass of machine guns. The famous "tachanka" is an indicator of this connection. A characteristic feature is that the cavalry acquired another new property that gave it victory over Denikin's cavalry: it attached to itself some of the infantry units that it usually moved on carts "(Stalin I.V. Soch. Vol. 5. pp. 352-353).

joint struggle with the White movement, was broken immediately after the end of the fighting on the Crimean peninsula. The Soviet military command violated the military-political agreement between the government of the Ukrainian SSR and the Revolutionary Insurgent Army of Ukraine (Makhnovists), concluded on October 2, 1920: in accordance with this agreement, the Makhnovist army was part of the armed forces of the Soviet Republic as a partisan, with the preservation the established routine, "without conducting the foundations and beginnings of the regular units of the Red Army" [2: 485]. On November 23, 1920, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front issued an order to the command of the Makhnovist Insurrectionary Army: to immediately begin transforming the partisan insurgent units into regular military formations of the Red Army. The fate of this order was predetermined from the very beginning: the Makhnovists would not take such a step. The RVS of the front (Frunze, Smilga) clearly exceeded their authority. The next day, M. Frunze announced in his order: "The Makhnovshchina must be put an end to in three counts" [28].

On November 26, 1920, by order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front, Makhno and all his detachments were declared enemies of the Soviet Republic [29]. On November 24, the commander of the Crimean group of Makhnovist forces, S. Karetnikov, was summoned to Frunze's headquarters allegedly for a military conference, arrested, and shot on November 28. A similar fate befell the head of the Makhnovist field headquarters in the Crimea, P. Gavrilenko. The representative of the Makhnovists at the headquarters of the Southern Front in Kharkov, A. Budanov, was arrested by the Cheka on the night of November 25-26, and was shot at the end of November.

A powerful propaganda war was launched against the Makhnovists, in which provocative means were used. In particular, the created myth about Makhno's secret alliance with the White Guard generals was actively exploited [2: 427]. The population of Ukraine was excited by persistent reports of regular seizures by the Makhnovists of railway food trains for the workers of Donbass [30].

On October 10, 1920, in Trotsky's appeal "What does Makhno's defection to the side of Soviet power mean?" a new myth was being asserted: the Makhnovshchina "out of thoughtlessness" relied directly on the kulak upper classes of the village [2: 498]. The author did not pay attention to the obvious contradiction of this statement with his own statement in the article "Makhnovshchina" in 1919 about the anarchist nature of the Makhnovshchina: after all, for an anarchocommunist, the kulak was perceived only as an enemy of the working people. Therefore, Trotsky's attempt to unite in one social

In a real phenomenon, the Makhnovshchina, the irreconcilable sides seem to be not just erroneous, but rather provocative: a qualified theorist Trotsky could not fail to understand elementary theoretical nuances. Another thing is that such exercises in knowledge did not interest the illiterate peasant masses. For the people, their own life observations were more understandable, when the kulaks tried to destroy Makhno with the help of volunteer detachments.

As soon as the Crimean campaign ended, the Soviet authorities in Ukraine launched a struggle against the phenomenon, which at that time was called the term "banditry". The detailed order of its conduct was regulated by a special document - "Brief Instructions for Combating Banditry in Ukraine", which was approved by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine Kh. Kharkov December 8, 1920

According to this instruction, all types of weapons and military equipment were subject to seizure from the population. Since orders to surrender all weapons, as a rule, did not achieve their goal, it was proposed, using the information of special departments, to establish the exact number of weapons to be surrendered. When assigning the planned quantity to be issued, it was recommended to "not bury yourself" and indicate what is really possible for execution, but the requirement to complete, without stopping before the execution of the hostages taken as a guarantee for the successful collection of weapons. In order to maximize the collection of weapons, it was allowed simultaneously with this operation to establish an indemnity for the local population: a horse, a cow or a pig for an undelivered rifle, for example. Contribution could be replaced by weapons. In the event that a weapon not handed over during the search was found, regardless of whether the outfit for rifles was completed in full or not, those guilty of hiding were subject to execution.

Taking into account the special importance of transport routes and means of communication, preventive punitive measures were introduced in a fifteen-verst lane on both sides of the railway line or telegraph mainline: imposing responsibility on the local population for blowing up bridges, damaging the track or steam locomotives, and taking hostages. In the districts and localities most affected by banditry, the local population was held responsible in the form of mutual responsibility for any kind of unrest or rebellion against the Soviet regime.

In such cases, the hostages taken or part of the civilians bound by mutual responsibility were responsible "with their heads for the death of agents of the Soviet government or persons under its protection." A similar responsibility was assigned for untimely warning about the appearance of gangs in the given area, the departure of fellow villagers into gangs, or if a bandit or suspicious persons with no specific occupation, especially those of non-local origin, were hiding in a given village.

In case of manifestation of hostility of the population in any locality in relation to the Soviet power, harboring or non-delivery of bandits and rebels, various punishments were established for the local population: indemnity with food and food; contribution with items of uniform (linen, warm clothes, boots, pillows, blankets, etc.); the eviction and "confiscation" of the families of the leaders and instigators of the uprisings with the confiscation of all their property and the transfer of the latter to the poor; in certain cases, the destruction (arson or destruction) of the houses of bandits. At the same time, the inadmissibility of burning or destroying entire villages or individual quarters by artillery "out of combat" was specifically stipulated [31]. The last prohibition of the destruction of villages and villages was explained by the excessive waste of potential property and property. The text of the given instructions was sprinkled in places

accentuated references to kulaks, "kulak population", "kulak strata", however, such class accents could not obscure the very definite anti-people orientation of this document.

In the liquidation of the Makhnovshchina, the same military-punitive methods were used, which were tested on the "internal front" formed in the first half of 1921 in the fight against other large centers of peasant rebellion, especially the Antonovshchina and the West Siberian uprising. The tactics of fighting the partisan methods of the Makhnovists included isolating the rebels from the main bases and strongholds - permanent garrisons from the regular troops, mainly cavalry, were placed in the rebel areas. For this purpose, "gangster centers" were specially identified - villages were declared "counter-revolutionary nests", from which those suspected of having links with the Makhnovists were evicted, their property was confiscated. Under the protection of the garrisons, the Soviet apparatus was created on the ground, self-defense units were formed [32]. Armor was used against the rebels

trains, armored cars, airplanes that carried out reconnaissance, bombing and shelling.

Strong barriers were set up on the proposed routes of movement of the Makhnovists. The uninterrupted exhausting pursuit of the Makhnovist detachments was ensured by mobile detachments and special cavalry flying detachments at the garrisons; Special bodies were engaged in the organization of an agent network among the population. Clear tasks were set before the special departments and bodies of the Cheka: identifying the current leaders of the gangs, their place of residence, the persons hiding them, and methods of catching or destroying them; determination of the number of ordinary gang members, their armament, the location of headquarters, the possibility of decomposition and liquidation; the political state of the village population, their attitude towards active gangs, the number of weapons the population has; operational measures to eliminate and liquidate the ringleaders; the introduction of informers into the composition of Soviet bodies - volost executive committees and volrevkoms - to identify bandit elements that have penetrated into them and eliminate them [33]. The Red Army units were also purged of Promakhnovist sentiments - special army commissions worked on this.

At the personal insistence of the chairman of the Cheka F. Dzerzhinsky, the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) discussed the issue of rewarding distinguished Red Army soldiers in battles with the Makhnovists - for this purpose a large batch of gifts was allocated, including from the funds of the Gokhran: silver cigarette cases, metal and silver watches, chains, checkers, daggers [34]. In a circular telegram to all the gubchek and special departments dated March 30, 1921, Dzerzhinsky demanded to intensify the recruitment of agents among the peasantry in the villages, to speed up the liquidation of the ringleaders, "not stopping at rewards, either monetary or material" [2: 608-609]. On the initiative of Dzerzhinsky, special detachments of the Cheka were formed to fight the Makhnovists (in modern parlance, spetsnaz) [35].

On April 6, 1921, the order of the commander of all armed forces in Ukraine and authorized representative of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic M. Frunze put into effect the "Instruction on hostages", approved by the Central Commission for Combating Banditry under the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine. In accordance with the provisions of this document, in each individual case, before the taking of hostages, a specific period was announced, within

which the requirements presented to the population must be met, and it was widely announced that in case of non-fulfillment of the established requirements, responsibility was assigned

for the entire population of the area.

The hostages must be determined from among the relatives of the bandits, persons suspected of complicity and sympathy with the bandits and rebels. After the taking of hostages, the population was informed on the spot that only as the demands made on the population were met, within a certain period of time, the hostages would be released. At the same time, the local population

The leaders of the operation were notified of the following: the hostages were kept in the provincial town, so that in the event of further banditry in the area, the departure of the inhabitants to the rebels and uprisings, they were subject to execution. This instruction was required to be guided by all Soviet troops sent to fight. with banditry [2: 610].

In order to eliminate the insurgency, an amnesty was used for voluntarily returning bandits and partisans. Local Soviet authorities adopted resolutions: repentant bandits and partisans had the opportunity to get back their former land allotments [2: 611]. An amnesty was established for the Makhnovists in connection with the 4th anniversary of the October Revolution, later the amnesty period was extended by a decree of the Central Executive Committee of Ukraine until May 15, 1922. The All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets adopted a law on amnesty. The appeal of the former chieftains "To the Makhnovist rebels" called voluntarily

lay down your arms. Amnesty throughout the Soviet Republic was announced in connection with the 5th anniversary of the October Revolution. The transition to the NEP significantly undermined the foundations of the insurrectionary movement.

Sources and notes:

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Grigorievshchina

In May 1919, a major uprising against the Soviet state took place in the south of Ukraine. After the name of its leader, ataman Grigoriev, the anti-Soviet action was named

Grigorievshchina.

Grigoriev Nikolay (Nikifor) Alexandrovich [1878-1919] - from the peasantry, staff captain of the tsarist army. Member of the Russo-Japanese and World War I. Awarded with the George Cross. In 1917-1918. served in the troops of the Central Rada, then received the rank of colonel in the Ukrainian state of Hetman Skoropadsky. In December 1918, he joined the Petliurites, at the same time he entered into an agreement with the left Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries-Borotbists. After the defeat of the Directory of the Ukrainian People's Republic, on February 2, 1919, he went over to the side of the Red Army. By agreement with the commander

Ukrainian Soviet Front V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko, the partisan detachments of Grigoryev joined the 2nd Ukrainian Soviet Army as an autonomous unit. The terms of such accession contradicted the order of formation of the regular Red Army. Mutual concessions were explained by the understanding on both sides of the temporality and fragility

concluded union.

On February 18, Grigoriev was appointed commander of the 1st brigade of the Zadneprovskaya Soviet division P.E. Dybenko (commander of the 3rd brigade was N.I. Makhno). On March 10, 1919, Grigoriev's troops captured Kherson, and on March 12, the French command voluntarily liberated Nikolaev. After that, Grigoriev sent a telegram to the military governor of Odessa, offering to surrender the city, threatening otherwise to remove his skin and make a drum out of it. The Franco-Greek troops received an order from their own command to clear Odessa within three days (after the fall of the government of Clemenceau in France in early April, an active supporter of intervention, the first steps of his successors was to recall the allied landing of the Entente from Russia). Therefore, the troops of Grigoriev, without meeting a rebuff, occupied Odessa on April 6, 1919. Nevertheless, the brigade commander Grigoriev was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for the capture of Odessa. On April 25, his brigade, which consisted of 6 regiments, cavalry and artillery battalions, was reformed into the 6th Rifle Division of the 3rd Ukrainian Soviet Army. However, the Red Divisional Commander preferred to call himself "ataman of the partisans of the Kherson and Tavria regions." In imitation of the great Kyiv prince Svyatoslav the Conqueror, the chieftain in his appeals to the enemy said: "I am coming at you." His contemporaries unequivocally characterized him as an imperious, overly ambitious, selfish, cunning, adventurous, reckless and boastful person. According to Nestor Makhno's description, he was a dense, squat, nose-spoken, rude, self-confident man with an ugly, stupid face, always scolding the "kid" Trotsky [1: 528].

Ataman Grigoriev had the ability to quickly change his political appearance for the sake of the prospect of his own brilliant career, repeatedly betraying his recent associates. The phenomenon of Grigorievism was generated by the costs of revolutionary social breakdown, when statements of loyalty to the Ukrainian people were accompanied in practice by the desire to destroy the Ukrainian state. Ataman Grigoriev dreamed of the glory of the "victor of the imperialists An

Tanty", about the role of the leader of the Ukrainian people. After the capture of Odessa, he spoke of himself as a great commander, a world-class strategist. Within two weeks in May 1919, the chieftain became one of the main figures in Ukrainian politics, claiming to be the dictator of all Ukraine. He did not have any political experience or education (his education was only two grades of elementary school). Since February 1919, Grigoriev's chief of staff was Yuri Tyutyunnik, a former ensign of the tsarist army, in 1917-1918. - Member of the Central Rada, organizer of the uprising against Hetman Skoropadsky, chief of staff of the troops of the Petliura Directory. He was one of those who pushed Grigoriev to betray Petliura. But already in March, Tyutyunnik, an ambitious, sharp man, realizing the lack of prospects for an alliance with the government of the Soviets, began to carry out anti-Bolshevik agitation in the brigade. Grigoriev himself was indignant at the "dominance of the commissars", who were sent to his brigade, according to the ataman, "thirty pieces." On the other hand, the Soviet military command hatched plans to reorganize the Grigoriev division into a regular unit and arrest the ataman.

The inevitable contradictions between Grigoriev and the Bolsheviks intensified after the capture of Odessa. Odessa was the center of the intervention of the armies of nine countries. The Allies did not have time to evacuate a huge amount of weapons, ammunition, munitions, factories, food delivered from abroad to Odessa for the interventionist armies. Ataman was not going to share the captured wealth with the Bolshevik Revolutionary Committee. Tyutyunnik, the commandant of Odessa appointed by Grigoriev, was especially dissatisfied with the Odessa Revolutionary Committee. Grigoriev began to take out the looted trophies by echelons to their native villages in the northern Kherson region. The troops of Ataman Grigoriev, who himself was distinguished by chronic drunkenness, were mired in constant robberies and confiscations, bloody reprisals against prisoners. In the Askania-Nova National Reserve, the Grigoryevites killed the last Ukrainian bison.

Grigoriev's alliance with the Bolsheviks was accelerated by the decision of the ideologists of the world revolution, represented by the Bolshevik leadership, to send ataman detachments to save the revolution in Soviet Hungary, which was under blockade, and also to kindle the flame of the proletarian revolution in Europe. This required the defeat of Romania, the liberation of Bessarabia, Bukovina. However, the prospect of shedding their blood on foreign soil did not suit the Ukrainians.

peasants - the world proletarian revolution did not interest them. At the same time, the dissatisfaction of the peasants with the food policy of military communism in their native villages, attempts to carry out mass collectivization in a short time, and the arbitrariness of food detachments and Cheka bodies was growing. Prodrazverstka in Ukrainian villages was carried out uncontrollably and resulted in food requisition, dooming peasant families to starvation. The landlords' land was transferred not to the peasants, but to the created collective farms, state farms, state farms, state sugar factories. The peasant who shed blood in the struggle for land and freedom, for whom his own land was the main dream, was deceived by the Soviet state. Instead of elective Soviets in the villages of Ukraine, revolutionary committees and committees of the poor were planted, headed by communists, whom the people did not elect.

Waiting and not refusing to attack Romania and Hungary, Grigoriev received three weeks from the Soviet command to reorganize units before a long campaign and to rest for his division in his native lands. At the end of April 1919, the Grigoryevites left for the area of Elizavetgrad (now Kirovograd) - Alexandria, most of them were sent home. The appearance of the Grigoryevites in the villages, where the food detachments and security officers were in charge, dramatically changed the situation in the Kherson region. Grigoriev's fighters openly called for pogroms, the massacre of communists and the expulsion of Russians from Ukraine. In the very first days, bloody conflicts began in the Elizavetgrad region, accompanied by the murders of communists, Chekists and Red Army soldiers.

On May 3, 1919, the first of the Jewish pogroms organized by the Grigoryevites began - at the Znamenska station. On May 4-6, they committed pogroms in Elizavetgrad, Alexandria, at the Dolinskaya station; during the pogroms, the Grigoryevites beat and killed communists, Chekists, and commissars. On May 7, the commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Soviet Army N.A. Khudyakov ordered Grigoriev to stop the disgrace on the part of the soldiers of his division within 24 hours. Otherwise, he had to arrive at the army headquarters in Odessa and resign as divisional commander. The order-ultimatum of the commander did not leave the ataman a chance. In addition, on the same day, when Grigoriev received an ultimatum order, the security officers of the special department of the front tried to arrest him, but unsuccessfully. The Grigoryevites shot the Chekists, arrested all the communist political workers of the division. It is noteworthy that a few days before the specified order in the division, Grigoriev finished

work of the Higher Military Inspectorate. The inspection report spoke of the need for the speedy dismissal of Grigoriev and his staff officers from command positions and bringing them to justice. A legitimate opportunity for this was provided by the decree on the abolition of the principle of elective command personnel, issued at the end of April 1919.

On May 7, 1919, Divisional Commander Grigoriev received an order from the Soviet command to concentrate along the Dniester River, on the Romanian border. However, Grigoriev refused to comply with the order to move the 6th division to the Romanian front. Based on the discontent of the peasantry of the south

Ukraine's surplus appraisal, he raised an uprising in the rear of the Red Army against the Bolshevik dictatorship. Imitating the hetmans of the era of Khmelnytsky and Mazepa, on May 8, 1919, the chieftain issued the famous "Universal" "To the Ukrainian people [Its beginning]" - a political manifesto of the rebels, which stirred up all of Ukraine in May 1919: the Ukrainian people were called to rise up against the commune, Chemists and Commissars. Grigoriev announced the mobilization within three days of all who are capable of owning weapons.

The rebels put forward slogans: "Power to the Soviets of the people of Ukraine without communists!", "Ukraine for Ukrainians!", "Free trade in bread!" The text of the "Universal" contrasted the party dictatorship with the dictatorship of the working people "with the rights of the working people." The peasantry was called upon to immediately organize people's power. In every village it was proposed to elect a peasant soviet, in every volost a volost soviet, in every province a provincial soviet. The council had the right to be elected representatives of all parties on the Soviet platform, non-partisans, supporting the Soviet government. Established national proportional representation in the Soviets: 80% for Ukrainians, 15% for Russians, 5% for Jews. The All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, which appointed the government, was declared the supreme people's body. Criminal acts were defined as murders without a people's court, looting, outrages, "invasion of someone else's economy", illegal requisitions, agitation against individual nationalities, which were punishable "on the spot by force of arms." "Universal", signed by "the ataman of the partisans of Kherson and Tavria" N. Grigoriev, was distributed in units of the 6th Infantry Division and among the population of Elizavetgrad. The ideologist of Grigoriev's "Universal" was Yuri Tyutyunnik. High-sounding appeals to the working people ("Ukrainian people, your fate depends on you", etc.) and calls to establish

4 - 4735

people's power in Ukraine in the very first days of the uprising were refuted in practice, as well as in subsequent "generalists" of the ataman.

The ignorance and anti-Semitism of Grigoriev and his associates embodied in a series of brutal and bloody pogroms against Jews, during which about 5,000 people died. The rebels, fueled by anti-Semitic propaganda, vented their hatred of the Communist dictatorship on the Jews, who were considered Bolsheviks and the culprits of all their misfortunes. On May 15, more than three thousand Jews were exterminated in Yelizavetgrad; yesterday's Red Army killed women, children, the elderly. Among those killed was the younger brother of the future leader of the Comintern, Grigory Zinoviev, the local anarchist Misha Zloy. The pogrom also touched the so-called "newcomers from the North" - Russians, several hundred of whom were brutally killed. A wave of pogroms also swept through other cities: Uman, Kremenchug, Cherkassy, Yekaterinoslav. In the next "universal" Grigoriev attacked the "hook-nosed commissars" and called for plundering Odessa - a city with a large Jewish population - until it becomes small.

According to Ivan Bunin, an eyewitness to the events, described in Cursed Days, in May 1919, almost all of Little Russia was covered by Grigorievism. Grigorievshchina spread over most of the territory of the Kherson and Yekaterinoslav provinces.

On May 9, Grigoriev launched an offensive from the Znamenska-Alexandria region in several directions: a group of the chief of staff Tyutyunnik was moving towards Yekaterinoslav (now Dnepropetrovsk), Kiev led by the brigade commander Pavlov, and Cherkassy led by the Cossack ataman Uvarov. Elizavetgrad was captured by a group under the command of ataman Gorbenko. The Soviet and the Cheka were dispersed in the city, military units were disarmed, and communists were executed. Power in the county town was in the hands of the Grigoriev Revolutionary Committee. The rebels captured Cherkassy, Uman, Kremenchug, Yekaterinoslav, Elizavetgrad, Kherson, Nikolaev and other cities.

Initially, the rebel forces had 16 thousand bayonets, 52 guns, 7 armored trains and about 500 machine guns. With the development of the uprising, the number of rebels exceeded 20 thousand people. In mid-May, success accompanied the rebels: they were supported by the peasantry of the center of Ukraine and

part of the Red Army soldiers, mostly of Ukrainian origin. Before the peasants, Grigoriev spoke as

defender of the Orthodox faith and the Ukrainian people. There was a real danger of all Ukrainian Soviet armies going over to the side of Grigoriev. In his next "generalist" the ataman hastened to announce that the communists had already been defeated on all fronts, and the Leninist government was fleeing abroad through the Poltava region.

The Grigoriev uprising took place during the period of fierce battles between the Red Southern Front and the advancing armies of Denikin - this explains the initial successes of the ataman. To fight the uprising, the Soviet military command had to urgently release military units from the front. May 10, 1919 Grigoriev was outlawed. On May 14, three groups of Soviet troops with a total of 30 thousand soldiers launched an offensive from Kyiv, Poltava and Odessa. May 15 A.Ya. Parkhomenko recaptured Yekaterinoslav from the Grigoryevites, and the city changed hands three times. On May 16, 1919, L.D., chairman of the RVSR, arrived in Ukraine in an armored train. Trotsky. Every tenth captured insurgent was shot.

In an effort to keep the initiative in his hands, Grigoriev used the tactics of "blitzkrieg echelon warfare". Having put most of his troops in echelons, he moved them to Poltava, Kyiv, Yekaterinoslav. However, the "echelon war" revealed a fatal prospect for the ataman: the armed forces of the rebels dispersed without determining the direction of the main attack, dissolved in the vast expanse of Ukraine. The rebels flooded a huge region from the Dniester to the Dnieper, from the Black Sea to the outskirts of Kyiv. Grigoriev overestimated his own abilities as a strategist and politician. He turned out to be an incompetent commander and politician, unable to either plan a military operation or foresee the consequences of his actions. Five days later, his offensive fizzled out. Among the rebels of Grigoriev, the process of internal decomposition was growing.

The rebellious chieftain hoped to combine the actions of his detachments with the actions of other Ukrainian chieftains, primarily Batka Makhno and Ataman Zeleny. Hoping for the support of Zeleny (Terpilo), who raised the uprising in March 1919, Grigoriev hoped to capture the south of the Kyiv province. However, by May 8, Ataman Zeleny was defeated by Soviet troops. Nestor Makhno enjoyed great popularity in the Ukrainian Soviet armies. In May 1919, he still fought on the side of the Reds as part of the 3rd Ukrainian Soviet Army, but relations between him and the Bolsheviks were on the verge of breaking.

However, Zaporozhye was threatened by the White Guards - Makhno threw all his forces against the advancing Whites. He declared that Grigoriev's "feuds" with the Bolsheviks over power could not force him to open the front for the White Guards. Makhno did not support the uprising and took a wait-and-see attitude. In a statement to the Soviet government, he said that he did not have accurate data on the goals of the rebels, so he initially refrained from issuing an appeal against Grigoriev "until clear data were received." On May 18, 1919, the Makhnovist commission visited the region of the uprising and informed the brigade commander that the Grigorievites were smashing and killing Jews. After this message, Makhno issued an appeal "Who is Grigoriev", where he declared the ataman a "robber", "counter-revolutionary", "adventurer", "pogromist provocateur". "Grigorievshchina smells like Petliurism," Makhno concluded.

By the end of May, Soviet units under the command of K.E. Voroshilov, P.E. Dybenko, A.I. Egorova, M.K. Levandovsky, A.Ya. Parkhomenko suppressed the uprising. When the Grigoryevites found themselves under fire from machine guns and cannons, their fighting ardor quickly faded. Thousands of rebels began to surrender at the first approach of regular formations of the Red Army. The Red Army units, which supported Grigoriev a week ago, returned to the "red" command. On May 19-20, the Grigorievites were driven out of Kremenchug, Cherkasy, and Krivoy Rog. On May 21 the ataman's troops were defeated near Kiev. On May 22, the Reds took Alexandria, the center of the rebels; on May 23, Znamenka; In the battles, the rebels suffered heavy losses. Most of the Grigorievites fled to their homes. The remnants of the defeated forces fled with weapons in the steppe villages and switched to partisan tactics.

war. Tyutyunnik led his detachment to join forces with Petlyura (later he became the commander of the 4th Kyiv division of the Petliura army).

The remnants of the rebels were localized in the steppe regions of the Kherson region. The area of the uprising was surrounded by the forces of three Soviet military groups. However, the liquidation of the rebels took a long time and required a significant expenditure of manpower and resources. So, in early June, on the right bank of the Dnieper, in addition to cadets and special units, the fight against the consequences of the Grigoriev rebellion was carried out by field troops numbering up to 7000 bayonets, and on the left bank of the Dnieper, detachments performing the same purpose reached 7024 bayonets, 13 guns, 600 sabers [2: 99].

Ataman Grigoriev was hiding in the steppe farms. In June 1919, he had just over three thousand left. The main detachment of Grigoriev made raids on Alexandria, cutting off the main railway lines from the south of Ukraine to the north. At that time, the Grigoryevites seized a significant amount of valuables and military property, attacking trains that were coming from the Crimea and the Black Sea region. In the Dnieper region, the former Grigoriev chieftains (Tchaikovsky, Orlik, Sagay dacha) managed to capture for a short time the cities of Borislav, Kakhovka, Nikopol, and the Dolinskaya station.

In July 1919, detachments of Father Makhno came to the area controlled by the Grigoriev rebels. Makhno met with Grigoriev and offered him a military alliance against the "whites and reds." The military forces were united. Makhno became head of the Insurrectionary Council, Grigoriev became commander of the troops, Makhno's brother Grigory became chief of the joint staff. However, Makhno was annoyed by Grigoriev's unwillingness to fight against the "whites" and the hostile attitude towards the Jewish population. As a result, ataman Grigoriev was killed by the Makhnovists on July 27, 1919, in the village of Sentovo, Aleksandriysky district, Kherson province, on suspicion of secret ties with Denikin and for Jewish pogroms. The main part of the Grigoriev rebels joined the rebel army of Makhno.

Grigorievshchina was considered by the Bolshevik leadership on the same plane as the Makhnovshchina. Such a statement cannot be perceived otherwise than as a completely conscious creation of another Soviet ideological myth, the author of which was L.D. Trotsky. The Makhnovists themselves evaluated Ataman Grigoriev's "Universal" as a sermon of nationalism, anti-Semitism, and national enmity between workers [3: 105]. Grigoriev was killed on the orders of Makhno by his inner circle, and this happened after the break in relations between Makhno and the Soviet authorities (Makhno telegraphed Moscow about the event).

The attitude of the Makhnovist leadership towards Grigorievism was substantiated by one of the ideologists of the Makhnovism, P. Arshinov. He stressed that a movement like the Grigorievshchina posed a threat to the freedom of the working people and was therefore just as hostile to the Makhnovshchina as was Bolshevism. The Makhnovshchina could not unite with individual anti-Bolshevik actions on the sole ground that the Makhnovshchina itself opposed Bolshevism. According to the figurative description of Arshinov, "a new predator appeared in the person of Ataman Grigo

ryeva, who, croaking to the people about their disasters, labor and oppression, actually carries the old robber order, in which the labor of the people will be enslaved, their disasters will increase, bondage will be fixed, rights will fall" [3: 108, 109].

In contrast to Trotsky's assertions, Arshinov accused the communist authorities of generating the very phenomenon of Grigorievism. The gist of his reasoning was as follows. The Bolsheviks established the dictatorship of their party as a state party to govern the people. As a result, a situation was created in which the working people fell under the supervision and control of authorities alien to the working people, who used methods of arbitrariness and violence. The dictatorship of the Bolshevik Communist Party gave rise to anger, protest and hostility towards the existing order among the masses of the people. Grigoriev took advantage of this in his adventure. Grigoriev is a traitor to the revolution and an enemy of the people, but it was precisely the Bolshevik Party of Communists, by its irresponsible dictatorship, that created the bitterness among the masses, with which he

took advantage (similarly, another adventurer can take advantage of this circumstance). Blaming Grigoriev for betrayal, Arshinov at the same time insisted on blaming the Communist Party for the appearance of the Grigoriev movement [3: 111-112]. Makhno fought against independent nationalists, and also spoke out against anti-Semitism: he adopted the anarchist denial of nationality as such and the rallying of workers on an international basis. One of the reasons for the murder of Ataman Grigoriev by Makhno's entourage was anti-Semitic pogroms.

There are also groundless attempts to draw an analogy of Grigorievism with the rebellious action in August-September 1919 of the brigade commander of the Don Cossack Corps Philip Kuzmich Mironov, who undertook a campaign from Saransk with a detachment of less than a cavalry regiment to the location of the Southern Front to fight Denikin (unauthorized Mironov's act was a gross violation of military discipline in wartime conditions). The authorship of this propaganda campaign again belongs to the chairman of the RVSR Trotsky, who created the myths about the "famous colonel Mironov" and "Mironovism". On September 21, 1919, Trotsky's article "The Lessons of Mironovism" was published in the Pravda newspaper. "Colonel Mironov", according to the propaganda legend of Trotsky, committed a crime: having allegedly established secret ties with Denikin, he raised an uprising against Soviet power. Motivation for his actions

was made clear by the desire to become the Don ataman. Grigoriev and Mironov, Trotsky argued, are like brothers. However, Mironov's rebellious speech was not, in content and form, an anti-Soviet uprising similar to Grigoriev's. It demonstrated disobedience to the party leadership, setting the precedent for a major rebellion in the regular part of the Red Army.

The strategic consequences of Grigoriev's uprising were reflected in the position of the Red Southern Front. By June 1919, the Soviet military command expected to transfer up to 30,000 additional bayonets, 3,000 sabers and 60 guns from the Ukrainian Front to the Southern Front [4: 147]. However, the Grigoriev uprising disabled the main part of these forces on the Ukrainian Front, a significant part was thrown to suppress the Grigoriev uprising. The consequence of the uprising was the abolition of the relative military autonomy of Soviet Ukraine. In June 1919, the Ukrainian Front was liquidated, the front commander V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko and member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Front E.A. Shchadenko, commanders of three Ukrainian Chovet armies - S.K. Matsilevsky, A.E. Skachko, N.A. Khudyakov. All three Ukrainian Soviet armies were reorganized into ordinary numbered rifle divisions. Against the rebels of Grigoriev, the Bolsheviks threw all the reserves collected not only to fight Denikin, but also for the red campaign in Romania and Hungary. The plan of a breakthrough from the East towards the Red Hungarians, Slovaks and Germans was not destined to come true.

Sources and notes:

1. Makhno N.I. Anarchist ABC. M., 2005.
2. See: Kakurin N.E. How did the revolution fight? T. 1. M., 1990.
3. See: Arshinov P.A. History of the Makhnovist movement (1918-1921). Zaporozhye, 1995.
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PEASANT UPRISINGS IN THE VOLGA REGION

Events of 1919-1922 in the Volga village are an integral part of the all-Russian peasant movement during the Civil War, directed against the policy of military communism, the basis of which was the food allocation.

The peasants of the Volga region were one of the most active detachments of this revolution. As in other areas of landownership, the origins of peasant protest were rooted here in the preservation of semi-serfdom and land shortages.

In 1917 - the first half of 1918, the peasants of the Volga region, as well as all of Russia, with the support of the Bolsheviks, achieved the elimination of landownership and an equal redistribution of land among those who cultivate it with their own hands. But the peasant revolution did not end with the liquidation of the landownership. It has entered the stage of the struggle of the peasants for the right to be the master of their land, to freely dispose of the results of their labor, against the extremely difficult state duties associated with the supply of food to the city and the army, mobilization and provision of the needs of the front. All these duties turned out to be objectively inevitable in the conditions of a war — first a world war, then a civil one. As is known, the surplus appraisal was introduced by the tsarist government at the end of 1916 and then in 1917 was carried out by the Provisional Government. The inability of the Provisional Government to solve the food problem contributed greatly to its downfall. The Bolsheviks, relying on the commanders and armed detachments of workers from the starving industrial centers, achieved different results. In the summer and autumn of 1918, by force, they took bread and soldiers from the village for the Red Army. The response to such actions of the Soviet government was mass peasant resistance.

The Middle and Lower Volga region is a huge space along the banks of the Volga from the border with the Nizhny Novgorod region to the confluence with the Caspian Sea, inhabited by Russians, Tatars, Bashkirs, Mordovians, Chuvashs, Kalmyks and even Germans, who have long mastered a rather large area in the Saratov Trans-Volga region. Like the Central Chernozem region, the Middle and Lower Volga regions were the closest region to the industrial centers of the country for the production of agricultural products - bread in the first place. However, there were also pastoral areas - semi-nomadic in Bashkiria and nomadic in Kalmykia. The Middle and Lower Volga regions have always occupied a very important place in the life of the country, both as one of the main granaries, and as a powerful channel of economic and cultural ties between the north and south of Russia, and, finally, as a historical field of ethnic cooperation and rapprochement, which has overcome any significant moments of confrontation. Not

By chance, after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly by the Bolsheviks, Komuch chose the Volga region as the seat of the highest body of state power opposed to Bolshevism. Nevertheless, the first fronts of the Civil War, moving both from the east (Kolchakovsky) and from the west (Cossack-Krasnovsky) at the end of 1918, were defeated precisely on the banks of the Volga.

The support of the Volga peasantry for the Bolshevik revolution was quite natural, since the agricultural regions, especially in the Right Bank, have long been distinguished by the dominance of landownership, retained a semi-serfdom regime and have always been distinguished by an active peasant - anti-landowner - movement.

By the beginning of 1919, the Volga region was completely liberated from anti-Soviet forces and its entire territory became a source of food and human resources for the Bolshevik state. From that moment on, the peasant movement took on not only a new direction, but also a new character. With the transition of the Soviet state to a new economic policy, the mass insurrectionary movement in the Volga region, as in other regions of the country, begins to subside, and in 1922 it actually stops.

Mass spontaneous protests by peasants throughout Russia began in the autumn of 1918. Concerned about this, the NKVD published on November 18, 1918, "Circular of the NKVD to the provincial executive committees with an order to collect information on the causes of anti-Soviet uprisings" [1: 33-34]. In February-March 1919, it was sent to all district executive committees and volost soviets in the Simbirsk province as they returned to the rule of the Soviets. Fearing that "uprisings that have broken out recently will take on the character of a united counter-revolutionary front," the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs demanded that local governments "investigate in detail the causes of uprisings," their nature and scale, the composition of participants, organizers, etc. . The list of possible causes of "outbreaks", their participants and organizers in the circular turned out to be quite complete and close to reality, indicating the accumulated experience.

"Flashes" of protest and resistance could be caused, as stated in the circular, "by the actions and orders of the existing authorities, the behavior of individual agents of the local authorities, the introduction of a grain monopoly, the food crisis, mobilization, etc., or dissatisfaction with the general policy of the Soviet

authorities". There is no surplus appropriation here, the main reason for peasant uprisings against Soviet policy in 1919-1922. Its predecessor, the state grain monopoly, mentioned in the circular, as shown by the experience of both the Provisional Government in 1917 and the Soviet government in 1918, both aroused discontent in the countryside and was insufficient to overcome the food crisis that engendered discontent in the city. Surplus appropriation became an objective necessity, at least in the conditions of 1919, the experience of which began to lead both sides to an understanding of the necessity and desirability of a compromise. However, it will take another whole year of confrontation within the camp of the revolution for the surplus appropriation to be replaced by a tax in kind with the assumption of market grain turnover.

The introduction of food distribution at the beginning of 1919 and the forcible practice of its implementation very soon responded in the Volga region with a powerful peasant uprising in the region - the "chapan war". The uprising swept the counties of the Simbirsk and Samara provinces, liberated in the fall of 1918 from the power of Komuch. It was on them that immediately after the restoration of Soviet power fell the main burden of the surplus appropriation. From the harvest of 1918, only the Samara province gave Soviet Russia one fifth of all the grain harvested during the harvesting campaign [2: 181]. The situation was aggravated by the proximity of the front, which required the peasants of the front line to perform various duties related to meeting the needs of the army. A heavy burden for the peasants was the "extraordinary 10 billion revolutionary tax on the propertied groups of the urban and rural population" introduced on October 30, 1918 [3:465-469]. The tax on the village turned out to be so exaggerated that it was withdrawn not only from the wealthy, but from the population of the village as a whole. It is no coincidence that in peasant complaints and protests, an extraordinary tax was sometimes identified with an indemnity. The violent actions of the local authorities (kombeds, village councils, food detachments) against the peasants during the collection of the emergency tax and food requisition caused an explosion of peasant discontent. The events of January-February 1919 clearly foreshadowed a mass peasant uprising on the territory of the Volga region - in the immediate rear of the Red Army, which repelled the offensive of Kolchak's army, which was hostile to both the Bolsheviks and the peasants. Awareness of the danger has also arisen in the central authorities, as evidenced by the circular

NKVD on measures to prevent peasant uprisings. However, the circular did not offer any real measures to correct the situation. It all came down to the "work of the counter-revolutionaries" and the "insufficient tact" of the local authorities, their inept execution of the tasks of the Center.

The most important feature of the peasant movement in the region in 1919-1922. was a multinational composition of its participants. This feature was determined by the specifics of the Volga region as one of the multinational regions of the country. Peasant uprisings against the military communist policy took place in all national regions of the Middle and Lower Volga regions. And Russian, and Tatar, and Chuvash, and Mordovian villages took part in the insurgent movement. Moreover, during this movement, the peasants did not put forward nationalist slogans. This is convincingly evidenced by the most powerful peasant uprising in the region, called by contemporaries the "fork" or "Black Eagle uprising".

farmer."

"CHAPAN WAR"

The uprising of the peasants of the Simbirsk and Samara provinces broke out unexpectedly, spontaneously, almost simultaneously in several counties on March 3, 1919.

As evidenced by the telegram of the Samara provincial executive committee to the NKVD about the uprising of the peasants on March 3 in the village. Novo-Main, Melekessky district, the peasants "refused to allow bread to be accounted for, to give carts

for urgent needs and expelled the food instructors, threatening their lives. The head of the county administration department, the military commissar and two political workers with a detachment of cavalry of 20 people were sent to Novo-Maina, upon their arrival a meeting was held with the aim of settling the matter peacefully, but from the side of the crowd an attack was made on the seconded administration, military commissar. The detachment at that time was in the courtyard of the council, at that time it could not provide assistance, as a result, the head of the administration department, the military commissar got off with light beatings, two agitators were severely beaten by the crowd, the detachment dispersed the crowd with volleys, there are wounds.

On the same day, in the village of Novodevichye, Sengileevsky district, Simbirsk province, unrest began at a peasant gathering, which

very quickly developed into an uprising, called the "chapan war". Some documents say that there were up to two hundred thousand rebels.

The village of Novodevichye has over 1,000 households, located at the Volga pier, in the center of the grain district. A witness to the beginning of the uprising, propagandist N.G. Petrov, in his report on the causes and course of the peasant uprising in the Novo-Devichensky volost of the Sengileevsky district, writes that "the Cheka working here, led by its chairman Kazimirov, who was killed during the uprising, used the beating of their "clients" to the highest degree generously. fists, rifle butts, whips, pikes, etc... Pavlov's food detachment, who was here, behaved outrageously: he drank, made all sorts of extortions of sheep, dairy products, alienated free of charge what he liked, at night there was shooting upwards, etc. . Responsible representatives did not concede in drunkenness: Commissar Belov, chairman of the Cheka Kazimirov, head of the detachment Pavlov, commissar Stafeyev (in Mordov) and others, ending with a Novodevichy militiaman sent here from Sengiley and who did not leave, despite all the demands of Novo- Devichensky volost executive committee" [1: 182-187].

Some representatives of the local Soviet authorities, in drunken courage, went as far as open mockery and humiliation of the peasants. So, for example, "in M. Churashevo, during a feast at a wedding, one of the members of the volost council of deputies, Comrade Gavrikov, harnessed four women to a sleigh, put collars, saddles, bells on them, tied bells to the arc, picked up a whip and touched the outlandish four along the street. Sometimes Comrade Gavrikov would get down from his sleigh, tie the "four" to the gate, and enter someone's hut; "horses", standing in the cold, chattered their teeth" [5].

Unrest in the Novodevichy on March 3 began with a meeting convened by the village council. It reported several cases of too decisive requisition by Commissar Belov of grain and cattle: from the peasant Dm. Vorobyov, all the bread was requisitioned "under the panicle", leaving nothing to the owner; the widow Kucherova had her last cow, and so on. etc. As a result, the gathering came to the conclusion that it was necessary to repulse the actions of the food commissar on the scale of the entire volost. On March 3, in the evening, the peasants break into the post and telegraph office, led by Krokhin, who knows the Morse code, and establish their control over the apparatus.

Agitator N.G. Petrov writes in his report that "despite some similarities between the events of March 3–15 and the Left SR uprisings,

niyami, here, in Novodevichy, there is literally not a single indication of any connection with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. I am led to the same conviction by the complete absence of traces of unauthorized persons staying in Novodevichy, contrary to all the newspaper reports about some lieutenant, Count Orlov-Davydov, etc." The leaders of the Novodevichensky "headquarters" who came to the fore during the uprising were all exclusively from local people [1: 182-187].

Indeed, as soon as the uprising engulfed almost the entire Simbirsk province, the chairman of the provincial executive committee M. Gimov reported to the NKVD, the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee that "the right SRs, General Berdichev and Count Orlov" are at the head [6] .

The newspaper "Izvestia of the Simbirsk Provincial Council of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies" publishes an article "The White Guard Riot", in which it claims that "the peasantry participating in the uprising, firstly, consists of the kulaks, for the villages of Novodevichye, Bektyashka, Khryashchevka are the most

rich in this region, secondly, there is established evidence that the uprising is led by officers who were even among those killed, the bailiff, General Berdichev and a well-known landowner who has huge estates in Zheguli, gr. Orlov-Davydov" [7].

Member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Front S.I. Gusev informs V.I. Lenin and Ya.M. Sverdlov about the uprising of the peasants in the Simbirsk province, that it "bears all the traces of organization. According to rumors, they are led by former officers Colonel Pavlov, Colonel Count Orlov, and General Berdichev. There is information that under one document there is the signature of the former secretary of the Right SRs, but the presence of the Left SRs is felt. The organizations of the rebels are sometimes called the "Bloc of the working peasantry", sometimes the "Peasant Union", "Peasant Section", and so on" [1: 144-145].

But all this information is false, has no basis. When the uprising was crushed, it turned out that it was led by local peasants. In the village of Novodevichye, the peasant Kozyatin, in the Pechersk volost, the uprising was led by a peasant from the village of Lvovka, Vasily Mineev, in the Novo-Rachemsky volost, peasants Dmitry Ivanovich Chervyakov and Ivan Ivanovich Matveev, and so on everywhere. There was no general leadership in the "chapan war". And despite this, in a week the uprising spontaneously swept the entire Simbirsk province, part of Samara and part of Kazan. A characteristic and very revealing feature of the weapons of the peasants themselves: on long poles

bayonets are planted,

hooks (especially for cavalrymen), axes, pitchforks, and often just a Russian club. And if in some cases they had weapons, machine guns, this is due to the fact that they were taken from the Red Army soldiers themselves. On the fifth day of the uprising, the county town of Stavropol was captured, and on March 9, the chief of staff of the Eastern Front, Lazarev, informed S.I. Gusev that "the uprising swept the Sengileevsky district, Melekessky and Stavropol. The number of rebels is about 200,000 people" [8].

The center of the uprising in the early days was the village of Novodevichy. From here, telegrams were sent to many volost councils about the uprising in the Sengileevsky district with a request to support them. Chairman of the Simbirsk Provincial Executive Committee M.A. Gimov sent a telegram to Novodevichy on March 6 demanding that the instigators of the uprising be arrested. On March 7, the insurgents sent him a telegram in response to the following content: "There was no armed kulak uprising. A conflict arose with Commissar Comrade Belov on the basis of the incorrect requisition of grain and livestock, since the surplus of grain and livestock was not found out and the accounting records were not completed, but Comrade Belov proceeded with a forcible requisition. But this conflict with Comrade Belov was settled on the same day. The conflict was resumed by comrades Alekseev and Grigoriev, delegated by the Sengileevsky food committee to settle the aforementioned conflict, who on the evening of the 4th declared that everything would be settled peacefully, but on the 5th in the morning comrade Alekseev sent a food detachment to the volost council and telegraphed for others detachments, after which the food detachment was disarmed. The volost executive committee went into hiding from March 3rd to 4th, was subsequently found and arrested. A new one has been elected, he has not started accepting cases, we ask for instructions.

We salute Soviet power. Down with the communists, the violent anarchists who act against the decrees. Long live Soviet power on the platform of the October Revolution. Volost peasant organization" [9].

As can be seen from this telegram, the peasants did not want bloodshed, they hoped that the conflict would be resolved peacefully. This is also confirmed by negotiations on a direct wire of the Deputy Chairman of the Simbirsk Gubernia Executive Committee, Secretary of the Provincial Committee of the RCP (b) I.M. Vareikis with the headquarters of the rebels in the village. Novodevichy:

"[Vareikis:] - I am Simbirsk: from the Committee of the Bolshevik Party, Deputy Chairman of the Provincial Executive Committee Joseph Vareikis.

Who is speaking?

[Poruchikov:] - I am the chairman of the Poruchikov volsoviet. Anything?

[Vareikis:] - First, give an immediate answer about the situation in your parish and about your mood; second, immediately give an answer about the number of rebellious kulaks and deserters; thirdly, I bring to your attention that I was sent specifically for this counter-revolutionary uprising to investigate the perpetrators. In view of the fact that the investigation can be conducted only after definite data, I suggest that you urgently collect materials and in 2 hours leave for personal reports to Sengilei.

[Vareikis:] Everything.

[Poruchikov:] We don't have kulak uprisings and never have. There are no counterrevolutionaries. We are against the wrong requisition of grain and livestock. We welcome the Bolshevik Party and do not go against them, we go against the violence of the communists. In general, there is no counter-revolution... There is no kulak uprising, all the peasants are Trudoviks. The number of rebels - all the villages and villages. We would like you to come to us yourself, so that you can see for yourself who has risen... After all, Comrade Vareikis, we are not saboteurs, we would like to talk to you ourselves; you will see for yourself that we are right and the people will listen to you with pleasure. Answer now, will you come to us or not?

[Vareikis:] — So far, I am not going to you, because the appropriate speakers, that is, guns, have been sent.

[Poruchikov:] - Now, if you come yourself, it will be better than your guns. They will only embitter the people" [10].

However, the Soviet government had a different view on this. Guns arrived for negotiations. And a fierce bloody war began, which the chairman of the Special Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee for the revision of the Volga Soviets P.G. Smidovich characterizes this in his report to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee: "The features of this uprising. Centralization and great organization of the entire movement, energy and bitterness in the offensive, and especially in defense, the confidence of the leaders in success, the widespread organization of agitation among the masses), reinforced attempts at propaganda influence on the Red Army units, the manufacture of special tips for wooden peaks in forges. The moving crowds consisted of elderly peasants in chapans with the participation of the middle peasants and even the poor. Fists, on the average, for each village, no more than 5-10 people.

"1

lovek. By March 20, the uprising was liquidated everywhere by energetic and merciless measures. Our victims - up to 200 people, the victims of the rebels, no doubt, at least 1000 people. The number of rebels, according to various sources, is 100,000-150,000 people]. The number of rifles is several hundred, several machine guns" [11].

On March 8, the rebels occupied Stavropol and immediately elected the Stavropol Temporary Executive Committee, the rebel commandant's office, which immediately set about organizing the Peasant Army and streamlining the lives of the civilian population. The commandant issues orders:

"Order No. 1 of March 8, 1919: From this March 8, all power is transferred to the elected citizens of Stavropol: commandant Golosov, his assistant Belousov and second assistant Bostrigov.

Order No. 2 of March 8, 1919: The commandant's office of the city of Stavropol announces to the residents of the city that Stavropol has been declared under a state of siege since that date. The right of passage is allowed from 7 o'clock. morning until 7 o'clock. evenings. After this time, passage and passage is prohibited. Moreover, the patrol and other persons will be provided with proper passes. Persons who do not have established passes will be detained and transferred to the commandant's office.

Order No. 3 dated March 8, 1919: The Commandant's Department orders the citizens of Stavropol to appear by 3 o'clock this afternoon on March 8 at the premises of the former city government for enrollment in

active military service. The draft age is announced from 18 to 40 years. Persons who deviate from the performance of their civic duty will be considered as opponents of the people's power and will be brought before a court-martial.

Order No. 13 of March 8–9, 1919: I order all Soviet institutions in the city of Stavropol to immediately draw up lists of employees that the institution needs to continue further work" [1: 107–108].

The attitude towards the Red Army soldiers and their families among the leaders of the insurgents is friendly. The commandant of Stavropol issues a special order about this: "I bring to the attention of the wives and families of the Red Army and Communists that all the violence and abuse inflicted on you by the Peasant Army, report to me, do not be shy about anything. I declare to the Peasant Army of the Stavropol District that those responsible for such violence and outrages will be prosecuted according to the law of wartime" [12].

The Stavropol Provisional Executive Committee adopts a resolution on the priorities of the insurgent government:

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"2. To publish at the expense of the executive committee the bulletin "Izvestia of the Stavropol Executive Committee", in which all current events should be notified ...

4. Set the mills of Konovalov and Shagarov to full speed. Shamin's mill should finish only the grinding that is currently available and should not accept grain again. To transfer oil from the Shaminskaya mill in the amount required to the Shagarovskaya mill. To ask to be released from the mobilization of the workers-specialists of the Konovalovskaya and Shagarovskaya mills. In cases of deficiencies in these specialist mills, add those from the Shamin mill at the end of the last grinding.

5. To ask the commandant of the city of Stavropol to release from mobilization a section of bakers including 6 people needed for the city bakery, and who cannot be replaced by women or teenagers.

8. All communists arrested in the Stavropol region are to be imprisoned in the Stavropol prison.

9. Instruct the municipal department to immediately begin the development of firewood from existing forest materials. Development is carried out by recruiting volunteers who are not subject to mobilization. Development must be done for a fee.

15. It was decided to deliver potatoes and millet to Fedorovka for 1,000 people: transfer it to the trade union committee so that it would take care of sending the named products to Fedorovka for 3 days today" [1:112-113].

The insurgent commandant's office, in order to explain its actions, goals and tasks to various sections of Russian society, adopted several appeals: "The appeal of the insurgents to the peasants, the intelligentsia, all citizens of Soviet Russia", "To the Red Army men", etc. In the appeal "To the Red Army Men", the rebels wrote: "We, the rebellious workers, the breadwinners of the entire population of Russia, the peasants, appeal to you with a statement that we did not rebel against Soviet power, but rebelled against the dictatorship of the dominance of the Communists - tyrants and robbers .

We announce that Soviet power remains in place. The soviets are not abolished, but the soviets must include persons elected from the population who are known to the people of the given locality. We do not deviate a single step from the Constitution of the RSFSR and are guided by it.

We call on you, brothers of the Red Army, to join us, who have risen for a just cause, who have risen against the dominance of the communists.

Brothers! Do not shed brotherly blood in vain! Don't hesitate, shut up to the peasants - after all, you are the same peasants! (1:105).

And some Red Army units responded to this call of the insurgent peasants. Commander of the 4th Army M.V. Frunze writes in a memorandum to a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front I.T. Smilge, L.D. Trotsky, V.I. Lenin: "On the night of March 10-11, an attempt was made to raise an uprising in Samara itself in military units. The 175th regiment rebelled; having broken the artillery depots and dismantled the Berdanks that were there, he tried to raise other units and, first of all, the engineering battalion of my (4th) army. The appeal was not successful, and by 3 o'clock in the morning the case was liquidated" [13]. A detachment from Samara disarmed the military units in Syzran.

Regular Red Army units were sent to suppress the rebellious peasants. The unarmed insurgents defended themselves fiercely and initially successfully repulsed the attacks. "The attack of the Reds was repulsed, the peasants fought back with pitchforks alone, there are dead, wounded, prisoners of the enemy. Send weapons and reinforcements immediately," reported the inhabitants of Khryashchevka village [1: 100].

In the Izvestia of the Stavropol Executive Committee, a special section "News from the Front" was introduced, which reported on the fighting of the rebels:

Fedorovka. 11th of March. The communist attack on Matyushki was repulsed. Send rifles as soon as you receive them. The Red Army soldiers killed near Fedorovka were not four, but seven.

Usolye. 11th of March. At 2 o'clock in the morning a courier from the village appeared. Muranki with a report from the village council and reported that the enemy, including 170 people, was defeated. In Usinsky, 20 horses, 2 machine guns and rifles were selected. A wave of people moved to Syzran. Syzran is surrounded by a ring. Usolsky headquarters.

Khryashchevka. 11th of March. Today we had a battle that began at 12 o'clock in the afternoon and ended at 7 o'clock. The enemy had 2 infantry companies and a detachment of 50 people, 1 three-inch gun with 112 shells, 1 cavalry squadron and 3 machine guns. The fight started very hot. Reconnaissance met and opened fire on it. Their infantry approached, and we fought with them, not yielding a single step, for four and a half hours. After

retreated to the village and from different places of ambush, when the Reds entered, they opened fire on them. They faltered. At that moment, we rushed with the people's forces with a bang. This scared them. They ran in a panic. The cavalry was set in pursuit with the help of the infantry, which pursued and stabbed the Reds. There are no losses in our troops. There were three wounded on our side, no one was killed. Military leader Petrov.

Berry. 11th of March. It is reported that the Reds retreated again to Bely Yar. On the enemy side there are dead, but how many have not yet been clarified. There is no loss on our side. The mood in Khryashchevka is cheerful. The enemy retreated in panic. Delegate of Soldiers" [14].

In response to the fierce resistance of the rebels, the Syzran Revolutionary Committee adopts a resolution on the captured rebels: "1) Issue an order for all parts of the active army so that persons who took an active part in the uprising, such as: forced with weapons in their hands, found during damage to roads, telegraph, etc., do not take prisoner, but shoot on the spot. 2) Instruct a special department to conduct a strict investigation of the prisoners and, in connection with the degree of guilt, divide them into 3 categories: 1) persons who took an active part in the uprising and are subject to execution, 2) persons who contributed to the uprising in another way and are subject to be sent to public works, and 3) innocent persons subject to release..." [15: 38].

As already mentioned, the rebels did not have a unified army, neither did they have a unified leadership, each settlement, each village defended itself independently, so the uprising of the peasants was doomed to failure.

On March 17, two weeks after the start of the uprising, the commander of the 4th Army, M.V. Frunze reports to the member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front I.T. Smilge, L.D. Trotsky, V.I. Lenin about the peasant uprising in the rear of the Eastern Front: "To date, the uprisings have been liquidated in the districts. The center of the rebels - Stavropol, was taken on March 13, and by the 16th the last centers of the uprising were occupied. The movement was massive and organized. Its goal is to capture the cities of Samara, Syzran, Stavropol. The uprising proceeded under the slogans "Long live Soviet power on the platform of the October Revolution!", "Down with the communists and the commune!". Volost "military-revolutionary" headquarters were formed in cities, volosts and villages. During the suppression of the movement, at least 1,000 people were killed, according to incomplete information. In addition, over 600 heads were shot.

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brew and fists. The village of Usinskoye, in which a detachment of 170 people was first exterminated, was completely burned. Now everything is calm, but, of course, only outwardly. Thus, the nearest rear of the army is unstable and the arteries of the Soviet Republic are again in mortal danger" [16].

L.D. Trotsky, in response to this report, sends a telegram to the Kremlin I.V. Stalin and V.I. Lenin about the need for revision in the rear of the Eastern Front: "... an extremely authoritative revision in the rear of the Eastern Front is necessary to calm the peasant elements. I would consider it expedient to have a commission composed of Kamenev, Smilga, or Gusev and another person. If not Kamenev, then another authoritative person from the Center. The movement has become widespread. The middle peasants, on the one hand, are irritated by the obvious abuses of the institutions, and on the other hand, they are fooled by the counter-revolutionaries" [1: 147].

A "Special Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee for the revision of the Volga region councils" was created, headed by P.G. Smidovich. She drew quite objective conclusions about the causes of the uprising, but the Soviet government did not learn lessons from the uprising of the peasants of the Volga region, did not make adjustments to its policy towards the peasants. Peasant uprisings throughout Russia continued.

FORK MOVEMENT

In February-March 1920, on the territory of the Kazan, Samara and Ufa provinces, where about 3 million peasants lived, an uprising spontaneously arose, which was called the "fork" or "the uprising of the Black Eagle farmer."

In terms of scale, number of participants and bitterness, it can be compared with Antonovism. Just like the "chapan war", it became a natural reaction of the peasants of the front line of the trans-Volga regions, liberated from Kolchak's power in the summer of 1919, to the food policy pursued there since the autumn of that year. If in late 1918 - early 1919 the main burden of the surplus appraisal fell on the counties of Simbirsk, Samara and Kazan provinces, liberated from the power of Komuch in the autumn of 1918, then in 1919 this fate befell the Ufa province and the areas adjacent to it, the majority of the population of which were Tatars and Bashkirs. Food Organs

managed to procure in the Ufa province from the harvest of 1919 15 million poods of grain. In 1920, among all the provinces and regions of the RSFSR, it took second place in terms of the amount of bread handed over to the state. On the territory affected by the uprising, food distribution was carried out without taking into account the damage that the front-line areas suffered from military operations, the requisitioning of working and productive livestock by the troops, and the loss of the male population during mobilizations. The main means of its implementation was coercion. Bread was raked clean, without taking into account the needs of the population. The threat of famine pushed the peasants to an open mass uprising.

Just like the "chapan war", the fork uprising was spontaneous in nature. It began spontaneously, without any prior organization on the part of the Socialist-Revolutionaries or agents of the White Guards. At the same time, the insurgent peasants sought to introduce elements of organization into it. In Zainsk, Menzelinsky district, the Central insurgent headquarters of the Black Eagle was created, trying to coordinate the actions of the insurgents.

The head of the special department of the Reserve Army in his report, F.E. Dzerzhinsky. At the beginning of February 1920, in the village of Yalan, Ersu-baykinsky volost, Menzelinsky district, Ufa province, the county food detachment confiscated bread. The heterogeneous bread taken from the peasants: rye, oats, barley, as can be seen from the testimony of the insurgents, was poured by the food orderers on the street right into the snow in one place, which angered the peasants of the indicated village and caused the uprising. The uprising was not organized in nature and did not have leaders at first - it was just an angry crowd that armed itself with anything, attacked the food contractors and began, beating, driving them out of their village, escorting them to the next villages, which, being embittered at food contractors, joined the rebels. From that moment on, the uprising becomes larger, leaders appear and it is more organized. Taking into account that the uprising was not strictly organized and the rebels were very poorly armed (forks, stakes, axes, shovels, etc.), the uprising was quickly liquidated when regular troops arrived (in Chistopolsky and Menzelinsky districts). In the Menzelinsky district, the rebel detachments were much larger in number,

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than in Chistopol, which indicates that the uprising there was more organized and the leaders more experienced. In Chistopolsky, the detachments were few in number, because, in most cases each village acted independently. The participation of party organizations was not noticed, but individual members of the party participated [1: 473].

However, the head of the special department was mistaken when reporting to F.E. Dzerzhinsky that the uprising was "quickly liquidated". The regular troops extinguished the first outbreak in two counties and dispersed the unorganized crowd of peasants. A day later, on February 9, the uprising engulfed the entire Ufa province and part of Kazan and Samara. Communist agitator K.M. Karimov was a participant in the gathering, which was gathered by the commissar of the food detachment Mikhailov on February 9 in the large Tatar village of Kazaklar-Kubovo. As soon as Commissar Mikhailov announced that the food detachment was beginning to requisition foodstuffs, "those assembled began to get excited," writes the propagandist, "shouting and rushing at their comrades. The food contractors fired back from the crowd, retreated and hid in the house of citizen Murzakaev, located 200 sazhen from the bazaar. An angry mob found them here, and right there in the yard, Commissar Mikhailov was killed, and the rest, having loaded into a sleigh along with the murdered commissar, they brought them to the market square and then finished off with two food detachments, having previously beaten them with anything. Of the inhabitants of Kazaklar-Kubovo, two were wounded by rifle bullets. Comrade Temurkhanov, head of the Chukadytamak land department, who was at the bazaar, was severely beaten, and he saved his life only thanks to the assistance of the chairman of the Kazaklar-Kubov council, citizen Asfandiyarov.

Some of the comrades from the food detachment managed to escape, and one, Tarasov, escaped with the assistance of the Kazaklar-Kubov mullah Nasretdin Asfandiyarov, who disguised Tarasov, thanks to which Tarasov could hide. During the disorder and the murder, the crowd was noisy: "The communists did a lot of harm to us, they robbed us a lot. Beat them, beat their supporters!"

As for the participants in this murder, besides the resident of the village. Kandra-Aminovo Usman Mukhamedov, a major speculator, all from among the poorest and middle peasants. I paid special attention to this, and I tried to find out personally, to be convinced of the social status of the criminals. The results of my observations are very sad. For example: one of the participants, a resident of Kazaklar-Kubovo, Almukhamet Shaimukhametov, is poor, has nothing, feeds himself

and half a dozen of his children by weaving and selling bast shoes - took an active part in the murder and, holding bast shoes in one hand and a club in the other, beat our comrades to the last possibilities.

Another example: during the general meeting, I paid special attention to a few citizens standing nearby, who were so poor that it was a pity to look at them. During my speech they were crying. This picture had a touching effect on me and aroused in me the conviction that the poor are with us, that they understand us. But what was my disappointment when, during the roll call of the participants in the crime, it turned out that these poor people, who were crying during my speech, were criminals who had taken part in the murder. And then I understood the causes and factors of the Kazaklar Kubov event. In this event, we are the main culprit, we are communists, Soviet workers, since we have not yet been able to light the fire of social revolution in the countryside: the poor of the countryside are not yet with us, they are a tool in the hands of our enemies. : 332-334].

Local leaders, as in the "chapan war", are trying to find the culprits, the organizers of the uprising among the White Guards and Socialist-Revolutionaries. So the military revolutionary headquarters of the Samara province on February 17, 1920, at the very beginning of the uprising, reports F.E. Dzerzhinsky and the head of the troops of the VOKhR K.M. Valobuev that "the uprising is led by the staff captain Shimanovsky, a certain White Guard who calls himself the chief of staff of the Green Army.

Rebel slogans: "Long live the Red Army! Down with the oppressor Bolsheviks!", "Down with the communists!", "Long live faith in God!". When questioning the inhabitants, the basis of the uprising is clarified, for example: 40 pro-Darmians gathered bread and piled it in a heap on the snow in front of the population, which caused strong indignation, but, however, it turns out that under the flag of the pro-Darmians a handful is working, having heads of two old landowners, whose names are still unknown. Discovered a large espionage alien element. The number of rebels is about five thousand, and they are joined by villages on the way to Bugulma" [17]. The same report says that "an uprising broke out in the Menzelinsky district of the Ufa province on food and ethnic grounds. The Russian population is reluctant, under threat." This is not true. The Fork Rebellion was multinational. Tatars, Bashkirs, Russians, Chuvashs, Mordovians, Germans, etc. took part in it. Disagreements on national and religious grounds were not found in the documents.

On February 12, the uprising covered almost all the counties of the Ufa province, part of the counties of the Kazan and Samara provinces. Chairman of the Kazan Provincial Executive Committee I.I. Khodorovsky February 17, 1920 sends V.I. A telegram to Lenin in which he talks about the uprising: "Within a week, the entire Chistopol district, with the exception of six volosts, was in the grip of an uprising. Chistopol uyezd is a kulak-merchant uyezd, and here it is an inexhaustible source of ferment. The uprising began in the adjacent Menzelinsky district and rolled into the Kazan province. Slogans: "Down with the communists and the pumping out of bread!" The spontaneous kulak-peasant revolt was joined by malicious deserters and cadres of Vseobuch. According to a report from Chistopol, the movement proceeded as follows. To the east, from the center of the insurgents, Zainsk, Menzelinsky district, delegates travel to the nearest villages, gather gatherings, offer, sometimes order, to oppose the communists. These villages welcome such delegates, disperse village councils, beat communists, elect a military commandant and in turn send delegates to neighboring villages, and so on. Military commandants have certain instructions from their center, mobilize from 16 to 50 years into the people's army, establish communication between villages, volosts, gather peasants, a crowd of thousands, armed in small numbers with rifles, mostly with drekols. The traffic spread within a week due to the remoteness from Kazan and the lack of a railway connection. The Chistopol punitive regiment and food detachments were unable to withstand the onslaught of the insurgents and fled. As a result, the rebels were yesterday 5 versts from Chistopol" [1: 372].

Some leaders of the peasant detachments gathered in Zainsk, Menzelinsky district, and elected the Central Insurgent Headquarters, which began to hastily organize the Black Eagle Army, and also issued appeals and appeals to the people, to the Red Army, urging them to support the uprising. Several large Red Army units supported

rebels, went over to their side. On February 28, the Bashkir and Sterlitamak regiments came up with a joint resolution on joining the rebels, which began like this: "We, the Bashkirs and the Red Army, are joining the peasant uprising and going against the communists" [18].

In its appeals, the Central Insurgent Headquarters explained its goals to the citizens of Russia: "Why did we rebel? Who are we? Who are our enemies? We are a multi-million peasantry. Our enemies are commo

nists. They drink our blood and oppress us like slaves. They take our last piece. Comrades, brothers and citizens, have pity on our sons and brothers who are beaten like flies. They die of hunger and disease like cattle. Let's get rid of this horror. Let's rise as one. And remove the communist noose. Down with the communists. Down with the civil war. Only those elected from all the people in this assembly will establish order" [1: 393].

And in numerous instructions, the Central Headquarters of the rebels recommended how to act in the rebel villages, how to organize power, ordered "to set up posts in every village. Detain communists, let our own people through. In each volost, there should be chiefs: the chief of staff, the chief of explanation of everything that is happening, and the commandant, who is in charge of guarding the arrested and carts, the head of communications, who is also intelligence - he reports to all neighboring villages and volosts what is happening with him. He also sends scouts for clarification, explains to everyone why we rebelled and how to mobilize. The chief of staff is in charge of everything and is responsible for everything. Don't go anywhere without orders. In each village, appoint a duty unit and several horses. Do not kill those who surrender, even if they are communists, send them to the main headquarters for interrogations" [1: 394].

Of course, the Central Headquarters of the rebels paid much attention to the organization of the combat forces of the Black Eagle Army. For this, he issued a special instruction, which he sent to all counties and volosts:

"1. In all villages, military commissariats should be organized, which should include: a military commissar, a secretary and a clerk who is obliged to immediately register the entire male population from 18 to 45 years old and keep detailed correct records.

2. Of all the persons registered, appoint detachments, one third, so that after one detachment goes into battle, two more detachments remain ready in case of need, and one of these detachments must be composed exclusively of persons who have undergone military service.

3. From the persons who have done military service, the heads of the detachment, separated company commanders, mostly familiar with military service, should be appointed; the latter are obliged to lead the formed detachments according to their intended purpose.

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4. All detachments formed must consist of not less than ten men on horseback, armed, if possible, with weapons appropriate for riding, such as revolvers, pikes, iron pitchforks, etc.

5. All formed troops, upon receipt of orders from the chief of staff, must go into battle without delay, and the commanders of the detachments must contact the chief of staff about the issuance of fodder and feed allowances from the day of departure.

6. Take firm measures to ensure that there are strong guards on all roads day and night, which should not let anyone pass without a pass; search suspicious persons and put them at the disposal of the chief of staff.

7. Make every effort to ensure that drunkenness, excesses, self-governing actions and other disorders are not allowed under any form, report the occurrence of such to the chief of staff.

8. All those who hold the positions of Soviet institutions from mobilization must be released and must remain in their places to fulfill the duties assigned to them" [1: 395].

Hastily formed on the model of the Red Army, the "Army of the Black Eagle" launched an offensive against Ufa, captured several county settlements. The most significant victory of the rebels was the capture of the rather large city of Belebey. Chairman of the Ufa Provincial Committee B.M. Eltsin urgently sent a telegram to F.E. Dzerzhinsky on measures to suppress the uprising. "All members of the party have been mobilized," he wrote, "50 percent of the members of the trade unions... The disorganization of the VOKhR and the inadequacy of its apparatus explains the shameful abandonment of Belebey. The failure to provide timely assistance to Topornino, thanks to the decomposed units and the inept command of the detachment commanders, led to the fact that the uprising in the north of Ufa rolled up (to the city) almost 20 versts (Podymalovo). We hope to quickly liquidate the uprising in this area, as communist detachments are exposed. Everywhere, on the orders of the Gubernia Committee, Revolutionary Committees were formed, which were put on the surface that they were responsible for the abandoned areas according to the laws of wartime. A military investigative commission has been formed to investigate shameful acts and manifestations of cowardice" [19].

The Ufa Provincial Military Revolutionary Committee obliges the commanders and political committees of units sent to the areas affected by the uprising, at their personal discretion, to take hostages from among most-

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more prosperous and hostile to Soviet power residents, while exclusive attention is supposed to be paid to colonists, especially German ones, as well as to people who have recently returned from localities in Siberia, cleared of Kolchak gangs.

He recommends that the gubchek pay serious attention to clarifying the role of the German colonists in the uprising, and take hostages from among the most active and counter-revolutionary elements [1: 423].

Regular Red Army units headed by Yu.Yu. Applec. In a few months, he will also lead the suppression of the uprising of the Tambov peasants. Despite the fact that the "Army of the Black Eagle" was armed mainly with pitchforks, which is why this uprising received the name "forklift", the rebels resisted fiercely. And yet, by mid-March, the main combat forces of the Black Eagle Army were defeated. The Moscow commission to investigate the causes of the uprising came to the conclusion that "firstly, this is the inept attitude of the leaders of the food detachments to their work, and in some cases a deliberate violation of government orders. The Executive Committee and the Procurement Committee did not try to get statistical information in time. The allocation of grain was carried out completely incorrectly, no information was collected about the yield. It was the same with the distribution of livestock.

It is known that Tatars do not breed pigs, and the ancestor requires pigs from those volosts inhabited by Tatars. The Tatars, having no pigs, cannot fulfill this order. When pumping out surplus grain from the kulaks, the pro-Darmians were often sold last for honey, butter, and the like, as a result of which the kulaks' bread remained untouched. The food detachments went to the village with decrees and resolutions, not at all considering the yield, and demanded that everything should be handed over according to the apportionment" [1: 450].

V.I. Lenin. At the US Congress of the RCP(b) on March 18-23, 1919, he spoke about the principles of the attitude of Bolshevism towards the peasantry: "There is nothing more stupid than the very idea of violence in the field of economic relations of the middle peasantry. The task here is reduced not to the expropriation of the middle peasant, but to taking into account the special conditions of life of the peasant, to learning from the peasants the methods of transition to a better system and not daring to command! That's the rule we set ourselves."

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In Lenin's speech, it was not only about attempts to move to collectivization, but also about other problems that were no less acute for that time. Revolutionary law-making was subjected to re-evaluation - a lot of hastily adopted decrees, in which "many things are useless, many things that will not pass in life" and therefore, Lenin declared, "we will not look at them as absolute decrees that must be by all means, at once, at once." No less important was the recognition of abuses in the practice of local party and Soviet bodies: "We have been joined in some places by careerists, adventurers who called themselves communists and are deceiving us, who got in our way because the communists are now in power ... These people who seek only to curry favor, use coercion in the localities and think that this is good. But in reality this sometimes leads to the fact that the peasants say: "Long live Soviet power, but down with communism!" (i.e. communism). Such cases are not invented, but taken from real life, from the reports of comrades from the field. [20: 38: 201].

The coincidence of Lenin's assessment of the rural situation at the beginning of 1919 with the picture that the documents from the Volga region recreate allows us to consider that the "chapan war" was the direct factor in rethinking the Soviet policy towards the peasantry, of course, in conjunction with the "decossackization" on the Don in January-March of the same 1919 and a number of other similar events.

The "chapan war" and the "fork uprising" in the Volga region were a spontaneous protest, and not a prepared action of the anti-Bolshevik forces. The myth about the leading role of the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the "chapan war" and the influence of Kolchak's agents on the peasants was born in the Bolshevik party milieu. First, it was created by local leaders and the military, responsible for order in the territory entrusted to them, and then actively used by higher authorities. This ideological trump card was also widely used for propaganda purposes. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and agents of the Whites were a convenient excuse for the Bolshevik authorities for their miscalculations and mistakes. In reality, the real influence of the anti-Bolshevik forces on the peasant movement in the region in 1919-1921 was insignificant. It was expressed in the participation of members of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, former officers in peasant actions as ordinary participants or leaders of individual insurgent detachments. Reports from local authorities and reports from various

commissioned to study the causes of the "chapan war" and the "fork uprising" convincingly confirm the spontaneous nature of the peasant protest, due to the hardships of the duties imposed on the peasants.

At the same time, the spontaneous nature of the uprisings did not mean the absence of elements of political organization and activity of the peasantry in it. The documents show how the rebels quickly and quite effectively reorganized the organs of Soviet power on the territory they controlled and adapted them to the needs of the uprising. Military headquarters and commandant's offices, the Stavropol executive committee, which published the printed organ of the uprising and took active measures to establish economic life and order in the city, the agitation and propaganda activities of the rebels, etc. convincingly testify to the political experience that the peasantry acquired during the years of revolutionary upheavals in the first decades of the new century. Participation in peasant unions, the sentencing movement and elections to the State Duma, the organization of peasant committees and councils did not go unnoticed. The experience of conscious political activity was fully manifested both during the "chapan war" and in the "fork uprising".

The documents also refute another stereotype, previously dominant in historiography, about the kulak nature of the peasant movement. Given in the report of the chairman of the commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee for the revision of the Volga region P.G. Smidovich, the figures of tens of thousands of participants in the "chapan war" are a clear confirmation of this. Other facts and testimonies speak about the same

Events of 1919-1920 in the Volga region, they discovered another important feature of the all-Russian peasant movement in the period under review - the absence of monarchical peasants among the peasants.

illusions associated with the former Romanov dynasty, their adherence to the republican form of government in revolutionary Russia.

In 1861, after the publication of the tsarist manifesto on the emancipation of the peasants from serfdom, a wave of peasant uprisings under clearly expressed tsarist slogans swept over the entire territory of landlord Russia. The peasants were convinced that the landlords and officials had concealed from them the real tsar's manifesto. Then the "rebels in the name of the tsar" became the peasants of the village of Bezdna in the Kazan province and another village on the Volga - Kan-

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Dievka of the Chembarsky district of the Penza province. A little more than half a century later, in the same Volga villages, only once the peasants put forward the slogan of restoring the monarchy and the power of the Romanovs. This happened at the end of February - beginning of March 1919 in the Bolshe-Azyassky volost of the Krasnoslobodsky district of the Penza province.

Both at the beginning of the "chapan war", and in the "fork uprising", and in the mass insurrectionary movement of 1921, in the program documents of the insurgent peasants, the state structure of Russia was defined as republican.

Thus, the materials confirm the fact of the loss of the people's faith in the tsar-redeemer, which is also characteristic of other regions (for example, the Tambov province). The so-called "monarchist" performance in the village of Bolshoi Azyas was the result of the activities of the religious-monarchist sect, which enjoyed great influence among the local

population.

Another thing is the protection of religion and the church. As a rule, the peasants did not come out in defense of their priests and the village church against violence and harassment by the local authorities. Threats of church closures, arrests of clergy, and actions of local activists that offended the feelings of believers often provoked uprisings under the slogan "For the Christian faith and Islam!". The religious factor manifested itself with greater force in the course of the fork uprising, where the bulk of the rebellious peasants were Muslims. In the Muslim villages of the Kazan, Samara and Ufa provinces, as can be seen from the documents, in the winter of 1920 the local food agencies did not take into account the religious traditions of the population in the course of surplus appraisal and livestock procurement. Peasants were particularly dissatisfied with the actions of local authorities to forcibly mobilize the mullahs and take them as hostages for failure to perform state duties. However, the vast majority of peasant uprisings in 1920 arose on the basis of dissatisfaction with the food policy and other actions of the Soviet government. At the same time, village priests, closely connected with their personal lives and knowing firsthand the hardships of the peasants who lived next to them, often actively participated in the peasant movement, were among the initiators of uprisings, campaigned against the policy of the Bolshevik state, and therefore among were the first to be repressed.

The peasant movement in the Volga region, despite the elements of organization, by its nature still remained spontaneous, about

destined for an unequal confrontation with a powerful state machine. Ultimately, as elsewhere, power was on the side of the state, which had technical superiority and a more efficient military organization.

L.D. Trotsky was well aware of the causes of the peasant uprisings in the Volga region and at the end of February 1920 submitted proposals to the Central Committee of the RCP(b) to change the food and land policy. He pointed out the fact that the entire policy of the Soviet government "is directed against the many-horse, many-seeded peasants (kulaks), the food policy is based on the selection of surpluses (in excess of the consumption norm). This pushes the peasant to cultivate the land only to the extent of his family's needs. In particular, the decree regarding the removal of the third cow as superfluous actually leads to the secret slaughter of cows, to the speculative sale of meat and to the destruction of the dairy farm. At the same time, semi-proletarian and even proletarian

elements of cities settle in the countryside, where they start their own food farms. Industry is losing labor, agriculture is evolving towards an increase in the number of self-sufficient food farms. This undermines the basis of food policy, built on the extraction of surpluses. If the current food year shows a significant success in procurement in comparison with the past, then this must be attributed to the expansion of the territory and some improvement in the food apparatus. In general, food resources threaten to dry up, against which no improvement in the requisitioning apparatus can help. It is possible to fight against such tendencies of economic degradation by the following methods:

1. Replacing the withdrawal of surpluses by a certain percentage deduction (a kind of progressive income tax in kind), so that a larger ploughing, or better cultivation, still represents a benefit.
2. By establishing a greater correspondence between the issuance of industrial products to the peasants and the amount of grain poured by them, not only in volosts and villages, but also in peasant households. Involvement of local industrial enterprises in this. Partial payment to the peasants for the raw materials, fuel and food they supply with the products of industrial enterprises.
3. Complementing the forced development for backfilling with forced development for plowing and processing in general.

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4. By placing the Soviet farms more widely, more correctly and more efficiently.

The first two points signify a certain weakening of the pressure on the kulaks: we keep it within certain limits, but do not bring down the food farming peasant to the level.

The last two points mean, on the contrary, the strengthening of the trend towards the collectivization of agriculture.

There is, however, no contradiction between these measures. While strengthening Soviet farms and social cultivation of the land according to apportionment, we are more cautious about the peasant upper classes until we can transfer the center of gravity of food policy to state farms and public plowing.

In rich agricultural areas (Siberia, Don, Ukraine) it is necessary to put forward a policy determined by the first two points.

In the central provinces, second-order politics may predominate.

In any case, it is obvious that the current policy of egalitarian requisition in accordance with food standards, mutual responsibility for dumping, and egalitarian distribution of industrial products is aimed at lowering agriculture, at dispersing the industrial proletariat and threatening to completely undermine the economic life of the country [21: 543-544]. .

In these proposals, L.D. Trotsky, elements of the future new economic policy are visible, which will begin to be implemented only a year after the powerful peasant uprising in the Tambov region under the leadership of A.S. Antonov, which lasted a whole year and became the culmination of the peasant movement in 1918-1922. For comparison: the "chapan war" lasted two weeks, and the "forklift" - a little more than a month.

The tragic lessons of the insurgent movement in the Volga region in the spring of 1920 were not taken into account by the Bolshevik leadership. As a result, in the region, as well as throughout the country, during 1920-1921. the element of peasant uprisings did not subside.

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THE PHENOMENON OF THE PEOPLE'S REBELLION IN THE VOLGA REGION: FROM THE "ARMY OF TRUTH" (Sapozhkovshchina) TO THE "ARMY OF "VOLINAROD" (SEROVSHCHINA)

The insurrectionary movement in the Volga region and the Ural steppes under the leadership of Vasily Serov was born in 1920. leadership — the second case of a large military formation in the Red Army (after the rebellion of F. Mironov). On July 13, 1920, the military units of the 2nd Turkestan cavalry division, located 15 versts east of the city of Buzuluk, rebelled (the 7th and 8th cavalry regiments and a horse battery - a total of about 600 sabers and

600 bayonets with four guns). The personnel basis of the Turkestan cavalry division was predominantly Ural and Astrakhan ka

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zaks, as well as Cossacks and peasants - natives of the Novouzensky district

Saratov province and Pugachevsky district of the Samara province.

The reason for the uprising was the displacement of the head of the division A.V. Sapozhkov: the division consisting of two regiments, according to the order of the commander of the Zavolzhsky military district, was to merge into the newly formed 9th Cavalry Division. In the division, Sapozhkov, as a well-known former red partisan, was very popular. The reason for the uprising was the dissatisfaction of the Red Army with the Soviet food policy. In the Volga region, land departments took away land from the Cossacks and transferred them to other owners. So, in the Saratov district, the land department cut off from the Cossacks of the village of Saratovskaya in favor of the society of tillers of the city of Saratov 2860 acres of convenient arable land. The Cossacks were left with only a small amount of convenient land [1].

On the day the uprising began, Sapozhkov issued an appeal "To all working people and Red Army soldiers." He declared himself at the meeting the head of the so-called "First Army of Truth". In July-September 1920, the Sapozhkov uprising engulfed the territory of the Buzuluk district of the Samara province, the Novouzensk district of the Saratov province, and also part of the Astrakhan province. The number of "Army of Truth" initially amounted to 2,500 people. They were mainly mobilized peasants from the Saratov and Samara provinces. The program of the Sapozhkovites was set out in the appeal "To all working people and Red Army men", as well as in Sapozhkov's order of July 15, 1920. The appeal said that in Soviet Russia the power of the people had not existed for a long time, the workers did not want to reckon with his opinion "are needed only in order to take everything necessary from them and to keep their power on this taken. The appeal noted that the district food committees are nothing but an institution that exploits the people, and in them, as well as in all Soviet institutions, the enemies of the revolution have settled: the bourgeoisie and officers. In an order dated July 15, 1920, it was stated that the uprising of the cavalry division became necessary "in view of the split in the Bolshevik Communist Party, in connection with the incorrectly introduced state government of Russia,

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The territory of the Astrakhan Cossack army extended to Sa

ratovo province. In 1918, at the congress of the Astrakhan Cossacks, held in Saratov, it was decided to transfer the capital of the army

in Cherny Yar.

which fundamentally undermined the strength of the Russian people. The order indicated the goal of the rebels - to unite the working population with one idea, breaking some of the responsible members of the Communist Party, who were too bourgeois, under the slogan "All the power of the Soviets is valid on the program of the Bolshevik Party on the basis of secrecy." "There is no agreement with the bourgeoisie and every element that has recently laid down its arms under the powerful blow of the Red Army and is currently occupying prominent posts such as: in the councils of people's commissars, in the district food committees, in headquarters, etc."

The slogans of the Revolutionary Military Council of Sapozhkov's army were: "Down with the commissars, down with the old specialists, long live free trade!" - found the support of the Cossacks of the Volga region, as well as the Samara and Saratov peasants who joined the Sapozhkovites. Sapozhkov organized a military headquarters. His troops occupied the city of Buzuluk and Pogromnaya station. At the station, the Sapozhkovites dismantled the railway track, and two echelons of Red Army soldiers on their way to the Western Front were stopped and disarmed.

A state of siege was declared in Buzuluk. The rebels demanded re-elections of the Soviets, the dissolution of the district food committees. The Sapozhkovites established their own government headed by Sapozhkov. Was

an appeal was issued in which the population was called upon to maintain order, support the Soviet government, the "Army of Truth" and the Third Communist International. The announced registration of volunteers took place with great enthusiasm.

On July 17, the Sapozhkovites were forced out of the city by Soviet troops approaching from Samara and dispersed. One part of the Sapozhkovites headed towards Orenburg, hoping for the support of the Orenburg Cossacks, the other towards Buguruslan. Sapozhkov's cavalry detachments appeared in the volosts of the Buguruslan district: Novo-Sultansulovskaya, Sredne-Averkinskaya, Mal-Talskaya, the villages of Troitskoye and Matveevo, where Sapozhkovites carried out agitation under the slogans of "free trade".

Sapozhkovism posed a serious danger to the Soviet state: the uprising could cause a chain reaction and become a catalyst for peasant and Cossack uprisings in the Volga region and the Southern Urals. This was indicated in a note by Trotsky, transmitted by direct wire on July 28, 1920, to the commander of the Zavolzhsky military district, Avksentievskiy. Trotsky demanded: "The rebellion of Sapozhkov must be liquidated as soon as possible. The culprits from above

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to the bottom must be mercilessly punished. Wide-ranging kulak uprisings are possible in the area under your jurisdiction. They can only be warned by giving an unforgettable lesson to all the elements that directly or indirectly supported Sapozhkov's rebellion. Trotsky demanded that any insurgent captured with a weapon in his hands be shot. Lenin also sent a telegram on August 2, 1920 to the Zavolzhsky military district, the Ural and Saratov provincial committees of the RCP (b) also put forward a demand for the speedy elimination of the Sapozhkov rebellion.

Sapozhkov's rebel detachment operated in the Trans-Volga region until the early autumn of 1920. On September 6, 1920, near Lake Bak-Baul in the Astrakhan province, it was defeated by a detachment of Borisoglebsk cavalry courses, and Sapozhkov himself was killed [2: 758-759].

Sapozhkovism clearly revealed a characteristic phenomenon: in 1920, in the minds of the working Cossacks and the peasantry, a mood was established about the ongoing degeneration of Soviet power as a result of the gradual seizure of its institutions by former oppressors (landlords, kulaks, officials). The opinion has spread among the people that the institutions of Soviet power and its local organs are becoming a concentration of bribe-takers, speculators, marauders, drunkards, and saboteurs. There were grounds for such reasoning: according to the assessments of the VChK, the main blame for the uprisings was assigned to local bodies and institutions of the Soviet government, since they incorrectly implemented the orders of the central government, discredited them with their activities [2: 32]. Sapozhkovism had a pronounced political coloring.

Sapozhkovism continued in the rebellion of Vasily Serov, one of Sapozhkov's closest associates. For more than two years - until the autumn of 1922 - the military might of the Soviet state could not cope with the rebels, who were based on the Ural and Astrakhan Cossacks - the only example of such a long-term resistance to communist power.

Member of the RCP(b) since 1919. Serov served in the 2nd Turkestan division of division chief Sapozhkov, after the capture of the city of Buzuluk he was appointed Sapozhkov head of the local garrison. After the death of Sapozhkov, he began to form his own rebel detachment. Serov's insurgents, who by 1921 had numbered up to 2,000 people, carried out attacks on bulk grain points, conducted armed

fight against the Red Army.

Serov's insurrectionary army was called "The First Ataman Division of the Insurgent Troops - the Will of the People" and consisted of three regiments. Serov held the post of division chief. The commander of the 1st regiment was the Siberian Cossack Kiselev, a native of the village of Chelkarskaya, Semipalatinsk province. Compound

The regiments were Cossacks (cavalry), Kirghiz (Kazakhs) and Russians (infantry). At the headquarters of the division there was a Revolutionary Military Council (its chairman Fedor Dalmatov was with Serov from the beginning of the organization of the insurgent division), a propaganda department and a commission of inquiry with the functions of a special department. The rebel division of Serov had a pronounced raid character. Their wives and children followed in the convoy of the rebels [3: 774].

Serov's rebellion acquired a clearly expressed ideological character. Even the Soviet leadership admitted that the struggle of the detachments under the leadership of Serov "went beyond the bounds of ordinary banditry." In January 1921, the Declaration of the Revolutionary Military Council and Army Commander "The Will of the People" was distributed among the rebels, signed by Commander Serov and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council Dalmatov. In this document of 16 paragraphs, the political program of the protest movement against the policy of the Soviet state was actually outlined. This document certainly deserves to be quoted in its entirety:

"\$ 1. We, the members of the Revolutionary Military Council and the Commander of the insurgent groups "Will of the People", officially declare on behalf of the insurgent people that the dictatorship of the proletariat, which has ruined Russia for three years, is abolished and all power is transferred to all the people without all sorts of subdivisions into classes and parties. \$ 2. All decrees issued by the Communist Government curtailing the freedom proclaimed by the second revolution of 1917 are repealed, and the principles of the second revolution serve as the foundation in the construction of Russia. \$ 3. The insurgent people do not accept any appointments of commissars coming from the center as violating the rule of the people, and any orders of such are not executed, and the commissars themselves, who did not voluntarily renounce power, are declared illegal. \$ 4. All institutions, both Party-Communist and professional, which have taken state functions into their own hands, are declared invalid and harmful to the Working People. \$ 5. Recognizing a great future for communism and the idea of its sacredness, the new revolutionary government does not have in mind the power of the bayonet

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to oppose this idea, but fights against the rapists-commissars who speculated on communism, and also does not recognize and fights against the forced state commune, believing that fascination with all kinds of ideas is the right of every person and the minority does not have the right to impose its will on the majority of the people. \$ 6. Political parties, with the exception of the party of the Black Hundreds-monarchists, are recognized as the new revolutionary power, and their activities are limited to political parliamentarianism, and the encroachment of the parties on the seizure of state power will be considered usurpation and suppressed in the most merciless way. 5 7. Taking into account that the bourgeois-Black-Hundred army of monarchists, taking advantage of the troubled revolutionary times and the fatigue of the Russian people, will try to seize power in their dirty hands and enslave the Working People, the Revolutionary Military Council and the Commander declare that even the slightest attempt to such capture will be suppressed, not stopping at the highest measure of punishment - execution. \$ 8. Without prejudging or imposing this or that appointment of the future supreme power, the Military Council and the Commander declare that they will fight against all attempts from right and left to impose a power on the People, which should be elected on the principle of universal suffrage. \$ 9. Ruined by the three-year rule of commissars and communists, Russia needs an intensive economic correction, and therefore the new revolutionary power declares free trade, and the transitional stage of the socialist operation abolishes every kind of state monopoly on vital products and manufactured goods. \$ 10. Recognizing small partial ownership in the land, factory, factory areas, the new government will fight big capital, allowing the concentration of capital and land only in the hands of artels created by the people themselves. \$ 11. Recognizing the principle of self-determination of peoples and regions, the new government, while expanding its base of influence, will strictly implement this principle and refuses any imposition of this or that form of government, leaving the right of decision to the peoples and regions themselves. \$ 12. One of the greatest crimes of communist power is the refusal to work with the democracy of Europe, such as: America and

others, resulting in a blockade and boycott of Russia and its economic decline. The new revolutionary government sets as the immediate task of establishing the closest relations with the aforementioned democratic

states through the mediation of their representatives of the socialists, whom the communist government, on the principle of Nicholas the Bloody, expelled from their homeland, whose participation in the construction of Russia the new revolutionary government considers necessary. § 13.

Tired of external and internal wars, the Russian people need a lasting peace, and the new government declares that all efforts will be made to reach a peace agreement with all states hostile to communist power. § 14. Until the establishment of a permanent supreme power, the Russian Republic will require banknotes and obligations of national importance.

Therefore, all previously and now existing are valid and circulate in the territory occupied by the insurgent group. § 15. Taking into account that the Communist government, with its terrors and brutal reprisals, greatly intimidated the people, the new government invites all those who sympathize and implement this declaration to elect local authorities at their discretion, until a special order from the Supreme Power. § 16. All the principles underlying this declaration will be supported by the insurgent troops and the government in arms, and encroachments on them by the groups will be mercilessly pursued [4: 275-277].

This Declaration formulated the tasks of the protest movement in all major spheres of public life: economic, political, spiritual, foreign policy. There is not a hint of a rejection or revision of the communist idea - a "great future" is recognized for communism. The Communist Party was accused of usurping power and replacing the promised power of the people with the dictatorship of the proletariat, in fact, with the dictatorship of the Communist Party.

The Serov-Dalmatov program actually anticipated the principles of the New Economic Policy: the rejection of the forced state commune and the state monopoly on the product of labor, the recognition of small private property, the organization of capital control, the creation of a state monetary system, and the permission of free trade. However, there is a qualitative difference from the Soviet NEP - the organization of elected people's power on the basis of universal suffrage, the recognition of the principles of democratic freedom and human rights, the inadmissibility of the seizure and usurpation of power by individual parties, the development of local self-government, the right to self-determination.

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the formation of peoples, the establishment of lasting peace and relations with foreign states.

The main provisions set forth in the cited document are consonant with the program ideas expressed in 1919 by the defender of the interests of the people and the people's leader Philip Kuzmich Mironov. It can be argued that the Serov-Dalmatov Declaration is comparable in content to other protest documents - the Program of the Antonov Council of the working peasantry in the Tambov province, the resolution of the garrison assembly of the rebellious Kronstadt | March 1921

On October 16, 1921, in Moscow, the Central Commission for Combating Banditry adopted a decision: "On the territory of the Volga Military District, a delay in the fight against banditry is unacceptable." The Commander of the PriVO troops was ordered within 1.5 months to "uproot banditry on the territory of the military district." The possibility of "if necessary, seizing the families of bandits for sending to other areas" was especially stipulated [5].

At the end of 1921, the top Soviet leadership adopted a decision that, in 1922, secured the right of the military command to operationally control the actions of all troops in "the most serious cases of manifestation of banditry." For the territory of the Ural, Saratov, Simbirsk, Samara provinces, as well as the Region of the Volga Germans, a similar "case" was

liquidation of the "Serov gang", which was located at the end of December 1921 in the Guryev district of the Ural province, numbering up to 600 sabers with 8 machine guns. In the lower reaches of the Ural River, Serov's detachment was replenished with Ural Cossacks at the outposts of Orlovsky, Zelenovsky, Topolinsky, Baksaevsky and Yamankhalinsky. The total number of rebels increased to 2-3 thousand people. On January 7, Serov's rebels from the outpost of Kharkinsky - the fortress of Gorskaya redeployed in a southerly direction to the outpost of Grebenshchikovsky, where on January 10 they engaged in battle with the Soviet units. Having suffered losses, Serov went to the Kara-Kul tract, where he sent most of the Cossacks home. Avoiding the constant pursuit of the punitive troops in the valley of the Ural River, Serov's detachment turned east and on January 18, with no more than 500 men, occupied the fortification of Uilskoe.

From Uilsky, Serov undertook telegraph negotiations with the command of the Volga Military District, located in Uralsk. From the side of the Soviet command was created komis

this for negotiations as part of the brigade commander of the 81st brigade, the chairman of the Ural provincial executive committee and the chairman of the gubchek. On 26 January, preliminary conditions for a two-week cessation of hostilities were concluded. The Soviet side interpreted Serov's initiative unequivocally as "negotiations on surrender." Probably, the motives for entering into negotiations on the part of Serov and Dalmatov were much deeper.

This is evidenced, firstly, by the conditions for the cessation of hostilities set by the rebels: freedom of the individual and choice of residence, leaving one horse for each rebel. Secondly, Serov used the two-week truce to carry out agitation work in the area of the fortification of Wilskoje, distributed the Declaration of the Revolutionary Military Council and the commander of the army "Will of the People", propaganda leaflets among the population. Thirdly, Serov held re-elections of rural and volost executive committees of the Uil and Temir districts. Taking into account the above arguments, it can be concluded that Serov acted quite in the spirit of his own political Declaration: having made sure during the long period of military battles (from July 1920 to January 1922) that military confrontation with the regular units of the Red Army had no prospects, Cheka, CHON, VNUS, he was looking for a political way out to a peaceful life. Probably, the possibility of going abroad did not appeal to him, otherwise he would have

took advantage.

A leaflet of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Volya Naroda group of rebel troops was distributed among the local population, in which the goal of the rebels' struggle was explained to the people: "For a long time in the remote steppes there was a rumor spread by the enemies of the people, the communists, that wild gangs of criminal personalities were roaming everywhere, the purpose of which is to rob and kill oncoming and transverse. For a long time, the people, entangled by terror and brutal reprisals, continued in their darkness to believe this provocative rumor and unconsciously stood up under arms and tried to kill their own brothers, who were fighting for freedom and democracy on the basis of truth. And God helps, and we, the rebel troops, occupied the city of Uille with all the garrison and party members in it, and what did we do. Nothing, not a single hair not only from the head of a Red Army soldier or a private citizen, but even from the head of the same communist did not fall through our fault, our struggle is of a purely political nature, and not material. It is based on their slogan: "Freedom, equality and fraternity for the entire Russian people",

"177

so dear to the people that after the people got acquainted with the declaration of the insurgent people, volunteers joined our ranks not only from among private citizens, but from Red Army soldiers and party members who sincerely repented of their error. How is this explained? And by the fact that the people were convinced with their own eyes that the rebel troops of the "Will of the People" are not bandits, as the Soviet government calls them, but there are partisans who bring the will of the people, the liberation of the people from the oppression of the Soviet system, the people realized that the voice of the people is the voice of God that the people as a whole, as easily toppled the oppression of tsarism from their backs, will so easily topple the oppression of the communists, since all their support lies on the bayonets of that dark people, one has only to throw down bayonets to this people, and there is no pov

communists, and there will be only the power of the most on the principle of the great February revolution. The inhabitant of Uil understood and voluntarily laid down his arms, the rest of the Russian people will follow his good example and the end of the massacre and the end of the oppression and violence of the communists. There remains only one free Russian people without dictator-commissars, united under the common slogan "Freedom, equality and fraternity!" [4: 277-278].

The fact that "Red Army and Party members" joined the ranks of the insurgents, as the leaflet said, was not a mere propaganda device. This is evidenced, in particular, by the accession to the rebels in October 1921 of the communist A.B. Semenov, chief of staff of the 4th army, secretary and member of the collegium of the Cheka of the city of Novouzensk. In the fortification of Uilskoe, a platoon of a separate Aktobe company of the Cheka was taken prisoner.

The powers of the commission on the Soviet side were not defined. Strict demands "to surrender the gang" were not accepted: Serov did not send representatives to Uralsk by the appointed time, and interrupted further negotiations. The Soviet side interpreted this step as the use of a truce by bandits for a respite, replenishment of food and fodder in order to continue "banditry". To do this, rumors spread that Serov's bandits terrorized the local population, carried out requisitions and confiscations, taking away the last cattle and horses, announced the mobilization of Cossacks, and shot them for insubordination. However, the rumors spread did not correspond to the ideological content of the Serov-Dalmatov insurrectionary movement. As mentioned above, if necessary, to avoid unnecessary losses, Serov disbanded local Urals

sky Cossacks to their homes.

The main command of the Red Army regularly reported on the actions of Serov in the Guryevsky district to the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic Trotsky and his deputy E.M. Sklyansky. Two reports in January 1922 (January 14 and 16) were sent personally to Lenin and Molotov. One of the reports stated that "the Cossacks who had been mobilized earlier were dispersed by the gang to their homes" [6].

1] February 1922, Sklyansky asked the Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army Kamenev: "With whose consent was this commission created and on what basis are negotiations being conducted?" The Soviet command was afraid of a possible attack of the rebels on Guryev or Uralsk. The troops of the military district were ordered to launch a "decisive offensive to eliminate the Serov gang" from February 12, the overall leadership of the operation was entrusted to the brigade commander of the 81st brigade. The command of the Volga Military District, in turn, carried out the order of the headquarters of the Red Army - "before spring, be sure to put an end to Serov's gang" [7].

Serov's rebels retreated from Uilsky in a northerly direction, defeating a ChON detachment on March 5 near the village of Novo-Alekseevsky. On March 10, near the village of Krasnoyarsky (50 miles south of Iletsk), Serov's detachment took battle with the Soviet units. In the operational intelligence reports of the headquarters of the Volga Military District about this battle, it was reported that it lasted 18 hours. In the battle, the banner of the rebels was captured, on the white canvas of which is written "3rd Ataman Regiment. Death to communists - enemies of the people, long live the full right and will of the people. The report stated that "the composition of Serov's gang consisted of Cossacks, shooters and young people from 12 years old, there are many clockwork horses without saddles" [8].

It is safe to say that not a single gang would have got involved in such a long and bloody 18-hour battle. The motivation for the actions of the insurgents, obviously, was the ideological attitude. In the intelligence report of the operational department of the headquarters of the Volga Military District dated March 15, 1922, it was said that Serov's headquarters had a banner made of white linen with the slogan "Down with the communists! Long live the proletariat!" The conclusions to the report noted: "Voluntary joining the gang of residents of Novo-Iletsk and the selection conducted by Serov from a large number of applicants; throwing out new slogans by Serov" [9].

The operational situation regarding the elimination of Serov's rebels continued to be the focus of attention not only of the military, but also of the political leadership of the country. So, March 23, 1922

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the headquarters of the Red Army compiled a certificate of Serov's actions, which was sent to the deputy chairman of the Council of Labor and Defense A.D. Tsyuru-pe. On April 3, Sklyansky also sent him a telegram from the headquarters of the Volga Military District about the operational situation around Guryev. On March 28, a certificate from the commander-in-chief was sent to Molotov in connection with the statement by Vvodsky, authorized by the Central Committee of the RCP, that the military command was incapable of leading the elimination of banditry in the Volga District. The certificate indicated that the number of Serov's gang, according to agents, ranged from 350 to | thousands of people [10].

On February 8, 1922, Sklyansky accused the headquarters of the Red Army of condoning the rebels in connection with the negotiations. The message to Commander-in-Chief Kamenev emphasized: "Serov used two weeks for anti-Soviet agitation, requisition of fodder and livestock, and, in general, to strengthen his gang ... Obviously, the command of the Volga District made a completely unacceptable mistake. I consider it necessary, if there are no special objections on your part, to point out the incorrectness of his actions, since if Serov entered into negotiations, then there was absolutely no need to conclude a truce in order to negotiate surrender" [11].

The Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army did not object to the higher leader. The headquarters of the Red Army declared the command of the Volga District to be the culprit of the unsuccessful actions of the Soviet troops to eliminate Serov. The reason was found in negotiations with Serov. On March 28, 1922, signed by Kamenev, the following telegram was sent to the headquarters of the district: "The cessation of hostilities against Serov led in the end to the strengthening of the latter. Obviously, the command of the PriVO made an unacceptable mistake, since if Serov entered into negotiations, then there was absolutely no need to stop hostilities against him" [12]. However, there were no punishments: only the assistant commander of the district escaped with a reprimand.

At the beginning of April 1922, Serov's detachment undertook a tried and tested tactical partisan ploy - it divided into groups. The small number of groups made it possible to obtain greater mobility. Attempts at parallel pursuit, encirclement, and corralling of the insurgents against the placed barriers proved to be ineffective. When surrounded, vast expanses of the steppes made it possible for Serov to leave in any direction. Infantry punitive units of the Reds

troops could not keep up with the maneuverable detachments. The persecution took place in a hungry steppe region, far from the lines of communication and communications - the Soviet units were not able to deliver the necessary food, carts, horses for those who had gone far from the supply bases. It was necessary to form mobile flying units on the move [13].

Serov's detachments dispersed into small groups from 40-50 to 100 people, who appeared in May 1922 in the Novouzensky district of the Saratov province. A group of Soviet troops unsuccessfully tried to encircle the area in which the Serovites were operating, to narrow the encirclement to a radius of 10 versts in order to eliminate them "with one blow." From the report of the headquarters of the Volga Military District to the commander-in-chief of the Red Army Kamenev, it followed that Serov expressed a desire to put an end to the futile military confrontation: the military command of the district had information that on May 4 the Saratov GPU received a letter from him with a proposal for negotiations. The situation that took place in January 1922 was repeated, but with one significant difference: Serov decided to negotiate not with the military leadership, but with the provincial body of the GPU. On May 7, representatives of the GPU commission left for negotiations with Serov (RGVA. F. 33988. Inv. 1. D. 477. L. 259). The fighting did not stop this time. On April 13, 1922, Kamenev reported to Trotsky on April 13, 1922, about the attempt to enter into negotiations with Serov on the part of the Saratov Department of the GPU [14].

Negotiations took place independently of the military command. On April 10, 1922, an order was issued by Commander-in-Chief Kamenev to the commander of the Volga Military District: "The Serov gang must be liquidated at all costs, and therefore, in order not to interrupt the operation you have already begun, I order you to continue it under your order and leadership, without handing it over to the GPU troops. Measures must be taken to ensure that Guryev does not again find himself under the threat of an attack by the remnants of Serov's gang" [15].

However, Serov again, as in January, broke off negotiations; He took 7 representatives of the GPU commission with him. Subsequently, representatives of the Saratov Gubernia Department of the GPU sent a letter with a wish to stop hostilities against Serov's detachment: the letter noted that Serov expressed a desire to stop resistance and expected a second commission for negotiations [16].

In this case, the interests of two different departments were divided. The military leadership still insisted on the elimination of Serov's rebels by military means, rejecting any negotiations. Commander-in-Chief Kamenev was sure that, just as it had been during the negotiations in January 1921, Serov was again trying to gain time for his reinforcement. Sklyansky supported the opinion of a categorical prohibition "to enter into any negotiations with Serov, which give him the opportunity to gather strength, and to lead the liquidation faster and more energetically" [16].

In May 1921, the negotiations failed. However, on August 15, 1922, Serov voluntarily surrendered to the special representative of the GPU. On August 14, Serov's associate, F. Dalmatov, also voluntarily surrendered (Serov and Dalmatov were sentenced to death by the Samara Provincial Court on December 18-25, 1923). It can be assumed that the cessation of the armed struggle and the simultaneous voluntary surrender of the two leaders of the insurgents had an ideological basis.

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PEOPLE'S REBELLION MOVEMENT IN THE SOUTH OF RUSSIA

In the winter of 1920-1921. demobilization from the ranks of the Red Army began - after the victorious completion of military operations in the Crimea and the liquidation of the Russian army of General Wrangel. Demobilization was massive: by decision of the Council of Labor and Defense from December 1920 to mid-summer 1921, the size of the Red Army was to be halved (by the end of 1920, the army was about 6 million people) [1: 136; 2:170].

The much-desired peaceful life has come. However, the fighters and commanders, who had been hardened in the battles of the Civil War, returning to their native places, faced the military-communist methods of the food policy of the Soviet state. The surplus appraisal turned against the middle peasant economy, undermining the incentives for agricultural management. It was possible to force the producer to give away grain and not to reduce agricultural production at the same time only by expanding the measures of coercion and violence.

The continuation of the policy of war communism in the changed, peaceful conditions gave rise to an acute political crisis, when the main part of the rural population - peasants and Cossacks - began to express not only passive, but also active opposition to the policy of surplus appropriation. The organs of the Soviet state continued to act by the methods of orders and instructions.

It is not surprising that former and current Red Army soldiers were the active part of the rebels. The commanders of the Red Army often became the head of the rebels. Among them were holders of the Order of the Red Banner - a rare award for that time for great military merit.

On December 17, 1920, in the center of the Ust-Medveditsky District, in the settlement of Mikhailovka, a rebellion broke out against the Soviet authorities, which was led by Vakulin, a former regiment commander of the 23rd Mironov division, a member of the RCP (b), who was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. In 1920, Vakulin served as the commander of a guard battalion at the Ust-Medveditsk district military registration and enlistment office.

The proclamation he issued read: "Citizens! The moment has come when the power of a handful of communists and commissars has been torn out and handed over to the working people. Our destiny is in your hands. You are free to destroy yourself, bend your backs before the first

raided by an organized gang of communists, but crouching down, you will never straighten up. Everything is at stake—either death for the communists or for the Trudoviks. Therefore, you, who are strong in spirit, who are honest and cheerful, must raise the banner of the sacred struggle, so that parasites and vampires do not take away the last piece of bread, the last cow from the father and mother, wife and children, and thereby doom innocent families to obvious death. Whoever does not want the power of the communists, their oppression, robbery and violence, sign up for volunteer detachments to fight it. Your cheerful spirit and bright mind will lift and support the already firm mood of the rebellious Red Army soldiers, who have given themselves the word to destroy all the dirt of communism. Citizens! Help the rebels in this difficult moment, all who can, so that everyone's conscience is calm in the consciousness of fulfilling their duty. So, whoever wants to see true freedom, equality and fraternity, join the ranks of the rebels to defend their rights. Long live the rebels of the Ust-Medveditsky district!" [3: 588-589].

Vakulin referred in his appeals to the support of the popular people's leader F.K. Mironov, which the latter allegedly should provide with the 2nd Cavalry Army, like S.M. Budyonny with the 1st Cavalry. Mironov himself categorically rejected such conjectures, calling his former brother-soldier a bandit who raised a "criminal bandit uprising." Mironov declared himself an opponent of all uprisings because of their fatality. The main content of Mironov's speech at a rally on June 6, 1920 in Mikhailovka in front of more than 2,000 captured White Cossacks gathered from all villages was a call to prevent uprisings against Soviet power: Mironov warned the Cossacks and the peasantry "from this disastrous step for them and

Republic", recalling the order of the Soviet military leadership to destroy the villages and farms for the uprisings.

Mironov did not deny the presence, in his words, of "fuel material" for the uprisings: starvation began in the villages and villages, the dissatisfaction of the population and Red Army soldiers with the food policy. He predicted the possibility of uprisings in the spring of 1921, while emphasizing that they would lead the country to anarchy. To prevent such a situation, Mironov argued that the policy of the ruling party must take into account the demands of life, without concessions it is impossible to overcome contradictions [3: 593-394, 642, 643, 644, 645, 652].

Initially, the number of Vakulinsky rebels operating at the end of December 1920 in the area of the Sebyakovo station of Ust-Medveditsky

district, did not exceed 500 people. In mid-January, under pressure from the regular troops of the Don region, Vakulin crossed into the Saratov province. Parts of the VNUS (internal troops), despite their numerical superiority, could not hold back the Vakulinsky detachment, which reached the Volga on January 18-19 and crossed to its left bank 50 versts northeast of Kamyshin. The Vakulin rebels seized the bulk points, distributed bread and weapons to the peasants. The peasants voluntarily joined Vakulin. The rebels spread slogans: "Long live Soviet power without communists and commissars!", "Long live free people and free trade!" [4: 5:639].

The actions of the command of the Zavolzhsky military district were not successful, despite the numerical superiority of the Soviet troops. Vakulin's detachments were replenished with Cossacks and prisoners from the military units sent against him, who voluntarily went over to the side of the rebels. On the territory of the Novouzensky district of the Saratov province, several Soviet detachments were taken prisoner: on January 19 near Belyaevka - a detachment of 101 people, on January 21 near Pallasovka - a detachment of 500 people, on January 24 near Savinka - a detachment of about 500 people. At the expense of the Soviet troops, Vakulin provided not only replenishment of manpower, but also the supply of food and ammunition. As a result, a rebel detachment of 350 cavalymen with 6-7 machine guns, which crossed the Volga into the territory of the Novouzensky district, left the district already in the composition | thousand infantry, more than 400 cavalry, armed with 17 machine guns and 2 guns with 200 shells. By the end of January 1921, thanks to the sympathetic support of the local residents of the Saratov province, the number of Vakulins reached 1,500 bayonets and cavalry; in early February, Vakulin's army already numbered 1,600 infantry and 600 cavalry [5: 630-631]. In the detachments of Vakulin, companies were formed into regiments, the recruitment of which was built on the principle of territoriality.

On January 25, Vakulin turned west, crossed on January 27 to the right bank of the Volga and headed for the Don region, but under the onslaught of Soviet troops he again turned east. On February 1, 1921, Vakulin called a general meeting of command staff and held a rally on the same day of all the Red Army soldiers of the detachment. The following questions were on the agenda: the purpose of the uprising and its further tasks; about unauthorized arrests and searches; about robberies. In the army of Vakulin, a comrades' court was created, and a medical infirmary was organized. In the instructions to the senior doctor

about caring for the sick and wounded, it was stated: "To pay the most serious attention to the nutrition of the sick and wounded, for which purpose to demand semolina from the supply department and buy milk at free prices, and, if possible, eggs, and also pay attention to the very care of sick. Conduct an examination for all the sisters of mercy, examine them in a state of health" [6].

On February 5, 1921, after a short battle, Vakulin occupied Kamyshin, but left the city on February 7. Vakulin's detachments broke up into two parts, one of which moved to the north, the other to the southeast, threatening traffic on the Urbakh-Astrakhan railway. In the areas of movement of the Vakulin rebels across the territory of the Volga region, peasant uprisings broke out. The rebels smashed the chute points and took away the grain [7].

The Soviet leadership of the Saratov and Samara provinces did not know the real situation, underestimated the strength of the rebels, considering, obviously, the information from the field to be inflated. The Soviet military command was at a loss: the headquarters of the 77th VNUS brigade did not know where the enemy was, could not inform its units about the situation. Many responsible Soviet and party workers, frightened by Vakulin's raid, left Novouzensky district. The county revolutionary committee had no information about the movement of the rebels. At the same time, in an effort to attribute their own mistakes to the "bandits", Soviet, party and military leaders sent upward reports with "compromising evidence" against the rebels and Vakulin personally, explaining his actions as allegedly "an acute form of the last stage of syphilis and neurasthenia", "reactionary by 50%" of the population, which "sympathetically reacted to the movement of banditry, which was confirmed in its assistance to Vakulin with all the means necessary for the bandits", the dissatisfaction of the population of the Ust-Medveditsky and Kamyshinsky districts with the Soviet authorities. It was argued that Vakulin did not enjoy the sympathy of the local population and only the worsening food situation helped him gain the sympathy of the peasantry and even the urban population [8; 5:632.724].

A telegram was sent to the Labor and Defense Council about the need to resolve the issue of liquidating Vakulin with the help of the center. At the same time, the chairman of the Astrakhan Cheka, F. Stepnoy, telegraphed Dzerzhinsky about the need for decisive measures on the part of the center to eliminate Vakulin due to a real threat to Astrakhan - the cessation of the supply of bread.

Significant forces of the Trans-Volga and Caucasian fronts (2 thousand bayonets, more than 1 thousand sabers) were sent by the high command of the Red Army to fight Vakulin's units. In particular, in two days a flying detachment "of selected fighters and horses" of the 21st Cavalry Division consisting of 1000 sabers, an artillery platoon and a battalion of riflemen of the 22nd Infantry Division was organized. On February 17, in a battle near the village of Vodyanka (southeast of the village of Gmelinskaya), parts of Vakulin were defeated, Vakulin himself was killed in hand-to-hand combat [9; 10: 584, 587, 596, 599-603].

Vakulin's successor was his closest assistant, Fyodor Popov, a Don Cossack, former regiment commander of the 1st Cavalry Army. At the beginning of their operations, Popov's detachment had 2-3 thousand bayonets and sabers. Pursued by the Soviet cavalry units, he constantly maneuvered, inflicting significant losses on the Red Army detachments [5: 165]. Popov used the successful experience of carts and supplies to quickly move infantry (this tactic was effectively used by the Makhnovist army and the 1st Cavalry Army). Moving through the Pugachevsky district of the Samara province, Popov's detachments occupied the city of Khvalynsk. Popov's rebels also acted in the Ural province.

By the end of February, Popov's rebel army reached 6,000 infantry and 500 cavalry. It had a structure similar to the regular units of the Red Army. The basis of the cavalry of the rebels were the Don and Ural Cossacks. The headquarters, headed by Popov, was engaged in the development of operations, the chief of staff was the former lieutenant Smirnov (real name Ikunov), the headquarters had a commandant's team - chief Prokhvatilyev.

Rifle regiments were formed according to the territorial principle. The names of the regiments - the 1st Ust Medveditsky Regiment (Burzhakovsky regiment), the 2nd Astrakhan regiment (Lukovenko regiment, former military commissar of the Mikhailovskaya volost of the Ust-Medveditsky district, communist), the 3rd Samara regiment - testified to the composition of the fighters from which the rebel regiments were formed. In the Samara province, the 4th Pugachev regiment was formed from the inhabitants of the Pugachev district [11].

The regiments had a three-battalion structure of regular units of 3 companies each (400 bayonets per battalion). Each regiment had 5 machine guns. In addition, there was a separate machine gun team with 15 machine guns, each with 7 belts, each machine gun

The communication command was given to the calculation. 8 telephone sets were located in the bivouac. A separate cavalry division (again similar to the Red Army) (commander Kurylenkov) consisted of

three squadrons of 100 sabers, each with 2 machine guns. Popov's rebels were armed with three-line rifles.

The convoy consisted of 2 thousand carts for transporting infantry and 370 carts for fodder and equipment. The quartermaster team was engaged in supplying the rebels from the district food committees, there was a special supply of food - 200 carts. There was a daily allowance: bread with flour - one and a half pounds, meat - 1 pound. The detachment had an infirmary with a doctor, several paramedics and one nurse. Popov's headquarters maintained discipline in the rebel units. The prisoners passed through the commission of inquiry, after a positive decision, the ranks of the rebels voluntarily replenished at the expense of the Red Army and the command staff of the Red Army, including communists [12].

The Revolutionary Military Council was engaged in political and propaganda work among the personnel of the rebels and the local population. The rebels distributed appeals among the local population signed by the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council Shkuratov and unit commanders.

Popov's rebels posed a serious threat to Soviet power in the Don and Volga regions. According to the reports of the Soviet military command of the Zavolzhsky military district, at the end of March 1921, "the gang, once headed by Vakulin, and now by Popov, moved into the category of the most dangerous gangs, not only enjoying the sympathy of the local population, but being an instigator of gangster - Socialist-Revolutionary movement. The strength of the "gang" during this period was estimated at 6000 bayonets, 600 sabers, 20 machine guns. To eliminate the uprising in the territory of the Zavolzhsky district, there were not enough units of two divisions of the internal troops (20th and 26th VNUS), with 27 light and 4 heavy guns. The rapid movements of the rebels on carts with the change of horses from local residents left the pursuing Soviet units exhausted horse train, which could not be used. The local residents were friendly towards the rebels: they reported information about the movement of the Red Army units, sheltered

rebels.

At the end of March 1921, the main command of the Red Army was forced to pull large and combat-ready troops into the Zavolzhsky District.

Indian units from other regions: the 27th Rifle Division, the 70th Rifle and 22nd Cavalry Regiments, a cavalry division from Siberia, 4 armored trains. Reliable communists were sent to carry out political work and strengthen the Soviet apparatuses. General command over all units in the lower reaches of the Volga was entrusted to the division commander of the 27th division V.K. Putne [13]. A special role in the liquidation of the insurgents was assigned to the use of armored trains and armored detachments, as well as aviation.

March 31, 1921 by the directive of the Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army S.S. Kameneva Putna was appointed commander of the troops of the lower reaches of the Volga with operational subordination directly to the commander-in-chief. To manage operations to suppress the uprising in the lower reaches of the Volga and the adjacent territory of the Trans-Volga region, they were subordinated to him according to the directive: in all matters - all troops and all military establishments located in the Saratov province (with the exception of the troops transferred to the Tambov command to suppress the Antonov uprising) ; in operational terms - all troops located in the Pugachev district of the Samara province and in the Tsaritsyn province. The headquarters of the troops of the lower reaches of the Volga, formed in accordance with this directive, became the working apparatus.

Under the onslaught of superior forces of the regular Red Army, in April 1921 Popov returned to the Don region. After the defeat in a six-hour battle near the village of Preobrazhenka, the rebels were divided into two detachments - the Samara ("Samaritans"), operating in the Kamyshin district, and the Don ("Donets"), each of which was divided into several groups that acted on one's own.

While the insurrectionary movement of Vakulin and Popov was unfolding in the Lower Volga region, a major rebellion took place in the Ukraine in parts of the Red Army. And this happened

event in

the legendary 1st Cavalry Army of Budyonny. Brigade commander from the 1st Cavalry Army Grigory Maslakov, holder of two Orders of the Red Banner,

' The 27th Infantry Division under the command of Chief Division V. Putna, before arriving in the Lower Volga region to eliminate the insurgent movement, took part in the assault on the rebellious Kronstadt.

? Even during the period of battles with the Whites, according to the reports of the political workers of the 1st Cavalry Army, one could often hear from the lips of the Budyonnovists: "Let's finish with Wrangel, let's go to war with the commune, let's go" clean the rear ", or" we will defeat the whites, then we will start beating the communists " » [18:74, 75].

On February 8, 1921, he gave the order for his brigade on behalf of the division commander to march on the Don. The rebellious Budyonnovsk brigade commander, we recall, in September 1919 distinguished himself in the suppression of the rebellion and the arrest of F. Mironov.

Maslakov's speech was caused by dissatisfaction with the food and land policy of the Soviet state, as well as unwillingness to fight the Makhnovist rebels. In the area of the Kocherezhsky farm and the village of Khandoleevka, Maslakov called on the local population to revolt against the Soviet regime, declared himself a partisan and supporter of Makhno. In the indicated area, he joined up with the Makhnovist detachment of Brov. The Budyonnovsky brigade commander took with him almost the entire personnel of the 19th cavalry regiment (it is noteworthy that 90 people in this cavalry regiment were in the ranks of the RCP (b). Maslakov himself was admitted to the ranks of the RCP (b) in June 1920. Six months later, he opposed " injustices of the organs of Soviet power".

The leaflet-appeal issued by Maslakov said: "Comrades!.. We are not going against the Soviet regime, but are fighting for it... We are not going against the people, but we are going against the dictatorship from above, as they dictate to us now... we we want the people themselves to dictate, and not just one person. We are not going against the communist comrades who are following the right path, and the workers for the good of the people, but against paper communists. We gave ourselves a word of honor and vowed not to give up our weapons until we destroy these reptiles... Honest fighters of the Budyonnovsky army are coming... enough bloodshed and brotherly blood for us. And let's point our weapons together at those who bring it to this. Forward, comrades, against our bloodsuckers! Long live free soviets, but only such soviets that will be rightly chosen by the people and not appointed from above. Down with all dictators, whoever they are!" Maslakov's detachment acted under the slogan for "true Soviet power without communists." The Revolutionary Military Council of the 1st Cavalry Army outlawed Maslakov as a traitor to the republic. The army order dated February 11, 1921 ordered that all measures be taken to capture Maslakov and deliver him to the army tribunal [14: 796].

The rebels, under the leadership of a former fighting red commander, together with the Makhnovists, fought against their former comrades in the Pavlograd region. In the early days of March 1921, the commander of the Insurgent Army, N. Makhno, singled out Maslakov (Maslak, as Makhno called him) into an independent Don group and sent him to

raid on the Don and Kuban. Maslakovites crossed over to the territory of the 1st Don District. Their number reached more than 5 thousand sabers and bayonets, and they posed a serious danger to the Soviet government. Raising the Cossacks and peasants to fight against the authorities, Maslakov used the slogans "Free Soviets", "Soviets without Communists", "Free Trade" [15: 123].

Maslakovtsy in March 1921 operated in the area of the village of Velikoknyazheskaya. In the battle near the Remontnaya station, Maslakov suffered serious losses, but on March 12, 1921, his detachment broke through the railway line at the Remontnaya-Gashun station section, consisting of about 2000 sabers, intending to leave for the Kalmyk steppes. On March 13, Maslakov occupied Torgovoe next to about 400 sabers. Moving further to the northeast, on March 14, he captured the village of Zavetnoe. On March 16, after a battle with units of the Don Command, Maslakov retreated in three directions: with one group - to the Remontnaya area, the other - to the village of Grabeevskoye, and the third - with the main forces - to the village of Kezhe. On March 20, Maslakov occupied the village of Roguli. Surrounded in the area, having suffered great

loss, on March 23, Maslakov went east in the direction of the Kalmyk auls in the Astrakhan province [16].

Worried about the invasion of Maslakov's rebels, the leadership of the Astrakhan province urgently sent a telegram to Lenin and Dzerzhinsky about the need for decisive measures to destroy Maslakov's rebel detachment. In a secret telegram dated March 17, 1921, the gubchek, the provincial committee of the RCP (b), the provincial executive committee and the provincial committee of the Astrakhan province reported: "Maslakov's gang, with impressive forces with two guns, operating in the region of the Stavropol province and Donoblast, entered the Kalmyk steppe and conducts an offensive to the northeast (Tsaritsyn - Cherny Yar) from the area of Torgovoe - Remontnoye. According to the latest information, occupied with. Kiselevo. Tsaritsyn and Astrakhan do not have combat forces to oppose this impressive gang. All the 500,000 poods of grain for the Astrakhan province are concentrated in Tsaritsyn, and the advance of the gang to Tsaritsyn threatens bread, which is the only resource for the Astrakhan province during the fishing and oil transportation campaigns. Our Tsaritsyn bread is hastily loaded into barges, which, due to the ice, cannot move to Astrakhan, but will be moved immediately after the opening of the river. There are absolutely no grain supplies in Astrakhan, and receipts from the Pokrovsk railway station have completely stopped.

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as a result of the transfer of Pokrovsky bread according to your orders to the Center. The situation calls for the most resolute measures to be taken to destroy the said Maslakov gang, and in any case to prevent it from reaching the area of Tsaritsyn-Sarepta-Cherny Yar. Failure to receive bread from Tsaritsyn will inevitably cause a difficult situation. We ask you to urgently telegraph about your events. Having received this telegram on March 19, Lenin wrote a resolution to Trotsky: "Comrade. Trotsky. We must press with all our might and smash Maslakov" [5: 675].

The top Soviet leadership considered Maslakov's rebels to be a serious threat that could detonate the fuel of social discontent both in the Red Army and among the local population in the rebel movement areas. It is noteworthy that in the circular telegram of the chairman of the Cheka, F.E. Dzerzhinsky to all gubchek and special departments of March 30, 1921, "Maslakov's gangs on the Don" were placed on the same level with "Antonov's gangs in Tambov" and "Makhno in Ukraine" [17: 608].

In the Astrakhan province, more than 200 Kalmyk Cossacks in the Ikitsohurovsky ulus joined Maslakov's rebels. Having captured several settlements in the steppes of the Manych Ulus, on April 29 the Maslakovites captured Elista. To eliminate the insurgent movement on the Don and the North Caucasus, by order of the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic of Trotsky, on April 30, 1921, the North Caucasian Military District was re-formed on the former territory with the headquarters of the district in Rostov-on-Don.

The 1st Cavalry Army was transferred to the Don and the North Caucasus in full force. The Soviet leadership had doubts about the use of the Cavalry Army to fight the rebels, related, in particular, to the possibility of the cavalry soldiers moving to the rebels of Maslakov and other detachments. Dubious "kulak elements" were urgently withdrawn from the 4th division, and the lower command staff was purged. On April 24, in the 4th Cavalry Division, arrests were made among the commanders of the 12th Regiment, whose commander agitated the fighters to join Maslakov. After that, the Revolutionary Military Council of the 1st Cavalry Army had grounds for asserting that the Cavalry would not be an "assistant to the rebels", and the relatives and friends of the fighters would not be able to exert "any bad influence" on the cavalymen, since "at this time, the issue of food requisitioning is not as acute as before." Based on the opinion of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 1st Cavalry Army, M.V. Frunze reported to Lenin on the politically quite possible

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a possible transfer of the army to the Don, since "no evidence of a repetition of events similar to Maslakov's history is noted" [18: 76].

Nevertheless, the leadership of the Don Bureau of the RCP(b) objected and warned Moscow that the "imperfection of the Soviet apparatus" left indelible marks on the families of the soldiers and "the stay of the Budyonnovsk army on the Don would create conditions for a large development of banditry at the expense not only of the population, but and parts of the Budyonnovsk army, which we saw at the time of the return of the demobilized" [18: 76].

Among the 165 large rebel detachments operating in the spring of 1921, according to official incomplete data, a detachment of Yakov Fomin, a former participant in the Mironov rebellion, stood out. Being the commander of the cavalry squadron of the Red Army, Fomin raised the squadron on March 14, 1921 to mutiny under the slogan "Down with the requisition!". The detachment, which was based on the Cossacks, operated on the border of the Voronezh province and the Upper Don district. The composition of the detachment was replenished with residents of the Voronezh and Tambov provinces, in total up to 300 people. The rebellion was liquidated on March 18, 1922, Fomin was killed on the Kruglovsky farm on March 20.

In the spring and summer of 1921, the insurrectionary movement in the regions of the Lower Volga, Don, Kuban, and Terek flared up with renewed vigor. Detachments of several hundred, and sometimes thousands of people, on foot and on horseback, attacked collective farms, settlements, threatened regional centers. The rebels became especially active with the beginning of the next sowing campaign. The front-line soldiers, who returned from the war, could not put up with flagrant arbitrariness: they took out weapons, united in detachments and left for the endless Volga, Don, Kuban, Ural steppes. It is noteworthy that the protest movement of the Cossacks engulfed the Khopersky and Ust-Medveditsky districts, which became part of the Tsaritsyno province, which during the years of battles with the Whites (1918-1920) were considered "red Cossack districts", which formed the basis of the red Cossack units of Dumenko, Budyonny, Mironov.

Rebel detachments in 1921-1922 can be divided into three types: settled, nomadic and raiding. Small "sedentary" detachments of 10 to 30 people acted, as a rule, near their farms. Their tactics corresponded to the laws of guerrilla warfare: during the day the Cossack plowed and sowed, and at night he burst in with a dashing raid and smashed the collective farm, food office, disappeared as suddenly as he appeared. Having fled home, the partisans again turned into civilians.

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residents. Large detachments of Soviet cavalry and infantry, equipped with aviation and armored detachments, could not clear the provinces of "bandits".

Many detachments numbering several hundred sabers or more consisted of former Red Cossacks, who proudly called themselves Mironovtsy, Vakulintsy, Maslakovtsy, Fomintsy, after the names of their former famous Red commanders. Hardened in battles with the whites, the former red horsemen smashed the revolutionary committees, state farms and collective farms. Some formations numbered 2-3 thousand rifles and sabers. Infantry and cavalry regiments were made up of them, and their tactics already took on the features inherent in regular units. If the "nomadic" insurgent detachments did not go beyond their native places, then the "raid" overcame considerable distances across the territory of several provinces. The danger of a "raid" insurrection for the Soviet state manifested itself as a motivating factor for the "sedentary". Raid detachments, appearing in one area or another, raised the local population against the communist authorities. Cossacks, peasants, Kalmyks, Kirghiz, Kazakhs fought in one detachment, but for the most part, the basis of the detachments were local residents. The Cossacks, tired of the war and constant skirmishes with the pursuers, often remained in their native places, dispersed to their homes, organized into small detachments and acted in their native area. From the insurgent units, commanders who were authoritative among the people, who had mastered the experience of partisan tactics of warfare, stood out. Many of them stood out and acted independently.

The underdevelopment of the railway network in the southern steppe expanses, the vast deserted and waterless spaces (Astrakhan, Kyrgyz steppes) hampered the effectiveness of the punitive units and made it impossible to pursue the rebels at a considerable distance from the communication lines.

The drought, crop failure, and famine that struck the Lower and Middle Volga, Don, Kuban, and Northern Caucasus in 1921 made it difficult for the participants in the insurgent movement to return to peaceful life: for many insurgents, it simply did not make sense to return to the devastated farms in native villages and farms. Lost contact with their home, with their villages. This circumstance objectively prolonged the existence of armed detachments, whose actions were based on maneuverable raids from the region to the paradise.

he is under pressure from superior military forces. The wives and children of their commanders and fighters followed in the carts of the raid detachments.

Often, rebel formations undertook large-scale military operations. According to the report of the Soviet military command of the Lower Volga Territory dated May 23, 1921 it followed that the rebellious Cossacks and peasants of the Lower Volga region launched offensive operations: "Armored train No. 25 arrived in Tsaritsyn. The 70th Regiment went on the offensive and at 12 o'clock on May 21 occupied the Belenky farm (25 versts southwest of the village of Ozinki). At 6 pm on May 21, the enemy launched an offensive against the Belenky farmstead with thick lines of infantry and cavalry and attacked our units that had dug in near the farmstead. The battle continued until 06:00 on May 22 without a break. The enemy with significant forces, going over to the attack several times on horseback and on foot, tried to knock the regiment out of the trenches, but each time, met by friendly rifle and machine-gun fire or a counterattack by the regiment, it was thrown back. Surrounded on all sides, the regiment left the Belenkiy farm and, moving 2-3 versts to the north, again launched a counterattack and at 8:40 on May 22 occupied the farm, pushing the bandits to the west. Losses of bandits - 100 killed and 130 wounded..." [19: 165].

"Bandits" (according to Soviet terminology), who were engaged in robbery, would not several times attack a regular regiment of the Red Army, dug in on the outskirts of a farm. These fighters fought for their rights and freedom. Large groups of rebels created a threat to the movement of ships along the Volga, transporting fuel and grain to the industrial centers of Russia. The Soviet leadership was forced to allocate significant forces to protect transport caravans on the Volga. Steamships equipped with guns and machine guns were escorted from Volsk to Astrakhan by reinforced armed detachments. Along the coast, the waterway was guarded by armored trains, air detachments, and garrisons of the Red Army. They were also instructed to protect bridges, railway tracks,

stations.

The regular units of the North Caucasian Military District, which included the Don, Terek and Kuban-Chernomorsk regions, Stavropol province, were in a state of ongoing war with the rebels. K.E. Voroshilov, who was appointed head of the North Caucasus Military District, noted that the work of the headquarters and departments of the district did not differ in any way from the work of field armies and fronts [19: 68]. The fight against "banditry" was declared a shock one, since this phenomenon manifested organization with a pronounced political coloration.

#79

skoy. Parts of the Cheka, CHON, police were strengthened. An amnesty was declared for the rebels who surrendered voluntarily, and then in September 1921 hostilities were launched, which significantly weakened the insurrectionary Cossack movement in southern Russia. By September 1921, Maslakov's detachments were driven into the mountains of Chechnya and Ossetia, Maslakov himself was killed by amnestied rebels at the end of September 1921.

According to the order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic of December 9, 1921, the territory of the military district was included in the list of 20 provinces in which the fight against banditry was entrusted to the Cheka with the right

recruiting field troops. By January 1922, the number of rebels on the territory of the district had decreased several times [20: 68].

In July 1922, the department for the fight against banditry under the Don GPU announced in the press: "The issue of banditry in the Donoblast can be considered resolved. Gangs, as well-known groups with political overtones, are currently not available on the territory of the Donoblast" [15: 126].

With the development of the New Economic Policy, the nature of the insurgent movement underwent a transformation; many insurgents, inspired by the amnesties, went home. The amnestied rebels often provided voluntary assistance to the authorities in the fight against banditry. The cases of participation of amnestied insurgents in the capture or liquidation of the leaders of "bands" and "gangs", as they were then called (for example, the liquidation of Maslakov by amnestied insurgents in September 1921), is not only a desire to earn absolution from the Soviet authorities (this is unlikely can be denied), but also by the desire to put an end to the phenomena that hinder the establishment of a peaceful working life of the working Cossacks. The population of the Cossack regions is tired of wars and many years of exhausting struggle, which led the Cossack farms into decline and ruin. The Cossack villages, through which the bloody Civil War passed like a whirlwind of fire, were deserted: a significant part of the male population died in battles between the opposing sides or wandered in foreign exile.

In the second half of 1922, the insurrectionary movement began to decline. The struggle of the remaining detachments was limited to self-preservation, which inevitably led to their degeneration into ordinary banditry.

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THE PEOPLE'S REBELLION MOVEMENT IN SIBERIA: THE APOGEE OF THE POLICY OF WAR COMMUNISM (1920 - EARLY 1921)

In 1920 and 1921 In Siberia, a special phenomenon of the insurrectionary movement appeared, uncharacteristic for European Russia: the popular movement against the communist government united the interests of the peasantry and the Cossacks of Siberia. In Siberia, there was no such acuteness of the land problem that raised non-residents against the Cossacks in the Kuban, on the Don, on the Terek. Endless Siberian

"157

open spaces (including the lands that have gone to modern Kazakhstan) made it possible to allocate land and satisfy the vital interests of the entire agrarian population of Siberia - peasants and Cossacks.

The popular character of the insurgent movement was demonstrated by the largest uprising that took place in Siberia in 1920, as a result of which the People's Insurgent Army was created.

At the end of June 1920, unrest broke out in the Slavgorod district of the Altai province, and soon the entire Altai province was engulfed in a popular uprising. The peasants in the Steppe Altai created the rebel People's Army. One of the detachments was commanded by the Cossack Dmitry Shishkin, who later became the head of the entire peasant-Cossack army of the steppe Altai - an unaffluent native of the village of Lebyazhya of the Siberian Cossack army, participant in the First World War, commander of the Cossack hundreds on the German front, podaul, cavalier of two military orders'. Order No. 1 of Commander Shishkin for the People's Insurgent Army stated the following: "On the territory liberated by the insurgent troops from the commune, the entire fullness of civil freedom is returned to the population. Everyone who marches under the banner of the People's Insurgent Army is declared to be truly equal before the law, freedom of speech, assembly, movement, and occupation. Labor, crafts, trade, property of everyone are declared inviolable. In view of the exclusivity of wartime, the insurgent army is temporarily granted the right to requisition everything that is needed for the army, with the issuance of requisition receipts for payment, according to which, after the establishment of state order, the actual value of the taken at the rate will be paid in full. Long live real, non-communist civil freedom" [1: 237].

However, it was problematic to explain to the people the combination of "civil freedom" and "the right to requisition". The people's army was defeated by the Soviet troops in Altai and retreated westward to the Irtysh. The peasants hoped for the support of the Siberian Cossacks. Peasant, originally in its composition, the People's Army went to the Irtysh

' The village of Lebyazhya was located in the Pavlodar district of the Semipalatinsk province. Before World War I D.Ya. Shishkin served as a topographer for the Omsk military district, in 1909 and 1911 he conducted reconnaissance of the border strip with China in the Altai region, so he knew this very well.

territory.

and on July 21-22, 1920, it entered the villages of Krivinskaya, Podpusknaya and Lebyazhya (the native village of D. Shishkin). The Cossacks of these villages voluntarily joined the Shishkinites practically without exception.

On July 22, rebels in the Lebyazhye region captured the Vityaz steamer, which was sailing along the Irtysh from Semipalatinsk to Pavlodar. Shishkin placed his headquarters on it. Moving from Lebyazhya down the Irtysh, the rebels entered the Pavlodar district and occupied the villages of Chernavskaya (Chernaya) and, after the battle with the Pavlodar barrier, Yamyshevskaya. In all the villages, the rebels mobilized the Cossacks and formed them into village cavalry hundreds. It was on the Irtysh that Shishkin's detachments turned into the "Peasant-Cossack rebel army." By July 28, 1920, it included 6 newly formed Cossack hundreds: Krivinskaya, podpusknaya, swan, Chernavskaya, Yamyshevskaya and consolidated (from the Cossacks of other villages). The total number of the rebel army at that time was about 5 thousand people, including up to 3 thousand Cossacks, the rest were peasants, as well as the Kirghiz (Kazakhs) who voluntarily joined the rebels [2].

The words of the appeal of the headquarters of the Peasant-Cossack rebel army of August 5, 1920 were in tune with the mood of the people: "For Soviet power against the commune, against the predatory power of rapists - this is what we, the peasants and Cossacks of the Semipalatinsk region, rebelled for. Enough blood and violence, enough prisons and executions. We rose up for peace, for order, for justice, and with weapons in our hands we decided either to die or to throw off the hated ... commune. Whoever is for the Russian people to rule their own power, for this power to be really in the hands of the people, for our lives and property to be disposed of by our own, Russian people, elected by the people - go to our ranks. With arms in hand against the commune for people's Soviet power" [1: 239-240].

Soviet special forces under the command of N.I. Koritsky, sent by the Soviet command of Siberia to eliminate the uprising, captured the Vityaz along with the headquarters of the rebels. But Shishkin himself survived, because at that time he was with the avant-garde in Podstepnaya. On the morning of July 28, the Red Army occupied Lebyazhya and Podpusnaya. The entire male population of the Cossacks of the named villages left with the rebels towards Pavlodar without exception - from fourteen-year-old teenagers to the elderly [3].

The commander of the ChON detachment, Koritsky, personally reported on the fight against insurgents to the assistant commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the Soviet Republic.

public in Siberia V.I. Shorin. The information reported: Shishkin's pseudonym - Kazakov - "black, fat, short in stature, with a pointed beard, middle-aged." The captured headquarters of the insurgents had a red banner with the image of three spades with the inscription: "Down with the commune, down with all violence. Long live the power of the soviets of all working people" [4].

Shishkin, with the core of his army, managed to break through the encirclement and return to the peasant Marzagulsko-Volchikhinsky region of Altai, from where the uprising began. By August 3, 1920, he had no more than 600 people left, including up to 200 Siberian Cossacks. The rebels were continuously pursued by units of two red divisions - the 13th cavalry and the 26th rifle divisions. On August 9, the retreating rebels occupied Zmeinogorsk with a fight.

On August 9, 1920, the rebel headquarters appealed to the citizens of the Zmeinogorsk district with an appeal: "The unbearable oppression of the communist government forced us to take up arms. We stood up for liberation from violence and blood, in order to give our unfortunate Russia peace, order and elective power for the people. Everyone who understands to what death, to what poverty and hunger and lack of rights the non-Russian communist government leads the Russian people, must go with us, we want only order, justice and Russian people's power. So that everyone knows his own, knows that his house, his goodness, his work belongs only to him alone, so that everyone can and has the right to do what he is good for and what he wants, so long as it is not harmful people. When the commune is overthrown, the elected representatives of the people will gather and determine for themselves what order, what kind of power should be in Russia. We fight only against the commune, for the people's rights won by the revolution. We want the right and real civil freedom of speech, assembly and elections.

Russian people, let's stop destroying Russia and start building, let's live a real civil free life without flesh and blood. We, who have taken up the task of overthrowing the commune, have no weapons, but the whole people is with us, and where the people are, there is victory. Come, citizens, to us, liberate yourself, save Russia" [1: 246].

In Zmeinogorsk, Shishkin's order for the Peasant Cossack Insurgent Army dated August 9, 1920 announced the mobilization of the entire male population of the Zmeinogorsk district from 20 to 45 years of age. The first category - from 20 to 35 years - was determined in combat units, the second category - from 35 to 45 years - in

part of the local security forces. The first category of mobilized was ordered, having organized on the ground into military units - companies and squadrons, to appear on their horses and carts with their weapons at the army headquarters. The second category was to remain in place for garrison duty, organized into companies. In each village, it was required to elect the head of the garrison, the commander of the guards and the military committee of three persons: The latter was entrusted with resolving issues of mobilization and requisitions. The head of the garrison was the chairman of the military committee [1: 245-246]. The rebels failed to carry out this order. Under the onslaught of the pursuing Soviet units, they left Zmeinogorsk, making their way in the direction of Gorny Altai. Having reached the Biysk line of the Siberian army, the rebels occupied the village of Verkh-Aleyskaya. The Shishkin detachment was replenished with Cossacks: in mid-August 1920, the rebel forces consisted of 4 squadrons of cavalry, 2 hundred Cossacks and 4 infantry companies with a total number of up to 700 people with 2 machine guns [1: 247]. The retreat took place along the Cossack line to the northeast, through the Cossack villages of Klyuchevskoy, Beloretsky, Andreevsky, Tigiretsky, Yarovsky. Verkh-Aleyskaya village and the village of Klyuchevsky Shishkin surrendered with a fight. He bypassed the barriers of the Reds in the village of Tulatinskoye and the village of Charyshskaya.

Forced to leave the Biysk line, Shishkin went to the Altai Mountains, then through the mountains - to Mongolia, China. A noteworthy fact confirms the popular character of the Cossack peasant detachment of Shishkin: in China, the rebels refused to join the camp of the white internees of the Orenburg army, scattered around the haunts. They retained the elected command staff, did not wear epaulettes. The campaign of the Peasant-Cossack army of Shishkin with continuous battles across the territory of Siberia, then movement in Mongolia and China amounted to a total of more than 2 thousand km in three months! The Ice Campaign, sung in the White Movement, is far from the people's Siberian rebels in this indicator!

After the suppression of the uprisings in the Altai and Semipalatinsk provinces, repressions began against the local population. In the report of a member of the Semipalatinsk Gubernia Committee A.I. Bolshakov dated August 31, 1920, it was reported that Soviet military units carried out requisitions and confiscations of property from the population. However, the representative of the Revolutionary Committee was worried not so much about the arbitrariness against local residents, but about the material damage caused

6-4735

to the Soviet state: "Confiscations are made without any plan and, apparently, what is confiscated is not surrendered and not protected, but is spent recklessly and plundered, which is far from in the interests of the republic. After all, it is naturally impossible to leave the population naked and ruined in property and at the same time demand that they carry out certain urgent orders, because the population does not have the means to fulfill them, and everything that is taken from the population in the above way, for the needs of the republic, certainly will not be surrendered" [1: 396].

A similar concern of the authorities was expressed in the information report of the Semipalatinsk Gubernia Committee dated October 31, 1920. missing, except for a few old people and returned teenagers". All the rest of the men during the July-August uprisings joined the rebels, when the uprisings were liquidated, some of them were destroyed, the rest went to the mountains or abroad to China. Part of the Old Believers from other villages

fled, leaving their farms, including marals, which were disbanded from special gardens in the Kirghiz volosts, especially in Chingistai. The population of this volost half fled abroad, stealing cattle with them [1: 399].

On November 2, 1920, the Bukhtarma Uyezd Revolutionary Committee reported to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs: "The mood of the population is unsatisfactory, since since the establishment of Soviet power, the population has not received any food and goods, meanwhile, the first apportionment is almost completed, and the population needs all the necessary supplies. - ducts, such as: tea, matches, soap, not to mention sugar and butter - and besides, he no longer has shoes or clothes. At the present time, the second apportionment has begun, which is causing a hostile attitude towards the Soviet authorities: for the first appraisal, he was promised manufactory, leather, and other products. But in fact, nothing has been given since the day of the organization of Soviet power, with very, very few exceptions of the villages, which completed the apportionment by 100%. But the satisfaction of the population with material for clothing and footwear is more than necessary, because now the winter cold has come, and the population is mostly naked and barefoot" [1: 399].

The West Siberian uprising of 1921 also demonstrated a popular movement against the communist regime, uniting

interests of the Cossacks and the peasantry of Siberia. In the largest uprising in Russia in terms of number and coverage of the territory, there was practically no hostile attitude in the insurgent environment between the peasants and the Cossacks [5: 89-90].

Report of the Chairman of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee I.N. Smirnov to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Lenin on the prospects for 1921 contained an alarming forecast: to fulfill the plan of grain surplus appropriation for Siberia (110 million pounds), established by the Soviet government, according to calculations, it is possible by no more than 70% [1: 615]. The extension of martial law in almost all of Siberia did not help: at the end of 1920, martial law was completely lifted only in one province of Siberia - Omsk.

The head of Sibrevkom undoubtedly took into account the real state of the Siberian regions. Discontent of the population in Siberia in the autumn of 1920 during the winter of 1920-1921. the policy of the Soviet state manifested itself everywhere. The alarming prediction of the leader of the Siberian communists came true. With the active entry into the uprising of the Cossacks, the beginning of the main battles during the period of the West Siberian uprising is connected: February 14 - March 23, 1921!. It is noteworthy that Smirnov, the chairman of the Sibrevkom, in a telegram to Lenin dated February 18, called the uprising in the Ishim-Petropavlovsk region "kulak-Cossack" [6: 218].

Pomglavkom of the Soviet Republic for Siberia V.I. On March 9, Shorin expressed the opinion: the protest movement is serious, all the Cossacks are drawn into it, up to half of the peasantry [7]. This opinion was based on reliable information. Shorin had by this time prepared for him a special report of the Soviet military command dated March 6, which stated that in the Petropavlovsk, Ishim and Kokchetav regions, the Cossacks participate almost entirely in the insurrectionary movement, the peasantry is mainly youth and mobilization [8].

Along with the peasantry as the main force of the West Siberian uprising, the Cossacks played an important role. In the Uktuz district of the Ishim district of the Tyumen province, there were uprisings in villages

! The West Siberian uprising, according to the classification of the Novosibirsk historian V.I. Shishkin, is divided into 3 periods: January 31 - February 13, 1921 - the beginning of the struggle, February 14 - March 23 - the main battles, March 24 - the end of June 1921 - rearguard battles [6:5].

Kazanskaya, Presnovskaya, Rozhdestvenskaya. Detachments were created in the Cossack villages, in which everyone who was able to carry weapons, regardless of age, went. The Siberian Cossacks actively joined the peasant uprising also in the Petropavlovsk district of the Omsk province along the Cossack line. The rebels liberated the village of Arkhangelsk and launched an offensive against

the village of Krivoozernaya. In February, uprisings took place in the Cossack villages of the Kokchetav district of the Omsk province - Chelkarskaya, Imantovskaya, Kellervka [9; 6: 231, 248]. .

In the village of Arkhangelskaya, the 1st Cossack Siberian Regiment was formed, which included the Cossacks of the villages of Arkhangelskaya, Voznesenskaya, Bogolyubovskaya and Nadezhdinskaya. The First Siberian Cossack Regiment was formed by the former sergeant-major Zubkov. The Second Siberian Cossack Regiment was formed in the village of Voznesenskaya, it was commanded by the former lieutenant Ivan Vinnikov. The regiments were divided into two hundreds of 170 people each. There were about 100 rifles per regiment. The regiments were subordinate to the headquarters of the People's Army, the commander was Semyon Tokarev. The headquarters of the division and the 1st Cossack regiment were in Novo-Mikhailovka. According to the report of the commander of the 1st Cossack regiment dated February 16, on February 15, the Cossacks took the village of Yavlenskaya, captured machine guns, rifles, the offensive continued on Pokrovskoye. The Cossacks, together with the peasants, controlled the vast territory of the Petropavlovsk district: the villages of Novo-Nikolskaya, Arkhangelskaya, Voznesenskaya, Nadezhdinskaya, Bogolyubovskaya, Novo-Kamenskaya and Bishkulskaya, Mikhailovskaya volost, the villages of Ploskoye, Petrovskoye, Stolypino, Korneevka and Poltavka. In the report of the head of the Dubrovinsky headquarters of the People's Army dated February 17, it was reported that a temporary headquarters of the People's Army was formed in the village of Dubrovinskaya, which, upon taking up the performance of duties, took measures to organize detachments that came out from the farms and settlements of the

The intelligence report of the headquarters of the Priural'sky military district dated February 23, 1921 reported: "The area from Petropavlovsk to Novorybinsk village (100 miles southwest of Petropavlovsk), inhabited by Cossacks, is in the grip of an uprising. In the area of the Lopatinskaya volost (30 versts south of the Lebyazhye station) there is an enemy numbering up to 300 foot and 200 cavalry, who, advancing on the village of Presnogorkovskaya (70 versts south of Lopatinsky), attracted to his side through agitation up to 2000 insurgents, weapons from which are few.

The mood of the rebels is enthusiastic, the offensive is carried out in orderly columns, and most of them are Cossacks. The spread of the uprising among the Cossack population south of the Petropavlovsk-Makushino railway line is noted, and a band of insurgents in the Lopatinsky region (among which the majority are Cossacks) numbering about 3,000 people are taken into account. The intelligence report dated February 24 spoke of battles in the area of the villages of Voznesenskaya, Arkhangelskaya, Nadezhdinskaya, Bogolyubovskaya, Novo-Nikolskaya [11].

A week later, | March, in the next intelligence report of the Soviet command, it was reported: "The enemy is grouping 30 miles south-west of Mamlyutka and numbering up to 1000 people - in the area of the villages of Novo-Nikolsky and Novoyavlenny. A Cossack division under the command of Tokarev, consisting of three regiments, operates on the part of the rebels in this area. In addition, individual gangs of bandits roam the haunts in the area of \u200b\u200bVoznesenskaya - Bogolyubovskaya - Mikhailovskaya and Novoyavlennaya villages. The location of the main forces of the rebels with their headquarters in Novoyavlennaya and Mikhailovskoye, the latter - 18 versts south-west of the village of Stanovaya. The attitude of the population (Cossacks) towards the Red Army and the Soviet government is hostile and evil" [12].

The command staff of the rebel Cossack units was formed according to the elective principle. In this regard, the decision of the meeting of the commanders of the rebels of the Mikhailovsky district of the Petropavlovsk district is noteworthy. At the beginning of March 1921, a resolution was adopted at it: "A meeting of the command staff of the headquarters of the People's Army of the Mikhailovsky District, together with the command of the 1st Siberian Cossack Division, having gathered today for a more accurate organization of the main headquarters of the Siberian People's Army, in accordance with the expressed distrust of the will people to the former main headquarters in the person of the chief of staff c. Kudryavtsev and his assistants, who, self-proclaimed the ranks of colonels and others without the consent of the will of the people, against whom we are currently protesting, decided: to elect the main headquarters of the Siberian People's Army from the civilian command staff, whom the people themselves nominated and trust to him. The following persons were elected by secret ballot: comrade Zubkov, chief of the main headquarters of the southern Siberian People's Army, comrade Shevchenko, his assistant, comrade Tokarev, chief of division" [13].

Along with the Petropavlovsk district, a Cossack uprising developed rapidly in another district of the Omsk province - Kokchetav.

The Soviet leaders probably did not expect such a rapid development of events in this area: at one time, it was the Kokchetav Cossacks who were the first to oppose Kolchak. Authorized Sibrevkom E.V. Polyudov, in a telegram to the chairman of the Sibrevkom Smirnov and the commander-in-chief for Siberia, Shorin, on March 8 described the following picture: a detachment was sent from Kokchetav to the village of Chelkarsky by a Kokchetav revolutionary troika, but the detachment fled from there in a panic, leaving two machine guns. For three days the city of Kokchetav was virtually without power, robbery reigned in it. Then came, as the text of the telegram stated, "a barn army [emphasis added by the authors] of bandits. By their own definition, the bandits organized the Main Military Council, headquarters, commandant's office, and mobilization was announced. The Kokchetav printing house remained at their disposal, orders, appeals were printed, rumors were spread about the fall of Omsk and Irkutsk. The new government only made arrests, not shooting anyone. Soviet power was declared without communists, free trade. The bandits used their stay in Kokchetav extensively in the sense of agitation, propaganda of the so-called true democracy. They had great success among the peasantry, who actively took part, more than half, almost all Cossacks, Kirghiz - an insignificant part. The Kokchetav bands defended quite unitedly and bravely..." [6: 373]. It is no coincidence that the Cossacks were characterized as a "cane army" - the Cossacks had few weapons, they were obtained in battles with Soviet detachments.

On February 27, 1921, the main military council of the People's Insurgent Army of the Kokchetav district issued an order: instead of executive committees, military councils should be temporarily created in all volosts and villages, consisting of a chairman, two deputies for military and economic units and a secretary, in other villages and auls - village and aul military councils consisting of the chairman, his deputy and secretary. This order established the following order: "Volost, stanitsa, village and aul military councils are elected in the same manner as volost and village executive committees, according to the laws of the Soviet republic, with the only difference that all citizens without distinction have the right to elect and be elected. gender, nation and religion, who have reached the age of 18, with the exception of those who have been defamed by the court" [6: 302].

The military headquarters of the rebels of the Kokchetav district organized the formation of detachments, while the rebels adhered to the principle:

the main part of the participants in the uprising should remain in place in their farms, they were to be called out as needed to participate in operations. The order of the main military headquarters of the rebels of the Kokchetav district of March 2, 1921 announced the mobilization of all citizens of the district from 1895 to 1900 born [6: 283,339].

The intelligence report of the Kokchetav group of Soviet troops reported heavy and exhausting battles with the rebels in the Cossack regions: "On March 10, a gang of up to 500 people from the village of Chelkarskaya advanced on the village of Yeleninskaya occupied by the 26th cavalry regiment. After a three-hour battle, it was repulsed and retreated to the village of Chelkarskaya, but, having received reinforcements from the villages of Antonovskaya, Chelkarskaya and Labanovskaya in the amount of up to 500 people, a second time went on the offensive against the village of Yeleninskaya. After a secondary four-hour battle, the gangs retreated to the villages of Chelkarskaya and Antonovskaya" [14].

The Cossack detachments put up fierce resistance in the defense of their villages. The information reports were reminiscent of military front-line operations: "On March 10, two battalions of the combined regiment surrounded the village of Shchuchinskaya. The enemy offered strong resistance: he rushed to the attack and fired from windows, from around the corners of houses, fences. After a long battle, the enemy was driven out and retreated towards the village of Makinskoye, which is 50 versts southeast of the village of Shchuchinskaya, and towards the village of Koturkulsкая, as well as in the direction of the village of Chernoyarsky, which is 30 versts south of the village of Shchuchinskaya. After our units occupied the village of Shchuchinskaya, the combined regiment occupied the village of Koturkulsкая, which is 20 versts east of the village of Shchuchinskaya. On March 12, we occupied the village of Borovskaya. Gangs from these neighborhoods fle

the villages of Makinskaya and Kozherbaevskaya, where, in all likelihood, they intend to organize their strategic points" [15].

On March 11, Soviet troops occupied the villages of Shchuchinskaya, Koturkulsкая, Sandyktavskaya, the villages of Yeleninsky, Pavlovsky, Troitsky, Podgorny. On March 12, the 233rd regiment marched on the village of Labanovskaya and entered into battle with the rebels. There was no defensive line near the village. The battle took place on the streets of the village. Ambushes were set up in the houses of the Cossacks, from where they fired on the attackers. Cossacks with pitchforks, pikes and axes rushed from behind the corners of the houses to attack. The report of the command of the Kokchetav group of Soviet troops to Shorin described the picture of the unfolding of fierce battles: "The enemy

On March 12, he made a number of malicious, but unsuccessful attacks on the village of Labanovskaya. Street fighting in the village itself lasted about two hours. I had to fight to take every house, every barn. And only when the village was set on fire, it was cleared of gangs. The same battle took place on March 12 in the village of Chelkarskaya, the Soviet units could not hold out in the village. Chelkarsky. In the battles near the village of Chelkarsky and the village of Labanovskaya, the 182nd regiment and the 233rd regiment lost 75% of the command staff" [16; 6:401].

The Cossacks, who retreated from Labanovskaya in the direction of the villages of Airtovskaya, Chelkarskaya and Imantavskaya, launched a counterattack, which was repulsed. Having received reinforcements from other villages, the rebels again launched an offensive. After an hour and a half battle, the Cossacks withdrew towards the village of Imantavskaya. 1,300 infantry, 700 horsemen from the Chelkarskaya and Airtovskaya villages, as well as 800 infantry, 400 horsemen from the Imantavskaya village took part in the attack on Labanovskaya. According to the report of the Soviet command, the armament of the rebels during the assault on the village of Labanovskaya for the most part consisted of pikes, pitchforks and axes, to a lesser extent - rifles, only two machine guns. The rebels were armed with pitchforks, pikes and just sticks in another battle on March 12 - near Mikhailovskaya, where the Soviet group was met by Cossacks in the amount of 3 thousand people, of whom only one in ten had a rifle. The battle lasted up to 12 hours, as a result of which the village was taken by the Soviet troops. In the above heavy battles on March 12, the losses on the Soviet side were estimated at 40 people killed and up to 90 wounded, while the enemy's losses were determined up to 900 people killed, the number of wounded "could not be counted" [17]. Of course, the victors, to a certain extent, embellished their own successes, but one cannot ignore that the list of losses on the part of the rebels also included numerous losses among the local population during the assaults and battles directly in the villages. As a result, the approximate loss ratio of 1:20 and more is not surprising.

On March 14, the Cossacks launched a night attack to recapture the village of Koturkulsкая, which had been abandoned a few days earlier. In the village of Chelkarskaya, the Cossacks fortified their positions with trenches and overlaid with harrows. The 26th Cavalry Regiment launched an offensive against Chelkarskaya, but after a long battle was forced to retreat. The battle was fierce, reaching the street fights between the Soviet units and the rebels who had settled in the houses. Up to 70% of the command staff of the Soviet troops dropped out [18].

These facts refute the Soviet ideological myth about the rebels as bandits and White Guard "gangs" of Cossacks. The Cossacks, organized in hundreds, regiments defended their native villages and farms to the last drop of blood. Everywhere teenagers, old people, women provided selfless help to their fathers, sons, husbands.

The nature of the Cossack protest is expressed in the appeals of the rebels. Having entered Kokchetav on February 23, 1921, the command of the Cossack rebel detachments turned to the inhabitants of the city and county with an appeal signed by the chief of staff of the Main Military Council Romanov: "Frightened by the actions of our senior officers and generals, now you, too, probably, you think that the Cossacks rose to restore Kolchak's arbitrariness. No, brethren, we do not need what has been discarded by history. Kolchak fell because he did not understand the spirit of the freedom-loving Siberian peasant and Cossack. We, brothers, like you, do not need golden epaulettes, we, ordinary Cossacks, do not wear them: we are children of the same working family as you..." [5: 88].

At the end of February, the leadership of the rebels of the Kokchetav district appealed to the Red Army men and peasants: "Peasants and Red Army men, we know that you are distrustful of the movement we have raised against our common enemies: the Communists. Your grief is bitter for us. We in Siberia have nothing to share with you. We have enough land for everyone, and we have common enemies. We all rose as one man against a handful of mercenaries who insolently call themselves the workers' and peasants' power. We don't want to be commanded, robbed of us, put to rot in various checks and prisons, to be shot by the thousands, as in Omsk, by a handful of communists. We want labor to be free, so that everyone does what they want, so that there is free trade, so that everyone can sell what they have in excess, and those who do not have can buy. We demand that there should be no allocations; our brother, the grain grower, will sell the surplus himself. We stand for Soviet power, but not for the kind that the Communists represent; for the power of the whole people, and not for a handful of former prison guards. and communists. Soviet power is the power of the people, and should not be the power of the communists. Stand up as one: worker, peasant, Cossack, Kirghiz—all peoples against oppressors!.. Long live Soviet power without usurpers—bloodthirsty communists" [6: 317-318].

In another appeal - the Main Military Council of the rebels of the Kokchetav district - to the broad masses of the people - peasants, Kazakhs

Kam, Kirghiz (end of February - beginning of March) said: "The Communists have perverted the tasks of the true people's power. They have forgotten that the good of the people, of the working people, is the foundation of the people's well-being. They thought more about themselves, about their party discipline, and not about us, the true masters of the country. The well-known check, the inconsistent apportionment for the objects of our labor, the endless underwater service, constant fears for an extra word spoken, for an extra piece of bread, a rag, an extra thing - all this our life, already gloomy, turned to hell, turned us into slaves of random upstart boys with a dubious past and present. The inept management of our good overflowed the cup of patience, and we, knowing what awaits us, leaving our home and family, declared an uprising and drove out the communists. Expelling communists and false communist-traitors, we are fighting for truly people's power, for the inviolability of the person and private property, for freedom of speech, press, unions, beliefs, not aimed at harming the people's well-being of nations. We are fighting for free labor, for land for those who work on it. Down with personal violence. We are not supporters of executions: there is enough blood, a lot of it has been shed before us. We ask everyone to refrain from lynching: let the people's court establish guilt, which will punish only conscious enemies of the people and its well-being.

Red Army soldiers, you are ours in spirit, in conviction, you will understand us. Throw the "talkers", go to our ranks. Here there are no generals, bourgeois, tsarist officers, no upstart talkers. You will meet your brothers, fathers with calloused hands. Communists, know that the people are not with you. Your case is lost. Get away from us. It depends on you to stop new blood streams and bring closer the time of peaceful productive labor in our devastated country. Down with communes! Long live the people's power of the soviets and free labor" [6: 319].

The West Siberian uprising refutes another ideological myth - about the confrontation between the Cossacks and the peasantry. The following example from the history of the uprising is noteworthy: on February 19, 1921, the headquarters of the People's Insurgent Army of the peasant Petukhovskiy district of the Ishim district of the Tyumen province requested from the headquarters of the Petropavlovsk district of the Omsk province a detachment of Cossacks of 40-50 people "to raise the spirit of the peasant population, since the peasants are little sure that the Cossacks have rebelled and are working together" [6: 228].

February 22, 1921 representatives of the peasantry and the Cossacks of the Ishim, Yalutorovskiy districts of the Tyumen province, Kurgan district

Chelyabinsk province, Petropavlovsk district of Omsk province in the village of Yudino held a meeting to coordinate the common efforts of the peasantry and the Cossacks. Cossack Yakov Rogachev, a representative of the village of Bogolyubovskaya in the Petropavlovsk district, the commander of a Cossack regiment, was elected chairman of the meeting. After listening to reports from the field on current events, the meeting decided:

"Wage the fight against communism until final victory or death. To announce to the entire population of the rebellious areas that there is no other way out: we must win or die. Demand from citizens to help the army in the fight against communism with all their might, to spread this idea of struggle for the freedom and life of the people, to attract more and more people to it. There is no place for cowards and cowards in our midst. There is no mercy for the communists."

Considering the issue of introducing military discipline and a unified unified command, the meeting adopted a resolution: "To demand from the commanders of individual units to obey unquestioningly the highest command in terms of rank (not excluding commanders and privates) and immediately eliminate persons who do not obey orders from positions and severe punishment. Demand that the commanders of all units arriving at the front immediately come to the disposal of the commander of a known sector and concentrate overall command in the hands of the main headquarters, commander of the combat front. The slogan of our struggle will be: "The free right of the people, expressed by the will of the freely chosen representatives of the people." The meeting declared: "Let our slogan be the unification of all sections of the population and brotherly relations among all. The peasantry, the Cossacks, employees and workers called free citizens, a free people united in the fight against communism" [19].

Convened on February 26, a military conference of representatives of the Cossacks and the peasantry of the Ishim, Kurgan, Petropavlovsk and Yalutorovsk districts adopted a special appeal to the population of Siberia, which stated that the Cossacks and the peasantry had risen "to win the rights of the people, forcibly seized by the communists, with peaks, pitchforks and partly with bare hands. At this meeting, issues of a unified command were resolved in order to create an organized movement. The meeting established an elected military council with full military authority and appointment of commanders. It was decided to gather for a meeting on March 7, one elected representative from each volost, as well as

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one representative from a military unit with at least 500 people [20].

The Soviet and military leadership of Siberia opposed appeals and appeals from the side of the rebels with their own appeals - the struggle was carried out not only by military methods, but also by ideological ones. The appeal of the command of the Peter and Paul Group of Soviet Forces to the peasantry and the Cossacks of February 21, 1921 said: "Do not believe when you are told that we are shooting prisoners, do not believe evil slanders and provocateurs. Stop, enough blood! Return to peaceful labor and begin your work, which we all need so much. We promise you complete security, we ourselves have long been striving for peace and labor organization" [6: 253]. This appeal was signed: the commander of the defense of the Petropavlovsk region N.I. Koritsky is the same commander of an emergency detachment that was involved in the liquidation of a major Cossack and peasant uprising in the summer of 1920 in the Altai and Semipalatinsk provinces.

However, the brutal methods of suppressing the uprising crossed out the propaganda efforts of the Soviet side. A few days before this appeal, on February 16, in the same Petropavlovsk, an extraordinary field revolutionary tribunal sentenced 10 Siberian Cossacks to capital punishment for participating in the uprising: Kyzhanov Ivan from the village of Nikolskaya, Sergeev Efim, Fedorov Petr, Solomonov Grigory, Trofim Prokopiev, Terenty Kuzmin, Nikita Filippov, Ivan Mikhailov from the village of Arkhangelskaya, Anton Kurchenkov from the village of Bishkulsкая, Shchegolev Ivan from the village of Nadezhdinsky. The sentence was carried out at night on the orders of the same Koritsky, commander of the troops of the Petropavlovskaya group [21].

Information about the cruelty of the punitive Soviet troops spread among the population much faster than Soviet promises of pardon. The following example is indicative. The report of the Chelkar Military Council to the Main Military Headquarters of the rebels of the Kokchetav district reported: the Cossacks of the village of Imantavskaya in the Kokchetav district, Vasily Kungurtsev, 35 years old, and Nikifor Mironov, 25 years old, were sent to intelligence, but were arrested in the village of Novo Nikolaevskoye. The Cossacks endured inhuman torture. Keeping the style of the document,

Let us quote an excerpt from it: "At the first martyr, Vasily Kungurtsev, they first put a rope around his neck and began to put pressure, since during the examination of witnesses there were

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two blue gears, and the hands were tied back, then they began to inflict inhuman wounds, first on the right side of the esophagus, a wound was inflicted on the back of the head with an ax and the head was rolled off completely to the shoulder, the face was also cut from the right eye to the right ear and through the wound one can see that the brain was completely knocked out, then they began to make blows from the front (as it turned out according to the examination) in the forehead with a butt so that the skull turned out to be flattened from the front to half the head back. Torments were inflicted on the second martyr, Nikifor Mironov: a rope was put on his neck and they began to press, as evidenced by strong bands on his neck, then they tied his hands and began to prick his eyes so that (according to the examination) the right eye completely went out of its place and hanging on the right cheek, and the left eye was also pricked with a knife, there was a large wound in the eye socket. Then they began to stab in the mouth with a bayonet, and the wound went through the brain to the back of the head. All the teeth were knocked out, everything in the nose was mangled with a knife, the right arm was twisted out of the forearm" [6: 238].

The concern of the Soviet leadership with the speedy suppression of the uprising was explained by the following factor: the sowing campaign was approaching, on the results of which the harvest of 1921 depended, respectively, the plan for the implementation of the food distribution for the year, established for the provinces covered by the uprising, as well as for Siberia as a whole. The Soviet command was also concerned about the protection of the railroad along the Omsk-Chelyabinsk line: the insurgents' violation of the railroad communication caused significant damage to the economy not only of Siberia, but of the entire Soviet state. In view of the foregoing, the purpose of the numerous appeals of the Soviet leadership to the rebels becomes clear.

Within one day, February 22, 1921, two appeals appeared. The first one (signatures: E.V. Polyudov, authorized by the Sibrevkom, commander of the Petropavlovsk Group of Forces Koritsky, chairman of the Petropavlovsk Revolutionary Committee Barleben) stated: joined the uprising of gangs that ruined the railway, upset your peaceful life. The uprising was suppressed by the Soviet troops, the railway was being restored, spring was approaching - the time of sowing, the time of straining all the forces of the workers and peasants. On behalf of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee, we call on all peasants and Cossacks to return to their villages and villages and declare full immunity to all those deceived who surrendered voluntarily

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weapon. All those who do not immediately return to their villages and villages will be declared enemies of the Soviet Republic and will suffer severe and merciless punishment. Peasants and Cossacks! Before it's too late, return to your homes and families, hand over your weapons, get down to peaceful work!" [6: 265].

In another appeal, to the labor Cossacks, the command of the Peter and Paul Group of Soviet Forces (signed by Koritsky) said: "Spring is coming, warm weather will come soon, the time for sowing will come. It is necessary to start a peaceful agricultural life, and your dwellings are destroyed, fathers, brothers, sons are killed, maimed or hiding like wild animals in the thickets of the forest, among snowdrifts, dying from the cold. After all, it should be clear to everyone that the struggle against us is fruitless and aimless, senseless and criminal. Now the working masses of the whole world are stretching out their hands towards Soviet Russia. They are waiting for our help, desiring to overthrow the power of the landowners and capital in their own country. World capital is defending its last positions, it is still trying to strangle Russia, often taking advantage of your ignorance and unconsciousness. Their tools everywhere are the former tsar's henchmen, priests, officers and kulaks. And so you involuntarily help them, upset our rear, often force them to shed innocent blood and resort to violence. Comrades! It is in your power to stop all this horror and begin peaceful, creative work. Drop your weapons and hand over your instigators before it's too late. Soviet

The authorities and the Communist Party know how to forgive and forget mistakes and blunders, but on the other hand, it cruelly and mercilessly punishes all those who go against it! So, before it's too late, come to your senses and return to your abandoned families and abandoned households" [22].

However, the actual practice of the activities of the bodies of the Soviet leadership often diverged from appeals and promises. Noteworthy in this regard is the report of the chairman of the Kokchetav revolutionary troika, T.F. Rosenbach Omsk Provincial Committee of the RCP (b) from | On March 1921, the Commissar, frightened by the Cossack uprising, reported to the party organ: "The Cossacks act in masses of several thousand and instill fear in our small detachments. In relation to the Cossack villages, I will pursue the following policy. After the most merciless suppression of the uprising, I will resettle peasants or settlers from Russia in the villages. The Kokchetav Cossacks must be liquidated once and for all, otherwise there will be no peace here" [6: 327-328].

Field sessions of the Revolutionary Military Tribunal of Siberia regularly handed down death sentences. So, on March 2, a group of Cossacks from the village of Krivoozerny, Arkhangelsk volost, Petropavlovsk district, was sentenced to capital punishment for participation in the uprising. The mass robberies and violence of the Red Army units among the local population entered into everyday practice. Local residents complained: "The Soviets robbed, but the Red Army robbed and shot" [23; 6: 335].

To suppress the uprising, large groups of Soviet troops were pulled together - regular units of the Red Army, special forces, internal security troops. Soviet troops of various subordination were brought together into groups of troops with a single command, the territory of the rebellious provinces was divided into combat sectors (Petropavlovsk was also divided into separate combat sectors: left, middle, right). The tactics of the Soviet troops had a punitive nature, based on the complete encirclement of the Cossack villages (Labanovskaya, Chelkarskaya, Aryk Balykskaya, Imantavskaya, Shchukinskaya, etc.).

The military command paid special attention to the Cossack rebel units. On March 16, 1921, the representative of the Sibrevkom, Polyudov (a Cossack by birth), telegraphed from Kokchetav to the chairman of the Sibrevkom, Smirnov: "Everywhere it will be calm, as soon as we liquidate the gangs in the Cossack villages. Tomorrow we will occupy Imantavskaya and in three or four days we will liquidate gangs in the villages of Aryk-Balykskaya, Verkhne-Burluyskaya, Nizhne-Burluyskaya and Akan-Burluyskaya. Two squadrons and two companies, sent by me to the village of Krivoozersky, were given the task yesterday, by contacting the peasants, to catch the so-called Main Siberian Headquarters - about 30 people in all. The main forces of the bandits in the battles near Chelkarsky, Labanovsky, Airtovsky have already been defeated by us" [6: 424].

In mid-March 1921, the superior Soviet troops launched a decisive offensive. In the summary of the Soviet command of March 16, the completion of the main battles is described as follows: "The units operating on the right combat sector occupied the village of Antonovskaya, the village of Komarovskaya and the village of Krivoozernaya. The broken gangs retreat without offering resistance. Among them there is a strong decomposition. On the middle combat sector on March 15, the 233rd regiment, after artillery shelling, occupied the village of Airtovskaya. The gangs retreated to the village of Orlovskaya, which is 10 versts west of the village of Airtovskaya. On the same day a gang with a force of 400

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infantry and 200 cavalry launched an offensive against the village of Labanovskaya, occupied by the 233rd regiment, but was repulsed by our counteroffensive, after which the same units occupied the village of Imantavskaya. The gangs fled to the village of Aryk-Balykskaya, and 40 carts left for the village of Novo Ermakovskaya. On March 16, after a skirmish, the village of Yakshi-Yangyztavskaya was occupied. The bands retreated to the villages of Akkan-Burluyskaya and Nizhne-Burluyskaya. In the village of Yakshi-Yangyztavskaya, all the Cossacks who took part in the performance, excluding the leaders, remained. Cossacks and residents of other villages fled. The peasants separated from the Cossacks and went home. A similar phenomenon is observed among the Cossacks. The participants in the uprising, one by one and in groups, are returning home." The combat report of March 22, 1921 emphasized the mass return of the Cossacks to their ho

The villages of Nizhne-Burluyskaya and Akkan-Burluyskaya were occupied without a fight [24]. The fall of the Cossack villages by March 23, 1921 symbolized the end of the main battles of the West Siberian uprising. The uprising passed into the stage of rearguard battles.

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TAMBOV VENDEA: ANTONOVSHCHINA

CAUSES AND FACTORS OF PEASANT REVOLT IN THE TAMBOV PROVINCE

The uprising of the peasants in the Tambov province, better known as "Antonovshchina", was the culmination of the peasant protest against the policy of war communism. It was a real war of the peasants against the communist regime, which lasted more than a year. The Tambov peasants had their own regular army, created on the model of the Red Army, a single leadership and their own party. It was this uprising of the peasants that forced V.I. Lenin to cancel the surplus appraisal and go over to the New Economic Policy.

On October 26 (November 8), 1917, the very next day after the October Revolution, Lenin's Decree on Land was adopted at the 11th All-Russian Congress of Soviets. It would seem that the peasants' eternal dream of free labor on their own land has come true.

What, in this case, brought the Tambov peasants into conflict with the new revolutionary government, which, moreover, called itself "worker-peasant"?

The food crisis in Russia was not created by the Bolshevik revolution. It arose during the First World War, which brought down innumerable disasters on the broad sections of the Russian population, among which famine soon began to dominate. The slogan "Bread for the hungry!" was one of the main in the Russian revolutions of 1917 - both February and October. The appearance of this slogan in itself testified to the failure of food policy and tsarist

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Go, and the Provisional Government, although both of them took, it would seem, the necessary measures.

Already in August 1915, fixed prices for bread for government purchases (for military needs) were introduced. In December 1916, the crisis in government procurements forced them to embark on the path of a grain allocation, that is, the distribution of the state's demand for grain among provinces, villages, and farms as obligations for its supply. Even provinces other than grain—Vologda, Novgorod, Kostroma, and others—were obliged to supply grain. The Tambov Provincial Zemstvo Administration, which demanded a reduction in supplies, stated this with all certainty: "Not considering itself the right to deliberately lead the population to revolt and famine, the provincial government does not find it possible to allocate in the amounts indicated by the Minister of Agriculture" [1: 480— 490].

Both fixed prices and surplus appraisal turned out to be ineffective due to their partiality, limited purchases for military needs. The holders of grain stocks, which had a market value, preferred to speculate, achieving a rapid rise in prices, exacerbating food difficulties for the poor, especially in cities. The Provisional Government, created by the February Revolution, was supposed to start with the food question, with the introduction of the state grain monopoly, which meant both the establishment of fixed prices and the transfer of the entire grain stock (except for the owner's necessary food and household needs) to the state through its food organs. The law prepared by A.I. Shingarev (not a Bolshevik, but a Cadet) and adopted on March 25, 1917, had a completely Bolshevik name - "On the transfer of grain to the disposal of the state."

The grain monopoly had to rely on a wide network of food committees (public organizations that democratically emerged at all levels of government - from the volost to the state) and on the system of the Ministry of Food, created on May 5, 1917. There was also a "bread farm", which appeared even in royal times. However, too close connection with the selfish interests of large landowners and merchants, inconsistency and indecisiveness of the actions of the Provisional Government led to the fact that the grain monopoly and the transfer of grain to the disposal of the state

the gifts were not actually implemented. The failure of harvesting from the 1917 harvest became immediately apparent. Already on August 20, the Ministry of Food sent out a directive to the localities: "In case of unwillingness to donate bread, coercive measures must be applied, including

armed force." And this force was used when the peasants refused to hand over their grain, especially in the front-line provinces.

By the autumn of 1917, the food crisis had engulfed almost the entire territory of European Russia, including the front. Huge masses of the population found themselves in a distressed situation. The famine has become a real and increasingly significant factor in the development of events in the country as a whole. Therefore, no matter how one evaluates the food policy of the first years of Soviet power, no matter how one regards its interpretation as socialist (or at least "military-communist"), one cannot fail to see that it grew out of the objective circumstances of the time, that its foundations and directions were determined even before October.

Tambov Governorate is the most peasant among all Russian provinces in terms of its population: there are only 250,000 townspeople (about 8%) for 3.4 million rural population. Industry is extremely underdeveloped; only Rasskazov's cloth factories stand out (workers are semi-farmers), three beet-sugar factories, several alcohol factories, and a recently equipped "gunpowder factory" - (up to 2000 people) - the main support of the "Bolsheviks", the repair artillery is also of some importance. plant in Tambov (several hundred workers). Handicrafts are quite well developed (in the northern forest districts - cart, tar, pitch, etc., near Rasskazovo - knitting and hosiery, in Usmansky district - linen weaving, etc.). In 1917, up to 600,000 acres of land were under the landlords, of which up to 107,000 were the best meadows (the peasants had up to 150,000 acres of meadow lands in allotments). Most of the landed estates were highly cultured farms. Peasant farms were run in the usual routine way; but a strong layer of economic peasants with large soils has already emerged.

By 1917 up to 20% of peasant farms had arable land of 6 or more acres per household, and up to 8% - more than 10 acres of arable land. The province was considered a producer and exported up to 60 million poods of agricultural products per year, including up to 26 million poods abroad. Tambov, Rasskazovo, Kozlov were large grain markets, where multimillion-dollar turnovers were created. This peasant landowner

the provincial province was at the same time the old patrimony of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. For a long time it was a place of administrative exile; a considerable number of local peasants at different times from it landed in more remote places.

The revolution made significant changes in the position of the Tambov peasantry. The peasantry took possession of most of the landed estates and divided them up. Large-scale peasant farms also suffered. Up to 72,000 acres of the former landowners' land went to state farms, of which there were up to 150 by 1920, but not a single one was set up tolerably well - everyone is at a loss, everyone uses peasant labor (from half), and very few (the Ivanovo state farm in Tambov Uzda) provide any substantial assistance to the countryside. And the attitude towards the state farms (through them towards the Soviet power) is almost universally hostile among the peasants. The same hostile attitude is met in most cases by collective farms, which until recently have been diligently planting: in collectivization, the Tambov province is ahead of the others, but the craving for collective farming, naturally, intensified with the depletion of inventory, etc., was overly encouraged various benefits and awards. Both in state farms and in collective farms, the former landowners, managers or yards, etc., often settled. People.

Collective farms, no less than state farms, have become a refuge for the disabled and idlers; only very few of them are of economic value and successfully resist the captious criticism of individual farmers. Friendly attention was paid to the land management of the collective farms and state farms, but the land management of the individual peasants had barely begun. The striped land, the distant lands oppress the Tambov peasant heavily. The issue of resettlement is perhaps the most painful issue in the province.

The distribution of land changed dramatically between 1917 and 1919. In general, the number of farms increased only slightly. But while the group of non-sowing, reaching up to 6%, fell over

two years to 1%, the number of farms with crops from 6 acres decreased from 18 to 6.3%. This process was especially pronounced in the most grain-producing counties. So, in Kozlovsky, the number of non-sowing farms decreased from 5.1 to 0.2%; the number of farms with up to 2 acres of arable land increased from 29.9% to 36%; the group of farms from 2.1 to 6 acres increased from 46.5 to 53.2%, while the group of farms with more than 6 acres of arable land decreased from 18.5 to 5.6%; and completely disappeared

a group of peasant farms with more than 13 acres of arable land, and in 1917 there were 2.8% of them (of which 0.1% had from 35.1 to 40 acres). For Kirsanovsky (the birthplace of "Antonovshchina") uyezd, the data are even more typical: the group of non-sowing people decreased from 9.3 to 0.9%; up to 2 tithes - also decreased from 21.3 to 13.8%, the group from 2.1 to 6 tithes increased from 40 to 66%; the group of farms with more than 6 acres of arable land almost halved - from 30.4 to 16.3% (of the latter, it increased slightly, from 11 to 13.7%, the group of farms with crops from 6.1 - to 8 acres, and farms with more than 8 acres of arable land decreased from 19.4% to 2.6%, i.e., almost 8 times, while the group with more than 16 acres of crops completely disappeared).

The causes of the peasant war, when it began, were explained by the Soviet authorities very simply: the intrigues of the White Guards and Anglo-French imperialism. On September 8, 1921, Pravda reported that Antonov received "directives from abroad from the Central Committee of the Kadet Party." The Cheka reported to the Council of People's Commissars: "In the Ryazan, Tula, Kaluga, Smolensk, Tambov, Tver provinces, as it has now become clear, rebellions were organized according to a general plan with the assistance of Anglo-French capital."

However, familiarity with the programs and slogans of the insurgent peasants makes it possible to immediately discard the idea of a "Cadet" or "Anglo-French" conspiracy.

The reasons were deeper. The main one was that the peasants wanted to freely cultivate the land, freely use its fruits. "They gave away the land, but you take away bread to the last grain: yes, you yourself choke on such land! The muzhik has only one horizon left from the earth," a muzhik tells the Communist Dvanov in a conquered village. And in response to the explanation that the grain being taken away is needed by the revolution, the peasant reasonably objects: "You are a fool, the people are dying - who will your revolution remain."

The object of the bloody dispute between the peasants and the Bolsheviks was not only the surplus appropriation. The peasants believed that the revolution brought them freedom. The idea of freedom, perceived as free will, stirred up peasant Russia. The Soviets were perceived as a form of self-government, as the elimination of heavy, city power. The village wants to exist without the city. The city declares war on her. To collect food surplus, a prodarmium is created. Severe measures are being taken to suppress discontent. In order to break the resistance of the kulaks, the dictatorship of the proletariat resorted to emergency measures.

The means of struggle are return to trial, revolutionary tribunals, imprisonment, confiscation of property, hostage taking, and even execution on the spot in case of armed resistance.

Every action against the Soviet government, every expression of dissatisfaction with the policy of the Bolsheviks is declared to be the work of "kulaks", "resistance of the kulaks". In August 1918, Lenin determined the number of "kulak farms" at 2 million, and in April 1920, at the Ninth Congress, he already spoke of a million farms that were being squeezed in the countryside by the "exploitation of other people's labor." This figure was negligible in a country with a population (1920) of 130.5 million people, of which 110.8 million lived in the countryside.

Since the formula "the kulak is the enemy" had no meaning, because the concept remained indefinite and even the official number was negligible, the formula was reversed and sounded: "the enemy is the kulak."

In the circular of the Chairman of the Tambov Provincial Executive Committee M.D. Chichkanov to the volost councils on the requisition of grain surpluses dated July 2, 1919, it was said:

strict measures against holders of bread. Now the regional food committee is starting to requisition grain surpluses. All Soviet deputies and executive committees are instructed to render all possible assistance to the requisition detachments and agents in the matter of requisitioning and discovering hidden grain surpluses.

Any official who hinders the requisitioning by his inaction will be regarded as an opponent of Soviet power and will be brought before the court of a revolutionary tribunal. Citizens who destroy grain surpluses for moonshine are declared enemies of the revolution. It is prescribed to wage the most merciless fight against them, arrest them, escort them to Tambov for trial. The volost executive committees are invited, at the request of the chiefs of the detachment working in the given volost, to give three riding horses for the service of the detachment for the duration of work. Immediately convey this order to the volost executive committees" [2].

The following report characterizes the activities of the Gubernia Food Committee: "The entire supply of this city ... was obtained almost exclusively with the help of detachments. Detachments are now scattered in all uyezds, partly from the detachments of the VOKhR, partly the detachments are organized by local forces. The management of the requisition is concentrated in the provincial requisition department, in which

Roma is directly involved in the gubernatorial food commissar - leadership in the sense of the transfer of detachments from county to county or from district to district. The very technique of work, its plan in the county, is developed by the food committee together with the special representative of the provincial food committee. The detachments that worked in Kozlovsky, partly in the Morshansk districts, and partly in the Lebedyansky district were in a somewhat special position. These counties, bordering on the hungry Ryazan province, made it possible for bread to flow here by cartage, which is why the detachments worked here according to the plan of the provincial food committee: the first group was sent from the station St. Yuryevo on Lamki, Kozlovsky district; the second - Saburovo - Benkendorf-Sosnovka (Morshansky district) - Lamki. Having united, both groups advance to the south in front. As a general rule for all uyezds, detachments move from the periphery to the center in order to prevent the transfer of grain from uyezd to uyezd, and barriers are set up on all roads to stop the possibility of transferring grain within the uyezd.

Now the greatest attention has been paid to Tambov, Kozlovsky and Kirsanov counties. Now, with the transition to the jurisdiction of the regional food committee of Borisoglebsk district, detachments and workers will be moved there.

Detachments are divided into two categories according to their quality:

1. The main core is the detachments that mainly carry out requisitioning and which are scattered over all the counties.
2. Detachments of special purpose, of which we have two, and which are sent to the most kulak places, the most obstinate in surrendering surpluses.

These detachments take away in full all the annual surpluses from these workers. The method of requisitioning this city has been radically changed compared to last year: last year, a detachment, having come to a volost or village and being refused to hand over the surplus, proceeded to requisition from the yard and requisitioned the surplus found. This made it possible for the peasants to transport grain from village to village when a detachment approached, to hide it, and so on. Now this village is required to hand over the amount of surplus due under the apportionment, and failure to fulfill the apportionment is considered a crime, and all grain, all livestock are taken from this village and arrests are made.

Under last year's system, it always made sense for the peasant to refuse, since he literally did not risk anything, this year his situation is changing dramatically, since he risks all his grain and

with a cat. With such massive requisitions, of course, it could not do without clashes and unrest.

At the end of the "bread week," the workers sent by the executive committees and the Communist Party partly began to withdraw from food work, and this recall threatened to undermine our work. The gubernatorial executive committee and the gubernia communist party once again provided tremendous support by issuing a circular order to detain all workers already seconded in the field, which will enable us to maintain the work at the same pace" [3].

The attitude towards the Soviet food policy in the countryside was not unequivocal, although the tendency to reject it was very pronounced and grew rapidly. Protests were caused by the non-exchange nature of procurements, arbitrariness in determining surpluses, unbearable demands for peasant farms, and extensive use of brute force. In the autumn of 1918, the "crusade" of food detachments for bread and the activities of the commanders caused a wave of peasant uprisings that swept through many regions of Soviet Russia.

The Tambov province was "bread" and therefore experienced the brunt of the food dictatorship and the "crusade" for bread. By October 1918, 50 food detachments from Petrograd, Moscow, Cherepovets and other cities were operating in the province, with a total number of up to 5 thousand people - not a single province knew such a scale of confiscations.

In the operational report of the head of the food detachment to the gubernatorial food commissar on the progress of the requisition of bread in the Kozlovsky district, it was reported: "The work continues successfully. Agents with Red Army men, scattered in hundreds in the villages, begin their duties in the morning. The peasants oppose exporting grain and categorically refuse, saying that "we don't have bread and do whatever you want with us, but we won't give you bread." Then the Red Army soldiers with agents conduct searches of everyone who refuses to export bread. During a search, bread is found among the peasants, which is confiscated by us and sent to the collection points without payment. Here, in the Peschansky district, most of the volosts behave extremely defiantly and do not want to fulfill the state allocation of grain. But the Red Army soldiers are making every effort to take the bread that is hidden in the bins of the rich. The work of the Red Army with agents continued until

late

him in the evening.

The Red Army soldiers themselves drive the carts to the horseless peasants, pour bread and send it to the dumping points.

On this date, two peasants from the village of Tarakanovka, Volchkovskaya volost, rebelled against the export of grain, who armed themselves with axes and pitchforks and began to call on the peasants not to give bread, and drove the Red Army men out of the village. Some peasants began to join the bandits, but the Red Army soldiers dispersed the gathered crowd with upward shots from their rifles. The instigators were arrested, who, after an investigation, were transferred to the disposal of the Gubernia Food Committee. On the evening of this date, the detachments, together with local youth, staged a rally-performance-concert in favor of the "week of the front".

During the work, the Red Army soldiers of the detachment captured deserters, who were escorted to the Kozlovsky district by the deserter commander.

I inform you that, according to special information, employees of the Antonov gang are beginning to appear in the Peschansky district of the Kozlovsky district and are showing their actions. I have taken the most repressive measures to prevent any attack by the bandits of Antonov's gang.

On that date, Comrade Abakumov, an inspector from the People's Commissariat of Food, was there, who, for his part, noticed the wrong actions of the commissioner in that we do not leave the peasants the norm that they are supposed to, but he, of course, forgot that if we reckon with the norm, then we will not be able to take the figures that rely on the Kozlovsky district. I explain that if such controllers appear, then there can be no productive work. But we do not pay attention to the controller and continue to work as we worked before" [4].

M.I. Kalinin, the chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, who acted as a representative of the peasantry in the bosom of the proletarian party, stated in May 1919: "I believe that the peasants can only worry because of a misunderstanding, because there is no better power for the peasants than Soviet power". The peasants, however, had no difficulty in inventing much better power for themselves. Power was better for them first of all - power without the communists. Peasant uprisings rarely had a political program, except for the demands for the liquidation of the surplus appropriation, the expulsion of communists from the Soviets, and the cessation of communist terror.

Seething, all peasant Russia resists. Along with major uprisings, countless smaller ones break out; along with the "peasant armies" there are hundreds of small detachments.

Behind the slogans - from "for the Soviet power, down with the communists" to "burn out my torch" - there is a feeling of a deceived hope for freedom.

The civil war, the war of the Reds against the Whites, in 1918-1920 masks the true nature of the peasant war. The peasants are fighting on two fronts. They sing: "Oh, apple, the color of ripeness, we beat red on the left, white on the right." After the defeat of the Whites, the Soviet government completes its "triumphal procession", which began in October 1917 and was interrupted by the war. The danger of the return of the landowners disappears. The peasants believe that now the land is theirs forever. Resistance to the surplus appropriation, the Party's policy in the countryside, is intensifying. At the same time, the struggle of the Soviet power against the resistance of the peasantry is intensifying and even more fierce. The Party declares war on the "kulaks" and "bandits", "kulak gangs", "kulak-gangster revolts". In 1920-1921 the Civil War becomes a PEASANT WAR.

Sources and notes:

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SR PARTY IN PREPARATIONS FOR PEASANT UPRISING IN TAMBOV REGION: MYTHS AND REALITY

Against the backdrop of the disasters that befell the peasants and were increasingly associated with the surplus, various political and ideological factors of the social explosion in the Tambov village receded into the background. But still, one should dwell on the role of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. The leaders of the fight against Antonovism largely attributed the scope of the movement to its influence and leadership. This was done from the very beginning of the peasant war to its end. Chairman of the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko in a report addressed to the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on the state of affairs in the Tambov province

and the fight against the insurgency thus described the role of the Socialist Revolutionary Party:

"The peasant uprising in the Tambov province was carefully prepared by the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. The local organization of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, following the instructions of the circular letter of their Central Committee dated May 13, 1920, carried out extensive work in the countryside (several sentences for the English delegation to present). In unity with different anti-Soviet groups (including the Cadets), she created the "Union of the working peasantry", which was supposed to prepare an armed uprising. On June 10, at the estate of the former Vysheslavitsev in the village of Kareika, Aleksandrovskaya vol., the Gubernia Congress of the Socialist-Revolutionaries took place, after which their work in preparing the uprising intensified. Antonov, a Socialist-Revolutionary, who back in 1919 went over to an active struggle against the "Bolsheviks", having assembled a gang of up to 100 people, who killed up to 200 Soviet workers in Kirsanov Uyezd from around the corner, the Provincial Socialist-Revolutionaries proposed to stop

partisan struggle and surrender to "organizational work." In August, a significant part of the provincial committee was arrested by the Cheka. Some settled in the provincial committee of the Union of Labor Peasants of the STK and led the most activist line. That this line corresponded to the mood of the entire Tambov organization of the Socialist-Revolutionaries is evidenced by the behavior of their delegation at the September All-Russian Conference of the Socialist-Revolutionaries - here the "Tambovites" showed an uncompromisingly militant attitude towards the Soviet power and demanded the organization of an immediate armed action against it" [1] .

This opinion prevailed in official circles.

The head of the special department Chibisov and the head of the secret department of Sitro, in the certificate signed by them, informed the higher authorities: "When characterizing and analyzing the insurrectionary movement, as in the present and previous review, we indicated that the leaders are the Social Revolutionaries, without indicating which group, right or left. Analyzing and comparing the currently available material with the previous one, we can conclude that the leaders are the right SRs, despite the fact that Batko called himself a Left SR, because a number of documents we have - leaflets, appeals, programs and instructions, as a provincial committee The Union of the Working Peasantry, as well as the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, are right-wing and definitely show us that the leaders of the insurrectionary movement are Right Socialist-Revolutionaries" [2].

M.N. Tukhachevsky as a team

troops in the Tambov province. This can be seen from his order to local authorities on the attitude towards the population of the villages that took part in the insurrectionary movement. The order stated the following: "Materials about the actions of bandits and peasant riots in the Tambov, Kirsanov and Borisoglebsk districts documented that all these performances were organized by corrupt hirelings of the European bourgeoisie - socialist revolutionaries who recruited gangs of criminal bandits. A thorough investigation into the participation of the peasants in the revolts against the Soviet power showed that the peasants did this in their great darkness, deceived by skillful intrigues and lies. And now, after several months of hard trials, the peasants are convinced in practice that the Socialist-Revolutionaries have torn them away from peaceful labor, dragged them into the most criminal adventure of fratricidal war, plundered a lot of peasant property in the villages and do not give them the opportunity to begin preparations for the spring sowing campaign. The peasants are convinced in practice that all the promises of the Socialist-Revolutionaries are a bad lie, and they begin to beat the Socialist-Revolutionaries" [3].

And the commander of the troops of the Tambov province M.N. Tukhachevsky did not doubt this, about which he directly wrote to V.I. Lenin in his note on the state of affairs in the Tambov province:

"July 16, 1921 Secret.

The reasons behind the uprising are as follows:

a) a strong Socialist-Revolutionary nest, twisted in the Tambov province;

6) the skillful tactics displayed by the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the creation of the STK" [4].

This thesis penetrated into historiography and dominated it for a long time, removing responsibility for what happened from the ruling Communist Party and shifting it to the opposition, which gave a formal reason for the final elimination of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party from the political scene and the complete elimination of the remnants of the multi-party system in the country. . In the course of the trial of members of the Central Committee of the Socialist Revolutionary Party in 1922, among other things, they were accused of organizing the Antonov rebellion. It boiled down to the following points: firstly, the Socialist-Revolutionaries participated in the work of preparing the rebellion by creating the Union of the Working Peasantry; secondly, the slogans of the rebels were nothing more than an illiterate presentation of the usual SR slogans; thirdly, the movement started by the Socialist-Revolutionaries was aban

by them to the mercy of fate and given into the hands of the "first rogue" (i.e. Antonov). clumsy

188

The severity of such an accusation is obvious, but then, in 1922, it played its role in passing the most severe sentence on the leadership of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, although the Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal admitted that the party did not officially stand at the head of the movement.

As early as 1895, the Socialist-Revolutionary organization covered five districts of the Tambov province, at that time a congress of these district groups was held in Borisoglebsk. Tambov region since the time of the first Russian revolution was one of the bases of the Socialist-Revolutionary influence. The names of party leaders V. Chernov, S. Sletov, M. Spiridonova are associated with it. Having put down deep roots in the Tambov village, at the very beginning of the century, the Socialist-Revolutionaries created "peasant brotherhoods" here, launched a "sentence movement" for land, and had a network of organizations. In the elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly in November 1917, the Socialist-Revolutionaries won a complete victory in the province, collecting 71.2% of all votes (even higher in the countryside) and receiving 13 out of 16 deputy mandates. - zhenie, if only because they were a political formulation of purely peasant demands and did not contain anything unacceptable to the peasants.

After the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and then the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, were expelled from the Soviets in 1918, the most influential political force in the Tambov province practically lost the main lever of its activity. For some time they maintained illusions about the possibility of legal work among the masses, mainly through cooperation and trade unions. But these hopes were not justified. In the report of the provincial committee of the AKP in 1920, it was noted: "S.-r. strictly persecuted" [5].

Driven underground, the Socialist-Revolutionaries involuntarily faced the need to revive and intensify illegal activities. "Peasant brotherhoods" began to be recreated — by the end of the summer of 1920, there were about a dozen of them in only three districts of the Tambov province. At the same time, work began on the creation of the Union of the working peasantry as a form of political organization that is well remembered in the countryside. This initiative was taken up by the peasants, branches of the Union of the working peasantry arose in many volosts of the Tambov, Kirsanovsky, Borisoglebsky and Usman counties.

Nevertheless, the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party did not then put forward the task of organizing an armed uprising against the communists and did not overestimate the growing facts of peasant riots.

comrade On the contrary, believing that isolated, disparate actions would only lead to an intensification of the "Red Terror," the Socialist-Revolutionary leaders planned a broad political action of an emphatically peaceful character. On July 13, 1920, the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party adopted a plan to organize a "sentence movement" in the countryside: following the example of 1905, the peasants in their collective "sentences" were to present their demands to the authorities. Therefore, the mass uprising that began a month later under the leadership of A.S. Antonov was, from the point of view of the party center of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, a disorganizing performance. Prominent Tambov SR Yu.N. Podbelsky (brother of the Soviet people's commissar V.N. Podbelsky) described it as "bare partisanism, without slogans, without ideas, without programs."

The uprising of the peasants came as a surprise to the provincial committee of the Right Socialist-Revolutionary Party and even to the provincial committee of the Union of the Working Peasantry. On August 23, 1920, an emergency meeting of the leadership of the provincial committee of the Union of the Working Peasantry was held in Tambov, which was attended by delegates from several district committees. There was only one question on the agenda: what to do in connection with the uprising that had begun in the Kamensky district? The Socialist-Revolutionaries, who headed the Provincial Committee of the STK, showed indecision and, after hesitating, by a majority of votes passed a resolution about the prematureness and futility of an open armed struggle at the moment. To which one of the peasant rebels present at the meeting,

who knew perfectly well that it was the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Governor of the Union of the Working Peasantry who were ringing the most about the need for an uprising, and now, when it came to blood, they were striving to slip into the bushes, he answered them this way: "It is clear that we will have to act alone. But then beware. We'll come to Tambov and we'll kill you at the same time."

Since A.S. Antonov called himself an "independent" Socialist-Revolutionary, the Tambov Provincial Committee of the AKP demanded that he either stop being called a Socialist-Revolutionary, or submit to the tactics of the party. Antonov was asked to abandon the senseless terrorist struggle and move to another region of the province for a peaceful political struggle. Antonov verbally obeyed these instructions, but in fact continued the former "independent partisan tactics."

The following fact is noteworthy. When a real peasant war had been going on for about a month (the rebels defeated the Red Army units in open battle, which were headed by the chairman of the provincial

comra A.G. Schlichter, surrounded Tambov in a semicircle and stopped 15 versts from the city), at the All-Russian Conference of the AKP, both Tambov delegates (their names were not established) tried to persuade the party leadership to support and lead the spontaneous peasant protest. One of them proposed to declare a retaliatory terror as a counter to the extremes of Bolshevism. These proposals were rejected, because they would have meant a rejection of the resolution adopted in June 1919 of the 9th Council of the AKP on the cessation of the armed struggle "against the Bolshevik power and replacing it with the usual political struggle." In view of the dispersion of the masses, the conference outlined organizational work as a top priority, while recognizing the inevitability of the resumption of the armed struggle against Bolshevism in the future.

This issue was widely discussed at a meeting of the All-Russian Conference of the Socialist Revolutionary Party on the state of affairs in the Tambov province on September 8, 1920 [6]. Reports from the field noted that the Tambov organization carried out mainly organizational work. In 1919, the Socialist-Revolutionaries cherished the hope of the possibility of legal work - then the cooperatives were still alive and some scope was given to the trade unions. But the illusory nature of these hopes soon became apparent. The reports noted that, given the established attitude of the authorities towards the peasantry, the legal protection of its interests turned out to be unthinkable; in the countryside, only the bayonet and butt were wielded, against which the word was powerless, the cooperatives were brutally crushed, the trade unions were forcibly transformed into branches of the communist party. The authorities did not hesitate to arrest the boards of the trade unions when they opposed their forcible "communization".

Reports from the localities emphasized that as a result of the collapse of illusions about the possibility of legal work, the Tambov organization from February-March 1920 resolutely took the standpoint of illegal work, without hiding, however, its party policy. Twice the Tambov organization issued proclamations signed by the provincial committee: one - | May, another - on the occasion of the "Week of the Labor Front." Two issues of the illegal organ of the provincial committee "Land and Freedom" were issued, printed on a hectograph and a rotator [6].

Noticeable results were achieved by work among the peasantry, which proceeded in two directions: on the one hand, strictly party peasant brotherhoods were restored in some villages, such

there were no more than a dozen brotherhoods in the 3 districts of the Tambov province; on the other hand, the peasantry rallied into non-party, but strictly class-based Unions of the working peasantry. In this work, the Socialist-Revolutionaries entered into agreement with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the unions set themselves two main tasks, with which both the "Right" and "Left" Socialist-Revolutionaries agreed: the recapture of power from the hands of the Communist Party into the hands of a new provisional government composed of representatives of the peasantry unions, workers' organizations and socialist parties, moreover, the provisional government will have to convene all-Russian congresses of workers, which will have to decide the question of the form of state power; The second task is to carry out

the whole inviolability of the law on the socialization of the land. Peasant unions with such tasks met with the support of the Tambov peasantry, and the unions began to grow quite successfully in the villages, such unions were especially numerous in the Tambov district, where almost half of the volosts had their own peasant organizations. Separate peasant unions existed in Kirsanovsky, Usmansky and Borisoglebsky districts and in the north of the province [6].

STK appealed to the Red Army soldiers, peasants with appeals about the situation in the country and with calls to overthrow the Soviet government. On January 15, 1921, at a joint meeting of representatives of the provincial committee of the Union of the Working Peasantry, the command and political staff of the insurgents, an appeal was adopted to the Red Army soldiers.

"APPEAL

Comrades, Red Army soldiers, it's time for you to wake up and throw off the ashes of the communists, because they are leading you into battle against your brother and father, who rebelled against the communist terror. Comrade Red Army soldiers, mobilized, sleep enough, throw down your weapons or join the partisan detachments, otherwise you will face a merciless punishment of the people, because the communists have deceived our homeland, but no, we partisans will not give in. Down with the communist bastards! Long live the general uprising! Enough deceit and lies, time is running out, come back home to defend your native right and family hearths together with the partisans, destroyed by the communist rapists, who bring you to nothingness. It is time to be convinced of the reality, and not to be pawns and succumb to the deception of the communists, who introduce you into false deceit, but in fact ruin your families to the point of begging. Down with the communist bastards! Long live the general uprising

working people!

"Lenin and Trotsky doctors of sick Russia...". White Guard poster

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"Peace and Freedom in the Soviets". White Guard poster

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Agitators in the village. From Revolutionary Watercolors. Artist I.A. Vladimirov

L.D. Trotsky with his bodyguards. 1919

"This is how the Bolsheviks manage in the Cossack villages." White Guard poster

"Bolshevik punitive detachments". White Guard poster

After the destruction of the landowner's estate. From Revolutionary Watercolors. Artist I.A. Vladimirov

Interrogation of the fist and the priest. From Revolutionary Watercolors. Artist I.A. Vladimirov

Grain confiscation. From Revolutionary Watercolors. Artist I.A. Vladimirov

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Sending a food detachment from Moscow to the village. 1919

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Makhnovists as accomplices of anti-Soviet forces in a Soviet caricature

L.N. Zadov V.F. Belash

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A.I. Denikin P.N. Wrangel

Evacuation of the White Army from the Crimea

M.V. Frunze

Tachanka. Artist M.B. Greeks

Participants of the Tambov uprising

M.N. Tukhachevsky. Photo from the 1930s

Tambov Uyezd Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party" [7].

The Union of the Working Peasantry addressed various sections of citizens with appeals and leaflets. A leaflet to the peasants and workers in January-February 1921 said:

"Peasants and workers!

Believe, peasant and worker, in a quick and final victory over your sworn enemy, the communist rapist, the enslaver and violator of your sacred and inalienable rights: the rights to land, to your own labor, the right to freely dispose of it, according to your needs and requirements. The ranks of fighters for the fulfillment of your holy desires, such as: "A free union of the peasantry and workers," are growing and increasing every day, and the time is not far, the hour when a powerful cry will sweep from one region to another of the whole of enslaved Russia, escaping from the many millions of peasant and workers' breasts: "Long live a new free life with a government that truly expresses the will of the working people!" Then the true kingdom of labor will come, where labor will be higher than all other aspects of life, and the peasant and worker will be his immediate

hosts.

Peasant and worker, you have raised the banner of insurrection with the slogan: "Union of the peasantry and workers," so go boldly and straight along that marked path to the realization of your cherished thoughts, which you have your red banner as a signpost. Hold it tight so that no dishonest hand can tear it from your calloused hands. We repeat once again what should be your symbol of faith: "Faith in your own strength and victory, power only to the working people."

Tambov Provincial Committee of the Union of the Working Peasantry" [8].

A leaflet from the Union of the Working Peasantry to the workers in January-February 1921 stated:

"Working

Worker, how long will your patient slavery, your servile existence into which you have fallen thanks to the deceit and slyness of the pseudo-socialist Bolshevik communists, continue. We will not point here to all the abominations and meanness with which they put you face to face, forcing you to fearlessly look even at your very existence with a bayonet. Let us point out the most blatant, ultimate evil, the blatant contradiction with that with which they set out at the beginning on the path of revolutionary struggle, inscribing on their banner the profound

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positive slogans, not only for the Russian, but also for the world proletariat: "The dictatorship of the proletariat, the dictatorship of the working people", and the sad outcome of the struggle they have begun against capital in the name of liberating the workers from its dead chains.

At their call: "In the struggle for a better share of the workers and peasants," you all went out as one, honestly surrendering to the struggle at the front with your sworn enemy - the capitalists, tireless work in factories and plants with one quarter of bread, could not follow the secret diplomacy conducted by Lenin and Trotsky with foreign capitalists, to whom in the end they sold you with your factories and railways, satisfying the conditions of their peace with Poland - that is, with allied capital. Having strangled their own bourgeoisie, they call on others to be the bosses with even greater appetite.

It is unlikely that foreigners will agree to have socialist workers, revolutionary workers at their disposal, they need slaves, only slaves, and now they have handed over you, defenseless, as unnecessary goods, thereby enslaving you for many years of slavery, forced labor, immense humiliation before strangers. gentlemen.

The peasant protested against the new rapist masters in the person of the commissars, with a revolutionary struggle, to which he calls you, too, as his flesh, blood and bone, hoping that his protest will be common with the workers and that his achievements: "A free the union of the toiling peasantry and workers, land and freedom, and the Constituent Assembly of the whole people" — equally cover the interests of the peasants and workers.

As a close-knit, close-knit mass, we will be able to strangle the parasites that have settled on us. In the struggle we will win back our rights to work and will not allow ourselves to be exploited by international capital.

Worker, do not forget your friend, the plowman-peasant, who is languishing for the fifth month of the struggle he opened against the Bolsheviks. Rather, join his ranks, and victory is assured.

Tambov Provincial Committee of the Union of the Working Peasantry" [8].

In January February 1921, the leaflet of the Union of the Working Peasantry to the mobilized Red Army workers said: "The mobilized Red Army

Friends mobilized! In the vast majority in the ranks of the Red Army you are the sons of the Russian working peasantry. The Communist Bolsheviks forced you to give up peaceful labor by force,

take up arms, stand under the banner of communism, as if to defend free labor, land and freedom. For three years, under their command, you saber-rattling, often hungry, badly dressed and shod, exhausted by illnesses and all sorts of hardships of life. But this did not bring benefit and happiness either to you yourself or to us, your fathers and mothers. Your path and our path have intertwined, merged into one common path of abuse and torment, on which you and we are being driven to ridicule, torture and death.

Comrades mobilized! Turn away for a moment from the nightmare and horror of the bloody feast, lower the rifles from your weary hands, look the great truth in the face and at least think a little about what you have experienced during these three years of internecine slaughter. Weren't you languishing in the cold barracks, lying in groups on dirty floors, rotten unwashed bunks in permanent underwear, smelly tatters of your overcoat, impatiently waiting for a dinner of dirty unsalted lentils and half-fallen horsemeat. Are you not thousands and tens of thousands, either crippled at the front, or infected with typhus and cholera from starvation, or with frostbite on your hands and feet, were scattered to hospitals, where without medicine and care, without sufficient food and warmth, you died without counting.

Yes, it is you, mobilized friends, who survived such trials, and all this at a time when the authorities were robbing your property and household property. What is all this for? Is it really in order to

drag out a civil massacre for decades? Is it really in order to strengthen the happiness of a handful of communists who have created a new master class out of themselves on your blood, on your corpses for their own well-being?

Come to your senses, mobilized friends! The Communists have thrown us all into the abyss of poverty and wild arbitrariness. The people have completely turned into beggars, but the communists do not see this, because their eyes are clouded from the blood of innocently executed victims. The people, like a humble slave, begged for mercy and indulgence, and they do not hear this, for their ears are deafened by the groan and cry of the offended. The people appealed to reason, but they did not have or did not have reason, or he, too, was darkened from the horror of the action.

validity.

Cracking our heads like pots, breaking bones, the communists have been promising to build a new world for three whole years, but now we have already understood what this new world will be like, it will be deserted and gloomy, it will be inhabited not by free and happy people, but by hungry people, naked

and silent slaves. We don't want the communists to rob us and mock us anymore.

Comrades mobilized! Let your and our voices of indignation merge into one common cry: "Death to the communists, long live the general armed uprising of the working peasantry and all the oppressed against the violent communists!"

We peasants did this and took up arms. The hypocritical Communists called us bandits, hoping by this to disgrace us in the eyes of our brothers and to rouse the working people to fight against us.

Do not believe them, scoundrels, for they brazenly and shamelessly lie, like a Jew for a penny of a profit. We are not bandits, but a rebellious armed people - the people's army. That is why we appeal to you, mobilized friends. Bow your bayonets before the face of mother earth and, without a moment's delay, come to us, as many of you have already done! We will meet you as our brothers, if you wish, you can either remain in our ranks, or go to your homes, where your exhausted fathers and mothers are waiting for you. Go to your native homes before they are completely destroyed by the communists like bird's nests.

People's Army" [9].

In Tambov uyezd, even after the congress of representatives of four volosts, a district peasant union was formed with a district committee (of three people: sr, a sympathetic sr and a left sr), a district conference of the Union of the working peasantry was convened and successfully passed, in the spring In 1920, the Tambov district party conference was held, which was attended by 7 people from the district, three - individually, four - as representatives of rural organizations. In the summer of 1920, a provincial party conference was held with the participation of representatives of four organizations - Tambov city, Tambov district, Morshanskaya and Kozlovskaya. The organization of illegal trade unions among the workers was supposed, but this type of work did not give noticeable results. However, even without illegal trade unions, the workers fought against the authorities. One can note, for example, the strike in the Tambov railroads. workshops, announced in the form of a protest against the lengthening of the working day, carried out under the guise of the "Week of the Labor Front". Activist moods occupied a particularly prominent place among the peasantry. Immediately after the harvest in the Tambov district

a large uprising of peasants broke out, which fell under the leadership of Antonov, who calls himself "independent sr." Antonov had about 3,000 armed peasants at his disposal, of which \ - cavalry. The "Antonovites" waged a partisan struggle against the Soviet detachments, avoiding clashes with them, directing all their energy to the destruction of the communists, food workers and those protecting them and to the destruction of Soviet farms.

The "Antonovites" had red flags with the inscriptions "Long live the working peasantry! ". Sometimes the "Antonovites" staged public trials of communists, mostly ending in death sentences. There were cases of acquittals

communists. The area of activity of the Antonov detachments is Tambov, Kirsanovsky, Borisoglebsky, and partly Morshansky and Kozlovsky districts of the Tambov province. Detachments also appeared in neighboring districts of the Voronezh and Saratov provinces [6].

As noted at the above-mentioned meeting of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, "the Bolshevik government does not stop at the most cruel and barbaric methods of suppressing the rebellious peasants. "Legal" and "illegal" executions, mass arrests, destruction of entire villages—everything is being used. Three lists of executed peasants have already been published, with a total of 150 executed. Demolished by artillery and burned in the Tambov district 3 villages: Koptevo, Khitrovo, Verkhne-Spasskoye. Part of the population of these villages was killed, others were arrested, adults were placed in concentration camps, children in shelters. However, the movement has not yet been suppressed" [6].

At a meeting of the All-Russian Conference of the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries on the state of affairs in the Tambov province on September 8, 1920 [6], the Tambov delegates insisted on the need to meet the spontaneous protest against the Bolshevik regime that was growing in the mass of the working peasantry and give it their slogans. "It is necessary already now, in the process of daily revolutionary work, not only not to hide from the people the inevitability of the forcible liquidation of the Bolshevik dictatorship, but also to adapt all work to this goal, without diverting our forces to the sentence movement and so on. The time has come for an active struggle, and under this slogan all the preparatory work must proceed. Otherwise, the peasantry will be incomprehensible and alien to all the petty, but necessary for the success of the uprising, organizational work on their own.

the wound of small forces. In order to incite the villages to organize at least peasant unions, the peasant must clearly understand why he will need these organizations, where these organizations will lead him.

One of the Tambov delegates considered it timely to put forward, as a means of combating the extremes of the Bolshevik dictatorship, the retaliatory terror of the defense of the peasantry by the SR party [6]. Apparently, he was given a strong rebuff, after which he was forced to justify himself. Let us quote this discussion: "Tambovets: No one says that, having parted, we immediately started an uprising. We believe that it is necessary to take the path of organizing the peasantry with the slogan of overthrowing the Bolsheviks. We propose to keep a cool head, but with a warm heart. He says: it is practically impossible to declare an armed struggle. But in order to prepare it (it was already in full swing. - 4v.) it is necessary to start transferring the most active comrades. To remind that terror is necessary when the actions of the authorities offend society, and when there is no other measure of punishment, I insist on this method with the preliminary protection of organizations" [6].

The All-Russian Conference of the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries on the state of affairs in the Tambov province, held on September 8, 1920, in the adopted resolution emphasized: "The Bolshevik regime, by the very fact of its existence, inevitably gives rise to internal counter-revolutionary movements and encroachments of international imperialism, that the revival of democracy in itself would be a real means of tearing the ground out from under the anti-Soviet intervention and, stating (only stating! - Authors.) the presence of a broad insurrectionary movement of the masses for the overthrow of the communist dictatorship and the establishment of the power of the people, and at the same time, seeing the inevitability in the future of the resumption of the armed struggle against the Bolsheviks by the Party and, at the same time, taking into account the dispersal of the masses, the Conference of the Party of Sr believes that the next task of the Party is to work on organizing the active forces necessary to achieve the indicated goals. At the same time, the Party considers it necessary to wage the most resolute struggle against all attempts at counter-revolution, no matter what name it may be hiding behind;

goals" [10].

Member of the Central Committee of the AKP Yu. Podbelsky, who was accused of secret leadership of the peasant uprising, vehemently denying this, denying any participation of the Socialist Revolutionary Party in the rebellion, wrote in his statement: "My essay on the Tambov uprising to any representative authorities is available for acquaintance and, no matter how one treats him, but call Antonov's "leader" and "inspirer" a man who, as I did, characterized Antonov himself ("a typical expropriator of the era of 1905-1909", "free shooter of partisanship") and the movement led by him ("partisans", ridiculous "reckless" naked partisanism, without slogans, without ideas, without programs, etc.), this means, at best, to have imperfect logic. As for the materials seized from me, they include notes on numerous facts of cruelty shown in the struggle by both Antonov's supporters and the Soviet troops, and the worst thing is the story of one of the Tambov residents about how he got to the "headquarters" one of Antonov's regiments, what he observed there and how he protested in the "headquarters" against the outrages perpetrated by Antonov's supporters. Here are all the materials on the basis of which the Cheka "established" that "the Central Committee, in the person of this representative (i.e., in the person of Yu. Podbelsky. - Authors.), led the uprising of kulaks, bandits and deserters in the Tambov and Voronezh provinces" " [10].

Yu. Podbelsky wrote further: "At the conference of P.S.-R. in the fall of last year, the representative of the Tambov organization P.S.-R. Indeed, "a report was made on the Antonov uprising in the Tambov province," but regarding "the participation of local S.-R." the report did not and could not say a word, which can be verified by reading the original minutes of the September conference of P.S.-R., which is at the disposal of the Cheka, taken during the arrest of one of the members of the Central Committee of P.S.-R. . True, the protocol spoke of the organization of the Union of the working peasantry, but this Union had nothing in common with Antonov. He was against an armed uprising under the given conditions, although he admitted the possibility of such an uprising in the future. If subsequently individual cells of the Union of the Labor Peasantry, cut off from the provincial center, which began with a spontaneous uprising, in some places, perhaps, took part in the uprising, then, firstly, this happened contrary to the directives of the leaders of the Union, and, secondly, those spontaneous local uprisings, to which they joined in some places (but, in any case, they were not their initiators)

cells of the Union of the working peasantry, had nothing to do with the uprising led by Antonov. Antonov, as is clear from my essay in No. 6 of Revolutionary Russia, appeared on the scene only when the spontaneous peasant movement was suppressed by the Soviet punitive troops and the partisan phase of the Tambov uprising began.

Other fabrications about "correction of Antonov's actions by the provincial center of s.-r.", Antonov's participation at the meeting of s.-r. in Tambov, etc. I won't refute it, not so much because I haven't lived in Tambov since May 1920, and I don't even know approximately what was going on in the Tambov organization of the S.-R. during the uprising (since the entire Tambov organization was arrested in September 1920), but because these accusations hit everyone in the eye too much with their deliberate invention and hardly need refutation. The degree of their reliability can be judged by the accusations that are attributed to me personally and which I refuted point by point above. If it is possible for one person to lead an uprising from Moscow in two provinces separate from Moscow at once, then how many times easier is it to come up with a fantastic alliance between Antonov and the local Socialist-Revolutionaries. (even if they were arrested without exception and kept in prison). It is not in the activities of the P.S.-R., but in the policy towards the working peasantry that has prevailed so far ("surplus requisitioning", etc.), it is necessary to look for the reasons for the long partisan movement of the Tambov peasants. Antonov would not have lasted even one day in the village if it were not for the actions of the punitive detachments, from which not so much the "Antonovites" suffered, but the innocent ordinary peasantry. As a bloody mutual guarantee, entire villages were sometimes responsible for involuntary and inevitable contact with Antonov's passing detachments" [10].

Neither the all-Russian nor the provincial leadership of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party were directly involved in the Antonovshchina. But the influence of the Social Revolutionaries on the insurrectionary movement, its ideology and organization is undeniable, as is the fact that most of its leaders belonged to the AKP.

The foregoing allows us to conclude that the role of the party of socialist revolutionaries can be traced in the social explosion in the Tambov village. The leaders of the fight against Antonovism largely attributed the scope of the movement to her influence and leadership. "The peasant uprising in the Tambov province was carefully prepared by the Socialist-Revolutionary Party," was the official opinion.

Nevertheless, the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party did not put forward the task of organizing an armed uprising against the communists and did not overestimate the growing facts of peasant revolts. On the contrary, believing that isolated, scattered protests would only lead to an intensification of the "Red Terror," the Socialist-Revolutionary leaders planned a broad political action of an emphatically peaceful character. The uprising of the peasants came as a surprise to the Provincial Committee of the Right Socialist-Revolutionary Party and even to the Provincial Committee of the Union of the Working Peasantry.

Subsequently, at a meeting of the All-Russian Conference of the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries on the state of affairs in the Tambov province on September 8, 1920, the Tambov delegates insisted on the need to meet the spontaneous protest against the Bolshevik regime that was growing in the mass of the working peasantry and give it their slogans. STK appealed to the Red Army soldiers, the peasants about the situation in the country and with calls to overthrow the Soviet government. The Union of the Working Peasantry addressed various sections of citizens with appeals and leaflets.

Neither the all-Russian nor the provincial leadership of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party were directly involved in the Antonovshchina. But the influence of the Social Revolutionaries on the insurrectionary movement, its ideology and organization is undeniable, as is the fact that most of its leaders belonged to the AKP.

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TRANSFORMATION OF PEASANT REVOLTS IN THE TAMBOV REGION INTO A PEASANT WAR

Peasant War 1920-1921 in the Tambov province grew out of an insurrectionary movement that began in the autumn of 1918. The subsequent development of events was marked by constant outbreaks of riots in individual villages and the appearance in the forest areas of combat groups and partisan detachments, which were called "gangs" in Soviet documentation.

From the beginning of 1919, the "gang" of A.S. Antonova. At this time, the forces and centers of the future mass uprising were being formed, leaders were being nominated, combat detachments arose as a response to the surplus campaigns, which were becoming more and more unbearable. During almost all this time the situation was not irreparable, there was still an opportunity to prevent a social explosion. In this regard, the letter of A.S. Antonov to the Kirsanov Uyezd Committee of the RCP(b) in February 1920, in which, on behalf of the fighting squad, he declared to "comrade communists" that "we are always ready to give you a helping hand in the fight against criminality." Evidence of possible interaction and cooperation, a genuine union of the revolutionary forces of the city and the countryside on the verge of 1919-1920. can be found in the actions of F.K. Mironov, and N.I. Makhno, and other leaders of the peasant revolution. However, in all cases, the main condition for the realization of this possibility was a change in Soviet policy in the countryside, primarily the abolition of the surplus appropriation.

Understanding the need to revise the policy towards the peasantry began to emerge in the Bolshevik leadership.

In the same February 1920, L.D. Trotsky submitted proposals to the Central Committee of the RCP(b) to replace the surplus appropriation with a tax in kind, which actually led to the abandonment of the policy of "war communism". These proposals were the result of a practical acquaintance with the situation and mood of the village in the Urals, where Trotsky found himself in January-February as chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. His memorandum "Basic Issues of Food and Land Policy" began with a fundamental conclusion about "the inefficiency of food policy based on taking away surpluses in excess of the consumer norm", because it "pushes the peasant to work off the land only to the extent of his family's needs." Trotsky warned: "Food resources threaten to dry up, against which no improvement in the requisitioning apparatus can help." Moreover, the preservation of the surplus appropriation "threatens to completely undermine the economic life of the country." It was proposed to overcome the process of "economic degradation": 1) "replacing the withdrawal of surpluses with a certain percentage deduction (a kind of income tax in kind), so that a larger plowing or better processing still represents a benefit", and 2) "having established a greater correspondence between the issuance of industrial products to the peasants and the amount of grain poured by them, not only in volosts and villages, but also in peasant households. As is known, this was the beginning of the New Economic Policy in the spring of 1921.

Of course, the conditions of the Civil War had not yet been eliminated, the inevitability of new military clashes remained obvious, but the limit of the possibilities of the peasant economy had already been exhausted. After the defeat of the main forces of the counter-revolution in the east and south of Russia, after the liberation of almost the entire territory of the country, a change in food policy became possible, and, given the nature of relations with the peasantry, necessary. Unfortunately, the proposals of L.D. Trotsky in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) were rejected. The delay in the abolition of the surplus for a whole year had tragic consequences, as there could not have been an Antonovshchina as a massive social explosion.

Having flared up in mid-August 1920 in the villages of Khitrovo and Kamenka in the Tambov district, where the peasants refused to hand over their grain and disarmed the food detachment, the fire of the uprising spread throughout the province with a speed incomprehensible to the local authorities, since they were accustomed to

but they believed that they were dealing with gangs of bandits, and not popular indignation. Already in August-September 1920, the Antonov horseshoe captured Tambov, being only 15-20 miles from the provincial center. Their number reached about 4 thousand armed rebels and about 10 thousand people with pitchforks and scythes.

The atrocities of the food detachments gave rise to the discontent of the peasants, which was expressed in sabotage, the lack of ploughing of the spring wedge. The peasants also expressed their disobedience to the new authorities in the disruption of mobilization measures.

This is how the peasant uprising in the Tambov region began.

On August 6, 1920, when the indignation of the masses reached its highest apogee, on the initiative of G.N. Pluzhnikov ("Batko") in the village of Kamenka, Tambov district, an insurrectionary movement began. In the first days, those who came forward disarmed the food detachments in the Kamensky district, consisting of 23 people and disarmed the police, numbering 65 people, at the same time, raids were made on the Aleksandrovsky and Ivanovo state farms, where 14 people were disarmed and a detachment of the gubchek numbering in 66 people.

On the same day, August 6, 1920, a partisan detachment of 100 infantry and 20 cavalry was armed. On August 9, this detachment raided st. Chakino and defeated a detachment of a training team of 200 people, disarmed 15 of them. On August 13, a raid was made on the village of Afanasievka, where 60 people were disarmed, then an attack was made on the team of the gubchek, located in the village of Kamenka, where 30 rifles and 1 machine gun were taken from them.

On August 15, 1920, the partisan detachment was attacked by Soviet troops advancing from the village of Verkhotsenye. The partisan detachment, going on the counterattack, captured 36 Red Army soldiers, including the battalion commander, and on August 16, again on the orders of Pluzhnikov, an uprising broke out in the Khitrovsky district of the Tambov district.

The forces assembled in the same way were sent simultaneously with the Kamensky detachment to the Kirsanovsky district to join the Antonov detachment. The connection took place in the village of Treskino in the presence of all partisan forces. The management of the detachments was entrusted to Antonov, after which the growth of his detachments began to increase rapidly.

The news of the defeat near Kamenka of the food detachment and the detachment to combat desertion reached Tambov on the same day. The gubernia executive committee, the gubernatorial committee of the Communist Party, the gubernia military commissariat and the gubernatorial commissariat received alarming reports daily from the volosts and from the railway stations located in the neighborhood of the epicenter of the outbreak of the uprising.

Late in the evening of August 2, 1920, an emergency meeting of the presidiums of the provincial executive committee and the provincial party committee took place in Tambov, at which it was decided to form a military operational headquarters under the provincial Chek, consisting of the chairman of the provincial Chek Traskovich, the provincial military commissar Shikunov and the provincial military leader Zbruev.

On August 22, a detachment of cadets from the regimental school of the 21st reserve rifle regiment under the command of Vorobyov was sent from Tambov to the Rzhaksa station. Having made a stop at the Sampur station on the way, Vorobyov formed a combined detachment from scattered groups of Red Army soldiers, food contractors, policemen and rural communists who were at the station. The commander of this detachment, Nikolsky, was ordered to advance on Kamenka, "knocking down, if they come across, gangs, or, in extreme cases, holding them back." Vorobyov himself with his detachment traveled by rail to Rzhaksa and from there also moved to Kamenka.

In the afternoon, near the village of Ponzari, Nikolsky's detachment encountered the rebels and, unable to withstand their onslaught, began to randomly retreat to the Sampur station, where Vorobyov's detachment was forced to withdraw that evening.

On August 23, having received 60 reinforcements from Tambov, Vorobyov again tried to advance, but again unsuccessfully. He was pushed back first to the Chakino station, and then he was surrounded halfway between Chakin and Sampur at the bridge across the Osipovka river, dismantled by the rebels. Throughout the night, suffering losses, Vorobyov's detachment fired back. Only on the morning of August 24, an armored vehicle of the transport Cheka under the command of S. Salenkov came to the rescue from Tambov, which drove the rebels away from Vorobyov's detachment with its fire [1].

The failures of the Red Army detachments forced the military operational headquarters under the gubchek not only to speed up the search for new military forces in Tambov itself, but also to seek help from the county towns of Kirsanov and Borisoglebsk closest to the area of the outbreak of the uprising. On the evening of August 23, the Kirsanov military commissar Plastun and the head of the political bureau Sachko answered by direct wire to Tambov that they had serious difficulties with the formation of a company due to the fact that there were few

a numerical guard battalion of 300 bayonets was "all in dispersal" through the villages of the county, where it was also restless, small gangs appeared. The 2nd reserve cavalry regiment stationed in Kirsanov could not be touched, since an order was received from the district [2] to form a squadron of 300 sabers from it and send it to the Wrangel front no later than August 27. It was reported from the district that this was the order of the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, L.D. Trotsky. And in the whole city there was only one machine gun, and even that was in the railway battalion, which was not subordinate to the county authorities [3].

The military-operational headquarters under the Gubchek ordered to immediately take a machine gun and two platoons of soldiers from the railway battalion, but sternly warned the Kirsanov commanders: "In no case do not interfere with the formation of the squadron. Remember that this is Trotsky's task, and must be completed on time" [3].

Unlike Kirsanov, in Borisoglebsk there were no difficulties with the formation of a company. Created on the basis of a local guard battalion and reinforced by several Borisoglebsk communists, this company was sent by rail to Zherdevka station already at 6 am on August 24. It was headed by the commander of the Borisoglebsk guard battalion, Baryshnikov, and the political instructor, Perevedentsev.

ON THE. Perevedentsev is a full Knight of St. George and non-commissioned officer of the old Russian army, a prominent fighter for the establishment of Soviet power in Borisoglebsk and the first military commissar of the district. In 1918-1919. As a commissar and commander of the regiments formed by him, he took an active part in the battles with the White Guards, suppressed many rebellions and uprisings. And on the night of August 23, 1919, at the head of a cavalry regiment of the 14th Infantry Division, he made a raid, rare in audacity and thoughtfulness, against Borisoglebsk, occupied by the Whites, where there were about six enemy regiments. There were legends about Perevedentsev's personal courage and his leadership talent in these places [4].

It is indisputable that the presence of the illustrious commander affected the fighting spirit of Baryshnikov's fighters. Having unloaded in Zherdevka, the company made a swift rush to Kamenka itself and at 10 o'clock in the evening, with a decisive and unexpected blow for the rebels, drove them out of the village, capturing many horses as a trophy. This made it possible for Perevedentsev to put some of the company's soldiers on horseback. This marked the beginning of the formation of a cavalry detachment,

famous in the history of the suppression of Antonovism under several names: Perevedentsev's squadron, then Perevedentsev's division (two squadrons), and, finally, Perevedentsev's 1st Cavalry Regiment. From August 24, when Kamenka was taken by the Red Army for the first time, the name of Perevedentsev became even more famous.

At the same time, in order to find out on the spot what kind of uprising was taking place in the Kamenka region, A.S. came here with a small detachment from the Kirsanov forests. Antonov. Here he is found by two delegates who arrived for the same purpose at the meeting of the provincial committee of the Union of Labor Peasantry held in Tambov the day before. The delegates (both from the Khitrovsky District Committee of the STK) handed over

Antonov was instructed by the provincial committee of the STK not to get involved in the Kamensky rebellion, but to return to Kirsanovsky district and wait. Antonov verbally agreed, and the delegates left.

However, Antonov did not wait. From August 24, 1920, and until the very end of the rebellion, A.S. Antonov. In archival documents on the suppression of the rebellion, the name of Antonov is first encountered in connection with his appearance late in the evening of August 24 at the Aleksandrovsky state farm, not far from Kamenka, that is, immediately after he assumed command [4].

The first actions of Antonov, made not without the help of the Kamensky leaders. rebels G.N. Pluzhnikov and A.V. Boguslavsky, were the following. Having learned that significant Red forces were being concentrated against the weakly armed rebels to deliver a decisive blow, Antonov ordered most of the ordinary rebels to temporarily disperse to their homes or hide. This was a purely Antonovian device, repeatedly used later on. And on the night of August 25, he took the most prominent and active peasants with him to the east, to Kirsanovsky district. In parting, the Antonovites plundered the Aleksandrovsky state farm, "expropriating" 43 horses, 13 bulls, 6 calves, a herd of sheep and 150 pounds of oats [5].

Safely, except for a small skirmish near Uvarovo, having reached the Kirsanov forests, Antonov took measures to organize armed uprisings in the Kirsanov district itself.

On August 25, for the direct leadership on the spot of all the forces operating against the rebels, the provincial military commissar P.I. left Tambov. Shikunov. At the Sampur station, he created the headquarters of the combat site. The commander of the 4th rifle brigade of the VOKhR (internal troops) V.I. was appointed chief of staff. Blagonadezhdin. In the second

On August 25, a joint meeting of the presidiums of the provincial party committee and the provincial executive committee was held in Tambov, where the head of the military operational headquarters, Traskovich, reported on the progress in the fight against the rebellion. Many reproaches were made against the military operational headquarters and Traskovich himself as chairman of the gubchek. In particular, the leaders of the province declared that they were surprised that the gubchek still could not establish who was fighting so desperately with our detachments, what they wanted and who was leading them.

After the meeting, Traskovich, obviously offended, reported this by direct wire to Shikunov, who replied that "intelligence is really not well organized in our country." The provincial military commissar was once again convinced of the correctness of his words the very next day. Having concentrated significant forces, on August 26 he launched a decisive offensive, occupied the entire Kamensky region, combed it, but did not find the rebels anywhere. Stunned by this news, on August 27 Traskovich himself went to the place, personally traveled around the entire Kamensky district and reported to Tambov: "Everything is calm here" [6].

To find out the reasons for the uprising and punish its participants, military tribunals began their work. In all volosts declared under a state of siege, commandants-chekists were appointed by the representative of the gubchek Rekst. In addition, since August 29, two off-site sessions of the Gubchek started their work.

The first results were summed up. It turned out that at least 51 people were killed on the Soviet side in the Kamensky district. Of all the local Soviets, the volsoviet in the village of Verkhotsenye suffered the most, where all six of its members died. But this was not the case everywhere. For example, in Kamenka itself, the volsoviet did not suffer. All its members turned out to be alive, although only one communist chairman was hiding from the rebels. Chekists arrested two members of the Kamensky volost executive committee, and threatened the rest with a tribunal "for harboring accomplices of bandits" [5].

On August 29, near the village of Vyazovka, 45 km southeast of Rzhaksa, a well-armed detachment of rebels defeated a Red Army company of 126 people, which had left Borisoglebsk the day before. And the next day, in the morning, almost the entire Kamensky district flared up with the fire of a new, even stronger than before, rebellion. This time it really was "Antonov's fire", for the name

Antonov in the mouths of the rebels sounded everywhere. The rebels again occupied Kamenka. The so-called "campaign to Tambov" began.

The Red Army detachments scattered around the villages in small groups could not offer organized resistance and suffered heavy losses. When the rebels captured Kamenka, its commandant, 20-year-old Chekist E.T., died. Adamov. And in Alexandrovka, located next door, the rebels managed to defeat two small detachments of Red Army soldiers and food contractors and capture a machine gun. On the same day, the rebellion began to spread to the volosts of Borisoglebsky and Kirsanovsky districts adjacent to the Kamensky district.

The Tambov authorities, alarmed by this unexpected turn of events, sounded the alarm. On the evening of August 30, the situation in the province was recognized as "extremely serious", and in connection with the threat to Tambov itself, 500 city communists were transferred to the barracks. The military-operational headquarters under the gubchek was also strengthened. It additionally included the secretary of the provincial party committee N.Ya. Raivid and head of the 35th Tambov infantry command courses L. Zenkovich. In Borisoglebsk and Kirsanov, an order was given to create district operational headquarters and form new detachments.

On August 31, the chairman of the Tambov provincial executive committee A.G. Schlichter. However, having encountered the rebels 30 km south of Tambov, his detachment was defeated in the first battle and was forced to retreat. With every hour the rebels came closer to Tambov.

Realizing that they could not suppress the rebellion on their own, the Tambov authorities began to seek help outside the province. On August 31, Governor Traskovich and Gromov, authorized by the Central Committee for the Tambov province, addressed by direct wire to the deputy chairman of the Cheka, I.K. Ksenofontov with the following note: "In the area of Tambov, Borisoglebsk and Kirsanov counties, an organized large uprising broke out, led by Colonel Bogoslovsky, the Socialist-Revolutionaries Kazankov, Pluzhnikov, Yurin and others. Some of the small detachments sent by us were defeated and disarmed, having lost two machine guns. Gangs up to 3,000 in number 14-17 versts from Tambov. We have very few cartridges, rifles and forces. Saratov promised help, which would not arrive earlier than two days. We ask for the support of at least an infantry battalion and a cavalry squadron" [7].

I.K. Ksenofontov quickly responded to the request for help, and within a few hours, half-squadrons of the Tula and Ryazan gubcheks set off for Tambov. But it was already clear not enough.

Since September 1, the rebels in the Kirsanovsky district have sharply become more active. On this day, Antonov occupied the Ramzinsky volost with his detachment.

In the operational report of the provincial military leader Zbruev to the Oryol district military commissar about the activation of the insurgent forces, it was indicated: "Until now, the bandits continue to operate, actively cutting off telegraph and telephone wires, destroying the Soviet economy, killing communists and Soviet employees. The performance of the gangs is definitely Socialist-Revolutionary in nature with the slogans "Down with the communists!", "Long live Wrangel!". The bandits are most active in the region: Rzhaksa, Semyonovka, Uvarovo, Oblovka, Alabushka, Otkhozhaya; smaller and less active, but harmful to the state farm, killing councilors, in the area: Sampur, Chakino, Ivanovka, Ponzari, Kamenka, Stepanovka, Aleksandrovka.

To liquidate the gangs, the following were sent: a company of Tambov cadets with two machine guns, a company of regimental school 2 of the 1st reserve regiment with two machine guns, a guard company from Kirsanov with one machine gun, a company of the Borisoglebsky guard battalion with one machine gun and small food detachments. In addition, a half-squadron of Smolensk cadets from Borisoglebsk was called today. The commander of all detachments is the provincial military commissar Shikunov, chief of staff of the 21st regiment commander Brimmer. The headquarters of the Rzhaks settlement, which is near the Rzhaks station.

Taking into account that the regimental school is staffed by natives of the Tambov province, and the food detachments are deserters, I am convinced that the pacification of the gangs will drag on for a long time, since cadets alone are not enough for such a large area. The lack of ammunition does not give us the opportunity to conduct more intensive operations. For the good of the cause, I would consider it necessary to urgently send at least two battalions with two guns to Tambov, recall such cadets upon arrival, and guard companies for a delayed departure from transit points. For the second time, I ask for an urgent order for the Tambov and Morshansky artillery depots to give us ammunition as needed" [8].

Shikunov, the commander of all military forces, issued his order No. 5, by which he demanded from the troops subordinate to him: within 48 hours in 21 settlements on the territory covered by the rebellion, "to carry out a complete confiscation of the property of all citizens", to arrest all men aged from 16 to 40 years old and send them to forced labor. And the military tribunal ordered "to carry out a severe revolutionary reprisal against accomplices

bandits" [9].

Early in the morning (at 05:20) on August 31, 1920, an order was issued by the operational headquarters under the gubchek on punitive measures against the villages that had joined the uprising. The order noted that "the fight against bandits who destroy state farms, kill Soviet workers and communists, stumbles upon the opposition of the kulak population, which harbors bandits and counter-revolutionaries. For the speedy and decisive suppression of the bandit movement, the operational headquarters under the provincial emergency commission for combating counter-revolution orders the heads of military units operating against the bandits, in relation to the villages in which citizens are seen participating in bandit demonstrations or harboring bandits, to carry out a merciless red terror. It is ordered in such villages to take hostages - family members from those families whose members joined the bandits or helped them, to take hostages citizens from 18 years of age, regardless of their gender. Announce to the population that if the bandit actions continue, the hostages will be shot. The property of such citizens should be completely confiscated. The buildings occupied by them should be demolished, and if it is impossible, burned. Bandits caught at the scene of a crime are to be shot. Announce also that, according to the decision of the Presidium of the Gubernia Executive Committee, the villages that are seen participating in bandit movements will be subject to emergency food indemnities, for non-fulfilment of which all lands and all property of all citizens will be confiscated. The latter will be forcibly evicted: adult men and women to a forced labor camp, minors to orphanages until the end of the Civil War" [10].

Chief of staff of the troops of the Tambov province, a prominent army political worker A.S. In July 1921, Kakazov characterized the punitive policy of the Tambov authorities in the autumn of 1920 as follows: "Our units were more engaged in cleaning the village from all living and dead inventory than cleaning up gangs and destroying them. Here they do not understand who is right and who is wrong. The entire peasantry is lumped together and declared to be gangsters. The part of the peasantry, devoted and loyal to us, after the foraging (understand, robbery), as a result of which it lost all equipment and dwellings (since it was burned), is in a hopeless situation. For him, there is no other choice but to go and replenish the gang in order to cruelly avenge his property, acquired by such hard work. whole

"21

villages, fearing our "red terror", taking their livestock, women and children, leave and hide in the forests. As a result of such liquidation, bandits grow like mushrooms and the total number of rebels reaches tens of thousands of people" [11].

The ill-conceived and too cruel punitive policy of the Tambov authorities from the very beginning caused disagreement and grumbling among many Red Army soldiers and commanders. Some detachments refused to carry out orders to destroy villages. Quite a few fighters not wanting to go under

tribunal for failure to comply with such an order, deserted or went over (sometimes entire units) to the side of the rebels.

Let us refer to the minutes of the meeting of the Military Council of the Tambov province on the facts of the transition of the red units to the ranks of the rebels dated October 21, 1920, which was attended by: Deputy Chairman of the Military Council Meshcheryakov and members of the Military Council Raivid and Blagonadezhdin. According to the report of the commanders of Blagonadezhdin on the course of hostilities, a resolution was adopted: "A. Taking into account the statement by the commanders that the regiment of the Reserve Army and the detachment of the Tambov Provincial Military Commissariat available for the suppression of the uprising are not entirely reliable and that he is not sure of their loyalty, instruct the commanders to bring this to the attention of Comrade Kornev's VNUS of the Republic. B. To propose to the gubchek to investigate the fact that Zaparmin's company and a detachment of the provincial military commissariat went over to the gangs, having received information from Comrade Blagonadezhdin's commanders. C. Draw the attention of the head of the political department, Comrade Eidman, to this fact and suggest that he come to an agreement with the command troops to raise political work in the units [12].

Those who did not become a deserter or defector, but wrote protests and complaints to various authorities, were severely punished in a disciplinary manner.

The Tambov authorities more and more persistently turned to various cities and towns for help instances.

Here is a recording of a telephone conversation over a direct wire with the headquarters of the Oryol Military District on September 2, 1920 by Traskovich [13]. At that time, according to him, the rebels were 15-17 versts from Tambov.

"Eagle: So I say, accept, I will give you answers, write down. Give comprehensive answers to the following questions:

1. How many weapons do the rebels with bandits of each branch of the troops have and how many machine guns?

"227

2. Specify in detail the points of concentration of bandits and the number of armed insurgents in each point according to the data you have.

3. How many armed Red Army soldiers did you take from the regimental school and in general from the 21st reserve regiment, command courses, guard units, armed communists from local organizations and horsemen formed from among the Tambov and Kirsanov cavalry squadrons?

4. Who are these active strikers?

Traskovich: Not strikers, but protesters, we repeat, there are no strikers, but there are rebels.

Eagle: What are the main reasons that caused the uprising, according to your data?

5. The original place of the uprising and the number of rebels?

6. How good are the guns that you have formed into batteries, and is there a full-fledged servant who knows the matter?

7. How many machine guns are used to eliminate the uprising?

Tambov: We answer. We have repeatedly given information on all questions, which we remind, but additionally report: to the first question - in total, up to approximately 4 thousand armed, including up to 3,500 infantry and up to 500 cavalry. In addition, armed with pitchforks, scythes and so on. up to 10 thousand, with 4 machine guns. On the second question, the bandits are concentrated in the following districts: Sampur, Rasskazovo, Kamenka, Tambov district, Kurdyuki and Ramza, Inokovka of Kirsanovsky

uyezd and in Morshansky uyezd - Alexandrovka. It is impossible to establish the exact number of rebels and armed men in each district, but in each of them there are at least 300-500 people. For the third question, we took armed Red Army men: 21st regiment of the regimental school - 180 bayonets, Tambov command courses - 250 bayonets, guard units - 500, communists - 200, Tambov cavalry squadron - 30 sabers, Borisoglebsky cavalry courses - 30 sabers. To the fourth question - the uprising was organized by the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and the bayonets of Wrangel. The goals of the uprising: - disruption of the food campaign, undermining the power of the republic, the destruction of communists and Soviet workers. For the fifth question, Kamenka district, Tugolukovo, Borisoglebsky district. The number of rebels is 300-400 armed. To the sixth question - all 4 guns are in good order, a platoon has been formed from them, which has fully experienced servants from old artillerymen. For the seventh question - 6 machine guns, in addition, we lost 2 machine guns, retaining the lock of one "[13].

"2/7

In Orel then they still had a vague idea of what was happening in the Tambov province. Therefore, from the headquarters of the district, they reproachfully replied that the forces available to the Tambov authorities "are quite enough to not only liquidate the uprising, but also wipe out all the bandits, along with all the rebels, from the face of the earth. Give one or two artillery shots at such rebels, and everyone will scatter without any resistance. Less need to stand on ceremony with them.

On September 10, 1920, the newly appointed commander of the troops of the Tambov province Yu.Yu. arrived from Orel. Applec. He began his activities with the regrouping of military units, created two shock groups of one and a half thousand fighters each and assigned them the task of detecting and destroying all large detachments of rebels. The actions of the new commander are described in his report, which we present in the archival file [14].

"Report of the commander of the troops of the Tambov province Yu.Yu. Aploka to the commander of the VNUS V.S. Kornev on the situation and hostilities in the area of the uprising in Tambov, October 5, 1920.

In the area of the Tambov-Kirsanov railway (August 20, 1920), an intensified movement of small armed gangs began, to which the peasants of the indicated area adjoined.

Gangs united in groups numbering several thousand people, constantly changing their place of residence, killed Soviet workers, and especially cruelly dealt with members of the RCP. By the time I took command of the armed forces of Tambgub, the total number of gangs reached from 15 to 20 thousand people, and there were 2500-3000 people armed with firearms, the rest were armed with edged weapons (pitchforks, stakes, pikes, etc.).

1. The reason for the uprising was the Socialist-Revolutionary agitation on the basis of the policy of the Soviet government and the discontent of the local population, mainly kulak, and developed banditry in the Tambov province. since 1905, the Tambov Socialist-Revolutionary Committee (now arrested) became the head of the rebels, which used the existing small gangs of bandits to organize a real uprising, putting the bandit Socialist-Revolutionary Antonov, popular among the local kulak population, at the head of the gangs.

The strengthening of the gangs at the expense of the local population was carried out by agitation of the kulak element, which joined voluntarily, and by forceful mobilization among the middle and poor peasants.

P. The first active action was in the area of the Chakino station, in the villages of Verkhotsenye, Seredinka, Ponzar, a gang appeared, armed, about 300 people, with firearms, and the majority of the population of the said area; religious processions began, anti-Soviet rallies - the next day the entire area between the Sampur - Tokarevka - Oblovka points was covered, concentrated and organized in this area and on September 23 went to the Uvarov forests, which is the eastern station of Oblovka.

On September 25, our units operating in the area of the Chaki-no station were deployed against the gangs that had accumulated in the Uvarov forests, but the bandits leaked out of the forest and concentrated in the area of vil. Mozdok and Vyazovka, which is 20 versts west of the Oblovka station, and struck a blow at our company traveling from Borisoglebsk. On August 26, villages joined the rebels along the line of the Kandaurovka-Vorontsovo station, which is 8 versts south of st. Kandaurovka, Tsarevka, which is 10 versts southeast of Kandaurovka, Bogoroditskoye, which is south of Sukhotino, and further Nikolskoye, which is 17 versts northeast of Sampur. Our units operating in the Oblovka area were transferred to the area of the village of Koptevo, which is 10 versts northeast of st. Sampura, where the enemy was struck, after which he retreated to the area of the Inzhavino station, where the population of the Inzhavino region joined him, and the Inzhavino station was occupied on September 3. On September 4, our troops, deployed to the Inzhavino station, developing an offensive along the Inokovka-Inzhavino railway, forced the enemy to clear Inzhavino and the area to the east of the station and grouped southwest of Inzhavino. To suppress the uprising, the active troops were divided into five groups, and their action resembled actions along internal lines of operations with the center of Art. Sampur, without a definite, strictly developed plan, since the area of the uprising covered an area of about 1200 square meters. verst. Our command, not having enough forces and roads for the rapid transfer of troops, thereby gave the enemy great advantages, the enemy did not let go of the initiative, striking at the points he wanted. After unsuccessful operations, our command realized the incorrectness of its work and switched to small military formations, like partisan ones, and the operations of individual units were not coordinated, due to the lack of a general plan.

On September 11, at 1 a.m., the situation in the uprising area was as follows: the enemy occupied the area along the Kropotkino line,

“257

which is 25 versts southwest of st. Otkhozhaya - Mozdok - Vyazovka, which is 17 versts southwest of st. Otkhozhaya - Elakalatka, which is 5 versts east of Rzhaksa, which is 10 versts northeast of Chakino - Ozerki, which is 25 versts north of Chakino - Boldyrevka, which is 30 versts northeast of Sampur - Novonikolskoye, which is 5 versts northeast of Boldyrevka - Belyaevka, which is 16 versts northwest of Inzhavino - Troitskoye, which is 10 versts southwest of Inzhavino - Arkhangelskoye, which is 15 versts south of Inzhavino.

Our troops occupied the line: Repnaya, which is 18 versts southwest of the village of Otkhozhaya - Chikarovka - Tugolukovo, which is 38 versts west of st. Oblovka - Ananovka, which is 20 versts southwest of Rzhaks - st. Rzhaksa - Chakino - Sakharovka, which is 15 versts southeast of Sampur - Pereksy, which is 5 versts northeast of st. Sampur - Nikolskoye, which is 17 versts northeast of st. Sampur - Boguslavskoye, which is 15 versts northeast of Nikolskoye - Osinovka, which is 10 versts southwest of Inokovka - Kozmodemyanskoye, which is 17 versts northwest of Inzhavino - Khoroshavka, which is 18 versts southeast of Inzhavino. Our units, scattered small over 180 miles, offered little resistance and, in addition, a threat was created to our communications running parallel, and not perpendicular to the front, which could cause the defeat of our entire force, the enemy, cutting the railway, would move our parts from the base and the city of Tambov were in immediate danger of being crushed by the enemy, because. the garrison of the city was not sufficiently brought to combat

readiness.

GU. 1) I got into contact with the local authorities, and by the general decision of the presidium of the provincial executive committee and the provincial communist party came to the conclusion on the abolition of the Military Council, which was abolished on September 11; 2) having familiarized himself with the situation, immediately, on the night of September 10-11, he made an order to destroy partisan methods of struggle; 3) small detachments were consolidated into temporary combat units - first into battalions, and then into regiments; the battalions were divided into two groups and a general reserve was formed from units of the Tambov garrison; 4) drew up a plan of common action with the aim of establishing a united front and reducing it and ensuring communications; 5) put the Tambov garrison on alert; 6) formed new parts at the expense

local funds and the Oryol sector; 7) organized the protection of the city; 8) destroyed the separate self-supply

military units, using for this purpose the supply department of the 4th brigade of the VOKhR; 9) proposed to the local authorities to create trophy commissions for the correct accounting of the selected property and the systematic return to the victims of banditry; 10) organized sanitary assistance to military units; 11) formed a temporary headquarters of 9 people; 12) instructed his assistant comrade Basov to conduct political work, both among military units and among the population, and to get in touch with the provincial committee of the RCP (b); 13) drew up a plan for the distribution of military units for food work and for cleansing the area of the uprising from harmful elements.

U. Our losses in killed, wounded, missing 560; the bandits had 1,800 killed and 930 wounded-prisoners. Our trophies - 700 horses, 50 wagons, 2 Morse apparatuses and one telephone, one Shosha machine gun, the number of rifles has not been clarified.

UT. I personally did not impose an indemnity, but a confiscation of property in the village of Zolotoe was carried out for the treacherous murder of two Red Army soldiers, the said village after the confiscation is subject to burning.

UP. In the province at the present time and in the region of the uprising, no anti-Soviet movements, according to intelligence information, are noticed. As for the development of banditry, which began in the province as early as 1905 and almost did not stop, but only the presence of troops makes it temporarily freeze, I can say with confidence that as soon as the troops are withdrawn from the districts, banditry will grow again and will represent constant threat. The means of combating it is the Gubcheka, but it must be strengthened by employees.

USh. It is not possible to withdraw troops from the counties until fresh units are received.

possible.

The Antonov gang, now exhausted, will continue to exist until the destruction of its leader.

Commander of all armed forces to suppress the uprising of the Tambov province Y. Aplok" [14].

The military forces at the disposal of Aplock were quite enough to defeat and destroy all the rebel groups of any size. The troops were not inferior to them in numbers, and in terms of armament they significantly exceeded them. However, Aploc was unable to deal a crushing blow even against Antonov's own detachment, which, like a magnet, attracted the best forces of the Soviet units to itself, led them from county to county, entered with

them in

"21/7

short fights, but seriously, and even more so finally, did not allow himself to be defeated.

On September 19, a battle took place near the village of Tugolukovo, during which the Antonovites were dispersed by the Red Army, losing, according to the Tambov military command, about 350 people. Yu.Yu. Aplock, confident that after such a serious defeat, Antonov would never rise again, issued a victorious order, beginning like this: "The uprising in Borisoglebsk, Tambov and Kirsanov counties has been liquidated, the troops entrusted to me are finishing off Antonov at Tugolukov" [15] .

However, the commander celebrated the victory early, Antonov at Tugolukovo was not defeated. His detachment, scattered during the battle, immediately reassembled at the appointed place. Having made a transition of 70 km overnight, Antonov with a thousand rebels with four machine guns on the morning of September 20 occupied the large village of Znamenka, 40 km south of Tambov. Moving from here in a northeasterly direction, the Antonovites took by surprise and disarmed several Red Army detachments. Being in constant motion and unexpectedly appearing in the most unpredictable places,

The detachments of Antonov and his associates directed their main blows at the food detachments working in the villages, destroying some of them and demoralizing others.

In early October, leaving the troops pursuing him, Antonov with his detachment left the Tambov region, went to the Balashevsky district of the Saratov province. Taking this as a defeat for Antonov, on October 3, 1920, the commander of the troops, Y. Aplock, issued a new victory order announcing the suppression of the rebellion, declared revolutionary gratitude to the troops for the suppression of Antonov, awarded distinguished Red Army soldiers and commanders, and departed from Tambov to Orel, having handed over the command of the troops of the Tambov province to the commander of the 4th separate rifle brigade of the internal troops V.I. Blagonadezhdin [4].

The new commander, who also believed that Antonov was finished, transferred 2,400 fighters to carry out food work, sending them in small groups as food detachments to the villages.

Now it is difficult to count how many times the leaders of the party and Soviet bodies of the Tambov province reported to Moscow that Antonov's main forces had been destroyed, and the complete and final liquidation of the remnants of the defeated bands was a matter of the next few days.

The Military Council and the party and Soviet leadership of the province also believed in the final defeat of Antonov. From overcrowded prisons and concentration camps began the partial liberation of the peasants, "preventively withdrawn" (arrested) earlier.

On October 7, the chairman of the Tambov provincial executive committee A.G. Schlichter reported in a telegram to V.I. Lenin: "I twice visited the peasants captured during the suppression of the bandit Socialist-Revolutionary movement. In the first conversation with them, their mistakes and misconceptions were clarified, and prompt consideration of cases was promised" [16].

In the August and September battles of 1920, Soviet detachments of real rebels were not taken prisoner, they were shot on the spot. The peasants who were arrested were held illegally and indiscriminately in the concentration camps.

Chairman of the Cheka F.E. Dzerzhinsky also believed in the defeat of Antonov and announced through the central press that the Antonov gangs had been liquidated. Tambov leaders, trying to hide serious flaws in their work, for a long time pretended to be wishful thinking. And the fighters and commanders of the Red Army units, food contractors, village communists, village councilors, and the rest of the nearly 1.5 million population of the rebelling three counties had to pay for this.

At the beginning of October 1920, having hid with a detachment of two thousand in the Balashovsky district of the Saratov province and having caused quite a commotion there, Antonov divided his detachment into several groups of 300-400 people and gave them the task to covertly and quietly move to a new combat area. - to the section of the railway line Borisoglebsk - Zherdevka.

Having reached a predetermined area where no one expected them, on October 7, the Antonovites captured and defeated the Ternovka station, killing 10 communists in a neighboring village with the same name. On October 8, near the Zherdevka station, the rebels captured a company of 100 people. In the next 3-4 days, Antonov's detachments marched along almost the entire western half of the Borisoglebsk district on a wide front, sweeping away and destroying the food detachments working here. In connection with this, the harvest of surplus-appropriation grain in Borisoglebsk uyezd sharply decreased.

Representative of the Cheka Gromov and members of the provincial military council F.K. Traskovich and N.Ya. Rayvida | On October 1920, a memorandum was sent to the Cheka by direct wire with the following content: "Very hastily Moscow, Cheka, Ksenofontov. The uprising of the White Socialist-Revolutionary gangs in the Tambov, Kirsanov and Borisoglebsk districts continues, having

a tendency to seize new Socialist-Revolutionary districts of the province. The troops sent to suppress the gangs had a number of stubborn clashes with the gangs, some of which were defeated, in some cases our troops retreated, having been defeated" [17].

The attitude of the population towards the partisans was sympathetic. There were cases of partisans meeting with tears in their eyes, as deliverers from the yoke of the communists. At first, when the partisans convened general meetings of citizens, the peasants went to them willingly, after the speech of the speakers they adopted resolutions in which they expressed sympathy for the partisans, giving the word to go hand in hand in the fight against the communists. They provided them with material and technical support, and en masse volunteered to join their ranks. When attacking Red Army units, they assisted them, dismantled railway tracks, robbed state farms, served partisans as spies, scouts, indicated the whereabouts of communists and people who sympathized with the Soviet regime.

Initially, the Tambov leadership allotted no more than three to four weeks for the elimination of the peasant uprising. The guerrilla way of conducting combat operations of the rebels, who managed to hide under the onslaught of the Red Army units and simply dissolve in the peasant environment, the pulsating nature of the movement made it difficult to assess the effectiveness of military measures. In the report of V.I. Lenin, the commander of the troops of the internal service of the republic V.S. On November 1, 1920, Kornev declared that the uprising could be considered suppressed and that the whole task of the near future was to eliminate individual bands and gangs. The report said: "From the second half of October this year. In 2011, a turning point was noted in operations on the territory of the Tambov province, expressed in the fact that a strong enemy with a great advantage in maneuvering actions, after a series of strong blows inflicted on its core, lost its insurgent coloring on a large scale. From the 20th of October, the Antonovites began to avoid meeting with our units, noticeably lost themselves in unexpected battles and reduced their combat operations mainly to raids and robberies. However, keeping constantly in the area well known to him, the enemy, despite the blows inflicted on him, was quickly replenished at the expense of the local population, which gave him combat and horse strength ... "[18].

But, having visited Tambov at the end of December 1920, V.S. Kornev, in his own words, was convinced of the impossibility of coping with the rebels

available forces.

On December 13, the Antonovites captured and in three hours plundered the Inzhavino railway station, the garrison of which - 433 soldiers with 2 machine guns - "did not show any resistance, shamefully fled, leaving machine guns, leaving cartridges and rifles along the road." Commander K.V. Redzko concluded as follows: "There has never been such a manifestation of cowardice and meanness in the ranks of the troops fighting against the bandits." In order to prevent such cases in the future, Redzko went to extremes, ordering the execution of all ten machine gunners of the Inzhavinsky garrison and another 25 Red Army soldiers from among the "greatest cowards".

Here is the report of the commander of the armed forces of the Tambov province K.V. Redzko to the Tambov provincial military council of December 14, 1920 [19].

"October 26, the time of my entry into command of the troops of the Tambov province, Comrade Dezhkin, who had just then personally familiarized himself with the state of affairs in the province, promised me quite real forces, sufficient for the fastest liquidation of the kulak rebellion. With the hope of sending these real forces, I took command of the troops, and lived with the same hope for the past 1.5 months. Lacking any sufficient strength to prevent the organization and accumulation of gangs at first, and not receiving the promised help from the Center, I tried to increase my strength somewhat by personal means. So, I asked for a battalion from Saratov; the Moscow marching battalion, completely unsuitable for military operations, was reorganized and organized; finally created anew battalion of the Military Council. Of course, all these means of a purely palliative nature could not help the cause in any way. Yes and

they only worked for a very short time. All this, however, does not help, and some units still remain so incapable of combat that they are unable to offer even the slightest resistance to gang raids and only supply the latter with ammunition, weapons, sometimes even machine guns (a raid on December 13 on Inzhavino, 19 November at the Novopokrovsky sugar factory), the system of benevolent attitude towards the captured Red Army soldiers carried out by Antonov further leads to a decline in the military spirit of the units. On the part of the railway units of the VNUS, it came to open treason (the 294th battalion of the railway guard). Needless to say, the mere presence of such troops has an encouraging effect on the bandits, sometimes playing the role of fuel poured on the fire.

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The conviction of the weakness of the forces of the Republic, the conviction deduced from the 4-month experience, the conviction of the instability of the units, understood by the bandits as an expression of sympathy for them, the consciousness, as a result of all this, of their impunity - this is what serves as a force inciting the peasant masses to banditry. Antonov makes extensive and skillful use of this aspect of the matter. In all his speeches, he always points out to the peasants the internal weakness of the Republic, the insufficiency of its forces, and finally its imminent fall. He can illustrate this with examples, and his speeches affect the masses. The defeats inflicted on Antonov do not have a sobering effect on the peasants: Antonov cleverly knows how to deceive them and always passes off his own losses as losses suffered by the Red Army units. They believe him. My propaganda, which has no real power behind it, does not have much influence. It is only an illustration of Antonov's constant words: "There is nothing left for them to do but chat."

These are the main general conditions under which I am compelled to act... The consciousness is too heavy and makes me once again ask to be relieved of my duties by the command troops.

Commissar Redzko, Chief of Staff Brimmer, Military Commissar of Staff Vyazovkin" [19].

In a review of the special department of the Tambov provincial Cheka on the actions of the rebels, it was noted that from December 10 to 20, 1920, Inzhavino was taken, 300 people arrested were released, and the railway line in the Inokovka-Inzhavino section was dismantled. Taken 2 machine guns, 167 rifles, several thousand rounds of ammunition. A night attack was made on Perevedentsev's detachment, several rifles were taken. When attacking St. Inokovka, a train was fired upon, the second train was detained, in which several dozen rifles, one box of bombs, 13 large boxes of cartridges, 1900 pounds of sugar, etc. were taken. The train was diverted from the Inokovka station to the village of Nikolskoye and lowered under the bridge. When the Reds attacked the village of V.-Spasskoe, they were repulsed, the losses of the Reds: one squadron, 2 regiments, after which the Reds returned to Rasskazovo. There was a clash between partisan reconnaissance and Perevedentsev's reconnaissance near the village of Bogoslovka, as a result, the Reds fled, leaving 2 dead [20].

On December 17 and 18, the rebels twice captured the Inokovka junction station between Tambov and Kirsanov, where a wagon with cartridges, 2 wagons with sugar, matches and other things fell into their hands. On December 17, in the village of Alyoshki, Borisoglebsk district, a detachment of 500 rebels

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under the command of former officer I.M. Kuznetsov, by deceit under the guise of a Red Army unit, captured the entire staff of the local district revolutionary committee. All captured 22 Revolutionary Committee members were taken to the gardens and hacked to death. On December 18, in the village of Chikarevka, Borisoglebsk district, Antonovites were taken by surprise and completely destroyed a detachment of 20 policemen. On the same day, the rebels raided a sugar factory in Bolshaya Gribovka. On December 20, the Antonovites captured the village of Anastasyevskoye (45 km northeast of Tambov) and plundered a large factory located here for the production of overcoat cloth for the Red Army [21].

V.I. quickly learned about the incident. Lenin immediately responded with an angry note addressed to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs and Chairman of the Cheka F.E. Dzerzhinsky: "The height of disgrace. I offer the Chekists (and provincial executive committees) of the Tambov province who missed this:

- 1) put before a military court,
- 2) a severe reprimand to announce Kornev,
- 3) send super-energetic people immediately,
- 4) give a scolding and instructions by telegraph" [21].

This note by V.I. Lenin was destined to play an exceptional role in intensifying the fight against the rebels. December 26, 1920 V.S. Kornev was already in Tambov with a large group of "super-energetic people". Here, on the spot, he gave "challenging and instructions" to everyone and everything, and the day before, a special commission began its work here to find out "the reasons for the protracted nature of the insurrectionary movement in the Tambov province." The commission that arrived from Moscow was headed by P.A. Cameron.

V.S. Kornev, who was in Tambov until December 29 inclusive, urgently called the commander of the troops of the Oryol Military District O.A. Skudra and ordered him to temporarily head the leadership of military operations to suppress rebellions in the Tambov and Voronezh provinces. Fulfilling the order, O.A. Skudra tried to personally understand the reasons why the troops of the Tambov province had not yet been able to defeat the main military forces of Antonov. On the night of January 3, 1921, Skudra reported the results of his inspection of the state and combat activity of the troops of the Tambov province to the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the republic S.S. Kamenev [22].

At the end of December 1920, the work of the commissions and inspectors who arrived in Tambov was in full swing, during inspections of activities

"237

The situation of the provincial authorities, as well as the Tambov military command, did not appear in a rosy light. In addition, the operational situation in the province these days has become even more aggravated.

On December 22, the 2nd shock group of Soviet troops under the command of P.A. Altova came across stubborn resistance from the rebels from the detachment of I.S. Matyukhin. The Matyukhins failed to defeat, and the annoyed Altov burned down the neighboring villages of Nikolskoye and Koptevo. In total, 230 peasant houses burned down and 150 people were shot.

On the morning of December 27, V.S. Kornev held a meeting in Tambov with members of the Military Council. After discussing the issues of fighting the rebels and coming to the conclusion that the uprising could not be suppressed with the forces available in Tambov, the meeting decided to ask the Center to send additional military units of the regular Red Army to the province. If earlier Tambov's requests for military assistance were about no more than an infantry battalion and two cavalry squadrons, now 15,000 bayonets, 3,000 sabers, two artillery batteries and 2 airplanes were immediately requested. On the evening of December 27, in the presence of V.S. Kornev, another meeting of the Military Council was held, at which Orlov and Budnikov, authorized by the Main Textile, reported on the approximate damage suffered by the cloth factory in the village of Anastasyevskoye as a result of its looting by the rebels [23].

A few hours after the end of this meeting in Tambov, Antonov personally led his regiments to storm the Inzhavino station. And, despite the fact that after the capture of the station by the rebels on December 13, its garrison was significantly reinforced, it again did not offer worthy resistance and partly fled, and partly surrendered. At the same time, one gun and several machine guns hit the Antonovites. On the same night, the entire, with the exception of one person, visiting session of the gubchek, headed by A.V., died here. Segel.

On the afternoon of December 28, another unusual occurrence occurred. The cavalry regiment of Perevedentsev, with whom the rebels had previously avoided encounters in every possible way, was for the first time openly attacked by the rebel detachment of Boguslavsky near the village of Verkhotsenye. Although the rebel attack was

repulsed, the regiment for the first time did not emerge from the battle as a clear winner. In the evening of the same day, the commander of the troops of the Tambov province K.V. Redzko, who already knew about the shame and tragedy in Inzhavin, as well as about the attack of the rebels on the Perevedentsev cavalry regiment and, besides

In addition, completely exhausted by the commissions and inspectors, he gathered his courage and wrote a statement asking him to be relieved of his post, citing overwork. However, the main reason for Redzko's "voluntary" resignation was that he saw how the members of the Military Council and the provincial leadership, giving evidence to the visiting commissions, were trying to shift all the blame for the failure to liquidate the uprising on him and his predecessors, that is, exclusively on the military. Therefore, in his statement, justifying the impossibility of further tenure in his post, the former Guards Colonel K.V. Redzko wrote with a soldier's frankness: "I don't want to be a scapegoat" [24].

At midnight from December 29 to December 30, 1920, K.V. Redzko handed over the command of the troops of the Tambov province to O.A. Skudra. By this time, the commander of the internal troops, V.S. Kornev and the commission chaired by P.A. Cameron completed their work in Tambov and left for Moscow. It must be said that V.S. Kornev, P.A. Cameron and then O.A. The Skudra understood well the reasons for the rebellion, as well as why the rebellion has not yet been suppressed. So, for example, the commission of P.A. Cameron in detail and impartially revealed the serious shortcomings and mistakes in the fight against the rebellion, made by the Party and Soviet leadership of the Tambov province, the Military Council of the Gubernia, the headquarters of the troops of the province and the headquarters of the internal troops of the republic.

In a report to the Central Committee of the RCP (b) of the commander of the VNUS V.S. Kornev about the results of a survey of the situation in the Tambov province on December 31, 1920, it was said [25]: |

"To the Central Committee of the RCP (b) comrade Krestinsky

Copy of Comrade Dzerzhinsky

Copy of PUR RVSR

1. On December 28, I made a trip to Tambov to clarify the situation in the fight against the Antonov uprising.

2. During my 3-day stay in Tambov, for a more detailed analysis of the Tambov uprising, I managed to arrange a number of meetings with local responsible party and Soviet workers (meetings of the Military Council, meetings of responsible party and Soviet workers, etc.).

3. During the same time, commissions a) worked under my leadership to clarify the military situation and the work of the military council and secondment under the leadership of Comrade Cameron, a member of the RVSR tribunal.

wa 74

6. The Antonov uprising is a guerrilla uprising that completely engulfed three districts of the Tambov province and was well organized. The uprising, thought out and led by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, has taken on a protracted character (of a partisan style like the Makhnovist) and requires the use of an occupation struggle, to which the command has now passed.

I, as the commander of the VNUS troops, sitting in the Center, was not sufficiently informed specifically, underestimating the possibilities of an uprising, which were not in the Center and were visible to such an extent that it was possible to send military forces to the Tambov province at least with damage to the regions of the Republic, and more than once regiments of VNUS were transported past Tambov to other provinces. Only recently in Moscow has increased attention to the province so much that I had to come here myself. Underestimation of the uprising, incorrect definition of its depth, inability to

it is expedient to use the forces of both the military and the Soviet, and the party, not to involve everyone in this struggle - these are the main facts of the present situation" [25].

A fundamental analysis of the situation that had arisen in the Tambov region was given by a commission chaired by P. Cameron, a member of the RVSR tribunal, which studied, first of all, the causes of the peasant uprising [26: 8-11]. The report of the commission described the reasons for the protracted nature and untimeliness of the liquidation of the insurgent movement in the Tambov region.

Among the general objective conditions, the commission included the situation on the external front. The war with Poland, Wrangel, Petlyura deprived the Center of the opportunity to provide the Tambov command with significant assistance by timely sending a sufficient number of real forces capable of "crushing Antonovism in the bud and guaranteeing the complete calm of the province."

The commission noted that the food situation in the province, on the one hand, was severely undermined by drought, undersowing and crop shortages. This contributed to the emergence of mass discontent among the population with the food policy of the Soviet government. On the other hand, the severe need to supply the army and the center with bread did not allow the food campaign to be weakened. As a result of the categorical instructions of the Center, in conditions of continuous discontent and rebellion, it was necessary to intensify the work of the food authorities, weakening the forces operating against the insurgents and contributing to a certain expansion and deepening of the insurgent movement.

These conclusions of the commission were objective.

The commission also drew attention to the fact that the "certain" kulak composition of the population of the counties engulfed in the uprising did not allow Soviet power to take deep roots. In many areas, Soviet power existed only nominally and did not receive the support and sympathy of the majority of the peasantry.

An objective factor that had negative consequences was the fact that communist forces were weak in the province; moreover, the Center weakened them due to numerous mobilizations, underestimating the timely indicated scarcity and the need to leave communist forces within the province to strengthen Soviet power [26: 8].

The commission, led by P. Cameron, a member of the RVSR tribunal, revealed serious omissions of the central command. Even taking into account the need to maintain the external position of the Republic, the central command, represented by the headquarters of the VNUS, did not always listen carefully to the requirements of the local command and was late in sending real help, which significantly affected the defeat of the Red Army units. When appointing commanders for the liquidation of the uprising, their personal suitability was not sufficiently weighed, which resulted in a frequent change of commanders of different ranks, which also had a negative impact on the success of operations.

The commission pointed to the weak connection between the military and party and Soviet leaders in the first period of the operation against the insurgents, when the situation required a direct assessment of the situation that had arisen through constant communication with the local headquarters, as well as with party and Soviet provincial organizations in the field. As a significant miscalculation, the commission noted the imprudent trust in the information of the local command with optimistic assumptions of the imminent liquidation of the Antonovshchina and exaggeration of the successes achieved. This led to an underestimation of the complexity of the actual situation and the forces required to eliminate the insurgency [26: 8].

Significant shortcomings of the local command were pointed out by a commission led by P. Cameron, a member of the RVSR tribunal. The Commission noted that before | December 1920 from the Tambov command and the Military Council was not submitted to the commander of the troops of the internal service of the Republic, not a single detailed report on

military situation and the nature of the movement. All the reports received were of a very vague and rather reassuring character. From the irregular reports it was impossible to conclude that the movement had taken the form of an insurrection, and sometimes it was even indicated that the population had no sympathy for Antonov, whose gangs were replenished by supposedly violent mobilizations.

Reporting repeatedly assumptions about the imminent liquidation of the uprising, the local command itself was, of course, confident that the Antonovshchina was on the eve of liquidation, sometimes assuming that it would be completed within 7-10 days. The information of the local command pointed to the final clearance of bandits from the territory of the region in the triangle Kirsanov-Tambov-Balashov, and it was reported that the restoration of Soviet power had begun in these regions.

The Commission stated that before | December, there were no definite requests to send new large military units, the question was raised only of sending small cavalry units, but they were not categorical either. During this period, 2 squadrons and an armored detachment were sent. The first demand to send larger military units was made by the commission of the VNUS headquarters, sent to Tambov in the first days of December 1920, in the amount of 2 infantry regiments and the 1st cavalry division. This requirement was fulfilled by sending three infantry regiments, one cavalry regiment, one squadron and one artillery platoon.

P. Cameron's commission pointed to a systematic underestimation of the objective conditions, roots and nature of the uprising. A too frivolous attitude to temporary successes with single blows led to the fact that the very core of the movement was not destroyed, it was not taken into account that the bands, dispersing themselves, made the movement more formidable, spreading both deeper and wider. As a result, inaccurate information from the Center was allowed, lulling it with optimistic hopes for an early liquidation of the uprising.

The commission pointed out the lack of a plan and well-thought-out methods of struggle. Obviously not enough attention was paid to political work. The active units were not inspected, they were not subjected to constant systematic processing and influence, which, due to overwork by continuous operations, failures and generally irrational use, created conditions for incompetence, demoralization and looting.

As a significant reason for the failures of the Red Army units, the Commission drew attention to their dispersal over the territory, the lack of initiative in operations. An aimless race of cavalry after the enemy, exhausting and weakening parts. The fragmentation of military units into small parts led to the fact that the rebels effortlessly captured them, disarmed or destroyed them.

Inconsistency in the methods of struggle and abuse of repression were noted. The burning of villages, which became a system under the last command, could hardly have had positive results and only embittered the population, forcing the homeless to become active opponents of the Reds. The abuse of the "red rooster" fell even during the period of comparative operational calm (the first half of November) [26: 10].

In conclusion on the results of the audit, the commission, chaired by the member of the RVSR tribunal, P. Cameron, made the following conclusions:

"The commission states that the scale of the insurrectionary movement in the Tambov province is becoming catastrophic, for the elimination of which it is necessary to take the following measures:

1. Occupy the territory of the Tambov, Kirsanov and Borisoglebsk districts by means of flooding and the planned distribution of armed forces, instructing the local authorities, as they occupy, to multiply their efforts to restore Soviet power in the localities and Soviet farms destroyed by the bandits.

2. Provide the command with the necessary personnel of the command staff and send fresh units to the insurgent front, as well as replace worn-out non-combat-ready units with fresh ones" [26: 10-11].

On December 31, 1920, a meeting was held in Moscow on the question of the liquidation of the Antonov movement. At this meeting, which was chaired by People's Commissar of Internal Affairs F.E. Dzerzhinsky, the commander-in-chief S.S. Kamenev, commander of the internal troops V.S. Kornev and representatives of the Tambov province A.G. Shlikhter and V.N. Meshcheryakov. It was decided to immediately start pulling to the area covered by the Antonov rebellion, significant additional forces of internal troops, as well as the regular Red Army (to begin with, at least one cavalry and one rifle division). It was decided to arm all the communists of the rebellious part of the Tambov region, for which 1000 rifles were allocated. The meeting recognized the need to send a group of experienced party workers to the province, the selection of which was undertaken by F.E. Dzerzhinsky.

It was decided to appoint a new commander of the troops of the Tambov province. The choice of the participants of the meeting settled on the former commander of the 10th Army A.V. Pavlov.

Literally three days after this meeting, on January 3, 1921, Antonov achieved another success. In the village of Kersha, 35 km northeast of Tambov, his detachment captured about 500 diners of the Red Army, along with a field kitchen, one gun and three machine guns [27].

The presented material allows us to draw a conclusion. Peasant War 1920-1921 in the Tambov province grew out of an insurrectionary movement that began in the autumn of 1918. The subsequent development of events was marked by constant outbreaks of mutinies in individual villages and the appearance in the forest areas of combat groups and partisan detachments, which were called "gangs" in Soviet documentation.

Understanding the need to revise the policy towards the peasantry began to emerge in the Bolshevik leadership.

Having flared up in mid-August 1920 in the villages of Kamenka and Khitrovo in the Tambov district, where the peasants refused to hand over their grain and disarmed the food detachment, the fire of the uprising spread throughout the province with a speed incomprehensible to the local authorities, since they habitually believed that they were dealing with bandit gangs, not popular indignation. The atrocities of the food detachments gave rise to the discontent of the peasants, which was expressed in sabotage, the lack of ploughing of the spring wedge. The peasants also expressed their disobedience to the new authorities in the disruption of mobilization measures.

The failures of the Red Army detachments forced the military operational headquarters under the gubchek to speed up the search for new military forces in Tambov itself and seek help from the county towns closest to the area where the uprising broke out. The Red Army detachments scattered over the villages in small groups could not offer organized resistance and suffered heavy losses.

The ill-conceived and too cruel punitive policy of the Tambov authorities from the very beginning caused disagreement and grumbling among many Red Army soldiers and commanders. Some detachments refused to carry out orders to destroy villages. Many fighters, not wanting to go to court for failure to comply with such an order, deserted or transferred (sometimes entire units) to

side of the rebels.

The Tambov authorities more and more persistently turned to various cities and towns for help. instances.

Gangs united in groups numbering several thousand people, constantly changing their place of residence, killed Soviet workers, and especially cruelly dealt with members of the RCP. In the August and September battles of 1920, Soviet detachments of real

the rebels were not taken prisoner, they were shot on the spot. The peasants who were arrested were held illegally and indiscriminately in the concentration camps.

In many areas, Soviet power existed only nominally and did not receive the support and sympathy of the majority of the peasantry.

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"20

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PEASANT WAR UNDER THE LEADING OF A.S. ANTONOV

Of particular interest is the leader of the peasant war in the Tambov region A.S. Antonov. In Soviet historiography, he was presented as an adventurer, a criminal type, who dragged the peasants along with him through deceit and fear. The term "Antonovism" itself had a distinctly accusatory meaning, although it emphasized the figure of the leader.

Alexander Stepanovich Antonov is a remarkable personality with great organizational skills. Being Kirsanov's chief of militia, he began to prepare an uprising in the village. Ramza and Porevka. All the weapons confiscated from the Czechoslovak units and sent to Ramza were used by the rebels. With the speech of Antonov, the movement takes the form of a systematic organized struggle against the Soviet government, the purpose of which was to disrupt the food campaign, undermine the power of the republic, and destroy the communists and Soviet workers [1].

An objective basis for peasant uprisings existed wherever they arose—in the Volga region, Western Siberia, on the Don, and so on. But far from everywhere, peasant uprisings reached the level of formation of many thousands of partisan armies and a developed structure of political administration - and this was what distinguished Antonovism most of all. Its peculiarity was largely due to the presence of a corresponding leader. This encourages you to take a closer look at it.

In Russia at that time, there were quite a few big figures opposed to the Bolshevik dictatorship, primarily from among the Socialist-Revolutionaries. However, for the leadership of the insurgent movement, it is required

"23/7

There were completely different personality traits than for a politician. We needed people who, firstly, were able to lead a spontaneous, organizationally loose, mass movement without much chance of success, therefore, they were psychologically ready for self-sacrifice in the revolution, as they understood it; secondly, they would be close to the peasant environment and would be recognized by it as "their own"; thirdly, past revolutionary experience mattered.

Such features were endowed with the main leaders of the Tambov uprising of 1920-1921. A.S. Antonov, A.E. Ishin, G.N. Pluzh-NIKOV.

Aleksandr Stepanovich Antonov was born in 1889 in Moscow into a middle class family. Soon the family moved to Kirsanov, where A. Antonov's father started a locksmith's workshop, and his mother became a dressmaker-modernist. Alexander graduated from Kirsanov primary and at least three classes of the city's 4-grade school, but, apparently, he did not receive a completed school education. He also worked as a volost clerk in the village. Yards of the Tambov district, and a worker at a factory in Tambov, and a public teacher.

A.S. himself Antonov called himself a Socialist-Revolutionary since 1905. In any case, since the spring of 1908, his name has been mentioned in gendarmerie papers as a "well-known robber." Then he was a member of the maximalist "Tambov group of independent socialist-revolutionaries", which carried out a series of "exes" ("expropriations" - robberies for the needs of the revolution) in the province. In police reports, Antonov appeared as an elusive terrorist. It is known that he twice escaped the chase, injuring his pursuers.

The provincial newspaper "Tambovskiy Krai" describes one case from the life of a young revolutionary Alexander Antonov – about an attempt by the police to detain A. Antonov. Noteworthy is the title of the note: "Wounding a policeman while pursuing intruders."

"On Friday, June 13, from 9 o'clock in the morning, agents of the gendarmerie police established surveillance of Bochkov's house 63, which is along Teploya Street, near the rampart, where two young people, by the surnames Antonov and Vindryavsky, who had ve - On that day, according to the information of the agents, go on foot to the Lyada station, and from there take a train to Kirsanov, where it was decided to kill one of the officials.

At the end of the 4th hour, Antonov and Vindryavsky left the house of Bochkov and headed along Teploya Street to the meadow, to the railroad track.

roads. The agents followed them, and, passing by the policeman Tikhonov, who was on duty in Novy Tambov, informed him that the young people they were pursuing needed to be detained. The attackers noticed that they were being watched and, turning instead of a meadow into Novy Tambov, they headed along Novaya Kirkinskaya Street back to the rampart. When the intruders caught up with Konyakhin's grocery store, which is at the corner of Obvodnaya and Novaya Kirkinskaya streets, in Bryukov's house, the policeman Tikhonov, rushing to the intruders, wanted to stop them, but one of them, who kept his hand in his trousers pocket all the time (according to Antonov's assumption), quickly drawing a revolver, fired three shots at Tikhonov one after another, wounding him in the neck on the left side with damage to the collarbone, in the left arm and right leg. Tikhonov fell, and the attackers at that moment, taking advantage of the confusion that had occurred among the gendarmerie agents, rushed to run in different directions. The one who wounded the policeman ran through the gardens along the "New Tambov", and his comrade - along Kirkinskaya Street, towards the 1st Share. The agents immediately rushed in the footsteps of the first intruder to pursue him (all the agents, as they say, were five) and soon noticed him in one garden hiding in the bushes. Having opened fire on the attacker with revolvers, the pursuers forced him out of the bushes. Coming out of the bushes and shooting all the bullets, fortunately not hitting anyone, the attacker rushed again

run through the gardens, and on one of them he threw off his jacket, in the pocket of which there was a bag of bullets. After unsuccessful attempts to hide in some house (the attacker ran into several yards, but they didn't let him in, and in one yard he hit the old woman with a belt for refusing shelter), the attacker turned back, made his way through the vegetable gardens to the Lashchenko garden, which is on the shaft and - as he sank into the water. Another intruder, heading along Kirkinskaya street, without being pursued by anyone, also disappeared.

Arrived at the scene: Cossacks, mounted guards and reinforced police squad. All the nearest quarters, the entire "New Tambov", gardens were cordoned off, but the searches did not lead to anything. In order to detain the criminal, the Peter and Paul cemetery, brick sheds and the "Akhlyabinovskaya" grove were carefully examined, but also to no avail" [2].

The outstanding qualities of a conspirator helped A. Antonov until the time when in February 1909 he was arrested in Saratov and interrogated

"257

taken to a Tambov prison, and then sentenced to death, replaced by indefinite hard labor. In the prisons of Tambov and Vladimir, where he served his sentence, he was surrounded by many prominent figures of various parties, as well as peasant activists. So, in Tambov, G.N. was in prison at the same time as him. Pluzhnikov, the future leader of the Union of Labor Peasantry, who was arrested for participating in peasant uprisings [3].

Fighting SR past A.S. Antonov helped him to become, after the February Revolution, an assistant to the police chief of Tambov, and then the chief of police of the Kirsanovsky district. In the conditions of rampant revolutionary elements, this was a responsible post in which Antonov managed to prove himself. He had to fight the "agrarian terror" and disarm the echelons of Czechoslovak troops passing through Kirsanov in May 1918. Perhaps this weapon was useful to him.

Antonov's resignation from the post of chief of the county militia was voluntary, and behind it, undoubtedly, is his rejection of the degeneration of the Bolshevik regime into a state-dictatorial one, disagreement with the government's policy towards the peasantry. The revolutionary-maximalist attitude, the thirst for struggle against any dictatorship logically led him to organize an armed rebuff to the Bolsheviks. After a short stay in Samara, where the Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly (Komuch) ruled, Antonov again returned to his native Tambov region. From Kirsanov's peasants, he formed a "combat squad" for direct armed struggle against the "proletarian dictatorship." For almost two years he acted with the usual methods of individual terror and expropriation, trying to incite the peasants against the Bolsheviks [3].

In 1919, Antonov sought to establish contact with Denikin, which he succeeded under the following circumstances: during the attack on the Tambov province of Denikin's troops under the command of Mamontov, two representatives were sent from the side of the "Green Army" under the leadership of Antonov at that time: V. Yakimov and N. Santalov - to Denikin's headquarters, who, upon arrival in the city of Balashov, were stopped by a Cossack officer with the rank of captain, and, having identified themselves as representatives from the "Green Army" of the Chuevsky forest and received from him a package addressed to Uryupino, to the General Staff, left the city.

Upon arrival in Uryupino, they received documents with the following content: "I order all commanders, commandants, etc. the front entrusted to me to the bearers of this certificate

to provide all possible assistance in living, movement both in the frontline and non-frontline zones. Their requirements must be met. Signature: Commander of the 2nd Cossack Consolidated Corps, Lieutenant General (last name is illegible)" [4].

They tried to fight Antonov's fighting squad, but she always easily eluded the Chekists.

Information about the first steps of the "Antonov gang", who presented himself as a right SR, was deposited in the organs of the Cheka. In particular, it is said that in the Kirsanov Uyezd, since the movement of the "Greens", Antonov's (Right Socialist-Revolutionary) gang has been operating, which began to appear as part of the Tambov and Borisoglebsk Uyezds. Even then it was said that this gang posed a great danger, hindered all work, set itself the goal of exterminating the communists. She was credited with the murder of 100 responsible comrades, including the chairman of the provincial executive committee M.D. Chichkanova.

It was also pointed out that the Antonov gang received directives from the members of the Constituent Assembly, the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries Nemtinov and Arkhangelsky, who were within the limits of the Tambov province. It was noted that "the plans of this gang were broad, it was even supposed to attack Tambov. The gang hid in the forests and near the kulaks. All the detachments sent earlier could not destroy it. The Gubernia Committee, together with the Cheka, organized a detachment under the command of Comrade Maslakov to destroy the gang, a report on the work of which is available in the Cheka" [5].

At the same time, the archive preserved a letter from the head of the fighting squad A. Antonov to the head of the Kirsanovskaya district police protesting against the smearing of the squad and a proposal to cooperate in the fight against banditry. In it, Antonov wrote: "According to the information that has come down to us, comrades communists, wanting to denigrate me and my comrades in the face of the working peasantry and all free-thinking Russia, calling us bandits, are trying to ascribe to us involvement in the robberies committed in the district of volosts: Treskinskaya, Kaluginskaya, Kurdyukovskaya and others adjacent to this area. Such impudence is worthy of the shameful bureaucracy of the old times. I am more than sure that if you are true democrats, then, looking into the secrets of your soul, spattered with the holy blood of working people, you will say: they themselves are not capable of such a shameful deed, but they will not let others pass it with impunity." Since we know the desire for communication

"77

nists to denigrate us in the face of the working people, but this is not very successful, I hope that in this field they will continue to have similar success. The guarantee of this is the attraction towards us of the working masses of conscious Russia. We prove our non-participation in predatory gangs by the following facts: The Karavain gang, under the leadership of Berbeshkin, whom you know, has now been liquidated by us. You can take the corpse of Berbeshkin and his assistant Artyushka in the "Kenzari" district, a hundred sazhen from the road to the right, as you go from Kurdyukov to Rasskazovo. The corpses of others, if you require, we can deliver to the place of demand or simply find, and we consider it our duty to bring to your attention that we are always ready to give you a helping hand in the fight against criminality. What can you contact through Izvestia or in some other way. I ask you to bring the above to the attention of the county committee of the Bolshevik Communist Party. By proxy of the squad: Antonov" [6].

This "combat squad" became the organizational core of the future partisan army. |

It is characteristic that after the defeat of the uprising A.S. Antonov did not leave the province: he probably did not leave hopes for the revival of the movement. Death overtook him not far from his native places.

The documents recreate the image of a typical Russian revolutionary of the beginning of the 20th century, who came "from the bottom" and gave himself entirely to the revolution, a man of immediate action, ready to commit both "terrorist attacks" and "exes" for the sake of high ideals. It was from them that the fighting vanguard consisted of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the anarchists, and the Bolsheviks - those who themselves went to the barricades and called others. They easily identified themselves with the revolution, they were imbued with the consciousness of a special mission of their own personality - leadership. The verses attributed to Antonov are very expressive in this respect. Characteristic of these poems, as well as of the "Song of the Partisan", was a fierce denunciation of the enemy and a very vague reflection or complete absence of a positive ideal.

ORGANIZATION OF THE GUERRILLA ARMY OF THE TAMBOV REGION

On November 14, in the village of Moiseevo-Alabushka (25 km south of Rzhaksy), a meeting of detachment commanders from all three rebellious districts was held. The participants of the meeting summed up the almost three-month period

armed struggle. The main issue discussed at the meeting in Moiseevo-Alabushka was the question of what to do next. The audience was unanimous in one thing: there could be no question of stopping the uprising and armed struggle against the communists. In direct connection with this, at the meeting, a proposal was made and approved to unite the currently disparate detachments into one "Partisan Army of the Tambov Territory", the control of which should come from one leading center - the "Main Operational Headquarters". At the meeting, the leadership of the Main Headquarters was elected by voting in the amount of five people: A.S. Antonov, A.V. Boguslavsky, I.A. Gubareva, P.M. Tokmakov and Mitrofanovich. Thus, on November 14, 1920, the General Headquarters headed by A.S. became the supreme governing body of the Tambov rebels. Antonov [7].

At the beginning of 1921, the Glavopershtab assumed its final form — it was a fairly powerful organization with a complex internal structure. It was still headed by the same 5 people who held the following positions: 1) Chief of the Main Staff A.S. Antonov, 2) assistant chief of the Main Staff, 3) army commander, ace of 1921 - armies, 4) assistant commander and 5) intelligence chief. All of these positions were elective, and the chief of the General Staff was higher in position than the commander of the army. The assembly in Moiseevo-Alabushka elected P.M. as the first army commander. Tokmakova.

In 1921, the Main Headquarters included 8 departments: 1) political, 2) army court, 3) medical and sanitary, 4) economic unit, 5) commission for the replacement of horses, 6) trophy commission, 7) commandant of the headquarters and 8) head of communications.

A uniform uniform for all partisans and insignia for commanders was adopted. The adopted document stated: "At this, a uniform is announced for partisans and commanders of the partisan army of the Tambov Territory (red stripes on the left sleeve above the elbow): partisans - a bow to wear on their headdress. Ribbons: one for a detached commander, two for a platoon commander, three for a sergeant-major. Triangles at an angle downwards: one for the squadron commander and the heads of individual teams, two for the divisional commander and regimental adjutants, three for regimental commanders, assistants, heads of machine-gun teams and division headquarters. Triangles with an upward angle: one for the commandants at the regiments, one for the commandant at the Main Opera

rativny headquarters of the Tambov region - two. Rhombuses: one for the division commander and chiefs of staff of the army, two for the commander of the army and his assistant. Ribbon with the designation of the position held: to the ranks of the Main Operational Headquarters of the Partisan Army of the Tambov Territory, the head of communications and the adjutant at this headquarters "[8].

The process of creation and formation of the Partisan Army of the Tambov region took place in difficult conditions for the rebels. Already on November 17, Brimmer's cavalry almost covered Antonov's detachment, which was in Moiseevo-Alabushka, along with the entire newborn Main Staff. In the hands of the red cavalymen, among other trophies inherited after the rapid flight of the Antonovites from the village, the decision of the congress on the creation of the Main Headquarters fell into the hands.

Fairly deftly avoiding persecution, Antonov with his detachment and the Main Headquarters until the beginning of December continuously traveled around the northwestern part of Borisoglebsk district.

But, despite the many difficulties encountered, Antonov's army was successfully moving forward, and the rebellion grew every day. On December 1, the territory engulfed by the rebellion increased by exactly 15 times compared to September 10 and reached 18 thousand square kilometers.

In December 1920, the activity of the rebels increased sharply, although they also had individual failures, when, for example, in Borisoglebsk district, the cavalry regiment Perevedentsev twice - on December 4

near Kozlovka and on December 6 in the village of Kriusha - overtook and fairly beat up the detachment of Antonov himself, capturing over 150 prisoners in these battles and repelling one machine gun.

However, there were practically no other such invincible units as the cavalry regiment of Perevedentsev at the disposal of the commander of the troops of the Tambov province, Redzko. Therefore, he could not interfere with the formation of the Partisan Army of the Tambov Territory, although he closely followed the processes that took place inside the rebel army. Information similar to the following summary of the secret department came to him constantly:

"By November 20, when the number of detachments reached a large number, Antonov convened a plenary meeting of the command staff of all partisan detachments, at which a resolution was passed, according to which all detachments unite and form a single partisan army, for which The main operational headquarters of the partisan army of the Tambov region, consisting of 5 of

selected by secret ballot (Order No. | dated February 14, 1920), from now on he begins to unite individual bandit detachments by systematic organization both in political and military relations. A month later, both the design and the plans and tasks of the entire insurgent movement were concretized and received a certain look. All detachments, which are nothing more than separate gangs, without authoritative leaders, but only with leaders, begin to unite into separate units, when the number reaches 300-500 people they receive the name of regiments, which, in turn, have certain titles and numbers. There is evidence that the regiments are combined into larger units, like brigades, divisions, and the latter even into corps.

Operations of a military nature begin to acquire a certain regularity, and the actions of the regiments begin to be directed not by the initiative of the former leaders, who later became regimental commanders, but by the instructions and orders of the Main Operational Headquarters, headed by Antonov himself and the commander of all forces, Tokmakov. This is confirmed by the orders of the Main Operational Headquarters of the partisan army No. 14 paragraph 8 of 12/29/20, which indicates the existence of the 3rd division, No. 8 paragraph 1 of 18.01.21 - the existence of the 2nd division, No. 14 paragraph 3 of 12/29/20 - about the existence of the 1st division, in addition to this, a number of reports signed by the division chiefs. The existence of brigades is known from the orders of the headquarters of the 1st Partisan Army of the Tambov Territory No. 9 paragraph 2 of 01/16/21.

With regard to the corps, for a more vivid illustration, I will quote the entire paragraph 2 of the order of the headquarters of the 1st Partisan Army of the Tambov Territory No. 3 of January 8, 1921, which says: "In order to eliminate misunderstandings that may occur during the battle, I order: with the joint action of the corps, divisions and regiments, for more correct command of the troops, appoint one person or combine headquarters, together from which the orders of the units operating in battle should come. In addition, the order of the headquarters of the 1st Army No. 24 of 01/25/21 announced the states of the army, corps, divisions, brigades, regiments, etc.

These facts point to the existence, or perhaps only to the existence of such compounds. According to the protocol of the joint meeting of the members of the provincial committee of the Union of the working peasantry and the Main Operational Headquarters, commanders

units, political workers of the 1st Army of the Tambov Territory and organizers of the Tambov and Borisoglebsk districts, held on January 15, 1921 under the chairmanship of Batko and under the secretary Tyukov, at which, among other issues, a report was heard on the existence of two headquarters Army: Main Operational Headquarters and Headquarters of the 1st Partisan Army. On the merits of the issue, they unanimously passed a resolution that, for more flexible command and control of troops, the existence of the headquarters of the 1st partisan army should be recognized as expedient, and the Main Operational Headquarters headed by Antonov should be recognized as the second headquarters of the army of the Tambov Territory. The connecting link between the headquarters is to recognize the Tambov provincial committee of the Union of the working peasantry, representatives from the army headquarters. After that, on January 18, 1921, according to the protocol of the Chief

of the operational headquarters with the participation of a member of the provincial committee dated January 18, 21 No. 1 paragraph 2, announced in the order for the Main Operational Headquarters No. 9 paragraph 2 dated January 19, 21, the partisan forces available in the Tambov Territory to be divided into two armies. The first partisan army includes: 1st Kamensky, 2nd Borisoglebsky, 5th Panovsky, 6th Savalsky, 7th Tambov, 10th Volche-Karachansky, 11th Pavlodar, 12th Tokay, 13 th Bitugovsky shelves.

The composition of the second army includes: 3rd Kirsanovsky, 4th Nizovoi, 8th Pakhotno-Uglovsky and 9th Semenovskiy regiments.

Head of the secretariat of the department of Citro Chibisov Authorized Khvorov" [9].

There is no doubt about the good organization of the rebels, who formed a kind of "peasant republic" on the territory of Kirsanovsky, Borisoglebsky, Tambov districts with a center in the village. Kamenka. Armed Forces A.S. Antonov combined the principles of building a regular army (2 armies consisting of 21 regiments, a separate brigade) with irregular armed detachments. Antonovtsy did not practice mobilization into their ranks, attracting the population only for protection, transportation, etc.

To characterize the activities of the Antonovites, let us turn to the orders for the 1st Partisan Army of the Tambov Territory.

Order No. 1 (Panovy Kusty, January 1, 1921) declared deep gratitude to the entire command staff and partisans of the 3rd Borisoglebsky Regiment for the internal order in the regiment, correct marching movement and stamina in battle with the enemy. order for the purpose

nip in the bud banditry, which spread due to the abandonment of unreliable partisans for internal service, all the committees of the Tambov and Borisoglebsk districts were obliged to leave people trustworthy and unnoticed in order to carry out internal protection; The guards and the committees were supposed to monitor the internal order, especially the robbery, and if complaints were received from citizens about the wrong actions of the committees and the guards, then they should be brought to the revolutionary army court. (Original signed: Chief of Staff Gubarev, commander of the army Gavrikov) [10].

The order for the 1st Partisan Army of the Tambov Territory drew attention to the fact that during the march of the regiments it was noticed that "in long-term parking, partisans feed horses exclusively with only one oat, without giving any other fodder, regardless of the fact that the state over the 3 years of Bolshevik rule, it has been completely exhausted, and the outcome of the resistance struggle for partisan detachments depends on grain fodder, without which horses cannot make long hikes, and therefore I order regiment commanders to make sure that they make savings in grain fodder during long stops, replacing his other fodder: hay and straw" [11].

Order No. 4 (village of Kamenka, January 10, 1921) pointed out three problems and determined measures to solve them.

Firstly, it was noted that "many regimental commanders give orders for the arrest of persons superior in service without my order. I order such arrests not to be allowed."

Secondly, it was stated that "many partisans replace their horses almost daily, from which I see that partisans do not look after their horses, hoping that in another village or village they will replace them with another. I expose such an omission on the part of the regimental commanders and order all regiments to keep lists of horses, from which it will be clear when and where the horse was replaced by a partisan.

Thirdly, it was pointed out that many partisans, when the regiments were stationed together, moved from regiment to regiment, and in this regard, it was ordered "regimental commanders not to allow such a transition of partisans,

and the political leaders in the regiments should follow and inspire the partisans that such a transition is harmful in relation to the internal and combat

order of regiments" [12].

The order for the 1st Partisan Army of the Tambov Territory No. 5 (village of Chikarovka, January 8, 1921) stated that "no confiscations, requisitions, searches and unauthorized arrests, both in organized and unorganized volosts, should not be carried out without my order for that and the provincial and district committees. In order to eliminate misunderstandings that may occur during the battle, I order, during the joint action of corps, divisions and regiments, for a more correct command of the troops, to appoint one person or uniting headquarters together, from which orders should be issued for the units operating in battle "[13].

Order No. 6 for the 1st Partisan Army of the Tambov Territory (village of Kamenka, January 13, 1921) declared that "the old communist power of the commissars is considered to be overthrown, as a result of which all its old laws and orders are annulled." In all civil cases, it was prescribed to apply to the provincial and district committees. All commanders of regiments were ordered "to give in the order for the regiment a personal list of all partisans in the regiment, indicating their permanent residence, i.e. what village or hamlet, volost or uyezd does a partisan come from" [14].

Order No. 14 for the 1st Partisan Army of the Tambov Territory (village of Kamenka, January 14, 1921) appointed A.P. Sazhin. The regiment formed by the Abakumov organization was assigned the name of the 9th Bityugovsky partisan regiment. (Reference: protocol of the Abakumov organization dated December 25, 1920 No. 1.) D.G. was appointed commander of this regiment. Ivannikov. (Reference: protocol of the Abakumov organization dated December 25, 1920 No. 1) [15].

Order No. 9 (village of Tugolukovo, January 15, 1921) made personnel appointments and reshuffles. Appointed commanders of the regiments T.S. Gavrikov (1st Kamensky regiment) and G.V. The Krudskys (10th Semyonovsky Regiment) were expelled from the staff of the 1st Partisan Army. They were appointed brigade commanders with the fulfillment of the duties assigned to them by cavalry regiments: the 1st brigade - Gavrikov, the 2nd brigade - K.I. Baranov, 3rd brigade - I.M. Kuznetsov and the 4th brigade - G.V. Krudsky. Regiments included in the 1st Brigade: 1st Kamensky Regiment, 2nd Tambov Regiment; 2nd brigade - 3rd Panovsky regiment and 9th Bityugovsky regiment; 3rd brigade - 7th Pavlodar regiment and 6th Volche-Karachansky regiment; 4th brigade - 5th Borisoglebsky and 10th Semenovskiy regiments. "For the benefit of the service" commander of the 5th Borisoglebsky regiment A.B. Kuldoshin was seconded to

army headquarters, and D.P. Benediktov. Instead of the members elected by the plenary meeting to the Main Operational Headquarters, after T.S. Gavrikov and G.V. Krudskikh, were appointed assistant commander of the army N.M. Izofatenko and the head of the operational report S.D. Bogomolov. The order was signed by the chief of staff of the army Gubarev, vr. army commander Yegorchev, adjutant of the army headquarters Tyukov [16].

On the whole, the organization and leadership style of the Antonovites turned out to be sufficient for conducting successful military operations of the partisan type in the conditions of the three forest districts of the Tambov region - in the presence of excellent natural shelters, with the closest connection with the population and its full support, with no need for deep rear, convoys, etc.

This is evidenced by operational reports on the actions of the partisan army.

In the operational summary of the 1st Partisan Army of the Tambov Territory for only one day - January 11, 1921, the following military operations of the Partisan Army were reported.

1st Kamensky regiment together with the 5th Borisoglebsky regiment in the area of M. Alabukha during the offensive of the Red troops from Uvarov, numbering 350 cavalry and 150 people

infantry with 4 machine guns, 3 automatic rifles, the regiment repulsed this offensive, but due to the failure of the machine gun, they had to retreat with the loss of the commander of the 1st Kamensky regiment, E.I. Kazankov and local organizer P.A. Ivanov and 12 killed, 3 wounded partisans. Following that counterattack of the partisans, the Reds were driven out of Malye Alabukh in the direction of Orlovka, with the loss of 50 people among the Red Army men killed and several wounded, among the dead were commanders Morozov and Altov, political committee Kurnikov, and Lobanov seriously wounded.

The newly organized Sukmanov detachment detained a train, took 62 people prisoner, captured 100 rifles, a lot of ammunition and various products. The Bityugovsky regiment raided the Voronkovsky state farm, in which horses, cows and pigs, bread and many other items were taken, 3 communists were hacked to death, 10 rifles and a small amount of cartridges were taken away. Sukman organization at st. Esipovo was damaged railroad and telegraph communication between Zherdevka and Art. Ternovka. The 2nd Tambov regiment was stopped at the Tankovsky bridge le

cloud, which was subjected to heavy gunfire, capturing a box of cartridges from the guard of the railway bridge [17].

All these are events of one day - January 11, 1921.

Here is a report from the commander of the 5th Borisoglebsk partisan regiment to the commander of the 4th brigade of the 1st partisan army of the Tambov Territory G.V. Krutskikh about the fulfillment of the combat mission dated January 18, 1921: "I report that part of the combat mission assigned by you was completed on the night of January 17 to January 18 (1921 - Authors). Wish way. the road in the Otkhozhaya-Uvarovo area has been dismantled, the rest - Uvaro-vo - Moiseevsky junction - will be dismantled tonight. There are 200 or so Reds in Uvarovo with 2 machine guns. Upon completion of the task, we will be in Otkhozhaya. I inform you that the 5th Podgornsky partisan regiment is still missing. Despite the fact that an order was sent to him and it is not known where he is, tk. there is no connection from him. Commander of the 5th Borisoglebsk cavalry partisan regiment Venediktov, political committee Kulikov" [18].

The rebels attached great importance to the dismantling of the railway line and the destruction of all kinds of state structures, such as bridges, telegraph wires, poles, apparatuses, station buildings, booths, arrows. A number of issued orders and directives serve as confirmation. It should be noted that the partisans involved the entire population of the area and nearby villages and villages, both men and women, in the work of destroying state structures [19].

The 5th Panovsky Partisan Regiment had the immediate task of breaking down the railway line in the Zherdevki-Tokarevka section. The responsibility of this regiment was the task of upsetting armored trains and armored aircraft from the rails, preventing the workers sent from the Reds from repairing the railway line by shelling and setting up ambushes. This, in particular, was mentioned in the summary of the 5th Panovsky regiment, in the reports of the military units of the partisan army.

There were cases of attacks on trains for the purpose of robbery, as, for example, at the Saburovo station, a brigade of the Kozlov regiments "Karas" seized a freight train, took large military trophies, and the locomotive was dispersed and launched in the direction of the dismantled track for greater destruction [20].

In the operational reports of the General Staff on the units produced by the units directly subordinate to the Main Operational

of the headquarters, the actions said: "01/20/21 by the regiments of Antonov during the offensive of the Reds from Art. Zherdevka defeated a special regiment (Reds), from which 650 Tatars were beaten, 3 machine guns, a lot of cartridges and weapons were taken. On February 11, 21, there was a clash with the enemy advancing on the village of Karavaynia. The Reds fled in panic. Captured prisoners. On February 12, 21, partisan scouts in the village of Kurdyuki took 9 Red men. On February 17, 21, a clash near the village of Otyassy with a detachment of Reds numbering 150 people. The squad is disarmed. 118 people taken prisoner, rifles

and ammo. 02/22/21 clash with the Reds near the village of Dvoini. Withdrawal of partisan units. 02/25/21 clash with the Reds near the village of Kobylinka, as a result of which machine guns, rifles and cartridges were taken. About 60 Reds were disarmed. On February 20, 21, our scouts in the area of Kalugino, Treskino and Bogdanovo disarmed 32 Reds. On February 27, 21, the attack on the Reds, located in the village of Bogoslovka, after a short exchange of fire, the partisans retreated in view of the clear superiority of the enemy forces. On March 1, 21, an attack was made on a detachment of the Reds located in the village of Otkhozhye, the enemy was driven out of the village with heavy losses and, pursued by the partisan cavalry, hastily withdrew to the village of Uvarovo. The partisans took 4 guns, about 500 shells, rifles, a lot of cartridges, saddles, a convoy with provisions and prisoners. On 04/01/21, a raid was carried out by the Reds, numbering 250 people, located in the village of Kalinovka. The detachment was defeated, part, about 70 people, fled, the rest were disarmed. Taken 2 machine guns, a lot of cartridges and saddles. On April 2, 21, the Red regiment from the Dmitrienko group advancing on the village of Kalinovka was put to flight by a partisan counteroffensive. Taken 3 machine guns, a lot of saddles and cartridges. 04/07/21 when pursuing the Reds as part of one squadron from the village of Fedorovskaya to the station. Volkhon region, several saddles were taken. 04/08/21 raid on the regiment of the reds, located in the village of Treskino. The Reds, rushing to run, were surrounded and, with the exception of three people, were taken prisoner. 5 machine guns, 60 belts and a huge amount of cartridges were taken" [21].

The concreteness and visibility of the goals and results of military operations raised the morale of the army and attracted new forces to it: the number of fighters in the Antonov army in February 1920 reached 40 thousand, not counting the "vokhra" (guards). But that was the limit. By the beginning of May, their number had decreased to 21,000, both as a result of the decisive actions of the Red Army that had begun, and in connection with the abolition of the food requisition and the onset of the spring season [9].

Espionage and informing the partisans were well organized, as evidenced by the information they had not only about the military units actively fighting against them, but even located in garrisons, as well as about the mood of citizens and the internal order of the cities. Reports both to the headquarters of the partisan army of the Tambov Territory and to the provincial committee of the Union of the Labor Peasantry show that local residents took the main part in informing activities: women, old people and even teenagers, children who made their way from areas infected with banditry, along for one reason or another in the city. Here they received the necessary and interesting information for the partisans through personal observation and conversations with acquaintances living in the cities, who (by their psychology, the townsfolk) told everything they knew about the local authorities and their orders, about what they saw and heard. This information was sent to the local committee of the STK or to the headquarters of any partisan unit, from where, through the chain of command, to the army headquarters [9].

There were cases of sending disguised spies to the city of Morshansk under the guise of women and nuns (report of the Special Department No. 3). The head of the secret department Chibisov, the head of the secret department of Sitro, the authorized Khvorov noted in the operational summary: , then some of those, despite their partisanship, try and support banditry. For an illustration of such assistance, see the appendix in the column "weapons and the source of obtaining such". Reconnaissance and information about the enemy was the most well-organized apparatus in military terms, and both the first and the second were ideally placed in him. In addition to military intelligence, which acted in accordance with the instructions, a huge service in this regard was provided by local residents who were hostile to the Soviet regime. They obtained and immediately transmitted all information about the movement, movement and location, and sometimes even the number and armament of our troops" [9].

In the indicated operational summary of the head of the special department Chibisov, the head of the secret department of Sitro, authorized Khvorov, it was said: "The establishment of intelligence and communications can be called ideal, providing a huge service to partisan units. In each village of the volost or village, as mentioned above, there are: police, vokhra and communications,

setting up observation posts in the villages. When Soviet troops appear in a particular area, the local militia monitors their movement and actions, while communications at that time transmit reports on the movement of troops to other committees. Messages reach the headquarters or separate (if they are located nearby) military formations, which, knowing the number of weapons of the enemy, attacked them from the side from which they least expected. With the superiority of the enemy forces, the partisan units, through well-established communications, knowing the location of their units, unite together with several detachments or regiments and, thus forming a group, attack" [9].

Communication with the military units and the army headquarters, as well as with the committees of the Union of the working peasantry, was carried out in two forms: firstly, with each new quartering of the military unit, two partisans were sent to the head of the communications team of the headquarters of the 1st partisan army to establish connections. Secondly, a specially organized communication service was created in the form of flying mail, which was available in every village, volost or village located in the area of operation of the partisans and consisting of ten or more people carrying a shift among themselves. Moreover, the main role is played by women who hide packets sent by communication in their hair. In addition, the partisans had a telephone connection mainly between headquarters and army institutions, as well as some committees of the Union of the working peasantry, such as, for example, between Sukmanovka and Tugolukovo.

In addition to internal communication, there was communication with the leaders of the uprising from other areas. So, on February 27, 1921, I.S. Kolesnikov with a detachment of 1500 people, well-armed, with 9 machine guns, in order to contact the armies of the Tambov Territory and jointly solve several common combat missions [22].

Such a powerful organization and staging of espionage, reconnaissance and information, the supply of all types of allowances and equipment could not have happened if the sympathy of the population of the province had not been on the side of the rebels. This was especially evident in the days of the beginning of the insurrectionary movement. Citizens were recruited into the ranks of the partisans through agitation and appeals. Soviet warehouses, state farms, plundered by regiments, went to the needs of the partisan army, there were cases

the distribution of property to the population, the struggle was carried out with the food detachments of the Reds, who acted to fulfill the state appropriation, they destroyed the communists, etc., which, of course, won the sympathy of the population. But when reaching the highest apogee, there were various elements in the ranks of the rebels who were addicted to looting. The depletion of food supplies among the population, the successes of the Soviet troops - all this, taken together, tore out of action the partisans who were the first to raise the banner of the uprising, and cases of looting, robbery, requisition and confiscation of property became more and more frequent. A number of orders and instructions from both the Main Operational Headquarters and the headquarters of the 1st Army drew the attention of the commanding staff to the fight against looting by the partisans, to the need to bring such partisans to justice, and in most cases this was carried out in LIFE.

Let us cite the appeal of the Main Operational Headquarters and political leaders.

"Comrade partisans! Already six months have passed since we, the partisans, took to the fight for the complete liberation of the peasants and workers from oppression and violence, came out against the bloodthirsty rapists, the robber-communists. In the course of our six-month struggle, we have done a lot, hundreds and thousands of honest fighters flock to us from all sides of the working population, joining the ranks of our army to achieve our common task, in the interests of the entire working and oppressed population. Do you remember, comrades, when we went out in the first days of our revolution, we had up to 20 rifles and five cartridges for them, and now what we see in front of us: a large and well-armed army, which is already our enemies, the Communists dealt a big blow and made them think, but know, dear comrade partisans, that we have become strong not only by this, we are strong more by our honesty and by the fact that thanks to the latter, i.e. honesty, we are followed by the entire working population, who always and everywhere are trying with all their might to help us in any way they can and, on the contrary, are exerting all their strength to

so that, where possible, we put a brake on our enemies both in military affairs and in other branches of their work. But always remember, comrades, that the population is only willing to meet those advanced fighters who are trying with all their might and means to help them in all their needs and to keep them away from all tyrants and robbers who encroach on their rights and the property they have earned by the sweat of their brow.

And it is precisely in our revolutionary ranks of the people's army that a very sad phenomenon for honest partisans has recently been observed. Among you, honest fighters, there are people who treat the population, already offended and tormented by the bastards of the Communists, very impudently. There were cases when, from among our own midst, some partisans took away dresses and other things for the purpose of their own gain, and also resorted to the most insistent demands that the owners give the best food supplies that the owners don't even have.

Such a phenomenon in our army is unacceptable; by doing so, we set ourselves against the entire working population and can thereby lose all our cherished dreams for the complete liberation of all the oppressed.

We, members of the Main Operational Headquarters, your political leaders, appeal to you, dear comrade partisans, with a fervent appeal - be honest fighters and defenders of the rights of workers, present yourself before the population as the most modest and true sons of our peasant revolution, and then people themselves will understand that we really are not bandits, as the communist robbers call us, but honest fighters for the ideals of the oppressed. In this, comrades, is the guarantee of our struggle, in this lies our victory over the haters of enemies, the Communists. Calling on all honest and conscientious comrades to strictly watch those who serve in our army as a bad example and insolently treat the population, try to impress and explain to them that we did not take up arms in order to make pockets, but, on the contrary, to destroy all sorts of hooliganism and violence perpetrated by communist robbers on

humanity.

Remember, fellow partisans, that when we act consciously, honestly and justly, the work we have begun will sooner come to the desired end.

Down with all ignorance.

Long live the conscious and honest partisan army!" [23]

Looting by the partisans was severely punished, the perpetrators were subjected to trial and arrest.

The regimental court of the 6th Upper Karachan partisan regiment on February 19, 1921 considered the application of citizen N.I. Malshina about the illegal taking of her belongings by partisans of the 1st squadron of the 6th Upper Karachansky regiment. At the court session, the commander of the 1st squadron K.V. Pozdnyakov testified: "On January 17, during the parking of my

"21

squadron in the village of Petrovskaya, the citizens told me that the Malshins' son-in-law was a communist and brought them a lot of loot, then I did a search and really took the things that Malshina shows, only Soviet money was taken not 40 thousand rubles, a28 355 rub. 28 kopecks, Korean money is not at all brother, not 900 rubles from Nikolaev, but 248 rubles, a black pocket watch and 7 arshins of batiste were not taken.

The court ruled: "All the things taken from N.I. Malshina, with the exception of non-valuable things, 20 pounds of tobacco and one pillow, which go in favor of the partisan army, to return back to Malshina, namely: 1) | woolen winter coat on wadding for men; 2) RUB 28,355 Soviet money; 3) 248 rubles. Nikolaev money; 4) velvet carpet; 5) 6 rub. 90 kop. silver and 6) a gray jacket. A caveat: the coat will be temporarily in the use of a partisan who does not have clothes, until he is supplied with such.

The court gave a severe reprimand to the partisans and the commander of the 1st squadron for an unauthorized search and ordered them not to do this again without the permission of the court and the commandant of the regiment [24].

In the spring of 1921, during the sowing period, desertions became more frequent, and commissions to combat desertion were created to prevent them. On April 19, all organizations were ordered to pay serious attention to the cultivation of fields and their seeding. First of all, the families of the partisans had to be provided for in this respect, and then all other horseless citizens. It was established that the processing of the fields should be free, those who were noticed otherwise should be punished according to the laws of the revolutionary time.

Marauders in the partisan army were subjected to court verdicts, punishment with rods, whips, and even executions were carried out for robbery and looting.

The partisan army had a certain scheme for organizing its institutions, such a division of functions and duties was established between the existing bodies and official persons.

The partisan army court consisted of a chairman, an assistant, two members, a clerk (secretary) and a judge. Regimental court - from the chairman, the assistant to the chairman, one member, the clerk (secretary) and the judge.

The function of the court is to supervise the observance of the established rules and obligations, in the presence of deviations from them, to conduct investigations and impose penalties. In addition, the court was charged with monitoring the confiscation of property belonging to

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Communists and other persons, by court order. The personal composition of the court was to consist of partisans of a firm character, a free developed mind, trustworthy, who could not be bribed and persuaded in any case. The court in its work must be guided by instructions and a comradely alliance, i.e. he had to remember that a third revolution was approaching, i.e. the latter, which is created by the people themselves, which is why the courts are ordered to pay attention to this attention.

When condemning a partisan regiment for a crime, one should pay attention to the following - what was his behavior before the crime was committed: if the behavior was correct, then give him freedom to correct his character and deed. If his behavior was indecent, then he should be punished severely.

If the person under investigation in the regimental court, due to the nature of his crime, is not within the jurisdiction of the regimental court, then the case is transferred to the highest instance - the brigade or army court. The regimental court could sentence private individuals up to and including execution, so the defendants should have been interrogated with caution and greater vigilance due to the fact that among them there could be spies and counter-revolutionaries (counterintelligence officers), as well as innocent citizens.

If the court acquits one or another person, then the court commission writes an attitude to the regiment commander, who, according to the court order, issues a pass. It was considered necessary to be present at the court and a political worker, who, in turn, had the right to question the defendants.

All protocols, rulings and court decisions were sent in copies to the Main Operational Headquarters. Most of the work was assigned to the secretary (clerk) of the court. The functions of the court included the consideration of cases, except for the indicated cases, for all crimes: on charges of both citizens and partisans of military units of looting, desertion, robbery, insulting, agitation, espionage, counterrevolution, etc. The interrogation of prisoners at the regiments was in charge of political workers, who conducted these interrogations according to a specially developed scheme. The entire survey of the prisoner was reduced to clarifying the characteristics of the regiment, the state of the unit in combat, poly-

political and economic relations, the characteristics of the command staff and political workers, the attitude of the masses towards the partisans. At the end of the interrogation, the prisoners, along with the protocol of the interrogation, were sent to

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army headquarters, and sometimes they were released, judging by the evidence and their guilt. At the court there were escorts to accompany the arrested. There were no places of detention; according to the instructions on punishments for detention, they were not convicted.

Political department. All political, propaganda and organizational work lay: in the army, in the brigade - on the political department, in the regiment - on the political bureau, in divisions and squadrons - on the political workers of the regiment. The political department of the army kept records, registered and sent workers to the regions and military formations. In addition, the political department was to develop appeals, leaflets, and so on. in the army, which, after the approval of the provincial committee of the Union of the working peasantry, were distributed both among the population and among the partisans.

The main role was played by propaganda and organizational workers, who were sent by the political department of the army to brigades and regiments to work among the soldiers, partisans and the population in the area in which the unit was located. After completing the task, the duration of stay in the unit was allowed for a time at the discretion of the worker himself, on the result of which he sent a report to the operational headquarters.

The task of the political department was: a) to explain to the soldiers and the population the goals of the struggle; 6) inspire fighters; c) raise the revolutionary spirit of the population, d) inspire them with the need to provide all possible and comprehensive assistance to the partisans. In localities joining the general popular movement, the political departments organized committees of the "new order of life". The commanders of brigades, regiments, and other military units contributed by all means to their work.

Upon arrival at the brigade or regiment, the agitprop and the army's organizational workers contacted the political workers and acted in full contact with them. Unauthorized resignation from the post of a political worker or in general his evasion from the performance of his duties entailed responsibility in wartime. The above sending of workers gave positive results, from a number of reports it is clear that meetings and organization of committees of the Union of the working peasantry were carried out successfully even in those places where the regiment was on vacation for 2-3 hours. When partisans appeared in the villages, volosts and villages, a general meeting of citizens was immediately convened, who for the most part willingly went to the training camp. The speaker in his speech showed the citizens a sad picture of the state of the country thanks to the three-year rule of the communists and the expediency of the peasants' speech. As stated in operational reports as a partisan army,

and red units, the citizens, imbued with the words of the speakers, expressed their deep sympathy for "the good undertaking of the liberation of the working population from the "yoke" of the communists" and passed resolutions with the following content: "We warmly welcome and bring heartfelt gratitude to the rebels who are burning with the desire to people from under the yoke, slavery, and we give the word in close connection shoulder to shoulder to go cheerfully and boldly to fight and help the rebellious people in an organized way, in order to protect ourselves from new attacks. With a bold onslaught, we will throw off the shackles of enslavement of illegal, inhuman communist robberies, brutal deeds and repressions. At the end of the rally, volunteers were signed up in many villages and the organization (in the absence) of committees of the Union of the Working Peasantry and the formation of a local detachment were immediately carried out. Nominated candidates for responsible positions were approved by district committees.

Command team. At the army headquarters, at the head of the commandant, there was a platoon commander, a clerk and a team of partisans. The regiments had from 3 to 5 commandants, whose duties included conducting searches, arrests and confiscation of property, as well as mandatory participation in

battles to collect a trophy taken from the enemy, and spying on partisans who leave the chain during battle without good reason.

Treasurer. There was one with each regiment, his duties included keeping all the treasury books and, upon every request, giving reports on the receipt and expenditure of cash sums.

consignment The convoy at the regiment was supposed to consist of 13 wagons, which were distributed as follows: sanitary, household, regimental offices - 1, office of the household unit - 1, drill office - 1, machine-gun (according to the number of machine guns). The head of the convoy supervised the serviceability of the convoy, such as: in relation to the wagons, the horse train, as well as monitoring the departure of the horses and monitoring the construction of the convoy in accordance with the instructions of the headquarters.

Counterkhokom. Takes account of the entire convoy and household parts of the regiment: horses, harness, wagons, food, uniforms, weapons, etc., for which he has lists, keeps receipts of food and fodder a day of contentment. Everything listed on the lists is handed over against receipt to the head of the convoy or the chief of the utility unit. Responsibility was established every three days, reports from the nachboz were checked weekly

and nachkhok.

Opsvodka. The duties of the head of the operations report were to collect information of a military-political nature, for which he always followed in front with a team of mounted scouts.

Horse Replacement Commission. The commission consisted of: a chairman, an assistant to the chairman, two members and a secretary. The function of the commission included the mobilization and supply of the army with horses. Horses were mobilized from owners who had two or more horses. The replacement of horses was carried out by owners who had one horse.

Khokhach. It consisted of a manager, an assistant, a clerk, a weapons manager (he is also a weapons master), two locksmiths and 13 wagonmen. The functions of the economic department included: the distribution of fodder and other materials coming to the economic department, the confiscation of property belonging to the communists and other persons by court order, as well as the acceptance of any property belonging to Soviet institutions.

Medical unit. The functions of the head of the sanitary department included: monitoring the situation of the wounded and sick in terms of uniforms, food and being on the road. Each regiment of the partisan army had a district with a dressing station, with which the medical staff of the regiment: a doctor, two paramedics, and each squadron had two orderlies. The quartering of the district was carried out jointly with the economic part of the regiment. All the ambulances of the squadrons, occupied by the sick, followed the paramedic's cart. The okolotki were supplied with all kinds of allowances by the economic part of the regiment. In order to provide prompt assistance to the wounded partisans during the battle, they were informed about the location of the dressing stations. The two orderlies in each squadron provided the first immediate assistance to the wounded. When moving, the neighborhood had one free wagon in case of sudden illnesses. Dressing stations during the battle, taking into account the strategic plan, moved out of the convoy closer to the battle line at a distance of 2-3 versts. Wounded and sick partisans were sent to the nearest local hospitals. It was the responsibility of the local committees to send partisans wounded in battle to hospitals and provide them with apartments, provisions and care.

Considering the scheme of the organization of the army and its establishment, the relationship with the Union of the working peasantry, it is necessary to state the fact that all of it was copied almost to the smallest detail.

details from the structure of the Red Army. Most of the commanders of armies, divisions, regiments of the Partisan Army of the Tambov Territory used to be commanders of Red Army units. Just as the RCP(b) was the guiding start in the construction of the Red Army, so

the head of the Main Operational Headquarters of Antonov was the provincial committee of the Union of Labor Peasants. To guide political work in the Red Army, there were political departments that carried out the party line on the instructions of the PUR, the same political departments were in Antonov's army, and Antonov had the same political committees in each regiment. Political officers and political workers in the Red Army are Antonov's political workers and agitators. The regimental courts were also modeled after the regimental courts of the Red Army, and the brigade, divisional, and army courts were modeled after the revolutionary military tribunals. Desertion from the ranks of the partisan army began - and Antonov fought against this phenomenon by organizing commanders. The existence and effectiveness of this structure is to a certain extent evident from the report of the agitator of the 1st partisan regiment F.S. Podkhvatilin to the Main Headquarters of the 1st Partisan Army about the state of the 8th Tokai regiment and the political state of the population of the Voronezh province: "1921, on January 22, I arrived as a campaign worker Podkhvatilin F.S. at the disposal of the Tokai 8th regiment. What I observed: the regiment is the headquarters of the regiment, which consists of the commander of the regiment Gromov, adjutant. In the office, one clerk Gridnev, the second clerk - Chetverikov. There are two typewriters in the office. At the regiment there is an infirmary, at the infirmary there is one doctor Vinogradov, a prison paramedic Popov, a junior paramedic Ananiev and sister Orlova, the rest are on duty at the infirmary, twelve sick and wounded people. The care of the sick is energetic, as well as medicines in sufficient quantities, there was no economic unit, but now there is a constant number of armed 300 combat cavalymen, corresponding to 60 infantry fighters and 150 unarmed infantry volunteers. One Maxim machine gun, serviceable. With a sufficient number of ribbons and a cartridge, 40 pieces of weapons for each militant, so that upon arrival the regiment is still observed at the proper height, it is just lame in political relations, there are no corresponding agitators. When I traveled through villages and villages, I observed that although committees exist in some places, they still do not know the definite goal of common achievement, in view of the fact that there were no orators, political

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workers who could shed light on the current moment and what we are achieving, but people who are in the villages and villages, all of the same conviction against the communists, along the way I set up rallies. I prepared programs and instructions, covered the procedures that should be in accordance with the established authority of the Provisional Government, people were satisfied with me, my visit, they already feel solid ground under them, and, having appeared at the location of the regiment, they immediately begin their duties, according to the developed instructions. - structures. On the 23rd of this month, a congress was appointed from four volosts of representatives for the election of district and volost committees, so I hope to put all political work here, as well as organization, to the proper height" [25].

PROPAGANDISM ACTIVITIES OF THE UNION OF WORKING PEASANTS AMONG THE POPULATION OF THE TAMBOV REGION

Yu.N. Podbelsky, a member of the Central Committee of the AKP, in his statement about the accusations of the party of socialist revolutionaries in organizing a peasant uprising in the Tambov region and about the Union of the working peasantry, wrote as follows: "The union of the working peasantry, organized in the spring of 1920 by the "right" "Left" S.-R., was defeated in the autumn of 1920 in the very first days of the uprising and had nothing in common with the "Tambov Provincial Union of the Working Peasantry", fabricated by Antonov already in the process of the uprising itself. This can be easily verified by comparing the programs of both unions. It is enough to become superficially familiar with the illiterate program that was worked out by this second Antonov Union and some of the points of which were also quoted in Izvestia of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (State Personal Credit and other pearls of literacy) in order not to mix two completely heterogeneous organizations. It is this union, headed by Antonov, and not P.S.-R., that is the leader of the Antonov movement, and all attempts to shift all the blame for the cruelties shown by the peasants in the fight against the cruelties of the opposite side to the union created in the spring of 1920 are in vain. , which, of course, did not "sanctify" any atrocities, because at the time of the uprising it no longer existed. Some similarity in the names of these two completely heterogeneous organizations gave the Cheka a pretext for everything that was done on behalf of the "Antonov" Union (the existing

th, it seems, more on paper), to dump on the shoulders of the deceased in the autumn, as a result of the arrests and flight of his leaders, the Union of the Working Peasantry, and, along the way, to P.S.-R. None of the comrades mentioned in the report of the Cheka, who were called "members of the Tambov Provincial Committee of the P.S.-R.", were actually members of the provincial committee" [26].

And it was true. The Union of the Working Peasantry, created at the congress of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, and the Union of the Working Peasantry, which was actually the party of the Partisan Army of the Tambov Territory and headed by G.N. Pluzhnikov, had only the name in common. Neither Antonov nor Pluzhnikov created a new Union of the working peasantry. Just in three districts - Tambov, Kirsanov and Borisoglebsk, the territory of which was controlled by the Partisan Army, the Socialist-Revolutionary regional committees of the Union of Labor Peasants were headed by Antonov's associates, adopted their own, different from the Socialist-Revolutionary, Charter of the Party, the program, elected their provincial committee and began to actively promote their views on the future of Russia, to organize volost and village committees of the Union of the working peasantry.

The Union of the Working Peasantry set its main task as "the overthrow of the power of the Communist Bolsheviks, who brought the country to poverty, death and shame." Among the political and economic goals in the Program of the Union of the Working Peasantry were named: the political equality of all citizens, without division into classes (though with the addition in one of the versions of the Program of the words: "excluding the houses of the Romanovs"); the convocation of a Constituent Assembly on the basis of universal and equal suffrage to "establish a new political order"; the creation of a temporary (until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly) government "on an elective basis", but without the Bolsheviks; partial denationalization of industry leaving "in the hands of the state" large-scale industry, especially coal and metallurgical industries; "workers' control and state supervision over production"; "implementation of the law on the socialization of land in its entirety"; "free production" in handicraft industry; supplying food and other essentials to "the population of towns and villages through cooperatives"; "regulation of prices for labor and products of production" in state industry; "admission of Russian and foreign capital" for the restoration of economic life, etc.

The program of the Tambov Provincial Union of the Working Peasantry as a whole was a document of broad democratic content with a noticeable Socialist-Revolutionary influence and with obvious contradictions generated by the specifics of the peasant revolutionary ideology. Such a contradiction was the exclusion of the "house of the Romanovs" and "communists" from among those who were granted proclaimed democratic rights. In this series is also the announcement of the "cessation of the Civil War" as the goal of the "armed struggle" waged by the partisan detachments of the Union of the Working Peasantry, in other words, as the goal of the Civil War.

Let us note one more characteristic feature of the Program of the Tambov Union of the Working Peasantry as a political document: the Law on the socialization of the land, the implementation of which is named among the program requirements, was attributed to the Constituent Assembly, although in reality it was adopted on January 27 (February 8), 1918 The United (III) Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, led by the Bolsheviks and the Left SRs. The authors of the Program could not be unaware of this, but they saw their task in the struggle for the Constituent Assembly, against Soviet power.

The Provincial Committee consisted of three members: Ishin, who carried out agitation and organizational work in Kirsanov Uyezd; Shamov, who carried out propaganda and organizational work in the Borisoglebsky district, and Pluzhnikov (Batko), who carried out propaganda and organizational work in the Tambov district, at the same time he was the head of the political bureau of the headquarters of the 1st Army and a representative at the headquarters of the army, considered, together with members of the army headquarters, plans for operational actions with the Soviet troops. The provincial committee had an agitation department, the personnel of which were political workers and agitators of the army.

The program of the Union of the Working Peasantry determined the main goals, political and economic tasks of the STK.

The program of the STK proclaimed: "The Union of the working peasantry sets as its first task the overthrow of the power of the Communist Bolsheviks, who brought the country to poverty, death and disgrace, in order to destroy this hated government and its order, the Union, organizing volunteer partisan detachments, conducts an armed struggle" [27:77].

The goals of the Union of the working peasantry.

- "1. Political equality of all citizens, without dividing into classes.
2. Termination of the Civil War and the establishment of a peaceful life.
3. All-round assistance in establishing a lasting peace with all foreign powers.
4. Convocation of the Constituent Assembly on the principle of equal universal direct and secret suffrage, without prejudice to its will in choosing the establishment of a political system, with the right for voters to recall representatives who do not fulfill the will of the people.
5. From now on, until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, the establishment of provisional power in the localities and in the center on an elective basis by the unions and parties participating in the struggle against the communists.
6. Freedom of speech, press, conscience, unions and assembly.
7. Implementation of the law on the socialization of land in its entirety, adopted and approved by the former Constituent Assembly.
8. Satisfaction with basic necessities, primarily food, of the population of the city and countryside through cooperatives.
9. Regulation of prices for labor and products of production of factories and plants under the jurisdiction of the state.
10. Partial denationalization of factories and factories, large-scale industry, coal and metallurgical, should be in the hands of the state.
11. Workers' control and state supervision over production.
12. Allowing Russian and foreign capital to restore the economic and economic life of the country.
13. Immediate restoration of political and trade and economic relations with foreign powers.
14. Free self-determination of the peoples inhabiting the former Russian Empire.
15. Opening a broad public loan for the restoration of small farms.
16. Free production of handicraft industry.
17. Free teaching at school and compulsory universal literacy.
18. Volunteer partisan detachments organized and operating today should not be disbanded until the Constituent Assembly has been convened and the issue of a standing army has been resolved by it."

The STK program was presented as a document of the Tambov Provincial Committee of the Union of the Working Peasantry [27: 77-78].

The charter of the STK gave the following definition: "The Union of the working peasantry is an organization of peasants, which has set as its goal the overthrow of the power of the Communist-Bolsheviks."

The charter determined the rules for joining the Union: members of the Union could be persons of both sexes over the age of 18; the members of the Union had to strictly observe the discipline adopted by the Union; persons wishing to enter the Union must declare this to the local committee of the Union; the committee that has accepted the application of a person wishing to enter the Union reports this to the general meeting of the Union for its satisfaction; in order to join the Union, it was necessary to have the guarantee of two members of the Union, and where there is no Union, the committee creates it. In the event that the entire population of a society joins the Union, the approval of the protocol and the list is submitted to the volost congress of the Union. Before their approval by the congress, the societies are considered to have entered the Union with the prior consent of the volost committee. The Union accepted persons who fully shared its program and tasks; persons belonging to the communist or monarchist parties could not be admitted to the Union.

The rules for exclusion from the Union were defined. Those who did not attend general meetings of the Union without good reason were excluded up to three times; not subject to the discipline of the Union; immorally behaving, compromising the Union itself; defamed by the court for theft, robbery, murder, arson, espionage, etc.

Norms were introduced on the general meeting of members of the Union. The general meeting, the congress of the Union is convened as needed. The initiative to convene a general meeting or congress belonged to the committees. If necessary, committees were allowed to convene general meetings or congresses at the request of at least one third of the Union. The general meeting was considered competent with two thirds of the assembled members of the Union. Two hours after the second announcement, the meeting was considered eligible for any number of people present.

The Charter stated that the Charter is taken as a basis and can be supplemented by the district, provincial and All-Union Congress [28].

The main activities of the committees of the Union of the Working Peasantry were: agitation and organizational work among the population of villages, volosts and villages; the formation of detachments and the preparation of replenishment for partisan military formations;

supplying food to the families of the partisans and, to some extent, supplying the partisans; maintenance of internal regulations and structure of committees; carrying out guard-intelligence service and communication service; storage of weapons, supplies, equipment, etc.; supply of partisans; attack and disarmament of small military formations of the Soviet army. The leaders of the Union of the Working Peasantry paid special attention to organizing political and propaganda work among the peasants. The work is carried out in accordance with the instructions and regulations on committees [9].

Work on the organization of district, volost and village committees of the Union of the working peasantry and their duties were established by special instructions. Here is the Instruction approved by the Borisoglebsk district congress on December 26, 1920.

The district committee was supposed to consist of five people: the chairman, four members - heads of departments "A" (general), "B" (political), "C" (military) and economic. Volost committees were also to consist of five members: one chairman and four members, if necessary, the right of co-optation was granted with the permission of the county committee. The village committees were to be organized with three members: one chairman and two members. The members of the committees were elected by the general meeting of the Union of Working Peasants. The secretaries were invited persons.

Under the committees, armed teams of internal security were organized: 10 people under district committees, 5 people under volost committees, and 2 people under rural ones. In the villages bordering on the fortified points of the communists, armed teams were created as needed with the notification of the county committee.

The responsibilities of the committees were clearly defined. Keep close contact between yourself and the communications department under the county committee at least once a day. Follow the movement of the Red troops and espionage. Detained spies are to be brought to court at the county committee, small enemy detachments, if such are within the power of local guards, to be nipped in the bud. Arbitrarily absent partisans from the detachment should be detained and sent to the nearest detachments, in case of their resistance, disarmed and reported to those detachments from which the partisans left. Follow the robberies, murders and fires seen in this detain and send to court as bandits. Committee members were to be armed as much as possible. The protection of the people's property, whatever it may be. Strictly

to prosecute persons involved in the brewing of moonshine, those convicted of this to bring to justice. Notify the Red Army men who came on vacation so that they do not return to their units, guided by the order of the military headquarters. Provide food assistance to the extent possible to persons, primarily those who take part in the struggle, and their families. The committees must report weekly on their activities to the highest authority. All orders of the provincial committee and the county committee must be carried out accurately and accurately. Do not allow horses and bread to be sold from the rebellious region to other areas [29].

The work of the district committees of the Union of the Working Peasantry was regulated by instructions.

The district committee was to consist of a chairman, an assistant chairman, a secretary and two members. For special assignments, the committee had to have at its disposal the headquarters of a cavalry detachment of 20 people. At volost committees, detachments of 1 person, in villages - 2 each person.

The instruction in the duties of the committee included the following issues: to keep close contact with the partisan detachment and village committees at least once a day, for this it was the duty of one soldier to promote his work to the nearest villages in other regions. The committee was supposed to monitor the movement of the Red troops and spies. The committee and the headquarters of the cavalry detachment were charged with the duty to monitor the unauthorized absence from the partisan detachment without the leave of the commander and the committee, to detain and escort them to the partisan detachment with an escort. The committee was supposed to inform all millers that they should take the 15th measure for work, if pure bread, and if with quinoa, then the 20th measure. The card system was completely abolished. The committee was supposed to inform all the oil workers so that they would take one pound of butter and 250 rubles in money from the laying for their work, but they would not leave the cake in their favor. Volost and village committees themselves had to be armed as needed and could use the district cavalry detachment [30].

The committees of the Union of the Working Peasantry expanded their activities, this was facilitated by the growth of the insurgent army and its successes. In this regard, let us refer to the minutes of the plenary meeting of representatives of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th regiments of the combat squad of the Tambov Territory dated December 16, 1920. "Having heard the report of a member of the provincial committee

Batko about the current moment, in which the situation of the present moment clearly loomed, namely, the weakening of the communist government, the apathetic attitude of the members of the Communist Party to their own role, the increasing development of partisan ranks, a partial manifestation on the faces of peasant plowmen and a downtrodden maximum of the intelligentsia, the enormous desire of grain growers to join the ranks of the partisans and, in general, the negative attitude of the population towards the Soviet-Communist government, with the exception, of course, of only a small handful of Communists themselves, which this fact is confirmed by observing the population, decided: to express gratitude to Comrade Batko for clarifying such provisions we desire, to distribute among the population appeals to the peasant farmers, the intelligentsia, deserters and others, calling for the speedy overthrow of the obscure, ignorant and so rude executioner - the communist government, with an exact explanation of why the partisan detachments were created, and what they want to do for the oppressed and impoverished population of Russia. Long live the speedy unification of the population under the banner "In the struggle you will find your right!" [31].

The cells of the STK came out of the underground, local rural authorities were formed in the person of the committees of the Union of the working peasantry. For the most part, local citizens were elected to the committees, and under the field workers they dressed in the uniform of political workers of the army and were partly attached to units whose task was: to explain the goals of the struggle among the soldiers and the population, to inspire the fighters, to raise the revolutionary spirit of the fighters and the population, to inspire the necessary the need for disciplined performance of official duties, the need for the population of the need for all possible and comprehensive assistance to the partisans, along with which to organize STK committees in unorganized villages. Another part of the workers, being directly under the control of the political bureau, was sent to the regions for agitational organizational work, the results of which are evidenced by the fact that by the beginning of April 1921 there were up to 900 district, volost and village committees, mainly in Tambov, Borisoglebsk and Kirsanovsky counties [32].

The committees of the Union of the working peasantry were under the authority of the military command.

So, in the order of the commander of the 8th Tokai regiment to the village committees of the Union of the working peasantry in January 1921, it was ordered to divide the entire village or village into hundreds, out of every hundred

to choose 2 representatives each, who should be in the field, they are only required to appear at all district congresses. The STK committees were instructed to compile a list for all available livestock (cows, calves, horses, sheep, pigs) and a list for all citizens aged 19 to 40, both permanently and temporarily residing in a village or village. All lists for citizens and livestock had to be in place until further notice. For failure to comply with this instruction, the perpetrators were subjected to a military revolutionary court [33].

On the whole, an analysis of the structure and activities of the Union of the Working Peasantry shows them to be democratic both in terms of the method of election and composition. Even the negatively colored KGB reports did not deny the benevolent attitude of the peasantry towards the STK. The extraordinary nature of the situation left a strong military imprint on all the activities of the Union of the Working Peasantry and did not allow determining the direction and prospects for their development as future organs of people's power. In the very structure of the STK, elements of the future party were visible (centralism, meetings of supporters, possible membership in them). Many decisions and actions of the Union of the working peasantry copied the Soviet political commissars and political departments. In the units and formations of the army of A. Antonov, there was the strictest "accounting and control", severe punishments for misconduct "according to the laws of the revolutionary time", etc. However, like the Soviet government, it was forced to take tough measures similar to "war communism", primarily on the allotment system of material support for the army. The similarity in the organization and ideology of the revolutionary forces opposing each other was manifested in many ways, up to the appeal "comrade" and the red banner.

The directions of activity of the Union of the Working Peasantry are visible from the Instructions to the STK committees on the procedure for their activities. They had to monitor the exact receipt of grain from the mills at the disposal of the committee and issue such receipts to the owners of the mills. When voluntarily collecting donations of grain and fodder, draw up acts and keep them in the affairs of the committee. At the request of the commanders of units or individual partisans traveling on business, supply them and keep records of the supply, indicating the document number of those traveling. Satisfy, as far as possible, voluntary donations to partisans in need of

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and shoes. Satisfy the passing troops with food and fodder that the householder has on hand.

The duty of the STK committees. There was a replacement of horses at the request of unit commanders and at the request of individual passing partisans on business. This duty was signed down to the details. Firstly, foal mares should never be taken. Secondly, if there is

one horse (gelding suitable for a combat situation), this can be replaced. Thirdly, if there are two horses, of which one is about two years old, and the second is fit for a campaign, then the latter must be replaced. Fourthly, if there are three horses, one of which is about 2 years old, and the other two are fit for a trip, then one of the last can be withdrawn without replacement, and the second with a replacement. Fifthly, if a citizen has 2 or 3 horses that are not fit for a hike, but fit for work, and another has one horse fit for a hike, then that one can be taken, replaced by the horse of the first. The committees of the STK were supposed to give junk horses attached to the committee to the horseless. Keep a strict watch over the partisans brought in and the horses left at home, which are to be selected and kept at the disposal of the committee.

The committees had to ensure that all passing partisans had documents, and sent them to headquarters without documents. Take measures with the help of the militia to send deserters to the troops and arrest those who do not obey such an order and send them to headquarters along with weapons and a horse with an escort. Monitor the timely departure of the partisans after the release to the troops, with those who refused to act in accordance with the 10th paragraph. The guerrilla of your region, who declared the disease, should be sent to the nearest hospital for testimony and the issuance of a certificate of illness by a doctor, leave at home. Send those wounded in battle to hospitals and provide them with apartments, provisions and care. All property handed over by parts or organizations, to be accepted and sent at the direction of the handler, issuing a receipt to the handler. Monitor the non-export of grain, fodder and livestock in unorganized areas. Carefully monitor the issuance of passes and issue them only to trustworthy persons with a seal and written in ink. Detain all suspicious persons, not letting them through without asking, such as: women, potters, beggars, and after asking, deliver them to the headquarters. Detain communist spies and send them to headquarters under heavy escort. In no case should there be opening packages and breaking seals.

Ensure accurate and timely dispatch of packages. Upon the distribution of bread to the families of the partisans and the population, there must be a thorough examination by the members of the committee, which is not available, and on the application of the applicant for the allowance there must be a note of the member inspecting the bread, signed by him. Monitor the moonshine race and nip it in the bud by bringing moonshiners to justice. Issue fuel to the population, and only from the specified areas. Monitor theft, robbery, murder and arrest and bring the guilty to justice. With the help of the militia, follow the guards and posts in the villages, set up outposts on the main roads. Prevent unauthorized arrests, searches and confiscation of property. To prevent unauthorized massacres of the population with suspicious persons and prisoners. To root out bribery and bring the perpetrators to justice. Monitor the careful execution of military orders. To nip in the bud the game of cards and for money and bring the guilty to justice.

It is noteworthy that this instruction to the committees of the Union of the Working Peasantry on the procedure for their activities was drawn up on the basis of the order of the 1st Army No. 23 paragraph 1 of February 24, 1921 [34].

The committees of the Union of the Working Peasantry were actually authorities in the areas where the insurgent army operated. This was admitted in the report by V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko in the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on the state of affairs in the Tambov province and the fight against the insurgent movement on July 20, 1921. It said:

"1. In five uyezds, up to 900 village committees were created, elected by gatherings, united by volost, then district, uyezd, and finally provincial committees of the STK.

2. The STK Committee performs the main functions of the authority. In the military field, he organizes replenishment of volunteers or conducts, on the orders of the "headquarters", mobilization into a bandit regiment recruited in the given area. He organizes the collection of money, food and clothing for the partisans, organizes medical care for them and assistance to their families. He, through the "commandant's office", is in charge of quartering bandit gangs, changing horses, organizing communications and reconnaissance. In support of the Committee, in order to fight against the small parties of the "Reds" and promoters of the "Reds", as well as to maintain communication, the committee organizes "vokhra"

(internal. protection in the amount of 5 to 50 people per village). The STK Committee also carries out general economic and administrative work.

3. On the basis of the territorial system, a number of bandit "regiments" were created. On paper, there were exact states, in fact, the "regiments" were simply a collection of varying degrees of organization (from 2 to 7 squadrons), different numbers (from 200 to 2000 sabers) and weapons (a significant part were almost without weapons), most on horseback, walking as an exception. The headquarters developed precise orders and instructions, but these rules were rarely followed. Under the regiments, there were quite correct reconnaissance (horse), a machine-gun team, communications (horse), a well-placed office, an economic unit, a commission for replacing horses, a convoy (a very lightweight type according to the states, in fact often extremely cumbersome), regiment - howling court, sometimes a special "executioner", political department (political workers). The main measure of punishment in the disciplinary charter is flogging (from 2 lashes by the authorities separated to 20 - by the regimental committee and higher by the court), the next measure is execution. The fight against looting, drunkenness, gambling, judging by the orders, was carried out stubbornly, but did not give any results [35].

The committees of the Union of the Working Peasantry turned to the peasants on political and economic issues and, as a rule, received support. Thus, the Tambov Provincial Committee of the Union of the Working Peasantry wrote in its appeal:

"In the struggle you will find your right!

Peasants and workers!

Believe, peasant and worker, in a speedy and final victory over your sworn enemy, the communist rapist, the enslaver and violator of your sacred and inalienable rights: the rights to land, to your own labor, the right to freely dispose of it, according to your needs and requirements. . The ranks of fighters for the fulfillment of your holy desires, such as: "Free Union of the Peasantry and Workers," grow and increase every day, and the time is not far off, that hour when a powerful cry will rush from end to end of all enslaved Russia, escaping from the breasts of many millions of peasants and workers: "Long live a new free life with a government that truly expresses the will of the working people!" Then the true kingdom of labor will come, labor will be higher than all other aspects of life, and the peasant and the worker will be his immediate hosts.

Peasant and worker, you raised the banner of insurrection with the slogan: "Union of the peasantry and workers," so go boldly and straight along that outlined path to the realization of your cherished thoughts, indicate

them whom you have your red banner. Hold it tight so that no dishonest hand can tear it from your calloused hands. We repeat once again what should be your symbol of faith: "Faith in your own strength and victory, power only to the working people" [36].

Appeals were also addressed to the Red Army. One of them said:

"Brothers of the Red Army!

Remember, who are you fighting? This is not a gang, but a peasant uprising. We rose up in order to liberate the citizens from the commune. Red Army soldiers, we extend our brotherly hand to you. Let's fight together. Together we will throw off this torment and arrange our lives in an amicable way. The Communists, the Jews, pitted us. We began to kill each other. Eh! How much of our blood they shed in vain, and we forgive them! Stop, why are we killing our brothers? We want to restore the good life. Necessity made us fight. And you, our brothers, decide to suppress the uprising. Brothers of the Red Army, you do the opposite, hand over your weapons. Who - after all, the people rebelled. There you help us, the partisans, do not put out the fire. Let the flame of rebellion burn brighter. The people rose up to save themselves. This fire promises a fat life ahead. Then the annoying war will stop, each of you will get down to business. We will all disperse to our homes. Soon the industry will develop again. After all, the Communards interfere with this, they embittered the peasants,

raked all the barns, they made partisans out of the people. You are tired of fighting, the communists have mobilized you. They gave you weapons and sent them to fight against their brothers. Anyone who sympathizes with the partisans will never shoot at them, but they will hand over their weapons. Who shoots is the enemy, those partisans will beat.

Long live our Red Army brothers!

Long live the union of all peasants!

Long live our leader Antonov!" [37].

The insurgent army attached great importance to agitation and propaganda work both directly in military units and among the population. In the army units and in the committees of the Union of the Working Peasantry, a large staff of workers was engaged in this work.

In addition to political workers in the propaganda departments, there were so-called "editors" who compiled appeals, leaflets and edited appeals coming from the army headquarters, which were approved by a member of the provincial committee Batko. Police led by Chief Chichkanov

carried out guard and intelligence service, monitored antisocial offenses, brought those who were noticed in something to account. The connection with the provincial committee of the Union of the working peasantry consisted of 3 people headed by D.G. Pluzhnikov (son of Batko), she was exclusively engaged in maintaining communication with the army headquarters and military formations of the partisan army located in the Kamensky district. The specific indication of this area was explained by the fact that the quartering of the workers of the provincial committee of the Union of Labor Peasants was in this village. The task of the office at the provincial committee, consisting of 3 people, of which two clerks, one of them acted as a secretary and one as a machinist, was to give certain instructions to the county and district committees by order of Pluzhnikov. These technical workers were not involved in any business of the provincial committee. The Gubernia Committee of the Union of the Working Peasantry was in charge of the overall management of organizational work in the districts and propaganda work among the population and in military units. The organizational work of the committees was carried out by specially designated organizers for the districts, but they were not assigned to the districts. These workers, having organized the case, entrusted it to be conducted by a temporarily selected one from the population, and themselves, receiving an order from the provincial committee, went to the next district.

The nature of agitation and propaganda work is visible from the Instructions of the Operational Headquarters of the 1st Partisan Army to agitation workers. It stated that campaign workers were employees at the army headquarters, which sent them at their discretion to army brigades to work among partisan soldiers and the population in the area in which the brigade operates. After work, the duration of which was given to the discretion of the worker, he made a report on its results at the operational headquarters.

The tasks of propaganda work are: a) to find out among the soldiers and the population the goals of the struggle, b) to inspire the fighters, c) to raise the revolutionary spirit of the population, d) to inspire the population with the need for all possible and comprehensive assistance to the partisans. In localities joining the general popular movement, agitation workers had to organize committees for a new order of life. Commanders of brigades, regiments and other military units and committees assisted their work in every way.

The propaganda workers of the headquarters, upon arrival from the brigade, contacted the regimental propaganda workers and acted with

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them in full contact. Unauthorized departure from the post of a campaign worker and evasion from the performance of their duties entailed liability in wartime [38].

There were only three county committees: Tambov, Borisoglebsk and Kirsanov. Ukom had departments - food, political, military, communications, court and police. The general work of the ukom was supervised by the chairman, the person supervising the work of the departments was the deputy chairman. The food department kept records of food by districts and volosts and, according to the availability, made orders, such as, for example, taking into account products, industrial enterprises: mills, presses, grain processed by mills, etc.

The military department supervised the work of the district and volost military departments in the field of the correct formulation of the case, issued orders regarding the formation of detachments, the preparation of replenishment of partisan units, the conduct of mobilizations, etc.

The political department, which had at its disposal political workers, agitators and organizers, sent them to the districts and volosts for the purpose of agitation and organizational work, controlled the work of district and volost committees, rallied the masses around rebel committees.

The militia, headed by the chief, was directly subordinate to the chief of the provincial militia in operational terms. The district police team was directly subordinate to the chief and, on his orders, carried out searches, seizures, confiscations, requisitions and arrests. During each search, arrest, confiscation or requisition, the sent militiaman invited a member of the local committee and two witnesses, in whose presence he drew up a protocol. Each policeman in the course of the operation had to behave decently, treat citizens decorously and humanely, and in case he was not able to deal with the matter on the spot, invite citizens to the chief. A policeman, who noticed any case that harms the people or one person, and in case of no delay, was obliged to immediately take measures to stop and prevent the crime and immediately report to the head. The policeman could not go anywhere without the permission of the chief. Every day, the senior team appointed one duty officer and his assistant to the daily duty.

In February 1921, a special instruction was adopted by the provincial committee of the Union of the working peasantry and the headquarters of the 1st partisan

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army about the duties of the militia. According to the instructions, the duties of the police included the following. Accurate and irreproachable execution of all orders of the chief of police and committees. Monitor the exact execution by private individuals of all orders emanating from the military and civil authorities. Carry out alternating day and night duty as assigned by the committee or the chief of police. Monitor the distribution of posts and outposts. Monitor and nip in the bud the moonshine race and bring the guilty to justice. Detain all suspicious persons and, after questioning, send them to the committee. Check documents of passing partisans and detain, send to the headquarters without documents. Monitor the timely departure to the regiments of partisans who arrived on vacation. Carefully observe the partisans arriving home, and if they do not have legal documents, send them to the headquarters. Keep an eye on the partisans so that they do not leave their war horses for domestic needs, and the regiment does not leave on bad horses. Follow the drive of the second horses and select those, giving them to their partisans, who will declare that their horses are unfit for battle (conclusion of a veterinarian). Do not allow the export of grain to unorganized areas. Watch out for espionage, communist propaganda. Do not allow unauthorized searches and arrests, no matter who they come from. Witnesses from local residents and one of the family members must be present during searches. During the confiscation of property, an inventory of the confiscated property must be drawn up, and under it must be the signatures of the owner of the house, witnesses and police officials. Monitor robberies, thefts, murders, and arrest those responsible for this and bring them to court. Do not allow unauthorized reprisals against captured suspicious persons. Provide any assistance to military units at their request. Prevent bribery at the root and bring those responsible to justice. The police must be armed with firearms or cold weapons [39].

The police officer on duty was obliged to monitor the actions of the enemy, posting observers, where necessary, from the citizens of the village, to know the quartering of the team. When moving from one village to another, he should be the first to go to the village, where he should post observers and appoint apartments. Change happened daily. Not a single policeman had the right to enter the presidium of the ukom without work and had to report everything to the chief.

The court was in charge of investigating only accused civilians and those politically suspected of loyalty.

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communism, criminal, civil offenses, etc. Accused and detained in the specified nature of the crimes were sent to the county court.

The communications team established communications with military units and nearby committees of the Union of the Labor Peasantry, instructed district and volost communications teams. The head of communications was directly subordinate to the chairman of the ukom.

For more flexible administration, the counties were divided into several districts. Tambov and Borisoglebsk counties had four districts each. The district committee included the general, political, food and military departments, the court, the police, the communications team, the heads of the departments were members of the district committee, at the same time being members of the court. The functions of the district committee included the execution of various orders and orders applicable to local conditions, coming from both the ukom and the provincial committee.

The food department kept accurate records of food products, collected donations for the needs of the partisan army and distributed the registered products among the population, mostly and primarily to satisfy the families of the partisans. Moreover, the registration was carried out by means of a list system (household lists), in addition, the functions of the food department included the registration of cattle and horses, with which the military formations of the partisan army are supplied:

At the head of the political department was a member of the district committee. The functions of the political department included controlling the bodies subordinate to the district committee - volost and village committees and conducting agitation and organizational work among the population, explaining to citizens the goal of the struggle and pointing out the need to provide all kinds of assistance to the partisans. The commandant of the vohra team was part of the department.

The military department carried out the formation of detachments initially by voluntary registration, later, taking into account the population in terms of age and political relations and, according to the order of the ukom or any formation, carried out mobilization. In most cases, this is what happens - the presidium of the district committee at its meeting singled out one citizen, entrusted him with the formation of a detachment. The detachment for 3-5 days at first carried out independent actions in the form of an attack on small combat units of the Soviet troops, dismantling railway lines and killing individual Soviet workers, and then merged into other detachments or merged

several teams together. Thus, regiments were formed, which was brought to the attention of the Main Operational Headquarters, which assigned the number and name of the regiment, indicating which army it was subordinate to. At the military department there was a commandant who took an active part in the formation of the detachment and the fight against espionage, counter-revolution and the like. The functions of the vohra at the military department included carrying out internal security, setting up outposts in the village, posts and guard duty, protecting the public property: forests, estates, structures, as well as conducting independent operational actions, patrols, reconnaissance and etc.

The functions of the general department, headed by a member of the district committee, included monitoring and maintaining internal regulations.

The militia was under the jurisdiction of the district committee, at the same time obeyed the orders of the county militia.

The functions of the communication team included establishing communication with the committees and nearby military units of the partisan army, mutual information with the units about the actions taken. The composition of the communication team was insignificant, and therefore private citizens were often involved in carrying out the instructions of the committees, expressed in the delivery of certain packages by appointment.

Each district included several volosts, the local volost authorities were subject to various orders and orders of the district authorities. The volost committee was divided into militia, economic department, military department and communications. The general work was supervised by the chairman and the deputy of the chairman. The technical execution of the work of the presidium lay with the co-opted secretary.

The police, together with the vokhra, carried out guard and reconnaissance service, monitored the movement of Soviet troops, espionage and persons spreading false rumors, watched partisans who left for one reason or another, and arbitrarily arrested those who had left and sent them back to the unit, fought against criminal and antisocial offenses, all those suspected of this were sent to the court of the district committee.

The functions of the economic unit, the communications team and the military department are the same as those of the district committee, only with the change that the protection of the public domain was in charge military department.

Rural committees were subordinated to the volost according to the number of villages, villages and farms in each volost separately. Changes are only

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in that the vokhra acts independently, reporting to the chairman of the committee, there was no communication team, and its functions were performed by the police in addition to their duties and, in addition, the local “trustworthy” population was used.

The committees and their departments were headed by citizens predominantly of the prosperous class, but in some places there was also the poorest peasantry for the reasons that the committees in other places were formed on an elective basis by open voting, and in other places even those who were appointed by the highest bodies were appointed. persons whose family members or relatives were in the ranks of the Red Army. At the same time, the appointed chairman of the highest body was an active participant in the insurrectionary movement, in order to monitor the activities of the members.

The weapons of the vokhra and the police were formed from the stock prepared during the work of the STK committee and which, for one reason or another, was in the hands of citizens, and the replenishment took place by capturing from small Soviet detachments with which they had to fight, and disarming individual Red Army soldiers, taken prisoner while they were in organized villages.

For the most part, the armament consisted of berdans, sawn-off shotguns and rifles of various designs and an average number of cartridges. All surplus weapons were sent through the military departments to the army headquarters or, at his direction, were surrendered to military formations.

The organization of espionage and informing the committees was up to the mark. From a number of documents available in archival files, it can be seen that espionage, mainly at railway stations, was staged by individuals who were in the service of Soviet institutions, such as, for example, at Zherdevka and Volkonskaya stations. Behind the signature of the pseudonyms, indicating the echelons with Soviet troops that were and were passing through the stations, it was indicated when the units arrived, their weapons, numbers, condition, mood, political composition and route, which unit is on guard duty, where it sets up posts, their weapons, where an armored aircraft plies, the mood of the population, and a plan was also given here

attacks. Spies were divided into two groups according to the nature of the transmission of information: one group transmitted information about the international situation (excerpts from newspapers). All the information received by the wolf was systematized and sent to the army headquarters in one general report, and a copy was passed on to the provincial committee. Second

a way of espionage was to cross the front line in the areas occupied by Soviet troops, from where they made their way to the city: some with the intention of finding out the state of Soviet power, others simply for the purpose of speculation. But in the end, the result is the same, because, being in the city, through personal observation and having relatives and acquaintances who lived in the city or even served in Soviet institutions, starting a conversation on topical topics, referring to Antonov, citizens told coming from the village about everything that is happening in the city. The information received upon arrival at the place of residence was immediately transferred to the committee, from where, through the communications service, the information was urgently conveyed to the provincial committee and the army headquarters.

The leaflet "Why the Bolsheviks Can't Beat Antonov" revealed the Antonovites' vision of the origins of their victories and defeats of the red units [40].

"Almost six months ago, a peasant uprising began in several districts of the Tambov province. Exhausted by the yoke of the Soviet autocracy, ruined to the ground by the state apportionment, driven to despair by the unrestrained revelry of local communists and various visiting agents, swollen from swans, the peasants finally could not stand it and almost with their bare hands rushed at their oppressors. With pitchforks and axes, they went headlong into rifles, machine guns and guns. And a few days later the rebels already had both rifles and machine guns. The movement, which began in two or three volosts, spread further and further. At the present time we see that the Kirsanovsky, Borisoglebsky and Tambov districts are completely occupied by the rebels. Instead of separate small gangs, which were in the month of August and September, we see dozens of cavalry regiments, beautifully armed, with machine guns and even guns. These regiments are constantly moving, jokingly repulsing all attacks by the Reds on them, and every day they grow and grow. At the head of this movement stands the tried and tested fighter for people's freedom, the Social Revolutionary Antonov. Who is Antonov, what did he do for the people, this is not worth talking about, since all this work is in full view of all the peasants of the Tambov province. One thing must be said, that there is no more hateful name for the Bolsheviks than Antonov; to him they ascribe the chief role in the insurrectionary movement, and in this they are quite right. It is not for nothing that the Bolsheviks even the very movement

called Antonovshchina.

The Bolsheviks use all their strength to defeat Antonov, to destroy the Antonovshchina, but it turns out just the opposite. The Antonovshchina is growing and growing - almost a whole army has grown out of small detachments, which is beginning to disturb not only the Tambov, but even the Moscow communists.

What is the strength of this Antonovshchina, why have the Bolsheviks still not been able to crush Antonov, as they have more than once intended? And will they be able to defeat Antonov at all and destroy the popular movement in the Tambov province? These questions should be of interest to all who have not lost faith in the Russian peasantry, and a truthful answer to these questions will clarify to many what remains unclear to them. We will answer these questions.

Despite all the efforts of the Bolsheviks to denigrate the peasant movement with all sorts of vile and slanderous fabrications, despite the shameful names (bandits and robbers) by which they call the insurgents, everyone knows very well that the insurgents are the true working peasantry, which with its hump fed and feeds the entire Russia, which does not get away with corns. Exhausted, tormented and hungry, these diggers rose with their breasts against their oppressors and decided: either die or win, there is no turning back and cannot be, that is their motto. The rebels have an idea - a free life in a free state. Going into battle, they know for sure what they are dying for, and this is their strength. Inspiration, valor and heroism, these traits are inherent in every rebel. And if we add to this that for the most part the rebels

— old soldiers, who bore the great German war on their shoulders, then it will become clear to everyone what kind of force those whom the brainless Bolsheviks call bandits are. And what are the valiant red troops, who, regiment after regiment, rush into the Tambov province and disappear without a trace here. This is truly rubbish! A thousand mobilized young people who did not even have the courage to be a deserter, a dozen other communist hooligans, a mass of cartridges and machine guns - that's the red regiments for you.

The brave with the women and old men, mobilized at one approach, the partisans drop their rifles and surrender without a fight. The communists fight desperately, knowing that a sad fate awaits them, but what can a dozen or two even desperate brave men do against the superior forces of the rebels? With threats and executions, the communists force those mobilized into battle to go, and those who, at the first convenience,

otherwise drop the weapon. This is where the rebels get tens of thousands of rifles, machine guns, millions of rounds of ammunition, saddles and other equipment. So it was and so it will continue, because the Soviet government has no other, better army. This means that in the future this valiant Red Army will only replenish Antonov's people's army with military equipment, but this rabble cannot offer any serious resistance to the rebels. How many Bolsheviks told about the Budyonnovists, in whom they had all hope! Where are they? They were and, like smoke, dissipated. The army, which fought well on the fronts against the Poles and Wrangel, turned out to be powerless against a handful of partisans, some surrendered and some fled. The Bolsheviks could not and will not be able to assemble detachments from some communists, since there are few hunters among them to expose their foreheads to bullets. To be a commissar, to flog old men and women with a whip, to get drunk, to walk around in expensive fur coats and gold—this is the real occupation of the Communists, and they send mobilized people to fight the partisans. What did the Bolsheviks do to suppress the popular uprising? Absolutely nothing, and all they did was only fan the fire. Merciless executions, beatings of the right and the wrong, senseless burning of houses and bread, wild robbery of property and peasants, taking hostages of all who did not take part in the movement - all this led to the fact that the most timid were forced to go to the insurgents. The houses are old and small.

The Bolsheviks themselves now understand what they have done, and with their last orders (the abolition of execution, requisitions, and the like) they want to win the peasantry over to their side. Peasants know how to guess wolves in sheep's clothing.

The Bolsheviks are doing their best to show that such a movement occurs only in one Tambov province. But you cannot hide an awl in a sack, and everyone now knows that the wave of popular uprisings is rising higher and higher. In the provinces of Voronezh, Kursk, and Saratov, the peasants, with weapons in their hands, also go against their enslavers. Don and Ukraine are completely embraced by the uprising. Siberia is gradually beginning to rebuff the Bolshevik autocracy. And there is no doubt that by the spring the cauldron of popular anger will boil even stronger. You, brother-peasants of the Tambov province, are not alone in your struggle. True, there are too few intellectuals in our ranks, but know that your peasant party of socialist revolutionaries is coming to your aid. Only a few days ago the congress of members of the

The Constituent Assembly, at which the majority decided to support the Socialist Revolutionaries in every possible way, and these, through the mouths of their best leaders Chernov, Kerensky, Avksentiev, announced that they would wage an armed struggle against the Bolsheviks. So, help is not far off. Take heart, brother peasants, know that the Soviet government is living out its last days. It is surrounded by a ring of hostile powers that do not even want to talk to brigands (otherwise Bolsheviks are not called brigands abroad), so there will be no outside help for them.

Inside the country, complete devastation in everything. Their army is a rabble of flogged deserters. Having seized power by deceit in October 1917, they mocked the peasantry too much, until, finally, it woke up and, with arms in hand, went to their enemies.

The Russian peasant is meek and gentle, but he is also terrible in his anger, the Bolsheviks were able to arouse this anger on his own head.

No, the Bolsheviks cannot crush Antonov, for Antonov is all the working peasantry of many millions, which is gradually beginning to wake up from sleep and throw off the hated yoke of the Bolsheviks. Another month, another, and the fire of peasant uprisings will engulf all of Russia.

A wave of popular anger will wash away all the manure called Bolshevism from the Russian land, and on the cleansed land, the sovereign owner of the Russian land, the Constituent Assembly, will give the suffering peasantry not only land, but also freedom" [40].

The rebellious population was brought into obedience by means of repressions that turned on everyone, from children to the elderly. The Bolshevik government did not stop at the most cruel and barbaric methods of suppressing the rebellious peasants: "legal" and "illegal" executions, mass arrests, and the destruction of entire villages. The villages of Koptevo, Khitrovo, Verkhne-Spasskoe were demolished by artillery and burned. The system of hostage-taking was especially immoral.

The political summary of the Tambov combat unit on the course of the operation to eradicate the insurgency dated June 30, 1921 says that in a number of areas executions were carried out for harboring and helping bandits, hostages were taken, for example: in Panovy Kusty - 64 people, in Krivopolyanye - all men population, and 14 involved in banditry were shot, in Gryaznukha - 17 people.

This further embittered the insurgents, who, as a response, took the families of Red Army soldiers and communists hostage.

In response, a network of concentration camps was introduced, in which the children of the rebels were also kept [1].

Summarizing the above, we draw the following conclusions. Documents recreate the image of A.S. Antonov as a typical Russian revolutionary of the beginning of the 20th century, who came "from the bottom" and gave himself entirely to the revolution, a man of immediate action, ready to commit both "terrorist attacks" and "exes" for the sake of lofty ideals. It was from them that the fighting vanguard consisted of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the anarchists, and the Bolsheviks - those who themselves went to the barricades and called others. They easily identified themselves with the revolution, imbued with the consciousness of a special mission of their own personality - leaderism. The verses attributed to Antonov are very expressive in this respect. Characteristic of these poems, as well as of the "Song of the Partisan", was a furious denunciation of the enemy and a very vague reflection or complete absence of a positive ideal.

The concreteness and visibility of the goals and results of military operations raised the morale of the army and attracted new forces to it: the number of fighters in the Antonov army in February 1920 reached 40 thousand, not counting the "vokhra" (guards). A powerful organization and staging of espionage, reconnaissance and information, the supply of all types of allowances and equipment could not have happened if the sympathies of the population of the province had not been on the side of the rebels. Citizens were recruited into the ranks of the partisans through agitation and appeals.

But when the highest apogee was reached, there were various elements in the ranks of the rebels who were addicted to looting. Looting by the partisans was severely punished, the perpetrators were subjected to trial and arrest.

The Union of the Working Peasantry, created at the Congress of the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the Union of the Working Peasantry, which was actually the party of the Partisan Army of the Tambov Territory, had only a name in common. Antonov did not create a new Union of the working peasantry. The Union of the Working Peasantry set its main task as "the overthrow of the power of the Communist Bolsheviks, who had brought the country to poverty, death and disgrace." Even the negatively colored KGB reports did not deny the benevolent attitude of the peasantry towards the STK.

Despite all the efforts of the Bolsheviks to denigrate the peasant movement with all sorts of vile and slanderous fabrications, despite the shameful names (bandits and robbers),

which

they call the rebels, everyone knows very well that the rebels are the true working peasantry, who fed and feeds all of Russia with their hump, who can't get away with calluses.

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SUPPRESSION OF THE PEASANT REBELLION IN THE TAMBOV REGION

It is difficult to reproach the Tambov leadership for underestimating the danger that threatened it. As already noted, in the first days of the uprising, an operational headquarters was created to combat banditry. In early September 1920, the provincial committee and provincial executive committee delegated A.G. Schlichter for a personal report, noting in it that "the timely

precisely to crush the insurrectionary movement, which has now grown to enormous proportions and tends to expand, capturing new territories. September 9 A.G. Schlichter met with V.I. Lenin and asked him for assistance in obtaining for the Tambov province an infantry battalion, two squadrons of cavalry and two thousand food contractors, as well as 1,000 rifles, 1,000 revolvers and 25,000 cartridges to arm the local communists. Schlichter assured Lenin that if all this could be obtained, then the Tambov authorities would be able not only to quickly suppress the rebellion, but also to fully fulfill the state allocation for bread.

On September 24, Deputy Chairman of the Tambov Provincial Executive Committee V.N. Meshcheryakov sent V.I. A note to Lenin, which said: "Since your conversation (and assistance) with Schlichter about our uprising, our situation has worsened: our 2 companies have been disarmed, thus 400 rifles and 4 machine guns have been taken, and in general the enemy got stronger I visited the Commander-in-Chief (S.S. Kamenev, Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the republic. — Authors) and received a promise to send 1 battalion and 300 rifles to Tambov, but so far nothing has come of the issue of food detachments. They didn't give us anything. Issypka goes on 20-22-25 thousand pounds a day instead of 200-220 thousand needed. I have a request from Schlichter and the Gubernia Committee to speak with you on this subject, for the situation is bad" [1: 78].

In response to a note by V.I. Lenin instructed the Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic E.M. Sklyansky and Chairman of the Cheka F.E. Dzerzhinsky: "It is necessary to take extremely energetic measures. Hurry!" [1: 79].

Three days later, on September 27, 1920, V.I. Lenin instructed N.P. Bryukhanov to check whether the apportionment of 11.5 million poods for the Tambov province is correct - "shouldn't it be knocked off?" However, the next day, a telegram was sent to Tambov signed by the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars V.I. Lenin and Deputy People's Commissar for Food N.P. Bryukhanov, with instructions to urgently send two grain routes to Moscow, 35 wagons each. A telegram dated September 28, 1920 said: "Out of all queues (to Tambov from Moscow from the Kremlin)... In view of the catastrophic situation with the receipt of grain, the availability of supplies: at the front - two, in Moscow and Petrograd - one day, I order by exerting all my strength, using all the means of the province, no later than the first of October, to actually load and send to Moscow to the People's Commissariat of Food:

in addition to scheduled shipments, two routes with bread, thirty-five wagons each with special conductors" [2: 270-271]. Two days later, Tambov reported on the implementation of an emergency government order. These actions aroused the discontent of the people, people revolted. October 15, 1920 V.I. Lenin sent a telegram to the Deputy Chairman

Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic E.M. Sklyansky, in which he states: "Give the RVSR an order, or rather a precise order, to achieve a quick and complete liquidation. Let me know about the measures taken" [3: 51: 290]. On October 19, Lenin sent the commander of the internal troops of the republic, V.S. Kornev and Chairman of the Cheka F.E. Dzerzhinsky a note with the following content: "Comrade. Schlichter informs me about the intensification of the uprising in the Tambov province, about the weakness of our forces, especially the cavalry. The fastest (and exemplary) liquidation (Antonovshchina. — Authors) is certainly necessary. Please let me know what action is being taken. It is necessary to show more energy and give more strength" [3: 51: 310]. Initially, the Tambov leadership allotted no more than three to four weeks for the elimination of the peasant uprising. The guerrilla way of conducting combat operations of the rebels, who managed to hide under the onslaught of the Red Army units and simply dissolve in the peasant environment, the pulsating nature of the movement made it difficult to assess the effectiveness of military measures. In the report of V.I. Lenin, the commander of the troops of the internal service of the republic, V.S. Kornev already on November 1, 1920, declared that from that time the uprising could be considered suppressed and the whole task of the near future was reduced to the liquidation of individual bands and gangs. The report said: "From the second half of October this year. In 1948, a turning point was noted in operations on the territory of the Tambov province, expressed in the fact that a strong enemy with a great advantage in maneuvering actions, after a series of strong blows inflicted on its core, lost its insurgent coloring on a large scale. From the 20th of October, the Antonovites began to avoid meeting with our units, noticeably lost themselves in unexpected battles and reduced their combat operations mainly to raids and robberies. However, keeping constantly in the area well known to him, the enemy, despite the blows inflicted on him, quickly replenished at the expense of the local population, which gave him combat and horse strength" [4]. Having visited Tambov at the end of December, V.S. Kornev, in his own words, became convinced of the impossibility of coping with the insurgent cash

by our forces. At this time, more than 10 thousand bayonets and sabers were already operating against the rebels.

Subsequently, in official documents, more than once it was stated about the decline or defeat of the uprising, but it revived again. After a visit to Tambov by a commission headed by V.S. Kornevym, on January 1, 1921, the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) considered the issue of mass riots in the Tambov province. According to the report of F.E. Dzerzhinsky about the riots in the Tambov province, the need to strengthen the Tambov provincial organization by the communists and the impossibility of a quick transfer of military units, a resolution was adopted: "28. a) instruct the accounting and distribution department and the PUR to send 300 people to Tambov, mainly from the disbanded 2nd Army, within 3 days" [5].

But all these actions were insufficient, they did not give the desired result.

February 1921 became the most important milestone in the chain of events. By this time, the insurrectionary movement had reached its greatest extent, and began to find a response in the border districts of the Voronezh and Saratov provinces.

The Soviet government moved to decisive action against the Antonovites. The liquidation of the fronts against Poland and Wrangel made it possible to move large and combat-ready military contingents, equipment, including artillery, armored parts, and aircraft to the Tambov region. The tactics of actions against the rebels also changed. Instead of separate operations that were not connected by a single plan of operations, a clear structure of military command and control was created. The entire province was divided into six combat areas with field headquarters and emergency authorities - political commissions.

In February 1921 there was a turning point in the general policy of the state towards the peasantry. It was the state policy that had the last word in the fight against the peasant revolution and, consequently, in the country's exit from the state of the Civil War. These changes, expressed in the transition to a new economic policy, as the opening documents show, turned out to be connected with Antonovshchina not only as part of the general peasant movement of that time, along with the Kronstadt rebellion, but also directly with specific events and persons who came into contact with the Tambov region of that time.

time.

On the eve of the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b), a general party discussion was held on the problems generated by "war communism". At this time, two major representatives of the central leadership, N.I. Bukharin and A.V. Lunacharsky. Bukharin participated in the work of the Tenth Provincial Party Conference (January 28-30, 1921), Lunacharsky participated in the work of the Provincial Party Congress of Soviets (January 31-February 4). From the speeches of delegates from local organizations, from various institutions, they could form an idea of the actual scope and nature of the Antonovshchina as a mass peasant uprising and a rapidly growing threat to the very existence of the Soviet system. They also saw that the Party and Soviet provincial leadership, torn apart by endless and pernicious strife, was unable to cope with the situation.

Decisive action was needed on the part of the leadership. Immediately after Bukharin's return to Moscow, V.I. Lenin put the question of Antonovism on the list of questions for the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) on February 2. In the biographical chronicle of V.I. Lenin has this entry:

"So tomorrow we will put

1) Bukharin's report

2) Shklovsky..." [6: 48-49].

As evidenced by the minutes of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the party dated February 2, 1921, the first issue at the meeting was the report of N.I. Bukharin. The very form of the cited Leninist entry reflects the situation of some kind of tense conversation with someone, most likely with Bukharin. Let us quote the protocol No. 81 of the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party of February 2, 1921:

"Attended: tt. Lenin, Bukharin, Stalin, Krestinsky, Preobrazhensky, Rudzutak, Kamenev, Andreev.

Listened: |. Comrade Bukharin's report.

Decided: 1. a) To point out to Comrade Tsyurup that the political situation and the uprising of the peasants undoubtedly require the most serious attention to be paid to the speedy implementation of the food gathering in those places where the peasants have suffered especially from crop failure and are especially in great need of food relation.

It is also necessary to recognize the need to develop a number of other measures to alleviate the food situation of the peasants in these provinces, especially for the organization of public catering.

288

To instruct the People's Commissariat of Food to submit written reports to the Central Committee twice a week on the measures being taken to implement this resolution and on their actual implementation.

6) Instruct the Organizing Bureau, together with the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, to immediately organize the dispatch of a commission from the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to Tambov for political guidance and assistance to comrades in the fight against the peasant uprising and for the political cultivation of the regions liberated from the insurgents.

c) Instruct the Secretariat of the Central Committee to telegraph Comrade Antonov-Ovseenko to Tambov today.

Instruct Comrade Fomin to see to it that Antonov-Ovseenko is brought to Tambov as quickly as possible.

d) Instruct the Organizing Bureau today to find suitable workers for Tambov Gubernia. and send them to Tambov immediately.

e) To instruct the Orgburo to find the Chief Poarm in Tambov as soon as possible.

f) Instruct Comrade Shvedchikov to increase the supply of paper to the Tambov Gubernia Executive Committee.

Heard: 2. Report of the Commission on the issue of assistance to the peasantry affected by crop failure.

Decided: 2. a) Instruct comrade Preobrazhensky, in agreement with Comrades. Tsyurupa and Lezhava to work out a draft resolution of the Politburo on measures to be taken to alleviate the plight of the peasants, and submit it to the secretariat by 10 o'clock today for questioning all members of the Politburo by telephone.

6) Instruct TT. Bukharin, Preobrazhensky and Kamenev to develop and finally approve the text of the appeal on behalf of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee signed by Comrade Kalinin to the peasants of Tambov province. in order to distribute it only in this province, without publishing it in newspapers" [7].

The content of the report N.I. Bukharin is not reflected in the minutes of the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP; searches for him in other funds, including the fund of N.I. Bukharin, to no avail. But the decision of the Politburo, adopted on the basis of the discussion of the report of N.I. Bukharin, to some extent reflects his position. It manifests itself, in our opinion, in the section that "the political situation and the uprising of the peasants (not banditry. — The authors) undoubtedly require ... the most serious attention to the rapid holding of food gatherings in those places where the peasants are especially suffered from crop failure. Persistent development

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this topic in the ruling, up to "catering", is unusual for this level of documents and, most likely, comes from the speaker. Among the features of Bukharin's position is the decision to send a commission from the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to Tambov "for political leadership and help comrades in the fight against the peasant uprising", and not to create another proposed Revolutionary Military Council. The next day, at a meeting of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee was created, headed by Antonov-Ovseenko.

Let us refer to the protocol No. 93 of the meeting of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) of February 3, 1921.

"Heard: 52. About the chairman of the Perm Gubernia Sowing Committee to replace Comrade recalled to work in Tambov. Antonova-Ovseenko.

Decided: 52. To send to the disposal of the NKZem for the appointment of Comrade Perm Provincial Sowing Committee. I. Shelekhes if the latter finds it possible to refuse to use the leave granted to him.

Heard: 54. Decision of the Politburo on sending a commission from the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to Tambov for political guidance and assistance to comrades in the fight against peasant uprisings.

Decided: 54. To instruct the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to organize a commission headed by Comrade Antonov Ovseenko.

Listened to: 55. Politburo resolution on the urgent dispatch of political workers to the Tambov province and the Chief of Staff for Tambov.

Resolved: 55. Instruct comrade. Alexandrov, together with the PUR, urgently allocate 200, better quality workers than the first 350 for Tambov, and nominate a candidate for the post of chief poarm" [8].

As you can see, the practical decisions of the Politburo on the report of N.I. Bukharin were of an emergency nature - they had to be carried out "today", "in the most urgent manner".

The second question raised at the Politburo meeting on February 2 was not indicated in the mentioned Leninist note of the agenda of this Politburo meeting - the report of the commission on the issue of assistance to the peasantry who suffered from crop failure. No preliminary decision on this issue was prepared. E.A. Preobrazhensky, A.D. Tsyurupa and M. Lezhava were instructed, following the results of the discussion, to "work out a draft resolution and submit it by 10 a.m. today. to the secretariat to interview all members of the Politburo by telephone" [7].

Another important assignment was given - N.I. Bukharin, E.A. Preobrazhensky and L.B. Kamenev was instructed to "work out and complete

It is important to approve the text of the appeal on behalf of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee signed by Comrade Kalinin to the peasants of the Tambov province. in order to distribute it only in that province, without publishing it in newspapers" [7].

At the same time, it was clear that the handling of the announcement of the termination of the collection of surplus appropriations on behalf of the highest body of state power could not be limited to the Tambov region. Concealment of the very possibility of canceling the surplus could become the detonator of even greater social explosions in the countryside. Therefore, an appeal to the Tambov peasantry was distributed on behalf of the provincial executive committee and the provincial committee of the RCP (b) on February 9, 1921. Its essence was to abolish the surplus appraisal and allow local trade exchange of agricultural products.

The Appeal noted that the People's Commissariat for Food decided to stop further collection of the grain allocation in the Tambov province. This measure was explained by the fact that, firstly, it became possible to gradually receive grain from the south and from Siberia; and secondly, it was a response to the appeal of the provincial committee of the Communist Party, which pointed out the gravity of the situation in which the Tambov peasant was, and that most of the apportionment had been completed, and the remnants that some kulaks had, compared negligibly insignificant.

The Appeal stated that the Provincial Committee of Communists and the Provincial Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Red Army Deputies accepted with great joy the order of the People's Commissariat for Food to stop further collection of grain allocations in the province and gave orders to the county food commissariats. immediately stop the collection of grain distribution and remove all food orders.

The Address said: "Comrade. peasants and peasant women! With terrible difficulty, but with honor, you fulfilled your great duty to the workers' and peasants' state. Now the workers' and peasants' state, your own, your chosen government must, in turn, pay you a hundredfold." At the suggestion of the provincial party committee, the provincial executive committee decided to provide priority supplies to the peasant population and petitioned the central government for an increase in material loans.

The gubernatorial executive committee and the gubernia communist party assured the peasants: "Everything that can be done to help you, the Soviet government will help. And in order to better hear your request and need, throughout the province or

extensive non-Party conferences are being organized, to which we invite you to send your representatives.

Name boldly and directly your needs and your offenders. The Soviet government will be able to protect you." The provincial organs of the Communist Party and the state called for peaceful labor: "Comrade peasants and peasant women! The war is over, the deployment has been completed - now a close-knit family for preparations for the spring seed campaign! May anyone who dares to tear the peasants away from this peaceful labor be cursed! The Soviet power will mercilessly fall on his head! To work, to peace, to spring sowing, comrade peasants and peasant women!" [2: 299-300].

This Appeal was adopted and promulgated a month before the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b), which replaced the apportionment with a fixed tax in kind and allowed free trade, and almost a month before the Kronstadt rebellion.

One circumstance attracts attention: the day before the date of adoption of the said appeal, a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) was held. On the text of the Appeal by V.I. Lenin wrote the "Preliminary, Draft Theses Concerning the Peasants," from which Soviet historiography determines the development of the New Economic Policy.

In reality, the appearance and significance of this historical document looks different. It is indubitably connected with what happened in the Politburo on February 2, 1921, and with what happened between February 2 and 8. IN AND. Lenin was intensively engaged in accelerating the military solution of the Tambov problem. In this series of events linking the struggle against Antonovism and the transition to the NEP, one should note Lenin's meeting with the deputation of the Tambov peasants, in a conversation with which he not only listened to complaints about the unbearable apportionment and the arbitrariness of the sellers, but also approved the measures taken. The content of the conversation between the Tambov peasants and Lenin is known from a leaflet that was distributed among the insurgent peasants. Naturally, this conversation was interpreted by the propagandists of the Gubernia Party Committee in their own way. Here is the text of the leaflet prepared by the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee - "What did Comrade. Lenin to the peasants of the Tambov province":

"On February 14, Comrade Lenin received in the Kremlin the peasants of the Tambov province, who had come to tell him about the peasant needs.

Peasant Pakhotno-Uglovsky vol. Kobzev of Tambov uyezd and Solomatin, a peasant in the village of Grushevo, Treskinsky volost, Kirsanov uyezd, talk about this technique as follows:

- Tov. Lenin received us alone in the hall, kindly greeted us, shook hands, invited us to sit down and said: "Tambov peasants, dear comrades, explain to me what your displeasure is and what the Antonov gang is and what it does."

Peasant Bocharov, Ivanovo volost, explained: "The gang is robbing Soviet farms and consumer houses and private citizens, taking away cattle, horses, harness, fodder from the peasants. And then the Reds come and also offend the peasants."

Tov. Lenin wrote it down on paper and asked for more comments.

Tov. Bocharov pointed out that they imposed an unbearable food allocation.

Tov. Lenin asked:

"And in 1918 and 1919. did you carry out the apportionment without scandal?"

Tov. Bocharov replied: "No scandal. Only this year there was a strong crop failure, and it is impossible to carry out the apportionment".

Tov. Lenin further asked: "What is the attitude of the local authorities?"

We gave him answers that the agents of the food agencies, regardless of anything, demanded and took, but the authorities did not pay attention. And it's also very disappointing that sometimes they take potatoes, we bring them where the potatoes rot, and we are again forced to clean this place. We peasants are very sorry that the Red Army soldier and worker do not use our labor.

Tov. Lenin said to this that people are not in their places. Moreover, he asked us to elect the best, conscientious people from the working class to the Soviets. He also drew our attention to a non-party conference, where he said to send more good people and express to the authorities all the needs of the peasantry.

"And if the people you have chosen turn out to be unfit for power, then you need to remove them and replace them with others."

Ivan Kobozev asked: "What should we do with the land in the sense of division?"

Tov. Lenin replied: "Dispose of the land as you see fit. If you want, divide every year, if you want, for many years".

And we also said Comrade. Lenin, as it happens. Loafers sit on Soviet estates and get everything - kerosene, matches, and salt. And he wrote it down, and finally said:

"If now the peasants are offended by the authorities, inform the province, and if the provincial authorities do not pay attention, then contact Moscow, the Kremlin, me. It can be done in writing and in person.

And another tov. Lenin said: "Together with the workers, you shed blood for freedom, for your power. Hold it firmly in your hands along with the workers. And then you will see what kind of power there will be."

And tov. Lenin asked to be told to all the peasants that he received the peasants as kind guests and asks all the peasants to firmly maintain their worker-peasant power and elect the most honest people from the working peasantry to the Soviets. And he ended like this: "I know how difficult it is for a peasant to live when everything is taken from them and they are given so little. I know peasant life, I love and respect them. I ask the peasants to be patient a little, to come to their senses and go to the aid of their power."

On that we said goodbye to comrade. Lenin. And now we will return to our volosts and tell what he told us and how we should hold on to Soviet power and help our common misfortune.

According to the words of the peasants Kobozev and Solomatin, a member of the Tambov Executive Committee, Smolensky, recorded" [9].

As you can see, V.I. Lenin was concerned about the situation of the peasantry of the Tambov region and the entire peasantry of the country. At the same time, he correctly raised the question that the peasants themselves should use their rights when choosing leaders and demand from them an account of their activities.

Delegate of the II All-Russian Congress of Soviets, communist N.N. Ispolatov from Usman, Tambov Province, in a letter to V.I. Lenin expressed the innermost thoughts of the peasants, gave an "earthly" description of the actions of representatives of local authorities. He wrote:

"Dear Comrade!

I consider it my duty to tell you my impressions of the relationship of social forces in contemporary Russia. I think that to you, standing at the top of the Russian state pyramid, and to me, who is at its base, in the very thick of life, the picture of Russian life is presented from different points of view. The Usman uyezd of the Tambov gubernia, which suffered a crop failure, was outright plundered by the food detachments under the guise of levying state allowances—and the state did not receive as much as they did—at the present time it is suffering the pangs of acute famine. People fight over carrion, swell beyond recognition from hunger, go from institution to institution and are sent away, children are abandoned by their parents and dozens are thrown into orphanages. Robbery and theft have reached unprecedented proportions Ideological communists - a drop in Russia

the sea... The situation can only be saved by the widespread use of working-class democracy in the party, trade unions and among the peasant masses, the creation of firm legal norms and raising the prestige of the people's court" [10].

The situation of the peasantry of the Tambov region was repeatedly considered by the highest bodies of the state and the Communist Party. Even the Manifesto of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee "To the peasantry of the Russian Socialist Soviet Republic" dated March 19, 1921 was adopted by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) at a meeting that began with the cancellation of "the decision of the Central Committee on the complete suspension of procurement in the Tambov province." This decision could not be found, but, perhaps, as a special document it was not, and we are talking about the content of the decree of February 2, which Bukharin, Preobrazhensky and Kamenev were instructed to prepare the Appeal of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, which appeared on February 9 on behalf of

Tambov Gubernia Executive Committee and Provincial Party Committee. Permission to harvest voluminous fodder (hay) "for the needs of the military forces operating there against local bandits" did not change anything: the surplus appraisal was canceled, "war communism" was replaced by the New Economic Policy.

It should be emphasized that the Tambov peasantry accepted the new economic policy as a whole with approval. This, in particular, is evidenced by the resolution of the 1st provincial non-party conference of peasants on replacing apportionment with tax in kind, supplying peasants with basic necessities of March 11, 1921. It said: "... We welcome the statement of V.I. Lenin about the need to give freedom to the peasant and move from surplus appropriation to a tax in kind, in which each peasant will know in advance how much state taxes he will have to pay. We welcome the cessation of levying the state appropriation of grain from the Tambov province and ask the central government to order to increase the supply of the peasantry with essential products" [11].

There were also many peasants who did not believe the assurances of the leaders, believed that the authorities did nothing just like that, without a secret benefit for themselves: "The Soviet government will take more from the peasants than under the decree on tax"; "As soon as bread is born, they will still take it away", "Do you want to win sympathy by canceling the apportionment. No, it's too late now. Natural tax - the same apportionment, only the name is different. These doubts were unfounded. At first, the tax in kind differed little from the surplus appraisal: in the spring of 1921,

its size in the province was determined at 5.3 million poods, and in October - already at 8.5 million poods. True, this increase in grain collections was due to the famine in the southeast of Russia, especially in the Volga region.

Let us turn to the "Information summary of the gubchek on the political mood of the population for the period from February 15 to March 1, 1921". The Tambov Provincial Extraordinary Commission noted that the mood of the population was extremely excited due to the food and fuel crisis. The abolition of the surplus appropriation from the peasant population of the province did not give the desired results. The first reports in the provincial and district Izvestia about the abolition of the food requisition made a good impression on the peasants, and for the most part (with the exception of Lebedyansky and Temnikovsky districts, where the population was starving even before the abolition of the food requisition due to the fulfillment of the entire food requisition), the peasantry met this with great joy. However, the abolition of the surplus requisition, as subsequent events showed, did not leave the peasantry alone due to the fact that "the work of the rebels, who have recently turned into a horde of thugs, thugs, and the entire village kulaks who have joined them, have created entire regiments from themselves, exclusively supported by the food of the peasants, in the same way, the Red Army units, due to the lack of supply from the state fund, are supported by 80% on the peasant account. In the Information Report of the Gubchek, it concluded that "the peasantry of Kirsanovsky, Borisoglebsky, Tambov and part of the Usman and Morshansky districts were in a deplorable food condition, on the one hand, due to the work of the rebels there, the result of which led to the systematic cooking of moonshine and speculation in bread, on the other hand, the fulfillment of a large percentage of the surplus appropriation by the last two counties, along with the scarcity of the 1920 harvest. Issues of banditry and the sowing campaign were raised at the regional and district conferences of the non-party peasantry [12].

Be that as it may, the inertia of the war not only continued to dictate the behavior of both sides, but even more embittered, brought their confrontation to an extreme degree. In late February - early March 1921, the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee became the highest body in the fight against "Antonovism".

On February 7, 1921, Antonov Ovseenko was sent to Tambov to organize the fight against banditry.

Vasiliev, chairman of the provincial executive committee A.S. Lavrov. April 26, 1921 V.I. Lenin made a proposal to the Politburo of the Central Committee, and on April 27 a decision was made "On the liquidation of Antonov's gangs in the Tambov province", according to which M.N. Tukhachevsky is appointed "individual"

commander of the troops. In May 1921, he took command of the troops of the Tambov province. Other military leaders arrived with him - N.E. Kakurin, I.P. Uborevich, G.N. Kotovsky, from the punitive authorities G.G. Yagoda and V.V. Ulrich [10].

The Plenipotentiary Commission actually concentrated all power in the Tambov province in its hands.

V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko, having arrived in Tambov and having studied the situation, the state of the Red Army units, reported to Moscow: "Political work in the Red Army without leadership. No accounting and no attempts to redistribute party schools. Commissioners are weak. Poarm is inoperable. Agitation against the Socialist-Revolutionaries and bandits is sporadic. At the headquarters - the dominance of local, unreliable people, there are almost no communists, communications are weak, intelligence is unsystematic, counterintelligence is absent. No systematization and study of data on the uprising, either in the Cheka, or in the headquarters, or in the provincial committee. The Revolutionary Military Tribunal is working on trifles; political campaigns are not being conducted at all. In units - looting, grazing, unreliability of the command staff, combat effectiveness is extremely low, lack of the simplest understanding of the situation, the ability to apply to it. These units are a monstrous mosaic of all sorts of military dregs (with a few exceptions), in one Tambove there are up to 16 small units. Some are definitely connected with the bandits (established for the 44th regiment in Tambov, associated with the preparation of the uprising, the regiment is being withdrawn to Rostov; the Cheka battalion in Tambov is extremely suspicious). Widespread talkativeness, ignoring the simplest rules of conspiracy, ignorance is the mother of panic (a number of false alarms in Tambov - "the enemy occupied Pushkari on the 20th 5 versts from Tambov", etc. information from units, from intelligence, arriving in headquarters and disturbing the entire garrison). Komtroyskoy alone at headquarters, without support in an empty provincial committee. Starts to get a little nervous. Komuchastami - especially early. 15th division, weak, do not understand the peculiarities of the situation. The Cheka is saturated with depraved and suspicious faces and is completely paralyzed. The special department is useless..." [13].

As you can see, the assessment of the situation in the Tambov region and in military units was given by V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko is extremely negative. In addition, about

he had a higher opinion of the state of affairs among the insurgent peasants. At the same time, he reported to the leadership of the country that after his first steps, the main parts were defeated, and the ideological leadership of the rebellious peasants was being placed on the shoulders of the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko concluded that "the uprising had been prepared quite systematically and was based on a solid, root organization of the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the Tambov, Kirsanov and Borisoglebsk districts. The counties are divided into districts, which include several volosts, sometimes villages, headed by committees of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and headquarters. Volost secret (and open, where the power of the Soviets has been overthrown) boards have a volost military department, which conducts regional and open mobilizations on the orders of headquarters. Commandant's offices were also organized at the location of the headquarters, in charge of searches, arrests, and internal security. The guard service, communications and reconnaissance were set up in a peculiar, but quite reliable way. A military unit (from platoon to company) was formed in each village, gathering on the first order of the headquarters and dispersing immediately to their homes in case of failure, etc." [13].

V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko informed the Center that the actions of the military units were well instructed, and that the higher headquarters were quite energetically fighting against the indiscipline of the units. This, in particular, was evidenced by orders establishing a scale of punishments from 20 to 2 (separated) rods in a disciplinary order.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries acted under the guise of the "Union of the Working Peasantry", the program of activities of which they outlined in 17 points, which differed significantly from the official one developed in the center. It contained an open call for the restoration of the Constituent Assembly; denationalization of industry, except for railways, mines and mines; all kinds of freedoms and peace with foreign capitalists, fixed prices for industrial products were expressed, while at the same time the fixed prices for grain, supplies

food through cooperatives, expressed the demand for freedom of teaching in schools, which was proclaimed by students from the intelligentsia and the village kulaks.

The facts showed that the Socialist-Revolutionary program was a success among the peasants. At the non-Party conference, the peasants spoke out frankly that the Constituent Assembly seemed to them "closer and simpler" to Soviet power. The removal of the grain surplus was interpreted by the peasantry as an action to its detriment, as a consequence of the victory of "their" troops, the recognition of the fact of the complete robbery of the peasants, and at the same time

the removal of the grain surplus appropriation was not appreciated in a number of counties, which completed the apportionment almost completely [13].

The Socialist-Revolutionaries, who did not have a printing press, campaigned with leaflets made on typewriters and a hectograph. In agitation, the expressions "Jewish communists" were not uncommon, it was said about the abuses and violence of agents of the Soviet government, exorbitant requisitioning, deliberate prolongation of the war. Such statements were especially addressed to the Red Army soldiers. Opponents of Soviet power had quick and accurate information, good connections were established among railway workers, food workers, and cooperatives. The actions of individual gangs were clearly planned and systematic [13].

In a report to the Center V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko noted that, despite the efforts of the Socialist-Revolutionary squads to isolate themselves from robber elements, the interpenetration of these two principles is quite obvious, their actions are coordinated and inseparable, under the influence of military failures, the bandit principle decisively prevails - the influence of the Socialist-Revolutionary command is lost, discipline is falling [13].

In February 1921, the main military forces of the rebels, grouped in the adjacent volosts of Kirsanovsky and Tambov districts, were defeated. The best regiments of Antonov were almost destroyed, most of their remnants moved to a peaceful position in their villages, part (up to 600 cavalry with Antonov at the head) broke into the Morshansky district, after which they appeared almost at Tambov itself, counting on a prepared and accidentally prevented uprising in the local garrison. By February 22, Antonov appeared at his main headquarters - Belomestnaya Twins of the Kozlovsky district, an old Socialist-Revolutionary nest, where he summoned the heads of all individual units to a military council. He was overtaken by the red cavalry, who badly battered him. The blow to the main headquarters upset the military organization of the bandits, but at the same time aroused frenzied energy in them. Antonov, with 500 cavalry, again rushed to his favorite area of the border volosts of Tambov and Kirsanov counties. At the same time, from the north, Selyansky (up to 2000 people), having accumulated at the Arable Corner of the Morshansky district, began to advance on Stove, Pokrovskoye, making his way to connect with Antonov. Kolesnikov (600 sabers, 400 bayonets and 6 machine guns), unexpectedly for the Red Army, appeared at the village of Zhernovka, captured two companies - he completely destroyed one and took 1 machine gun, and then moved north, again, apparently, then

murmuring at the connection with Antonov. Meanwhile, Antonov engages in an oncoming battle with a cavalry regiment and an infantry battalion. Antonov, twice defeated, seems to crumble in three directions and suddenly on February 25 at night attacks the cavalry regiment at the station. The waste, disperses the regiment and beats off 4 guns from the red units. Selyansky in Morshansky district the next day was taken between two fires - the red cavalry went behind his rear, he was almost destroyed and, most importantly, thanks to skillful provocation (having called himself white), the red cavalry units manage to shoot from several villages in a row Socialist-Revolutionary headquarters and military commands. Such was the situation according to V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko [13].

In a report to the Center V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko wrote: "We, relying almost exclusively on cities with a working and co-service population and on military units, we, who have almost completely lost all our ties with the countryside in three counties engulfed by an uprising. And the peasantry, united by the root party, who singled out several thousand active fighters - the kulak army. How weakly we are connected with the peasantry shows at least that the best

Our source of information is aerial reconnaissance. The rest does not give anything worthwhile" [13].

V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko informed the Center in detail about what had been done: "On February 16, a meeting of active workers in Tambov, my report on the general situation, on our tasks. It was decided to propose to the provincial committee that a provincial conference be convened for March 1. He took over the propaganda department, reorganized it - under the provincial committee there was only the secretariat and the head, the apparatus was merged with the provincial political education departments (also in the districts); developed a calendar plan for the work of the propaganda department for March, including the work of departments of the provincial committee of the Komsomol (gubernia committee of the Komsomol. - Authors), provincial education. He took over direct leadership of the provincial press. He personally spoke at citywide meetings in opposition to demagoguery and "urademocracy", in preparation for the regional conference. The conference opened on March 2 and ended on the 3rd. A firm tone was set at it, the necessary resolutions were adopted. There were two or three dirty Makhaev performances, in general, smoothly. He was elected by the provincial committee, to which only two of the old composition made it, then I, Zhabin and Antonov (predubchek). The work will be..." [13].

V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko informed about specific actions to combat banditry:

(not completely) special department. The Revolutionary Military Tribunal has been strongly tightened. Brochures "The Truth About Bandits", "Mandate to a Red Army Soldier" were ordered, edited and submitted for printing, leaflets "What Lenin Said to the Tambov Peasants" (25 thousand) and two propaganda in the press. A course (6 hours) on the Social Revolutionaries and the Union of the Working Peasantry is being introduced in all party schools. A plan for the fight against banditry with specific tasks for each institution was developed and carried through meetings of the presidiums of the provincial executive committee, provincial committee, command and check. An instruction on revolutionary committees was developed and, in agreement with the command and representatives of the districts, their network was outlined. An instruction was developed on peasant self-defense against SR bandits..." [13].

As can be seen from this report, the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee actively entered into a struggle with the Partisan Army of the Tambov Territory, began a struggle for the souls of the peasants, trying to tear them away from the rebels. The publication of the weekly wall newspaper Pravda o bandits was prepared, and a number of comrades were instructed to write draft leaflets on the following topics: bandits are the enemies of the peasants; the bandits are enemies of Soviet power and supporters of the tsarist system; whoever is against Soviet power is for the tsar, for the bourgeoisie; Banditry condemns the working people to death by starvation. Social revolutionaries are for the kulaks and against the working peasantry; whoever helps the Antonov gangsters digs a hole for himself; the working people are restoring the national economy, while the bandits are destroying it; deserters-self-seekers should not be in the labor village; who is for peace, for order, he is against the bandits; why the Antonov bandits are destroying the Soviet economy and peasant artels; peasant, drive the bandits away from you; why bandits kill communists; how can the honest working peasantry fight the bandits; who goes with the bandits [14].

Numerous appeals and appeals were issued to the population of the Tambov province for assistance in the extermination of bandits. One of these appeals was written no later than March 3, 1921: "From different parts of the province, peasants are turning to the Soviet authorities with a request to protect them from bandits. It is hereby made known to the public that the main forces of the bandits have been routed and almost annihilated. The remnants of bandit gangs wander around the province or scattered in separate villages, where they are intensively recruiting new supporters. In the extermination of the bandits must take teaching

the population itself" [15].

These duties were further listed: not to give shelter to counter-revolutionaries and bandits; disarm them and deliver them with arms into the hands of the authorities; to exterminate the resisting bandits like rabid dogs, to act against them with all their means; teach the hiders of the bandits a lesson in such a way that no one would henceforth be accustomed to assisting these villains; take action

surveillance and self-protection in order to prevent counter-revolutionaries from entering the protected area and to eradicate any counter-revolution within their villages; pass sentences against bandits at rural gatherings.

The appeal called: "Peasants of the Tambov province! Remember, all the inhabitants of each village will answer sooner or later for the criminal actions of each of them. Do not let yourself be brought under severe punishment. Do not let yourself be distracted from peaceful labor. Remember, the enemies of Soviet power are your enemies. Destroy them without mercy. Undertake immediately and boldly to purge your villages of counter-revolution. Until spring, banditry must be eradicated in the bud" [15].

These actions did not give tangible results. The peasants did not believe these appeals and appeals, mainly because the rebels were called bandits in them, and these were their neighbors, brothers, fathers.

This is how the land surveyor Nasonov saw the bandits and told about it in his letter to V.I. Lenin: "I was invited to serve as secretary. Bandits were brought to headquarters. Here I did not have to deal with landowners and bankers, but I personally met with poor peasants who were indignant at the "Communist tyrants" and began to destroy them without mercy. The captured bandits were dressed in rags, often barefoot, and emaciated. I could hardly restrain myself, burning with shame that it was brought to this, perhaps, by all the responsible workers sitting here. I thought a lot about ways to paralyze the elevated mood of the peasants against the "robbers", I thought a lot about the measures and methods that should be introduced into the peasantry and divert their attention from expressing anger, but I did not have the strength and influence to do this as a like-minded person, to express my opinion.

Now I am a land surveyor and do ordinary work. But the soul is sick of one thing: the bandits. It is hard and bitter for me to hear how these ignorant and irresponsible peasants are digging their own grave for the joy of the Russian and European bourgeoisie. I came to the deep conviction that not with cannons, not with machine guns, not with executions

to stop the attack of the peasants on the Soviet authorities, but by resolute and quick implementation of the decree on land. Do you remember why in 1905-1907. Was the Stolypin government so comparatively successful in liquidating the peasant "revolts" when, it would seem, there was no hope for the bourgeoisie to stop the popular movement? Think for a few minutes, and you will come to the conclusion—just like I do—about the land law, about the cut-off economy. At the same time, for the issuance of the law, the masses of the people reached out to the earth; the question of cuts became a matter of life for the peasants. Everyone is stuck in the land issue. The bourgeois government needed this: they triumphed in their palaces.

Although the Soviet power issued a decree on land, for the most part desirable for the peasants, it is almost never put into practice. This completely tore the peasants from the land. The attraction of the peasants to the land is now enormous. On the basis of the facts, I assert that it is possible to destroy banditry and improve agriculture only through a land policy based on a project for the resettlement of peasants on a voluntary and urgent basis, for which it is necessary to immediately conduct agitation, issue leaflets, brochures, etc., and then the peasant mass will feel that the earth really belongs to them, and they will all reach out to the earth, to new places, and they will throw bombs and rifles into garbage pits like unnecessary rubbish. Only a land policy can create socialist agriculture. Only land policy can strengthen the RSFSR.

Land surveyor of the Nasonov land department" [16].

At the end of April 1921, the Central Commission for Combating Banditry heard a report from Antonov-Ovseenko, Chairman of the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, on the political and economic situation in the Tambov province. It became clear that "recently there has been no improvement and even deterioration in places." On April 26, Lenin submits a proposal to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the party, and on the 27th a decision is made "On the liquidation of Antonov's gangs in the Tambov province." By the same decision M.N. Tukhachevsky was appointed "the sole commander of the troops in the Tambov

responsible for the liquidation of gangs ... "The resolution contained a direct directive to complete this task "no later than within a month."

The Sklyansky archive contains notes by V.I. Lenin and E.M. Sklyansky on the instructions of M.N. Tukhachevsky to suppress Tambov

skoe uprising:

"I would consider it desirable to send Tukhachevsky to suppress the Tambov uprising. Recently, there has been no improvement and even worsening in some places. There will be a somewhat large political effect from this appointment. Especially abroad.

Your opinion?

(Written by Comrade Sklyansky)

Submit to Molotov for the P. Bureau for tomorrow. I propose to appoint him without publicity in the Center, without publication. (Written by the hand of Comrade Lenin) True" [17: 460-462].

These issues were considered at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks on April 27, 1921:

"Heard: 7. About the liquidation of Antonov's gangs in the Tambov province.

Decided: 7. A. The commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, appointed in Tambov, should not be dissolved, strengthening it comm. Zalutsky and Tukhachevsky.

B. To appoint comrade Tukhachevsky as the sole commander of the troops in the Tambov district, making him responsible for the liquidation of gangs in the Tambov province, without recording his appointment in the protocols of the RVSR. Do not allow any interference in the hostilities of Comrade Tukhachevsky, both from the commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, and from other authorities.

V. Give Comrade Tukhachevsky a directive to liquidate Antonov's gangs in Tambov Gubernia. not later than within one month. Comrade Tukhachevsky's brief written reports to the Central Committee must be telegraphed weekly.

D. To instruct the Cheka to strengthen intelligence and KGB work in the Tambov province.

D. To move a thousand communists from the army to the Tambov front for the period of liquidation of the Tambov gangs, obliging Comrade Sklyansky to take extreme measures for the urgent promotion of the seconded communists and returning them to the army after liquidation.

Report on the course of the mobilization of military communists for Comrade Sklyansky weekly in the Central Committee.

E. Instruct Comrade Sklyansky to expedite the dispatch of a brigade of cadets to Tambov [18].

Thus, the foregoing makes it possible to come to a conclusion.

In official documents, more than once it was stated about the decline or defeat of the uprising, but it revived again. All actions of the authorities were insufficient, did not give the desired result.

February 1921 became the most important milestone in the chain of events. By this time, the insurrectionary movement had reached its greatest extent, and began to find a response in the border districts of the Voronezh and Saratov provinces. The Soviet government moved to decisive action against the Antonovites.

In February 1921 there was a turning point in the general policy of the state towards the peasantry. The transition to the New Economic Policy turned out to be associated with Antonovism not only as part of the general peasant movement of that time, along with the Kronstadt rebellion, but also directly with specific events and people who came into contact with

Tambov region of that time. The Tambov peasantry accepted the new economic policy as a whole with approval. There were also many peasants who did not believe the assurances of the leaders, believed that the authorities did nothing just like that, without a secret benefit for themselves.

The provincial leadership was unable to cope with the situation. Decisive measures were needed. On February 7, 1921, Antonov Ovseenko, who headed the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, which actually concentrated all power in the province, was sent to Tambov to organize the fight against banditry.

The Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee actively entered into a struggle with the Partisan Army of the Tambov Territory, began a struggle for the souls of the peasants, trying to tear them away from the rebels.

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THE DEFEAT OF THE GUERRILLA ARMY OF THE TAMBOV REGION

The appointment of the outstanding Soviet military leader M.N. Tukhachevsky as the leader of the suppression of the peasant uprising would inevitably have a very negative political resonance. Therefore, an attempt was made to carry out this appointment without publicity. Together with him, some other military leaders who distinguished themselves in the Civil War arrived in the Tambov region - N.E. Kakurin, I.P. Uborevich, G.I. Kotovsky. At the same time, G.G. Yagoda and V.V. Ulrich. The number of Soviet troops in the Tambov region was continuously growing: by January 1, 1921 - 11,870; by February 1, 1921, 33,750;

The entire military might of the republic was thrown against the peasant army. The Central Interdepartmental Commission for Combating Banditry was created, which included representatives of the Central Committee, the STO, the Cheka, the NKPS, etc. The Commission was headed by Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic E. Sklyansky.

The military defeat of Antonovshchina began. The strategy consisted in the complete and brutal implementation of the military occupation of the rebel areas, which had already been undertaken by the predecessors of the new leadership. The essence of this strategy has been set out with the utmost clarity in circulated to the public within

Tambovshina by order No. 130 of Tukhachevsky of May 12 and in order No. 171 of the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of June 1, 1921. This regime included the occupation of the territory by troops, management appointed from above (district political commissions and rural revolutionary committees, which included representatives of the army cheka and party organizations), the destruction of farms and the destruction of houses of the participants in the rebellion and their families, the taking of hostages (by singles and whole families), the creation of concentration camps and repressions up to execution for disobedience, harboring "bandits" and weapons.

The documents paint a grim picture of how the population of the rebellious villages was brought into subjection. Repressions fell on everyone - from children to the elderly. The system of hostage-taking was especially immoral, in essence, punishing peaceful people who were not involved in the uprising. This further embittered the rebels, who, as a response, took hostages the families of Red Army soldiers, communists, and Soviet employees.

Commander-in-Chief M.V. Tukhachevsky arrived in Tambov on May 6, 1921, and already on May 12, his order No. 130, famous for its cruelty, and instructions for applying this order appeared.

Here is the order: [2]

"The victories of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army over the capitalists and landlords, after a three-year bloody war, finally allowed the Soviet Republic to switch to the path of peaceful economic construction.

The first concern of the workers' and peasants' government was to improve and raise the ruined peasant economy to its due height. The distribution of seeds to the peasants was organized, and, finally, the food allocation was replaced by a food tax and giving the peasants the right to freely dispose of the surplus (sell, barter, etc.). The food tax is set at the smallest rate.

All the peasants of Soviet Russia, with a redoubled force, took up the field work, for the improvement of agriculture. Only in the Tambov province, where the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, the party of traitors to the working class and the peasantry, has made its nest, has banditry developed, which threatens to completely destroy the already devastated agriculture of the Tambov province. Russian landlords who fled abroad are now triumphant in their newspapers, hoping for anarchy in the workers' peasant state and for the return of their lost estates.

The workers' and peasants' government decided to eradicate banditry in the Tambov province as soon as possible by implementing the most decisive measures.

In pursuance of this and by decision of the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, I order:

1. The troops of the Tambov province, with the reinforcements they received, decisive and quick actions to destroy the bandit gangs.
2. All peasants who have joined gangs must immediately appear at the disposal of the Soviet government, hand over their weapons and hand over their leaders to be tried by a revolutionary military tribunal. Voluntarily surrendered bandits are not threatened with the death penalty.
3. Families of bandits who did not appear should be strictly arrested, and their property should be confiscated and distributed among peasants loyal to Soviet power in accordance with special instructions from the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, sent additionally.
4. Arrested families, if the bandit does not appear and does not surrender, will be sent to remote regions of the RSFSR.
5. Bandits who did not show up for surrender should be considered illegal.
6. Honest peasants must not allow the mobilization and formation of gangs in their villages and must inform the troops of the Red Army about all gangs.
7. Without exception, to all military units of the Red Army, to provide the peasants with all possible support and to steadily protect them from the attacks of bandits.
8. This order is the last warning before decisive and severe action and will be enforced strictly and steadily.

Commander of the troops Tukhachevsky

Chief of Staff of the General Staff Kakurin

Read the order at rural gatherings and assemblies" [2].

On May 12, 1921, they also signed a secret Instruction for the eradication of banditry in the Tambov province [3]. The Instructions determined those guiding principles on the basis of which the struggle to eradicate banditry in the Tambov province should be carried out. These are only fundamental instructions, while organizational forms of struggle were given in the corresponding orders.

The instruction prescribed that the task of eradicating banditry should not be regarded as some kind of more or less lengthy operation.

walkie-talkie, but as a more serious military task - a campaign or even a war. The area engulfed by banditry should be, as it were, returned to the state again. This requires, firstly, to smash the manpower of armed bandit gangs and, secondly, to seize the sources of nourishment for bandit warfare, so to speak, the vital centers of banditry. "These centers of life we occupy must not only be crushed by armed force, but the local population must also be cured of the epidemic of banditry by skillful measures."

Thus, the task was set in the areas occupied by bandits to organize not only armed resistance to the possibility of a new appearance of banditry, but, most importantly, to create environmental resistance to the emergence of this banditry. The military leaders warned that such a complexity of the task made it necessary to prepare extremely carefully military operations against the bandits in organizational, administrative, operational and combat terms, both in the purely military and political aspects of the matter.

The instructions charged not to get carried away with small operational tasks to the detriment of general training in the initial period of hostilities. Operations against bandits were to

carried out with infallible methodicalness, since banditry will be morally broken only when the very nature of the suppression inspires respect for itself by its consistency and cruel perseverance. The waging of a small war against gangs cannot eradicate banditry and, as experience shows, only inflates the brigandish and partisan fervor of the bandits.

The instruction established that military operations against bandits consisted in operations to destroy the main masses of manpower of bandit gangs and in occupying and securing for themselves the sources of banditism. The first task, from the point of view of the military, is the simplest and does not include anything specific, specifically anti-gangster. As always, it is necessary to organize intelligence well, have exemplary communications, and carefully carry out the security service. Gangs, as soon as they are discovered, must be immediately and swiftly attacked and destroyed. The persecution must be carried on relentlessly until the final dispersal of the gang.

The second task is much more difficult, and the outcome of the fight against banditry almost entirely depended on it. This period of struggle is called occupation. The entire territory covered by banditry is divided into areas, the protection of peace in which is entrusted to special military commanders and troops subordinate to them. On the basis of this military support, Soviet power is again restored, which counteracts the emergence of banditry.

The Instructions indicated that military operations during the occupation would not only be narrowly territorial, limited by the boundaries of the site, but there would also be operations of completely independent detachments, continuously pursuing the wandering, most significant gangs.

Gangs usually roam all over the area. The troops of each sector of occupation must invariably attack these bands and seek to destroy them within their borders. Thus, the gangs get into serious trouble. However, moving from precinct to precinct, they still find time to rest, recover, replenish themselves with local kulaks, and then again begin to actively manifest themselves. In order to avoid such phenomena, it is necessary to allocate against each significant gang a special, reliable and strong detachment, which should have as its goal continuous pursuit and assault on the gang, should not allow it to stop anywhere and rest, and even more so to complete it. Stopping the gang to rest already thereby sets the task for this detachment to attack it. This detachment should stick like a leech to his gang and should not give her any sleep, no rest, no opportunity to organize.

The instruction stated that with such an organization of the struggle, the main gangs, such as, for example, Antonova and others, taken into the bind by the occupying troops of the districts, at the same time are continuously pursued by individual leech detachments, which are finally reduced to nothing. Occupied troops must not under any circumstances be dispersed into small detachments. Each separate detachment of such a sector must be able to fight independently with any gang of bandits, and therefore the size of such gangs determines the minimum size of individual detachments of the occupying sectors.

The military leaders in this document noted that the distribution of forces across the territory should be carried out according to the following considerations: on the one hand, individual detachments should not be weaker than bandit gangs, and on the other hand, these detachments should be in time to any place in their area. In the presence of large gangs of bandits, our insignificant forces and vast areas

these two conditions may become in conflict with each other. Therefore, the question of the distribution of forces must be carefully studied, and the troops must not be distributed evenly over all sectors, but depending on the intensity of banditry in one or another region. If military means allow, then the distribution of forces must be made on the basis of the time at which the detachment must be in time for the most remote place of the sector. As forces become scarce, the same results will have to be achieved by forcing the movement of detachments.

The Instructions stated that individual detachments assigned to sections would receive sections in the same way, in which they were responsible for the liquidation of gangs. These units should no longer split up, because otherwise, their separate parts will be destroyed one by one by gangs. These detachments should be concentrated in groups, but on the other hand, throughout their entire sector, they must carefully organize reconnaissance and communications, so that at any moment they know well where and what is being done on the sector, and in order to immediately attack a gang if one appears anywhere. From the detachments, guarding units must be posted, and, in general, the guarding service must be carried out more than thoroughly.

Such in the Instructions are military actions during the occupational method of struggle against bandits. From this it follows that military units can fight only with active gangs, but cannot prevent their formation everywhere, since they are located in a heap at certain points and, of course, they will not take care of the population throughout their sector. This work to prevent the emergence of banditry is no longer carried out by military units, but by the organs of Soviet power, relying on the civilian armed force - the Soviet militia. The formation of militia in bandit areas should not be carried out on a general basis. In no case should it consist of local natives, it should be abundantly diluted with communists and reliable command personnel. Its number should be significantly increased in comparison with the established norms. This civilian armed force will no longer serve as a grouped, but, on the contrary, decentralized support for the local, lower Soviet

authorities.

The work of the militia, together with the impression of the unshakable might of the Red Army, which must necessarily be instilled in the peasants by the troops, will create that stable, calming mood, which must then be reinforced by the Soviet work of the revolutionary committees.

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In order to inspire the aforementioned respect for the strength of the Soviet power and the Red Army, the following measures must be taken: never make impracticable threats; once made threats to be carried out unswervingly to the point of cruelty to the end; to relocate families of unsurrendering bandits to remote regions of the RSFSR; to confiscate the property of these families and distribute it among the Soviet-minded peasants, which will introduce stratification into the peasantry, and Soviet power can rely on this; Soviet-minded peasants must be firmly and reliably guarded by our forces from the attempts of bandits; Soviet-minded peasants must be drawn in every possible way into Soviet work, into the organization of intelligence against bandits and others, which will put an insurmountable line between these peasants and banditism. The implementation of a pacification will immediately create many supporters of Soviet power among the peasants, too, since banditry is both tiring and ruinous for the peasant masses.

"Chiefs and commissars of all levels must firmly master the accepted methods of combating banditry and coordinate their actions with the general spirit of the instruction" [3].

May 25, 1921 commander M.N. Tukhachevsky reported to the Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic E.M. Sklyansky about preparing for decisive action against the rebels:

"I can only count the one-month period starting from May 6, when I took command. Now the period of preparation is coming to an end and so far the measures to eliminate the gangs have been only of an auxiliary nature. The completion of the training was delayed by the lateness of the communists, cadets for the camp collection, 1897 for the police, and, finally, various organizational preparatory measures. Finally, the preparation will be completed by June. The Soviet apparatus was rather weakly strengthened; the communists arrived more than weak. The preparation of revolutionary committees and their instructions are in full swing. The communists who arrived were divided into the army, the police, the formation of revolutionary committees and the strengthening of local Soviet bodies. Intelligence does not work well, it does not give what is needed. She's been instructed, and things are looking up. The intelligence apparatus of the special department is being strengthened. The following additional measures are needed: it is necessary to urgently get 7,500 people born in 1897 for the police, to make our Chusoarm full-fledged

Chuso with direct subordination to Eismont, to create a three-week supply of food and, in addition, it would be desirable to receive two or three armored trains and even one

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shooter brigade. The end date of operations is much more difficult to determine than the end of training, but our actions will be so severe, merciless and so methodical that quick results must be expected.

Command Troop Tukhachevsky" [4].

On June 2, a decisive clash took place between the 2nd Army of the Partisan Army of the Tambov Territory, consisting of the 4th, 14th, 16th and units of other regiments (in total, there were up to 2000 sabers in the battle near the village of Elani under the command of A.S. Antonov), and The Red Army soldiers had a significantly superior force, which, in addition to the cavalry, included an armored detachment. Antonovites were defeated and dispersed.

The commander reported to the Revolutionary Military Council: "During ten days of tireless pursuit, the armored detachment, with the assistance of the red cavalry, recaptured all machine guns from Antonov, the entire convoy, put up to 800 bandits on the spot, disabled even more wounded, scattered the rest" [5].

But after this battle, the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee set about eradicating the rebellious spirit of the Tambov peasants even more fiercely. A second, even more cruel in its essence, order No. 171 was signed.

Order of the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the beginning of repressive measures against individual bandits and families hiding them No. 171, Tambov, June 11, 1921 [6].

"To the political commissions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Starting from June 1, a resolute struggle against banditry will quickly calm the region.

Soviet power is being consistently restored, and the working peasantry is moving over to peaceful and calm work.

The Antonov gang has been defeated, scattered and caught by decisive actions of our troops.
one by one.

In order to finally eradicate the SR-bandit roots and in addition to the previously issued orders, the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee orders:

June 12, 1921]

1. Citizens who refuse to give their names should be shot on the spot without trial.
2. To the villages where weapons are hidden, by the authority of the political commission or the regional political commission, announce a sentence on the removal of hostages and shoot them if they do not surrender their weapons.

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3. If a hidden weapon is found, shoot the senior worker on the spot without trial
in family.

4. The family in whose house the bandit has taken refuge is subject to arrest and expulsion from the province, its property is confiscated, the senior worker in this family is shot without trial.

5. Families hiding family members or property of bandits should be considered as bandits, and the senior worker of this family should be shot on the spot without trial.

6. In the event of the flight of a bandit's family, its property should be distributed among the peasants loyal to Soviet power, and the abandoned houses should be burned or dismantled.

7. This order is to be enforced severely and mercilessly.

Chairman of the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee Antonov-Ovseenko Commander of the troops Tukhachevsky.

Chairman of the Gubernia Executive Committee Lavrov.

Secretary Vasiliev.

Read at rural gatherings" [6].

Let us dwell on one more order of Tukhachevsky - No. 0016 of June 12, 1921 on the use of gas weapons.

Order of the command of the troops of the Tambov province on the use of asphyxiating gases against the rebels No. 0116, Tambov: [7]

"The remnants of the defeated gangs and individual bandits who have fled from the villages where Soviet power has been restored gather in the forests and from there raid civilians.

For immediate clearing of the scaffolding, I order:

1. The forests where the bandits are hiding should be cleared with poisonous suffocating gases, it is precisely calculated that the cloud of suffocating gases spreads completely throughout the forest, destroying everything that was hidden in it.
2. The Artillery Inspector shall immediately submit the required number of poisonous gas cylinders and the necessary specialists to the field.
3. Commanders of combat areas to persevere and energetically carry out this order.
4. On the measures taken. convey.

Commander of the troops Tukhachevsky. Nashtavoisk of the General Staff Kakurin" [7].

Initially, the appearance of this order was perceived as an act of intimidation. However, facts of the use of chemical weapons have now begun to come to light. Metropolitan Commission for Combating Banditry

adopted a decree of June 19, 1921, ordering "gas attacks to be resorted to with the greatest caution." There would be no need for such an indication if it were only a frightening order. Direct evidence can also be cited: shelling of "an island northwest of the village of Kipets" (Karay-Saltykovskaya volost): "... 65 shrapnels, 49 grenades and 59 chemical ones were fired" [8]. The report did not state either the cause or the results of this shooting on August 2, 1921 [9].

Orders No. 130 and No. 171 were carried out with particular cruelty. In June, the Central Commission for Combating Banditry considered it necessary, "although most of the gangs in the Tambov province were defeated and the kulaks were convinced of the power of the Soviet government", to evict from the province "all persons involved in banditry, including some railway workers".

Let us cite information from the general provincial information report on the fight against banditry according to the data of district political commissions for June-July 1921.

From 19 to 25 June inclusive. Operations under order No. 130 were carried out in 11 districts, 15 volosts with villages. 728 bandits were taken, 1847 single hostages were arrested, 308 families were arrested.

68 farms were confiscated, 62 farms were conditionally confiscated, 6 houses of bandits were burnt down. Voluntarily appeared: 479 bandits, 3856 deserters, 136 deserters were detained. Of the bandits who voluntarily appeared, 21 appeared after taking families as hostages.

The local population, where a systematic struggle against banditry has already been carried out, partly definitely begins to support the Soviet government, partly comes out from under the influence of banditry. In the volosts where a systematic struggle has not been carried out, the population supports the bandits. The measures taken by the Soviet government to confiscate the bandits have a terrifying effect; part of the population sympathizes with how the mighty (i.e., measures) can lead to a quick end to the war, which is painful for them. There is little help from the population.

As of June 21, 1921, there were 1,094 bandits in various places of detention (of which 46 were shot, 83 were sentenced), 634 hostages, and 956 deserters.

From June 26 to July 2 inclusive. The population is sympathetic to the liquidation of banditry and in some places: Peresypkinsky, Inokovsky, Parevsky districts - the peasants took an active part in rounding up deserters and bandits.

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Operations under Order No. 130 were carried out in 8 districts, 14 volosts and 33 villages. 596 bandits were taken. Single hostages were arrested — 683, families — 183. 76 bandit households were registered for confiscation. 48 bandit farms were confiscated, 79 houses were burned and destroyed. Appeared voluntarily: 507 bandits, 1063 deserters, 1165 deserters were detained, 23 thieves. 395. 183 people were shot.

From 2 to 9 July. In the Bogoslovskaya and Tsarevskaya volosts, the revolutionary committees carry out the purge by means of periodic raids on bandit elements that accidentally remained after the occupation of the localities by the Red Army units.

In with. 21 bandits were taken by the burner, who were shot right there, at a general meeting of citizens.

In with. Surava, 6 bandits were shot by a special department and 18 by local citizens; in the Belomestno-Dvoinevskaya volost, 34 people were shot out of 40 bandits caught. In total, 233 people were shot at the 2nd combat unit.

In with. Khitrov, a meeting was convened, at which the decision of the Upolitcommission was announced and a one-hour period was given, after which the citizens responded with ignorance of the required information, why they had to shoot 7 fists, after which another | an hour during which a woman declared that there must be something hidden in the church; during a search in the church under the altar, a field telephone was found, a velvet-red banner with a sewn inscription: "In the struggle you will find your right."

Overall result: operations under order No. 130 were carried out in 19 districts, 30 volosts, 29 villages. 354 bandits and 93 different ones were taken. Hostages were arrested: singles - 432 and families - 161. Registered for confiscation, conditionally confiscated and 80 households described. 210 households were confiscated and 4 houses were burned down. They came voluntarily: 476 bandits, 329 deserters, 857 deserters were taken. 394 people were shot [10].

About how orders No. 130 and No. 171 were applied in practice, the chairman of the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko reported to V.I. Lenin like this:

“In the second most gangster district - Tambov - the most drastic measures were applied in the volosts: Belomestnaya Dvoynya,

where the peasants, stubborn in harboring weapons and bandits, surrendered only after the execution of two batches of hostage kulaks. In general, 154 bandits-hostages were shot here, 227 were taken

gangster families, 17 houses were burnt down, 24 houses were dismantled and 22 houses were handed over to the poor, in the Estal Volost 75 hostages and bandits were shot, 12 houses were burned down, 21 houses were dismantled, in both volosts up to 300 bandits were handed over to the peasants and partly brought in. , 118 rifles, 25 shotguns, 10 revolvers, etc.

The Kamenskaya volost of the Tambov district - the seat of the provincial committee of the STK - surrendered after the arrest of all the men - indicated warehouses, hiding places, extradited many bandit leaders, including members of the provincial and district, volost and rural committees of the STK; The local "vohra" and several dozen bandits came voluntarily. In with. Krivopolyanie, after the execution of 13 hostages, a warehouse of spare parts for machine guns was indicated, several bandits were issued, and the shelter of the remnants of the Selyansky gang was indicated. In general, in the Tambov district from June 1 to July 10, bandits with weapons - 59, without weapons - 906, deserters - 1445, bandits - 1455, deserters - 1504 voluntarily appeared. 549 families were taken hostage, 295 final confiscations were carried out property, 80 houses were dismantled, 60 houses were burned, 591 bandits were shot, 70 hostages, 2 for harboring" [11].

The methods of suppressing the peasant uprising, especially Order No. 171, provoked a protest in the upper strata of the Bolshevik leadership as well. In recent years, two important documents have been declassified that shed light on the final fight against Antonovism: a letter from A.I. Rykova L.D. Trotsky of July 18 and the minutes of the meeting of the commission on combating banditry, chaired by L.D. Trotsky dated July 19, 1921. From Lenin's previously published documents, it was only known that on July 16, at the morning meeting of the Politburo, Rykov asked Lenin, and Lenin promised "in two hours" to send a number of the Tambov newspaper with some order of unknown Antonov. The publishers of these documents stipulated that they "failed" to establish the name of this newspaper, and, consequently, the reason for the exchange of notes at the said meeting. It was about the issue of the Kozlovskaya district newspaper Nasha Pravda dated June 18, 1921, with order No. Rykov sent Trotsky a newspaper with the text of the order of June 11.

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In the minutes of the Politburo meeting of July 16, where an exchange of notes took place between Lenin and Rykov, we find paragraph 8 "Comrade Rykov's statement" and a very vague decision on this statement: "Refer the issue raised by Comrade Rykov for consideration The Commission for Combating Banditry, with the participation of Comrade Trotsky, instructing it to make a final decision by unanimity" [12].

Meanwhile, in a letter from Rykov, which we are publishing, it was reported that a proposal was made to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to cancel the order and recall Antonov-Ovseenko and Tukhachevsky from Tambov. Rykov was instructed to prepare a report on these proposals, and he asked the chairman of the RVSR Trotsky "to consider the issue urgently and notify me."

Note by a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) A.I. Rykov to the chairman of the RVSR L.D. Trotsky about the decision of the Politburo to annul order No. 171 and withdraw A.V. from Tambov. Antonova-Ovseenko and M.N. Tukhachevsky July 18, 1921:

"Lev Davydovich!

In accordance with the decision of the Politburo, I am sending you the order of Antonov-Ovseenko and Tukhachevsky. The Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee made a proposal supported by the majority of its members:

- 1) Cancel the order.
- 2) Recall Antonov-Ovseenko and Tukhachevsky.

Please consider the issue urgently and notify me.

In my opinion, the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee should somehow respond to this order with publication, at least in the local press.

A.I. Rykov" [13].

The Commission for Combating Banditry, chaired by L.D. Trotsky (an exceptional case) on July 19, 1921, she decided to "cancel the order" and on the same day "transfer it by direct wire for publication in Tambov publications."

From the minutes of the meeting of the Commission for Combating Banditry under the RVSR dated July 19, 1921] g:

"Attended: Tt. Trotsky, Gusev, Unshlikht, Aleksandrov, Danilov, Tukhachevsky, Kamenev.

Presiding: comrade Trotsky.

Heard: About order No. 171 issued by the Tambov command

em (Trotsky)

Resolved:

1) Order No. 171, which established the use of harsh measures of reprisal against the rebels, was caused by exceptional conditions and the criminal and treacherous activities of the anarcho-SR bandit elements, who concentrated their main forces within the Tambov province.

The purpose of the order was primarily to show the majority of the peasantry the seriousness of the situation created by these elements, and the determination of the Soviet government to mercilessly punish such elements that undermine the defense capability of the Republic and ultimately upset its economic life.

At the same time, the Soviet government had as its goal to stop those brutal tortures that were inflicted by bandits on often defenseless workers and peasants who were loyal to the Soviet Union.
authorities.

Today, when the gangs of bandits, after being isolated from the population, are defeated and virtually liquidated, it seems possible to cancel the order due to the exceptional circumstances indicated above.

2) This decision will be finally edited today and transferred by direct wire for publication in Tambov publications.

Chairman Trotsky Secretary I. Medyantsev" [14].

The decision to release Tukhachevsky "with his return to the Western Front" was made by the Commission at a meeting on July 17, 1921, those. on the second day after the first conversation about Order No. 171 at the Politburo. Soon Antonov-Ovseenko was also recalled.

In the note of the commander of the troops of the Tambov province M.N. Tukhachevsky V.I. Lenin was told about the state of affairs in the province on July 16, 1921;

"1. The situation of banditry by the beginning of May.

In five districts of the Tambov province: Kirsanovsky, Tambov, Morshansky (south of the Syzr-Vyaz. railway), Kozlovsky (east of the Rostov railway) and Borisoglebsky (with the exception of its southernmost part), Soviet power did not exist (excluding cities).

In this area, embraced by a peasant uprising, power belonged to the STK (Union of the Working Peasantry), through which the Socialist-Revolutionary Party pursued its policy.

There were up to 21,000 bandits.

The uprising began in September 1920, and the local peasantry and bandits call it their revolution and even date the events from the moment of the revolution (for example, they say: this was before the revolution, this is after, etc.).

The reasons for the uprising are common to the entire RSFSR, i.e. dissatisfaction with the surplus appropriation and the inept and exceptionally cruel implementation of it by the local food agencies.

The reasons behind the uprising are as follows:

- a) a strong Socialist-Revolutionary nest, twisted in the Tambov province;
- b) the skillful tactics shown by the Social Revolutionaries in the creation of the STK;
- c) a hidden large stock of weapons made by Antonov during his command of the Kirsanov district militia and, finally, Antonov's military organizational talent.

P. Campaign plan.

The forthcoming actions had to be viewed not as some kind of more or less lengthy operation, but as a whole campaign or even a war. The defeat of the manpower of the bandits, due to its weak combat capability, did not present serious difficulties.

The main and most difficult task was the conquest of the territory, the occupation of the sources of gang recruitment and their Sovietization.

The main military and political forces were thrown into this task of occupation, and only three cavalry brigades were allocated for maneuvering operations.

In order to harmonize Soviet work in the field with military measures, political commissions were created - district bodies of the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

Sovietization was to be carried out by the following measures: the removal of the bandit element, the planting of revolutionary committees, the stratification of the peasantry by arming it against banditry, interest it materially at the expense of the bandits' confiscated property, the use of terrorist measures against sympathizers with banditry, the removal of STK committees, labor assistance the Red Army to the population and the establishment of Soviet work.

In parallel with this, a number of maneuver operations against the gangs were planned, which were supposed to end in the complete death of the latter from exhaustion (the sources of recruitment were occupied).

PI. Results achieved and next steps.

As a result of methodically carried out operations for forty days, a peasant uprising in the Tambov province. liquidated.

STK destroyed.

Soviet power has been restored everywhere.

From 21,000 bandits, only 1,200 sabers remained by July 11. A huge number of gang leaders have been destroyed.

The peasantry has been compromised in the eyes of the bandits and is seeking armed protection from them for the Red Army.

But at the same time, the peasants definitely do not believe in the sincerity of the decree on tax in kind. There are rumors among them that by the autumn our troops will be withdrawn from Tambov Gubernia, and then the bandits will begin actions again and, finally, the volost committees of the STK are still sitting here and there.

In view of this, I consider it necessary to carry out the following actions:

- 1) not to withdraw from the Tambov province the troops currently operating in it for one year;
- 2) to leave the occupation command in the Tambov province at least until winter, without being carried away by the reduction of headquarters;
- 3) all the communists sent on mobilization to the Tambov province, to assign to the latter, as well as to regroup the overstayed communists;
- 4) not to impose any additional food taxes on the Tambov province.

Tukhachevsky" [15].

Extract from the minutes of the meeting of the Commission for Combating Banditry No. 22. Top secret. July 17, 1921:

"There were: comrades Gusev, Kamenev, Artem, Danilov, Aleksandrov, Shaposhnikov, Antonov, Unshlikht, Tukhachevsky, Bryukhanov, Mikhailov.

Comrade Gusev presides.

1. Listened: Comrade Tukhachevsky's report on the state of the fight against banditry in the Tambov province.

1. Decided: 1) Not to withdraw from the Tambov province the troops currently operating in it, necessary for the occupation and the final elimination of banditry. 2) Until October 1, if possible, do not remove the Communists sent to Tambov Gubernia. on mobilization. 3) Propose to Glavsnabprodarm to provide the Tambov troops with food without interruption. 4) Propose to Glavnachsnab to step up measures to equip the Tambov army. 5) Allow the command of the Tambov army to offer the bandits to surrender on the terms of preservation

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life and the widespread use of probation - subject to the surrender of weapons and the extradition of all leaders. 6) Suggest to the Commander-in-Chief to secure the Tambov province. until October 1 by a brigade of cadets.

2. Heard: On the release of comrade Tukhachevsky from the post of the commanders of the Tambov province. (S.S. Kamenev).

2. Resolved: The Commission finds it possible to release Comrade Tukhachevsky with his return to the Western Front and replacing him with Comrade Lewandovsky.

3. Listened: About the business trip of party workers to Tamb. lips. for the peasant conference.

3. Resolved: The Commission finds it necessary that the Central Committee of the RCP send responsible workers to the Tambov province specifically for holding a peasant conference, and also strengthen the Tambov province. Soviet workers.

Chairman S. Gusev Secretary I. Medyantsev" [16].

N.I. played an active role in making these decisions. Bukharin. In the midst of their discussions - July 17 - V.I. Lenin sends him the report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army S.S. Kamenev with the defense of the methods of struggle used by Tukhachevsky in the Tambov province, and the recognition of the expediency of their use in other areas. On the first page of the report there is an entry: "Secret to Bukharin. Return by reading from line to line as a punishment for panicking. Lenin" [17].

On July 20, 1921, the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee sent a secret dispatch to the pre-political commissions |, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 with the following content:

"Antonov's gangs have been defeated. Boguslavsky's gangs have been destroyed. The Karas gang, together with its chieftain, was liquidated. The bandits surrender en masse, betraying their leaders. Among the bandit leaders themselves there is confusion, and already many of them, having finally lost faith in the incorrectness of the Socialist-Revolutionary program, have gone over to the side of the Soviet government.

The peasantry itself has finally recoiled from the SR-gangster betrayal: it itself enters into a decisive struggle against the robber gangs, they organize squads to help the Red Army, the defense of the villages is created, the bandits and traitor SRs are seized.

The Plenipotentiary Commission is confident that, with the unanimous support of the peasantry itself, the Red Army will put an end to all remnants of banditry in the Tambov Territory in the shortest possible time.

"27

The final collapse of the Socialist-Revolutionary banditry and the full cooperation of the peasants in the fight against it allows the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to suspend the application of the exceptional measures of Order No. 171 directed against the stubborn bandits.

The Plenipotentiary Commission reaffirms that all those who voluntarily surrender retain their life.

All measures under Order No. 234 should be immediately reported to the Regiment by telegraph.

Regiment of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee Vasiliev" [18].

Concentration camps were created on the territory of the Tambov province, including for young children.

The report of the Commissioner for Improving the Life of Children at the Tambov Gubernia Executive Committee provided information on the number of children held in concentration camps in the Tambov Province as of August 1, 1921: up to 3 years old - 397, up to 5 years old - 758 children.

This further embittered the rebels, who, as a response, took hostages the families of communists, Red Army soldiers, and Soviet employees. In contrast to order No. 130, the provincial committee of the Union of the Working Peasantry issued its order - "to take hostages the families of Red Army soldiers and Soviet employees, confiscating their property." This order was carried out in some areas with the greatest cruelty (the Red Army families were directly massacred by dozens). In places, citizens sometimes asked the Red Army units, out of fear of white terror, not to touch gangster families [9].

This tactic was so developed that in July 1921 | A special order was issued by the Tambov Upolitcommission on the prohibition of the arrest of children, pregnant women and women with young children as hostages. On July 20, 1921, the Tambov Upolitcommissia sent an order to the chairman of the Prigorodno-Sloboda Volrevkom to prohibit the arrest of children, pregnant women and women with young children as hostages. For non-fulfillment of this order, the chairmen of the revolutionary committees were to be held strictly accountable" [19].

Leaving the Tambov region, V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko reported on what had been done by the Plenipotentiary Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and what was to be done in the future in the Tambov Territory so that the uprising of the peasants would not flare up AGAIN.

"In general, the current situation is as follows:

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1. The military forces of banditism are broken: by the beginning of May there were up to 20,000 active bandits, by now there are several hundred of them.
2. Bandit gangs completely lost the support of the economic strata of the village. The peasants in many places are definitely hostile to them and willingly organize squads to help our militia and troops.
3. The STK organization has been broken almost everywhere, and the entire system of the bandit militia army has been destroyed, as well as its entire communications, intelligence, and supply apparatus.
4. However, in Kirsanovsky and Tambov districts, some villages still retain gangster moods and organizations. Few weapons were seized. The mood of the majority of the peasantry is expectantly distrustful. Many bandits are disbanded (according to rumors) at home temporarily.
5. This mood is fed by the paucity and extreme diversity of the harvest, with a huge undersowing and panic rumors from the starving provinces, and rumors about the imminent withdrawal of the Red troops from the province.
6. The occupation of the region is almost completed and the planting of permanent organs of the Soviet power in the villages has already begun.
7. The rural militia settled in the localities and acquired some importance along with the peasant teams that began to organize themselves.
8. The party organization is weakened, overworked, oppositional mood is growing among the workers, peasant organizations (community cells) are just beginning to take shape. The party organization has up to 5,000 members instead of 14,000 last year. The army also has up to 5,000 party members.
9. Up to five thousand hostages have been accumulated in concentration camps, and orders for their expulsion No.
10. The railroad workers continue to serve as the backbone for the counter-revolutionary organization; meanwhile, the issue of moving them to other roads has not yet been practically resolved" [20].

In the summer of 1921, Antonov's main forces were defeated. At the end of June - beginning of July, he issued the last order, according to which the combat detachments were asked to divide into groups and hide in the forests or even go home. The uprising broke up into a number of small, isolated centers, which were liquidated before

the end of the year.

The Antonovites were a force only in their own districts, close to their native home. When, pressed by troops under the command of M.N. Tukhachevsky, Antonov's armies ended up in the Penza province, they were defeated in the first battle. The retreat to the Saratov province did not change anything: a new battle and a new one, this time a complete rout. Antonovshchina is a typical peasant uprising with a typical ending - a military defeat upon leaving their native places.

The leader of the peasant uprising in the Tambov province, Alexander Stepanovich Antonov, hid in the forests for another whole year and was hunted down and killed on June 24, 1922 in the village of Nizhny Shibryai Bori-

soglebsky district.

Summarizing the above, we draw conclusions.

The entire military might of the republic was thrown against the peasant army. A Central Interdepartmental Commission for Combating Banditry was created, which included representatives of the Central Committee, the STO, the Cheka, the NKPS, etc. The military defeat of Antonovshchina began. The strategy consisted in the complete and brutal implementation of the military occupation of the rebel areas, which had already been undertaken by the predecessors of the new leadership.

Commander-in-Chief M.N. Tukhachevsky arrived in Tambov on May 6, 1921, and already on May 12, his order No. 130, famous for its cruelty, and instructions for applying this order appeared.

The methods of suppressing the peasant uprising, especially Order No. 171, provoked a protest in the upper strata of the Bolshevik leadership as well.

In the summer of 1921, Antonov's main forces were defeated.

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NATIONAL FEATURES OF THE PROTEST MOVEMENT IN THE REGIONS OF RUSSIA

The most important feature of the peasant movement in the Volga region in 1918-1922. was a multinational composition of its participants. This feature was determined by the specifics of the Volga region as one of the multinational regions of the country. Peasant uprisings against the military policy took place in all national regions of the Middle and Lower Volga regions. And Russian, and Tatar, and Chuvash, and Mordovian villages took part in the insurgent movement. They acted as a united front in defense of their peasant interests. This is convincingly evidenced by the most powerful peasant uprising in the region, called by contemporaries the "fork" or "the uprising of the Black Eagle farmer" [1: 16].

The "fork uprising" at the beginning of 1920 revealed the national characteristics of the protest movement of the peasantry. The Volga region is a huge territory inhabited by a multinational population - Russians, Tatars, Bashkirs, Mordovians, Chuvashs, Kalmyks, German and Latvian colonists, who have long settled a large area in the Saratov Trans-Volga region.

The bulk of the rebels were Tatars and Bashkirs. But along with them, the peasants of Russian villages, German and Latvian colonists took an active part in the uprising. For propaganda purposes, local leaders tried to split the rebels along ethnic lines. At the Ufa provincial conference of the RCP(b) on March 3, 1920, the speaker, chairman of the provincial committee, B.M. Eltsin argued that the rebels were the Muslim part of the population, while the Russians were either passive or actively defending Soviet power [1: 419]. In reality, the "fork uprising" was multinational: Tatars, Bashkirs, Russians, Chuvashs, Mordovians, Germans took part in it. It was not a national movement. The majority of the population of the territories covered by the uprising was Muslim, so the uprising involved more Muslim population than the Russian peasantry.

The determining factor in the uprisings in a multinational environment was the protest against the food policy of war communism. In late 1918 - early 1919, the main burden of the surplus appraisal fell on the counties of Simbirsk, Samara and Kazan provinces, which were liberated from the power of Komuch in the autumn of 1918. In 1919, the surplus appraisal was extended to the Ufa province and adjacent areas,

"077

the majority of the population of which were Tatars and Bashkirs. In the Belebeevsky district of the Ufa province, the uprising spread to all Tatar volosts: Staro-Turai, V. Bshindinskaya, Chukadytamakskaya. Meeting of the Belebey organization of the RCP (b) March 3, 1920

stated: "Nations of a lower culture do not understand the difficulties of economic ruin" [1: 405, 412].

The report of the head of the Belebeevsky district executive committee of the Civil Code is indicative. Kasymov to the Ufa Provincial Committee of the RCP(b) about the circumstances of the murder of the food detachment in the village of Kazaklar-Kubovo, Chukadytamak volost on January 16, 1920. It was reported that on January 12, the commissar of the food detachment Mikhailov and two food detachment members were killed in a cruel way: the corpses were disfigured, some have their brains out, their eyes popping out and their teeth knocked out. The arrested participants in the murder turned out to be from among the poorest and middle peasantry: one of them, a resident of Kazaklar-Kubovo, Almuhamet Shaimukhametov, is a poor poor man who provided food for half a dozen of his children by weaving and selling bast shoes. He beat the food detachments, holding bast shoes in one hand and a club in the other. The explanation for the brutal murder had no national connotation: the food detachment decided to arbitrarily close the local bazaar, as a result of this action, the poor poor were deprived of the last opportunity to buy a piece of bread somewhere. No supply of food to the poor by the local authorities was organized. The general meeting of the inhabitants of the Tatar village recognized that, as a result of the murder committed on its territory, the village was disgraced, so the general meeting made a decision: within three days to complete the annual supply of bread. The Belebeevsky county executive committee proposed to urgently organize national food orders [1: 332-335].

The predominance of the Muslim population among the participants in the "fork uprising" did not fundamentally distinguish it in terms of its goals and mechanism from similar performances by Russian peasants. The appeal of the Birk Revolution Committee of the Ufa province to the Muslim population of the county on March 5, 1920 is characteristic: "Muslim brothers! Some groups of citizens have come out of your midst, who themselves have succumbed to various provocative rumors and who are insolently rousing the civilian population to revolt against Soviet power. The idea of an uprising, as has already become clear, originated among the kulaks, merchants, adherents of the old tsarist system, officers and the bourgeoisie, who had returned from Siberia. They let in the dark Muslim mass

they unleashed their corrupting poison and this same working poor against the Soviet government and the communists, while they themselves remained on the sidelines. Who is paying for their treacherous provocation? Who lays down his head in the fight against the valiant Red Army? Who comes out with flails, shovels and other similar weapons against the red rifle and machine gun? Yes, the same working poor of Islam, on which the impudent kulak pack always went. It is with her own life, with her own heads, that she pays for the sins of others, only because of her own folly....

Poor, misguided Muslim brother! Take care of your head and life - they are also needed for the good of your family, your little daughters and sons! Your hands are still needed to raise your ruined economy! You foolishly use shovels, pitchforks, flails - are these tools for war? If you want to fight, take a rifle, it won't change, and you need these peaceful agricultural implements for your peasant labor. That master is bad and unreasonable, who kills the enemy with a flail, and threshes bread with a rifle. And if you do not have weapons suitable for war, if you see that the rich and moneybags are fooling you, return to your household, for you are not a warrior. Work at home and you will bring more benefit to yourself and your homeland than going to war with a shovel. May Allah bless your peaceful agricultural work!" [1: 437-438].

The main factor in the protests was the food issue: discontent arose on the basis of miscalculations in the policy of war communism. The national and religious aspects played an important, but far from decisive role, and in this ratio, the religious one turned out to be more significant than the national one: the bulk of the rebellious peasants were Muslims.

In the Muslim villages of Kazan, Samara and Ufa provinces, local food agencies did not take into account the religious traditions of the population during the implementation of the surplus appraisal. Installing

assignments for distribution for pork for Tatar villages, the food committees did not even take into account that the Tatars do not breed pigs, therefore, they cannot fulfill the allocation plan [1: 449-453]. Peasants were especially dissatisfied with the actions of local authorities to forcibly mobilize mullahs to perform labor duties and take them as hostages for failure to fulfill the state allocation plan. Where this was done, there were protests. Religious figures of Muslims - mullahs - were often among the participants and initiators of the uprisings. Rural priests, closely associated with the peasants, often actively

participated in the peasant movement, campaigned against the policies of the Bolshevik state, were among the first to be repressed. Punitive detachments carried out arrests of Tatar mullahs as hostages. However, the population did not betray the instigators of the uprising even after the arrest of the mullahs [1: 449-453].

As a rule, the peasants came out in defense of their priests and the village church against harassment by the local authorities. Threats to close churches, arrests of clergy, and offensive actions of local activists for the feelings of believers often provoked

uprisings.

The religious factor manifested itself with greater force in the course of the "fork uprising", where the bulk of the rebellious peasants were Muslims. At the same time, among the slogans of the rebels was "For the Christian faith and Islam!".

Miscalculations in religious matters were supplemented by mistakes in national affairs: registers of births were taken away, births, deaths and marriages were required to be registered in Russian. Muslim peasants took it as if they wanted to be baptized. Inept circulars of the authorities played a negative role. So, with the birth registration there was such a case: a Muslim child's name is Haris, but they are recorded in the parish Boris.

The pro-Darmians openly mocked the minarets and the skullcaps. Women were subjected to labor mobilization (burning firewood), who, according to the laws of Islam, alone, without husbands, were not supposed to go into the forest. Food agitators in many places instead of agitation engaged in beatings, not because there was no bread, but simply because they did not like the physiognomy of Muslims [1: 453-454]. All this served as a match that caused a fire. One of the secret information reports of the Saratov Governorate described a protest action in the village of Stary Mostyak, Staro-Atlashinsky volost, Khvalynsky district, on September 7, 1919. On the day of Soviet propaganda, a rally was organized in the village, at which local leaders spoke. During the rally, the Tatars heard exclamations: "Why is it forbidden to learn the Koran, the Law of God, in schools?" Soon the shouts turned into noise. Without giving an answer to the question asked, the crowd shouted "Down with the labor school!", "Down with the communists and Soviet power!" rushed at the speakers and began to beat them [1: 310].

Ignoring national and cultural traditions, the leaders of local authorities often abused their official

position, engaged in arbitrariness in national areas. Some representatives of the local authorities, in their drunken courage, went as far as outright mockery and humiliation of the peasants. Such outrageous facts often appeared on the pages of the central print media. In the village of M. Churashevo, Kazan province, in February 1919, during a rural wedding ceremony, one of the members of the volost council, Gavrikov, organized a kind of wedding procession: he harnessed four women into a sleigh, put collars, saddles, bells on them, tied bells to the arc, picked up a whip and touched the outlandish four along the street. From time to time Gavrikov would get off his sleigh, tie the "four" to the gate, and enter someone's hut for refreshments; The "horses", standing in the cold, chattered their teeth from the cold. For this trip, Gavrikov paid each of them 40 rubles, but then returned them.

Another case of arbitrariness is associated with the tradition of Chuvash women to wear jewelry made from old silver coins. In the Yadrinsky district of the Kazan province, the head of the department

labor Akmin and the county extraordinary commissar Fedotov used this tradition in the interests of their own enrichment. In a certain village, a courier sent a messenger to the chairman of the committee with a notice that the authorities were coming, with an order to prepare a treat with moonshine. After the treat, raids began on pre-scheduled persons. The stolen silver was placed at the personal disposal of the "representatives" of the authorities. In some places, the robbers imposed another indemnity in their favor. The chairman was given up to 50 rubles for "silence". or threatened with the death penalty if denounced [2].

Numerous facts of violence and arbitrariness were noted by the Red Army units. So, in one of the operational reports, the facts included in everyday practice were listed: "The Red Army soldiers of the 93rd battalion near the mullah of the village. Karabash was taken away a sheepskin coat and one and a half pounds of kerosene was poured on it. The 27th battalion from the citizens of the village. Karabash of Suleman Bakkulov, Fatih Suleymanov, Sar-bukhmali Gaiseeva, Musekhka Bakkulov, Zakir Vittulov, a lot of clothes, linen with chests, samovars and carpets were taken" [3]. There were many such cases.

During numerous protests, there was no enmity between the rebels on ethnic grounds. Peasant movement in the Volga region in 1919-1922. did not accept the nationalist ideas of the Tatar and Bashkir radical intelligentsia. Tatar and Bashkir peasants remained indifferent to the political and armed struggle of the nationalist forces against the Bolsheviks. Define-

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tribal traditions played a significant role in this case. Thus, the traditional values of the Bashkirs were based on the ideological basis of Islam in Bashkiria - Ishanism - a variety of Sufism. In the traditional agrarian community with distinct patriarchal features, such as the Bashkir community, the authority of the ishan (teacher) was high. Representatives of the national intelligentsia in the villages (mugallims-teachers) were often subjected to arrests and even beatings by the rebels [1: 487].

The departments for Muslim affairs created in the national regions under the Soviets, later transformed into departments for nationalities, subordinate to the executive committees of the Soviets and Narkomnats, were not able to control the situation. A Muslim section was created in the Samara Provincial Committee of the Party, and a provincial commissariat for Muslim affairs was created under the Samara Provincial Executive Committee, which was engaged in agitation and propaganda work in national regions. In Dzerzhinsky's telegram to the commander of the Reserve Army, B.I. On February 25, 1920, Goldberg was instructed to the troops "in no way to affect the national, religious feelings of the population" [1: 379].

The formation of the national republics and regions in the Volga region, according to the plan of the leadership of the Soviet state, was intended to eliminate the national factor in the protest movement. Local leaders demanded the return of Communist Tatars, Bashkirs, Cheremis (Mari) and representatives of other nationalities from the fronts to work with the local national population.

On February 18, 1919, the Bashkir military formations, which had previously actively participated in hostilities against the Red Army, went over to the side of the Soviet government. In accordance with the "Agreement between the Russian Workers' and Peasants' Government and the Bashkir Government on Soviet Autonomy" on March 23, 1919, the Bashkir Soviet Republic was formed. It included the territory of the so-called Lesser Bashkiria - part of the Ufa, Orenburg, Yekaterinburg and Samara provinces with a predominance of the Bashkir population. The Bashkir Soviet Republic was declared an integral part of the RSFSR. The ideologist of the national republic and its actual leader was A.-3. Validov. Later, in 1922, the Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Greater Bashkiria, including the Ufa province) was created.

The top Soviet leadership was concerned about the danger of involvement in peasant uprisings of combat-ready Red Bashkir

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units: On February 28, 1920, the Bashkir and Sterlitamak regiments issued a joint resolution on joining the rebels, which began like this: “We, the Bashkirs and the Red Army, are joining the peasant uprising and going against the communists” [4].

Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party N.N. Krestinsky in a telegram to the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic L.D. On March 2, 1920, Trotsky expressed fears about the possibility of the rebels of the Kazan and Ufa provinces “to captivate the towers” [5]. Trotsky's reply telegram to Krestinsky reported: “The Bashkir units are behaving well.” Trotsky warned A.-Z. Validov about the possibility of the influence of the Muslim factor on the Red Army soldiers of the Bashkir units. According to Trotsky, “Validov swore that not a single Bashkir would oppose Soviet power,” moreover, “offered Bashkir units to pacify.” Trotsky's confidence in the loyalty of the Bashkir units was explained by the fact that the Red Army Bashkirs were natives mainly from 12 mountainous, consuming regions of Bashkirea, the population of which was hostile to the more prosperous population of the agricultural regions of the republic [6]. Authorized by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee F.A. Artem (Sergeev) also informed the leadership of the Soviet state that Validov offered his services in pacifying the rebels [1: 390].

These facts indicate that the nationalist movement in Bashkirea developed autonomously from the peasant movement and pursued its own goals. The clash between the two authorities - the Bashkir Revolutionary Committee and the Bashkir Regional Committee of the RCP (b) led to the fact that in May 1920 A.-Z. Validov went over to the side of the anti-Bolshevik forces [7].

In May 1920, the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was formed. In accordance with the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of June 24, 1920, the Chuvash Autonomous Region was formed on the territory of part of the Kazan and Simbirsk provinces.

However, the formation of national republics and regions did not eliminate the recurrent manifestations of the policy of war communism, which gave rise to new protest phenomena. In the Bashkir Republic, during the period of the “fork uprising”, in almost every village where punitive detachments took place, mass executions and requisitions were carried out. In the area of Ussergan, Burzyan-Tangaurov and Tamyán-Katai cantons, hundreds and thousands of Bashkirs were shot for no reason or reason, without preliminary investigation and trial. In Tamyán-Katai

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In the canton, executions took place in almost every village: in the village of Rasulevo on January 28, 1920, 9 people were shot by a punitive detachment, in the village of Vasilievka - about 200 people. Mass executions took place in the villages of Abzyakovo, Mukhametevo, Kurakaevo, Balabanovo. A 12-year-old boy was shot for not giving a horse, a Bashkir was raped, an old man of 70, the father of a Red Army cavalry brigade, was killed for the absence of his son, who was allegedly a deserter. Things and property of the Bashkirs were taken away. In the Burzyan-Tangaurov canton, the punitive detachments under the command of Polenov and Rudenko among the Bashkir population were known as “beasts”. As a measure of punishment, Polenov revived the terrible methods of the tsarist authorities (General Tefkelev, in particular) during the suppression of the uprising in 1872 - hanging the Bashkirs on stakes with a wattle fence. The Bashkir authorities not only did not take measures to curb violence, but often encouraged it themselves. Chairman of the Bashkir Central Executive Committee Mansyrev approved the commander of the punitive detachment Polenov for his “good and excellent terror.” The response to manifestations of state terror was the strengthening of popular resistance and the growth of mass protest phenomena [8].

The Bashkir peasants, like the Russians, were forced to bear all the burdens of allotments and labor duties. For Bashkirea, the complexity was exacerbated by its peculiarities: 94% of the population lived in the village, agriculture was predominantly extensive and a significant place in it

occupied a patriarchal-natural way of life. The differentiation of the peasantry was deep, there were significant differences in the economic development of individual regions of the republic. In the eastern mountain-steppe and mountain-forest regions of the republic, the traditions of the feudal-patriarchal socio-economic structure were strong, on the side of which were tribal institutions and the corresponding system of non-economic coercion. During the period of revolutionary transformation, the role of communal institutions strengthened: the rural gathering, as a body of peasant self-government, resolved the main issues of village life.

The process of stratification of the peasantry in Bashkiria had its own peculiarities. In the Bashkir village, especially in the eastern regions, the poor and laborers prevailed. The middle peasant of the Bashkir village differed little from the poor peasant of the Russian village. Difficulties in determining the norms of land use were exacerbated by the active influx of migrants into the territory of Bashkiria. Often, migrants occupied not only free lands, but also those that belonged to the local population, concluding predatory deals with the Bashkir poor [9].

These factors prompted the leadership of the Soviet state to provide the Bashkir Republic with certain benefits for the implementation of allocations and labor duties. In this regard, in the agricultural regions adjacent to Bashkiria, the desire of the peasants of Russian villages to voluntarily join the national Bashkir Republic was manifested. Such sentiments among the peasantry were widespread. This precedent was a confirmation of the characteristic priority of the common peasant interests of the agrarian population in relation to national factors.

In particular, the volosts of the Buzuluk district of the Samara province, bordering on Bashkiria, declared their voluntary accession to the Tok-Churan canton: the Bashkir peasants had fewer duties, especially household duties. In this regard, even a conflict situation arose between the authorities: on December 17, 1919, the Buzuluk district executive committee of the Samara province put forward a demand to the Tok-Churan canton of the Bashkir Soviet Republic with a demand to take measures against the movement for joining Bashkiria. In the Address of the Buzuluk executive committee to the leadership of the canton, "the strong agitation of the peasants on the basis of joining the canton of Bashkiria" of the Bogolyubovskaya, Grafskaya and Voznesenskaya volosts was stated: "The agents indicated that "we will not take away your bread or livestock, as Soviet power of the Russian Republic". Such meetings were held in almost all villages, villages of volosts, and at these meetings written protocols were taken out and lists of those wishing to enter the Bashrepublic were compiled. Representatives were chosen, and with all the materials on accession they were sent to the canton and presented all these materials, protocols and lists to you. Your canton revolutionary committee willingly accepted these materials about the accession and pointed out to these representatives that all these volosts would be attached to the Bashkirs and would be delivered from the Bolshevik power of the Russian Republic; these representatives, who visited your canton and were encouraged by joining the Bashkirs and getting rid of the Russian Soviet Workers' and Peasants' Power, led a strong agitation. The central Soviet government had to take measures to isolate the canton rebels from the rest of the peasant masses; during the arrest, the leaders of this rebellion pointed out and declared that "anyway, we will retreat to the Bashkirs, because detachments of the Bashkirs will arrive and kill you all, Soviet workers, and they will join

A tense situation has developed on the territory of the Tatar Republic. The actions of the local population caused particular indignation

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punitive squads. The authorities were forced to investigate the actions of the punitive detachment under the command of Zhigot, committed in Tatar villages in 1920. The results of the audit revealed "an endless series of merciless general vices, driving through the ranks, murders indiscriminately, arson of poor shacks, robbery, marauder - skoe, rude, inhuman treatment of the population. Families of Red Army soldiers were subjected to robberies. Particular cruelty towards the local population was emphasized on the part of the fighters of the Chinese detachment and

squadron of the Magyars. In Novo-Shemshinsk, a woman with a baby in her arms was shot by four Chinese. There have been cases of violence against women [11].

In its reports, the Tatar Cheka in September 1920 stated popular unrest in the Buinsky Canton: the food policy of war communism caused a shortage of bread. The discontent of the population was also noted in the Spassky canton: the reason for the "bad" mood was called the surplus. Crop failure, apportionment, duties created in the Chistopol canton, according to the report of the Tatar Chekists, the mood was "almost counter-revolutionary." At the end of 1920, according to the observation of the Tatar Cheka, the mood of the peasants in the republic was assessed as "unsatisfactory and partly hostile" [1: 564, 613].

At the beginning of 1921, uprisings engulfed the Sviyazhsky and Buinsky cantons. Mass unrest took place in the volosts: Bolshe-Baltaevskaya, Ulyankovskaya, Tavzarovskaya, Yalchikovskaya, Karlantalinskaya, Shimkusskaya. The rebels vandalized public barns and shared seeds [12].

From January 18 to 19, 1921 in the Chuvash Autonomous Region, in connection with the seed campaign, an uprising broke out simultaneously in four volosts: Akulevskaya, Cheboksary, Almi Kasinskaya, Kasinsko-Sotnikovskaya. The weapons of the rebels were pitchforks and axes. Toganashvskaya, Pomyalskaya volosts (about 2 thousand rebels), Pomarskaya, Khormalinsky and Ubeevskaya volosts (up to 5.5 thousand), Taburdanovskaya, Koshelevskaya volosts joined the uprising. Particular activity of the rebels was noted in the volosts of the Tsivilsky district: Akulinsky, Yanikovskaya, Shorkisrinskaya, Pokrovskaya. The bulk of the rebels were Chuvash and Cheremis. Unrest in the republic was caused by dissatisfaction with the food policy of the Soviet state, the unwillingness of the population to carry out seed distribution [1: 636-638].

The Cheka obliged the provincial Chekas to pay special attention to the role of the German colonists in the peasant uprisings, and the system of hostage-taking from among the most active rebels was encouraged [1: 423]. Such attention of the Extraordinary Commission was not accidental. labor com

The municipality of the Volga Germans, including part of the territory of the Novouzensky and Nikolaevsky districts of the Samara province, Kamyshevsky and Atkarsky districts of the Saratov province, was an autonomous state formation. The German population was mainly engaged in agricultural work.

In March 1921, on the basis of the seed campaign, a peasant uprising began in the Labor Commune of the Volga Germans: the bulk points were destroyed, the rebels occupied the county town of Rovnoye, where more than 100,000 poods of grain were collected. Provincial Commissar Volkov demanded armed assistance from the Cheka [1: 679].

A feature of the unrest in many German settlements was the active participation of women. A similar picture was observed in the villages of Rozenfeld, Weizenfeld, Blagodarnoe, and N. Tarlyk. Women armed with pitchforks, shovels, and stakes turned out to be active participants in the uprising in the German village of Neymariental, where on March 24, 1921, the colonists killed the Algaevsky regional food commissar Gvas-ta and the commissioner of the Baronsky district Cheka Tsytser. The report of the commission investigating the causes of the uprising described the events as follows. On February 28, 1921, a mill was closed in the village and the grinding of flour for the local population was stopped, which caused great indignation. When the residents appealed to the regional food commissar Gvas-ta, the latter answered in a rude manner, expressing himself: "I will make you gnaw at the walls." On March 24, Gvas-ta, Tsytser and 5 Red Army soldiers arrived in Neymariental and went to the mill in order to find out how the work was done at the mill and what payment the executive committee took for grinding. After some time, the local population began to gather at the mill, convinced that Gvas-ta had arrived again to close the mill. The crowd began to demand from Gvas-ta an increase in rations and the issuance of bread. Threatening with weapons, Gvas-ta offered to disperse, but the crowd did not obey. Gvas-ta fired a revolver into the air, after which a crowd of peasants disarmed him and began to beat him and Tsytser. Women threw sand and ashes into their eyes. Gvas-ta was killed, Tsytser was seriously wounded, the Red Army soldiers were disarmed, one of them was killed [13].

An insurrectionary movement broke out on the territory of the Commune of the Volga Germans. The operational reports of the gubchek reported on the fierce resistance of the rebels in the spring of 1921. The German colonists also provided assistance to the raiding peasant and Cossack rebel detachments moving through the territory of the Commune. Thus, the operational report for April 27-30 allows us to assess the scale of the insurrection: "In the Golo-Karamyshsky district, the gangs went to the village. Makarovka,

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which is 30 versts west of Goly Karamysh. Our detachments - Skorokhod, Fabrus, attacked gangs of bandits on April 24, the gang retreated, hiding in the forests between Talovka and Novo Talovka, the size of the gang was 600-700 cavalry and infantry. On April 26, there were battles in the area with. Makarovka, as a result, the gang retreated. On April 28, in the Zolotovskiy district, Popov's gangs held the direction of Sosnovka. On April 26, reconnaissance appeared in Golo-Karamyshskoye and Mordovo - 8 people of the opponents, and two of them were killed by our reconnaissance. During the fighting between Topovka and Dmitrievka, two machine guns were taken away from the gangs, and one leader of the bandits, Yermeev, was taken prisoner. On April 27, Popov's gang was defeated, 100 cavalry men, 30 infantry were killed, an insignificant part left. In Rovno uyezd 29 it is reported that the uyezd is inundated with gangs returning to their homes, spreading absurd counter-revolutionary rumors that give rise to a new uprising. Measures have been taken to catch the bandits in the Rovno district. A field military tribunal is working" [1: 715].

The national characteristics of the peasant protest left their mark on the protest movement. In the Volga region, despite the common interests of peasant actions, the traditional isolation of ethnic groups, the multinational composition of the peasant population weakened the organization of the protest movement as a whole. In comparison with the Volga region, the peasant protest movement in Western Siberia, in Ukraine (Makhnovshchina), in the Tambov province (Antonovshchina) turned out to be more organized, the resistance was much longer, since the population was homogeneous in its national composition. The famine of 1921 left a heavy mark on the population of the Volga region. Thus, in Malaya Bashkiria, 26.9% of the population died from starvation [14]. This pattern was ubiquitous.

Separate local protest phenomena in Siberia had distinctly expressed national features. In March 1918, an attempt was made to create a national state of Oirat. A.P. Kaigorodov was an active participant in this action. - the son of a peasant migrant from the volost village of Katanda, Uimon aimag, Karakorum district, Altai province, participant in the First World War, ensign and full cavalier of St. George.

In the course of the insurrectionary movement in the Omsk and Semipalatinsk provinces in the summer of 1920, the participation of the Kirghiz (as the Kazakhs were then called) was noted. They joined rebel groups, the Kyrgyz population hid the rebels and provided them with assistance [15: 268].

In September 1920, representatives of the Tatar population played a significant role in the Lubkov region in the Mariinsky district of the Tomsk province.

The Tatars made up the main part of the insurrectionary detachment of Pyotr Lubkov. And they joined the squad voluntarily. So, for example, the Tatar village of Teplaya Rechka gave Lubkov up to 170 volunteers, the village of Nizhegorodka - up to 40 volunteers. Volunteerism was explained to a large extent by the difficult financial situation of the Tatar population. Entering as volunteers, it was noted in the report of the Tomsk Gubchek, they said: "Lupka (Lubkov) gives trade, the communist does not melt away tarkavat, so you have to drink kamunist, by the way Mariinsk, little by little we will have a manufactory for ourselves." Residents of the Tatar taiga village of Tukaev, hostile to the authorities, hid Lubkov in the house of the Tatar Gaysin and helped him escape to the Yenisei taiga when the village was surrounded by a cavalry detachment on October 14, 1920. During a long and unequal battle, the surrounded house was under attack. - burned, but Lubkov managed to escape [15: 411, 429, 432, 437-439]. For participation in the uprising as an away session

of the Revolutionary Military Tribunal of the VNUS of Eastern Siberia, among those sentenced to death were active participants in the Lubkovshchina of the Tatars Abuzyarov Nab and Aikin Nikolai.

On October 30 - November 4, 1920, an uprising took place in the Molkinsky khoshun (ulus) of the Angarsk aimag of the Irkutsk province, inhabited by Buryats. The basis of the rebels were the middle peasants and the poor. The organizers of the uprising were representatives of the indigenous nationality of the Molka ulus - the Buryats Ulakhanov Iosif, Baldaev Gavriil, Razvozhaev Innokenty, Kharlov Luka, Sabidaev Stepan, Shodorov Matvey. The uprising was directed against the food policy of the authorities. There were re-elections of executive committees of local councils, arrests of communists. Simultaneously with the Molka khoshun, the uprising also engulfed the Kokhinsky khoshun [15: 565-566, 570-571, 576].

In November 1920, in the Verkholsky district, there was an uprising of the Buryats in the Lensky khoshun Ekhirit of the Bulagat aimag, the main part of the rebels were middle and poor peasants. A rebel detachment of about 80 people, most of which were Buryats, launched an attack on the city of Verkholsk on November 14, but was forced to retreat up the Lena River [15: 585, 591].

The region of the long-term rebellion was the Khakass territory of the Yenisei province between the Achinsk and Minusinsk districts. Many local residents, the Khakasses, understanding the Soviet government as a purely Russian government, treated it with hostility. Since the autumn of 1920, the rebel groups of A. Argudaev, S. Astanaev, F. Karachakov, A. Kiykov, N. Kulakov, I. and E. Rodionovs, N. Solovyov and I. Shadrin (Hawes) have been operating on the Khakass lands. In the summer of 1921 they united

under the command of N.I. Solovyov [16]. In autumn, the rebels often broke up and many of their members dispersed to the uluses, selling the loot and conducting reconnaissance. Those who remained settled for the winter in a safe place, so that in the spring, having gathered new supporters, they could start actions again. By the autumn of 1921, the number of Solovievites had decreased to 200, by 1922 - to 40, but with the unification of insurgent groups in the summer of 1922, it numbered up to 500 people. Solovyov's detachment found refuge for people who fled from the arbitrariness of local authorities, who had previously even served in the police or were members of the RCP (b), Khakass teenagers who deserted from logging, hunters deprived of weapons by the Communists, lovers of free life, as well as those who were forcibly taken away by the rebels. Persons who lived in the taiga for some time were perceived by local communists as bandits and were subsequently forced to defend themselves. The Khakass poor made up 70-80% of all

Solovyovtsev.

Solovyov managed to involve a significant part of the Khakass population in the rebellion. The rebel detachment was organized like a cavalry unit, in which relative order was established. The end of the Solovyovshchina was predetermined by the arrival of units of the Red Army and Chon's detachments, the use of hostage and punishment by the Soviet authorities. The main reason was the loss of support by the rebels among the Khakass population. Tired of looting and violence, it deployed more than a thousand fighters in support of the Chonovites. In November-December 1922, the rebels, under the blows of the CHON and units of the regular Red Army, had to leave their main base and flee the area, losing the bulk of the rebels killed and surrendered. Solovyov himself with a small group hid in the taiga (killed in 1924 in the village of Salt Lake, Minusinsk district). In general, the uprising contributed to the acceleration of the decision on the creation of the Khakass district [17].

In the largest West Siberian uprising in Soviet history, the protest against the violent methods of war communism united the multinational peasant population of Siberia. It is noteworthy that in the Tara district in the north of the Omsk province, the Karagai and Tukuz volosts, populated mainly by foreigners, were the first to revolt. In the reports of the Soviet military leadership, it was noted that in the Petropavlovsk district - in the south of the Omsk province - foreigners declared "something like gazavat" [18: 199, 326].

In the northern districts of the Tyumen province (Tobolsk, Surgut, Berezovsky), Samoyeds (modern Saami, Nenets), Ostyaks (modern Khanty), Mansi, Tatars took part in the uprising. IN

Tobolsk region in March 1921, Soviet troops fought fierce battles for Istyatsky, Be

Gita, Karagai, Klyashevsky and Inder yurts; in the Tara district - yurts of Aksurka, Salinsky, Reshinsky yurts [18: 656, 662].

The transition to the side of the rebels of parts of a separate Kazan rifle regiment, formed to suppress the uprising, was explained by the Soviet military command by national characteristics. During the offensive in the Yarkovo area on March 2, the Red Army soldiers of the 4th company of the 2nd battalion of the Kazan regiment with machine guns went over to the side of the rebels. In the Tyumen uyezd, the Yarkovsky district was predominantly populated by Muslims. The Red Army company, which went over to the rebels, also consisted of Muslims (Tatars and Chuvashs). A similar incident happened with another company of the Kazan regiment [18: 699].

The protest movement had significant features in the North Caucasus. This multinational and densely populated region was distinguished by its originality associated with ethnic diversity and the deep influence of Islam and historical traditions in this region. A feature of the region was also the historical enmity between the Terek Cossacks and the mountain peoples. The Sunzha line of Cossack villages divided Ingushetia into two parts. Mountain-Cossack enmity determined the main content of social contradictions on the Terek. In 1918-1919. The Bolsheviks found an active ally in the mountaineers, from the autumn of 1920 the former allies became irreconcilable enemies, as a result of which a significant part of the mountain population of the North Caucasus supported and took part in the uprising of N. Gotsinsky. What is the reason for such a cardinal transformation of the relations between the highlanders and the Soviet government?

The complex and confusing situation in the North Caucasus was far from the classical Marxist scheme. The tactics of the Bolshevik Party in the North Caucasus showed an objective consideration of the real balance of forces, and, if necessary, a tactical rejection (where it needed it) of a strictly class line, which led to the desired results. Relationships with national social groups were built not only along class lines. The policy of the Bolshevik Party in the North Caucasus demonstrated the skillful manipulation of public consciousness in order to achieve a specific pragmatic goal - to win over to their side nationalities distinguished by deep religiosity and conservatism. Moreover, the role of religion and religious figures, from the point of view of the communists, did not bear in the North Caucasus an unambiguously negative and hostile assessment, characteristic of the orthodox communist doctrine.

The assessment of the entire Cossacks as a "continuous counter-revolutionary mass" that prevailed in the Bolshevik leadership determined the stake on

mountaineer support. The 11th Terek regional congress, which took place from February 16 to March 15, 1918, adopted the "Law on the socialization of land", thus making the first step towards solving the agrarian issue in favor of the highlanders. On May 22, 1918, the 3rd Congress of the Peoples of the Terek adopted a resolution in which the People's Commissar for Agriculture was asked to "immediately begin to settle the patchwork by resettlement to equalize national borders in relation to the law on the socialization of land." For these purposes, the Cossack villages of Sunzhenskaya, Akki Yurtovskaya, Tarskaya and Feldmarshalskaya were subject to resettlement. As a result of this act, part of the Cossack Sunzha line was liquidated.

Since that time, in the face of the armed detachments of the Ingush and Chechens, often led by clerics, the Soviet government received selfless defenders who spoke out for it at critical moments, in particular, during the Terek uprising of the Cossacks in the summer of 1918. The highlanders supported the authorities during the attempt Cossacks capture Vladikavkaz on 6 August. At the congress of representatives of auls, held in the village of Bazorkino, the highlanders declared their readiness to help the Soviet government. By the end of March 1920, the North Caucasus was liberated from the Whites by the joint actions of the Red Army and mountain partisans. Ossetians, Ingush, Kabardians, Dagestanis, Balkars were imbued with the consciousness of the power of the new government and confidence in it. It is noteworthy that many decisions of auls in support of the Soviet government were made "with

according to the spirit of sharia and revolution. In those days, the North Caucasian Revolutionary Committee assured the Dagestanis: "Religion, morals, your customs, the entire internal way of the highlanders, the Soviet government leaves completely intact and will do everything to ensure that the highlanders of the North Caucasus become truly free in their national development and self-determination" [19]. Lenin in a telegram to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front addressed to G.K. Ordzhonikidze demanded: "Once again I ask you to act carefully and be sure to show maximum goodwill towards Muslims, especially when entering Dagestan. Demonstrate in every possible way and, moreover, in the most solemn way, sympathy for Muslims, their autonomy, independence, and so on. Report on the progress of the case more precisely and more often" [20].

However, soon after the consolidation of Soviet power in the fertile North Caucasus, local authorities in the region were bombarded with circulars and decrees in line with the policy of war communism: the region was seen as one of the main breadbaskets for the whole country. The former performers of state allocations and labor duties - the Cossacks - lost a significant part of their lands, a considerable part of the Cossacks were evicted during the mass deportation of the Terek Cossacks.

The highlander, who fought against the "counter-revolution" for Soviet power, received the former Cossack land as a reward. Extraordinary food commissars immediately appeared at the head of the food detachments, and planned targets for food requisitioning and labor duties were set. The total accounting of chickens, eggs, butter, the nationalization of primitive mountain mills, the demand from villages that are not even able to feed themselves, the delivery of a certain number of rams, wool, bread quickly prepared the ground for the discontent of the mountain peoples. The attempts of the representatives of the new government, despite the peculiarities of the region, to consider social relations in the mountainous regions only through the prism of the class struggle led to serious negative results. The highlanders, who even sincerely sympathized with the Soviet authorities, were negatively impressed by the system of refusal to hand over the bodies of the executed "counter-revolutionaries" for burial according to the Islamic rite. Excesses of atheistic extremism took place in different places.

In the summer of 1920, the clergy and the holy sheikhs with their murids launched propaganda to mobilize the mountain population to fight against the Bolshevik infidels. They used the mass discontent of the highlanders in relation to the policy of war communism. At the same time, it was taken into account that in the North Caucasus a clergyman is not just a priest, but also a judge, a folk teacher, a military leader, a fighter for freedom, a bearer of education. Mufti (head of the Muslim clergy) N. Gotsinsky in the autumn of 1920 raised an anti-Soviet uprising in the mountains. The uprising began in September 1920 in the Andi and Gunib districts of Dagestan. The ideological basis of the uprising, as conceived by its initiators, was an attempt to connect the idea of national independence with Islam among the highlanders. Gotsinsky in October 1920 was proclaimed imam and leader of the uprising. In early 1921, it spread to Chechnya. The number of rebels was about 10 thousand people. The Council of Four Sheikhs was proclaimed the supreme authority.

The uprising was stubborn and violent. Despite the fact that most of its participants were armed with antediluvian weapons, the rebels inflicted a number of heavy defeats on the Red Army. The retaliatory actions of regular units and punitive detachments were accompanied by manifestations of cruelty towards the civilian population. According to modern researchers, Gotsinsky's uprising cost the Red Army more sacrifices than the ten-year-old Basmachi in Central Asia. It lasted about 9 months and was suppressed in

May 1921 [21].

The study of the national aspects of the protest peasant movement suggests the need to revise the assessment of the Karelian events of 1921-1922. and historically substantiated determination of the place of the peasant uprising in Karelia in the history of the first years of Soviet power as one of the major episodes of its final stage [22]. The Karelian events, interpreted in Soviet historiography as the "White Finnish adventure", were of particular importance.

for the Soviet Republic: the country's only exit to the ice-free port of Murmansk ran through Karelia.

An objective analysis of the development of the Karelian events definitely leads to the conclusion that their definition should be approached not as a White Finnish adventure, but as a peasant uprising, which had pronounced national characteristics associated with the border position and the national composition of the population of the region.

In the "Brief Instructions for Combating Banditry in Karelia", a clear, unambiguous assessment of the movement was given: "Banditry in Karelia is of a deep political nature, why, when applying punitive measures against bandits, it is necessary to have great political tact and seriously weigh all the circumstances so as not to arouse indignation among the masses of the population. Further, it was proposed to divide the participants in banditry into two main groups: the first is the "foreign element", consisting of the Russian and Finnish White Guards, officials of the Miller army and Kronstadt rebels; the second is the natives of the region. Particular attention was paid to the second group in the "Instructions", since it was heterogeneous and consisted, in addition to "kulaks, the bourgeoisie and agrarians", "of politically undeveloped peasants and hunters", deceived and fooled by the White Guard agitators, and, finally, "forcibly mobilized peasants, politically completely undeveloped." Such differentiation testified to the participation in the uprising of various categories of the local population.

In relation to the second group, it was proposed to be guided by the following considerations: if it is established that the bandit "comes from a kulak element and, in general, from strata of society hostile to us, their property should be confiscated, and they themselves should be expelled from the Karelian labor commune." The confiscated property was to be transferred to the poor who had suffered from bandits, which pursued a political goal: to gain sympathy and social support among the poor.

The confiscation of property was to be applied to those who took part in the rebellion from the peasant environment with great caution, only in individual cases. If valid participation in

rebellion with a mercenary purpose, the bandits were tried by a military tribunal. Forcibly mobilized confiscation of property was not applied, with the exception of cases of their participation, including under duress, in armed rebellions [23].

The Karelian uprising was due to the ethnic proximity of the Karelians to the Finns: the independence of Finland caused the activation of nationalist sentiments among the Karelians, as well as the desire of Finland to annex Karelia. As a result, both factors - national-territorial and social - formed a kind of alloy.

The nature of the anti-Bolshevik proclamations of 1921-1922 is noteworthy. They talked about the deception of the Karelian population by the Bolsheviks, who declared autonomy for the Karelian people, but did not comply with the terms of the agreement: "They (the Bolsheviks) promise autonomy and freedom to the Karelians who suffered a lot... like under tsarism. They march under the slogan of people's power and freedom, but in reality they are a continuation of the past tsarism, they will eventually destroy all people's freedom, autonomy and the entire Karelian nationality will be forced to become Russified... But we can get autonomy for North Karelia only through our government, but not through Bolshevik talk. Russians are foxes, we know this from previous experiences. So why do we trust their words and promises? Still, they do not fulfill them. Our government, driven out by the Russians and located in Finland, will achieve autonomy for us. Let us drive the Bolsheviks away from our land, in this way we will only preserve our dear freedom, our forests as a whole. The government will get bread, and we ourselves will determine our fate" [24].

Chronologically, the Karelian events were a continuation of the actions of the peasantry against the policy of the Soviet state: the Kronstadt rebellion, Antonovshchina, the West Siberian

uprisings. The causes, occurrence, development of events are largely similar. The uprising in Karelia objectively could not reach the same scale as, for example, Antonovism, but these are phenomena of the same order: Karelia is not as densely populated as the Chernozem region, and locally the forces of the rebels were significant. Local conditions must be taken into account. Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army S.S. Kamenev emphasized, speaking of the liquidation of the uprising, that the main difficulty lay in the natural conditions in which military operations had to be carried out. The regular units of the Red Army, detachments of the "Red Finns" were thrown into the fight against the insurgents, the General Staff, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, the command of the Petrogradskoye

th military district. The methods of conducting military operations on both sides, the measures to eliminate the insurgency, although not as cruel as, say, in the fight against Antonovshchina, were of a nature characteristic of a peasant war. The struggle was complicated by the possibility for the rebels to go abroad under the pressure of the Red Army, there to rearm, replenish and return to the territory of Karelia.

The Finns provided supplies and military leadership for the rebel formations, but tried to get the necessary support from the local population, relying on the dissatisfaction of the peasants with the policy of the Soviet government. The Karelian peasantry acted as an active participant in these events.

The unresolved national question contributed to the aggravation of the socio-political situation in the Northwestern region. In the weekly information reports of the secret department of the Cheka, it was reported that there was hostility of individuals of Russian nationality to the Finns and vice versa; between the Russians and the Karelians there is a strong national strife: the Karelians gravitated towards the Finns.

The acuteness of the current situation was emphasized by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin in a letter to Lenin dated August 11, 1921: "Dear Vladimir Ilyich! One of the places requiring the most serious attention in relation to the political consequences of the famine is Karelia. That is why Karelia has played and is playing such a role in our relations with Finland, and we have worked so hard to create an autonomous Karelian commune there, that geographically it occupies one of the most important places for us, namely the corridor to the north to the Murmansk window to Europe. . The creation of the Karelian Commune solved the problem of national satisfaction of the Karelians while maintaining unity with the RSFSR. But these successful results are upset by the extremely difficult food situation in Karelia, which in this respect belongs to the most suffering parts of the RSFSR. She always ate imported bread. At the present time, we are supplying it so insufficiently that the Soviet apparatus in it is disintegrating, the workers are fleeing or being fired, all trades are suspended, constant persistent telegraphic requests for the deportation of grain remain unanswered, and at the moment food remains in all of Karelia. only for children and sick people. The result is that the White Finns are extremely intensifying their agitation, they transport grain across the border and use it for their political work, an extremely strong attraction to Finland is created in the population, which can feed. If we do not take measures, which, given the meager population of Karelia, will

are relatively not at all so difficult, we may face the most unfavorable political complications. Right now... the Finnish government is vigorously raising the Karelian issue and accusing us of violating the treaty and of all the sins in Karelia, which, of course, is due to increased agitation among the population and with some unknown plans to us. A blow to Karelia would be so sensitive for us that it is necessary to accept those comparatively insignificant sacrifices, at the cost of which we can calm the Karelian population, at least by feeding it a little" [25].

By the time of this letter from Chicherin, almost a year had passed since the existence of the Karelian Labor Commune. It was formed on July 7, 1920 by the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee: "1. To form in the areas of the Olonets and Arkhangelsk provinces inhabited by Karelians in the order of art. eleven

Constitution regional association in the Karelian labor commune". It included 24 administrative units (volosts and cities) of the Olonets province and 20 of the Arkhangelsk province [26]. In the preparatory report for the decision of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the creation of the commune, the goals of its creation were emphasized: "a) in order to exercise and supplement the right of self-determination of the Karelian people to counter the aggressive aspirations of the Finns, who, inciting Karelian nationalism, seek to annex the Karelian territory to Finland...; b) in order to develop and raise Karelian local economic life and its productive forces...; c) to promote revolutionary propaganda in Finland and Scandinavia." The report noted that the majority of the commune's population is peasant, who, in addition to farming and cattle breeding, was engaged in fishing, hunting, felling and rafting of timber [27].

The Karelian Labor Commune, according to the resolution of the first All-Karelian Congress of Soviets, "retains close ties with the working masses of Russia and with the Russian Soviet Republic as a whole. But as a part of the Republic, which differs from the rest of its parts in its national and economic conditions, the Karelian labor commune will have its own competent self-government bodies with wide freedom of action" [28]. It was declared that the commune was granted the right of national self-determination, broad autonomy in internal affairs, entry into the Russian state on a federal basis; Karelian was recognized as the language of administrative legislation and public education. The agreement provided for the right to organize the economic life of the commune in accordance with

places

needs [29].

With the creation of an autonomous national region, the mood of the Karelian population changed for the better. The Revolutionary Committee of Karelia informed the Council of Labor and Defense, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs: "Many of the labor Karelians who ended up on the territory of Finland after the liquidation of the Northern Front repent of their deeds and have a desire to move to Soviet Karelia. On the territory of Finland, bordering on the Kemsy district, a gang of five hundred people operates, mainly from Karelians, led by White Finns. The Kem uyezdvokom points out that it is enough to issue a decree on disarmament and guarantee those who have returned that they will not be drafted into the troops, after which the gang will disperse and return to their villages. The Revolutionary Committee of the Karelian Labor Commune, taking into account the need to provide labor force ... the need to protect the Kemsy district in the future from bandits, joins the Kemsy district committee and asks to sanction the issuance of a resolution, which will indicate that all labor Karelians who returned from Finland and handed over their weapons, the replacement of conscription with labor mobilizations and the right to enjoy the freedoms of the revolution on an equal footing with the rest of the citizens of Soviet Karelia will be guaranteed" [30]. In this regard, the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in November 1920 decided: "To satisfy the petition of the Karelian labor commune. In view of the upcoming celebration of the 3rd anniversary of the October Revolution, amnesty should be applied to the Karelians who went to the white gangs in Finland. The practical application of the amnesty should be entrusted to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs together with the Karelian Labor Commune" [31]. The action turned out to be successful. According to the leadership of the Karelian Commune, "according to the amnesty and personal permits, 8,000 people have so far returned from Finland, and another 4,000 people have remained in Finland." [32]. From the data of the Karelian Revolutionary Committee, it followed that 12,000 Karelian rebels had previously gone to Finland, which, by the scale of Karelia, is quite a lot. Many refugees subsequently not only took part in the uprising of 1921-1922, but also

The reason for the uprising in Karelia was the ill-conceived and contrary to the promises of the actions of local authorities. It began in October 1921 in the Tungudskaya and Yushkozerskaya volosts. At the end of November 1921, the Chief of Staff of the Petrograd Military District telegraphed the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic that "180 citizens of the Letnekonets volost, neighboring Tungudskaya, were called to | October to the court session of the Revolutionary Tribunal in Kem in the case of involvement in the uprising of 1920. Provocateurs intimidated citizens with the supposed cruelties of the Revolutionary Tribunal, called for an uprising against Soviet power. Meanwhile, the Carrevtribunal

due to the lack of evidence in the case of 180 citizens, the proceedings were stopped and this mercy was reported to the chief of police on November 18. In the time interval between the summons to the court and its cancellation, most citizens, wanting to avoid punishment, went to the Tungud volost. This circumstance could be one of the reasons for the uprising" [33]. This point of view was also shared by the Deputy Chairman of the RVSR E.M. Sklyansky, who sent the All-Russian Central Executive Committee a copy of the telegram with a note: "Forwarding a copy of the telegram from the Chief of Staff of the Petrograd Military District dated November 24 this year. No. 263742/op regarding the events in Karelia and considering it possible to agree with the conclusion of the said headquarters that the fact that 180 citizens of the Tungudskaya volost were brought to trial could not but play a significant role in the Karelian uprising, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic asks the All-Russian Central Executive Committee pay special attention to this fact and appoint a special investigation into this case, which took place in the session of the Revolutionary Tribunal of Kemi" [34].

The Ukhta government became more active, which, together with Miller's white army, went beyond the cordon to Finland, continuing its activities as a government in exile. Assistance to the Karelian rebels was organized by representatives of the Ukhta government, Sidorov and Borisov. Adopting the name "Supreme Committee of Karelia", it developed a structure of civil power. In the villages, it was proposed to elect foremen, in volosts - temporary volost committees, in cities - foremen of districts and temporary city committees [35].

On October 4, Sidorov and Borisov organized a congress of residents of 6 volosts inhabited by Karelians, which was attended by 100 people. The congress decided to start creating a ski Karelian partisan detachment and began recruiting Karelian volunteers. According to the report of the military commissar of the second combat sector of the Karelian region, "the number of gangs in the area of the volosts of Rogozerskaya, Tungudskaya, Kadozhskaya, Voknavolotskaya, Tikhtozerskaya, Ukhtinskaya, Pogoskaya, part of Kostenskaya and Maslozerskaya is 1000-1500 people. According to verified information, there are 50-60 people in the Voknavolotsk volost. visitors from Finland from among the previously fled Karelians..." [35].

In October 1921, the detachment of the Finnish officer Tokkunen, numbering 60 people, was the first to cross the border. Following him, other detachments crossed the border in various volosts and, according to Soviet information reports, "having merged with gangs of local origin that succumbed to the bait of the White Guard Finnish officers, began their Cainist work ... raiding the villages, ruining forest and fishing trades, warehouses and Soviet institutions. Villages and villages inhabited

elements that did not sympathize with the bandits and tried to disobey their orders regarding the supply of carts, food, etc., were mercilessly burned" [36].

At the end of 1921 - beginning of 1922 there was an intensive recruitment of volunteers to Karelia in all cities of Finland. The contingent of those recruited belonged to the Finnish Karelians, the Kronstadt rebels. The information summary for January 1, 1922 noted an increase in the number of insurgents and an intensification of the process of unification of active detachments, the formation of combat units from them - regiments. The regiments were built according to the territorial principle: a village with 30-40 households or more made up a company, 4 companies were reduced to a battalion, 3 battalions made up a regiment. The companies were named after the villages in which they were formed. The fragmentary data given in the report on the composition of individual detachments also confirm the fact that the local population participated in the uprising. The detachment in the village of Kostamuksha, numbering 120 people, under the command of three Finnish officers, consisted of one third of Finnish volunteers and two thirds of Karelians. In the village of Kudom Guba, the same detachment consisted of 30% Finnish volunteers. A detachment of 750 people was formed from the Karelian refugees who worked in the eastern border zone [37].

The participation of the Karelian peasantry in the uprising thus refutes the exaggerated role of the Finnish volunteers. The rebellion had support in the local population. In addition, the enumeration of the volosts, the population of which supported the rebels, showed that not only the Karelians, but also representatives of other nationalities sympathized with them.

Finnish volunteers provided support for the Karelian rebels with weapons, supplies and the organization of military detachments. The general leadership was carried out by the commander of the troops, the Finnish officer Tulonen. The headquarters of the armed forces was located in Ukhta, headed by a Finnish officer Tuskonda. As a reserve at the headquarters there was a detachment "Bear Mountain". The troops were divided into two fronts - Northern and Southern. The Northern regiment included the Arkhangelsk regiment - 827 people, the Olangsky detachment - 205, the Aloyarvi detachment - 66 people. The regiment was divided into three battalions, the battalion into three companies, the company into three detachments, the detachment into three units. The regiment had two reconnaissance units, a machine-gun team - 30 people, 4 machine guns. The total number of front troops is 1098 people. The Southern Front included the Karelian Partisan (Forest) Regiment with headquarters in Kimasozero. It had 4 battalions (one of them was a ski battalion) of 250 people each; the total number of the front is 1210 people, in each

battalion - 4 companies each, including machine-gun and reserve (100 people), 150 supplies. In total, the rebel forces on the territory of Karelia numbered 2708 people [38].

The command of the rebels gave an order to mobilize the Karelians in the occupied areas. Recruitment among the male population from 18 to 45 years old was carried out both voluntarily and under duress. As noted in the Soviet operational reports, "mobilization was carried out almost everywhere by force, except for the Tungud and Ukhta volosts, where most of the men at the beginning of the bandit movement voluntarily joined the gangs" [39]. The uprising began with the support of the local population. For the supply, products from Finland were used. At the same time, the "Supreme Committee of Karelia", although poorly, provided not only its army, but also the local population. For this purpose, he created "stage commandant's offices" in the villages, the task of which was to distribute food among civilians.

Summarizing data on the attitude of the population towards the uprising are given in the "Orientation" of the Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army S.S. Kamenev about the political situation in Karelia as of December 25 and 26, 1921, addressed to the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic L.D. Trotsky: "From an assessment of the mood by volosts, it turns out that out of all 46 volosts, 26 are undeniably on our side ... 11 are in a wait-and-see mood, and 11 do not sympathize with us. : Tungudskaya, Rebolskaya, Voknavolotskaya, Tikhtozerskaya, Ukhta, Porosozerskaya, Maslozerskaya". The hostile attitude towards the Soviet authorities was evidenced by the cases of destruction and damage by the local population of unguarded communication lines in the border areas. At the same time, in the Rebolsk volost, during the withdrawal of the Red Army units, the population provided assistance - carts and guides from among the local residents were allocated. In the Tungudskaya and Maslozerskaya volosts, during the mobilization carried out by the rebels, part of the inhabitants fled. Regarding the replenishment of the rebel detachments at the expense of local residents, it was noted that "the bandits are active only along the border, fearing to break away from the latter. Meanwhile, according to Kamenev, "if they felt the support of the population, they would probably go deeper, especially since damaging the railways is, it would seem, one of the most important tasks of the enemy" [40].

The assessment of the situation turned out to be contradictory. One of the reports of the command of the Red Army stated: "The local population of Karelia for the most part refused to participate in the "uprising", which is why their mobilization

"1/7

called under the threat of execution and burning of property. During the retreat, the rebels forcibly took the mobilized with them or sent them with an escort to the territory of Finland, leaving only women and children in the villages. This was especially observed in the border zone, where a few people remained in the villages - exclusively old people, and in some only women and children" [41]. However, in the political report for March 31, the departure of peasants in a number of volosts was characterized differently: "The situation in the Rebolsky district is extremely difficult. There is a shortage of food. There is no fodder for working cattle, many horses have been driven to Finland by gangs. 200 men and 308 women left the Rebolsky district voluntarily with gangs. In addition, gangs mobilized up to 300 men. The rest of the population is unable to work.

There are no logging operations. In the Ukhta region, only 15% of cattle and 5% of horses have been preserved" [42]. Care of the cordon was relatively massive. Three sanitary detachments left for Finland to work among Karelian refugees. A special bureau was set up in Helsingfors to find and provide jobs for refugees. In one month, 305 refugees were sent to agricultural work. It was decided to send young women to gardening schools, and men to agricultural schools. Zinoviev telegraphed Trotsky about the hostility of the frontier population [43].

Another document testified to the embittered mood of the peasants in connection with the collection of the tax in kind. "In the Tulomozerskaya volost, there were unrest among the peasants in connection with the incorrect distribution of the tax in kind... The attitude of the peasantry towards the Soviet regime was mostly undifferentiated" [44].

To suppress the uprising, the Soviet military command concentrated significant forces. A. Sidyakin, the head of the Petrograd fortified area, a well-known military commander in the Civil War, was appointed commander of the troops of the Karelian region. It was decided to immediately transfer two rifle brigades from the Tambov region to Petrozavodsk. Training and personnel regiments and divisional schools of two divisions arrived from the troops of the Petrograd Military District. Three armored trains, an air detachment and, by special order of the commander-in-chief, a communication train of the Red Army headquarters from the Western Front with five support companies were sent to the area of military operations.

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THE WEST SIBERIAN UPRISING OF 1921: FOR SOVIETS WITHOUT COMMUNISTS

The West Siberian uprising, dated February-April 1921, covered the vast territory of Western Siberia, the Trans-Urals and modern Kazakhstan (a whole series of uprisings actually received the generalized name West Siberian). This event was the largest of the peasant uprisings in Soviet Russia, directed against the military communist policy of the Bolsheviks, both in terms of the number of participants and the territory [1].

Various quantitative data are given: the spread is very wide - 40 thousand - 70 thousand - 100 thousand - even up to 150 thousand.

of the territory covered by the uprisings, in terms of their scale and military-political results, are quite equal to the front-line operation of the period of the Civil War, armed forces were involved in suppressing the uprisings, reaching the strength of the Soviet field army.

Groundless are allegations about the decisive role in the preparation of the uprising of counter-revolutionary conspiracies in Tyumen, Ishim and Tobolsk, about the influence of the Siberian Peasant Union in the Tyumen province as an organizer of counter-revolutionary work, relying on supposedly for

the subsistence of the West Siberian peasantry and the high proportion of

kulaks in its composition".

It is significant that the uprising did not take place in the Altai province, although the peasantry was more prosperous than the Tyumen, besides, there was (unlike the Tyumen province) a fairly wide network of cells of the Siberian Peasant Union [2: 9, 10, 14, 15, 24].

The following documentary evidence is characteristic: before the start of the West Siberian uprising, in the autumn of 1920, the surviving remnants of representatives of non-Bolshevik parties were registered with the Cheka (it was noted above that in the Tyumen Gubcheka in September 1920, 128 Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were registered). One of the main centers of the insurrectionary movement, where partisan actions did not subside until 1922, was the Ishim and Yalutorovsk districts of the Tyumen province. In the report of the Ishim district executive committee of the Soviets to the provincial leadership (September 1921) it was reported that during the peasant uprisings the influence of political parties (Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, etc.) was not observed. According to the report of the leadership of the Yalutorovsk district to the Tyumen provincial executive committee in November 1921, there was no influence of any party on the peasants, since the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries were persecuted by bandits in the same way as the communists, "they were afraid to show their nose to the district" [2: 527, 545].

Among the main reasons that caused the West Siberian protest action of the peasantry was the dissatisfaction of the peasants with the policy of "war communism" (food requisitions, mobilization, labor duties), which did not take into account the real interests and capabilities of the peasantry, as well as indignation at the methods of implementation this policy by the Soviet authorities, the arbitrariness of food service employees (often their cruelty exceeded the previous methods of Kolchak's punishers, which the Siberian peasant had once experienced). The food policy of the local authorities, carried out in the Tyumen province, did not take into account the fact that the Tyumen peasantry was on the verge of starvation and did not have seeds for sowing.

On July 20, 1920, the Council of People's Commissars issued a decree "On the withdrawal of grain surpluses in Siberia", according to which the Siberian provinces, liberated from the power of Kolchak, had to surrender from August 1, 1920 to March 1, 1921 for the surplus appropriation of 110 million poods of bread, which was one third of the republican task [3: 764]. The size of the surplus appropriation for peasant farms was set without taking into account the surpluses and possibilities of the peasant household, and was distributed according to the number of peasant souls. This found its vivid expression in the Tyumen province, especially in its southern districts - Ishim and Yalutorovsk.

In the autumn of 1920, the apportionment was carried out in the Tyumen province for the first time during the existence of Soviet power. The task of the People's Commissar for Prod for the province was 6.5 million pounds of bread. In addition to the state appropriation, the Tyumen Gubernia Food Committee established an additional internal appropriation for the creation of a fund for the poor - 900 thousand poods

2: 131]. "557

The leadership of the Tyumen province perceived the task of the People's Commissariat of the People's Commissariat as a combat order. In the resolution of the Tyumen provincial executive committee on the apportionment of September 3, 1920, in the tone of a military order, the installation was approved: the size of the apportionment is not subject to any discussion. Lip food commissar G.S. Indenbaum sent a circular letter to the workers of the province

strict requirement: "Not a moment's hesitation on the implementation of the apportionment in the countryside" [2: 31, 33].

In accordance with these guidelines, on September 8, 1920, the Gubernia Food and Drug Administration Committee developed a special instruction for the implementation of the apportionment. The volition executive committees that received an order for apportionment from the uprokkom were given a five-day period for conducting apportionment between individual villages.

The instruction regulated the actions of local Soviet authorities: after determining the apportionment for each village separately, the state and internal apportionment for individual farms was carried out according to household lists: detailed personal lists were compiled (indicating the rural community, name, surname, amount of bread to be delivered), receipts were issued with the determination of the delivery date. The list of names was submitted to the nearest collection point, a copy was sent to the volost executive committee. Members of the volost executive committees were personally responsible for the implementation of all these activities.

The norm was established, which was left in the peasant economy when determining the bread allocation: for the subsistence of family members - 13.2 pounds, for sowing - 12 pounds per tithe, for working horses - 18 pounds, for foals - 5 pounds, for cows - 9 pounds, for calves - 5 pounds.

The number of normative "rations" for working cattle had a double binding. Firstly, to the volume of arable land: having a plot size of one to 3 acres, a "ration" was intended for one horse, from 4 to 6 acres - for one horse and one foal, from 6 to 10 acres - for 2 horses and 2 foals, from 11 to 15 acres - for 3 horses and 3 foals. Such a calculation pursued the goal - working cattle should be exploited as much as possible by the peasant in agricultural work. But at the same time, there was another method of calculating the norm, which was tied to the number of family members: in the household of a single person, the norm for livestock was not left at all, a family of 2-3 people could count on receiving the norm for one calf, a family of 4-7 people - for one cow and one calf, a peasant family of 8-11 people - for 2 cows and 2 calves, a family of 12-15 people - for 3 cows, 3 calves.

All the grain coming from the internal apportionment of the volosts was first to be concentrated in the volost center, only then under

under the control of the volost executive committee could be issued to the poor, and only for one month [2: 35-36].

In the peasant environment, the listed norms were called the "hungry norm": they were only enough for half-starvation food, while the costs and expenses of hard physical labor in agricultural production were not taken into account - both people and workers.
livestock.

The poor rural population of the province, who did not have their own stocks of grain, had to be provided at the expense of internal appropriation - the surplus left by more prosperous peasants in excess of the standard for state appropriation and their own consumption. Of course, not a single strong owner was burning with the desire to voluntarily part with the "surplus" both from the state appropriation and from the actual re-appropriation - internal.

In order to get bread, the peasant poor had to get to the volost center, stand in line at the food office, deliver the resulting bread home - all this wasted a lot of time and effort, so necessary in the field season. For the poor households, if they had their own bread to last for some time, the calculation of the issuance of bread from the volost bins was based on a reduced rate - 9 pounds.

On October 12, 1920, the Tyumen Gubernia Food and Beverage Committee regulated in detail the procedure for collecting the internal grain forage allocation. The internal apportionment was defined as the extraction of the surplus left by the kulaks, the middle peasants and the poor in excess of the amount of the state appropriation and their own needs according to the established norm. Moreover, the internal allocation was carried out in parallel with the state one.

The procedure for distributing products was as follows: in order to receive rations, village councils compiled nominal lists of farms that really needed bread, indicating the number of eaters and the amount of missing bread - food and sowing separately - and submitted these lists to the volost executive committees with a corresponding petition. The volost executive committee, having received lists of those in need of bread from the village councils, compiled a general list for the volost and submitted it to the county food committee, again with a corresponding petition for the release of bread for the poor population. The food committee, which received lists from the volost executive committees, compiled a summary list for the county and submitted it to the next higher authority, the provincial food committee. The distribution department of the provincial food committee, having received lists from the food committees, developed an annual plan for supplying

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the tormenting population of the province and distributed monthly outfits to each food commissar for the sale of bread from the volost food offices, about which the volost executive committees and food offices were notified for information [2: 37].

Such a “transfer” bureaucratic system created fertile ground for all kinds of misuse of grain stocks, squandering and theft, which in practice was widespread.

The provincial authorities have created another administrative tool for the implementation of apportionment under the name “commodity blockade”. One and the same body responsible for the surplus appraisal, the Gubernia Produkt, concentrated in its hands the distribution of essential commodities necessary for the peasantry—salt, matches, kerosene, soap, nails, shoes, and so on.

On September 7, 1920, a commodity blockade was announced in the province. Its essence boiled down to the following: rural communities or volosts that completed all apportionments by the established deadline in full could receive a commodity ration in one and a half sizes; those who completed the apportionment in the amount of 50% grain, 25% meat, 25% vegetables, 25% poultry, 25% raw materials and 25% hay received a commodity ration in a single size; those who completed the allocations in the amount of 50% of grain, 25% of meat and 25% of all other allocations, taken together, received a commodity ration in half. If the percentage of apportionment completed in rural communities or volosts turned out to be less than those listed above, the goods were not issued. It was allowed to count one allocation for another as a percentage, with the exception of the bread allocation: the bread allocation was the main one and required mandatory implementation [2: 34].

The one-and-a-half norm (rather meager in itself) established by the provincial food committee is evidence that the provincial authorities foresaw in advance the impossibility of 100% fulfillment of all tasks - it was impossible. In addition to the allocation for bread, grain fodder and oilseeds, in the Tyumen province, allocations were introduced for potatoes (August 27, 1920), honey (September 2), poultry (September 3), cattle and small cattle, pigs (September 6), skin and wool (September 13), flax fiber and hemp (September 14, 1920) and other agricultural products. Tasks for tobacco, bristles, horns, hooves, tails, manes were unfolded. In total, by the beginning of 1921, there were 34 types of apportionment in the Tyumen region [2: 649-650], which placed an unbearable burden on the peasantry. Each layout was accompanied by the same instructions for installations: for example, in the order of gu

Bispolkom and Provincial Food Committee No. 59 dated October 28, 1920 said: “The apportionment for wool is a combat order. Immediately carry out the layout for individual farms with the delivery of a special agenda to each” [2: 40].

The leadership of the province demanded from uyezd and volost party, soviet bodies, food committees: to carry out the “combat mission” set by the People's Commissariat for Food and Raw Materials in the shortest possible time - no later than | December 1920. It was announced that the statements of the peasants about the lack of threshed grain could not serve

excuse. The workers who did not complete the tasks were subject to arrest. The telegram sent to the localities emphasized: "Be cruel and merciless to all volost executive committees, village councils, which will indulge in non-fulfillment of apportionments. Give certain combat written tasks to the volost executive committees and, in addition to the arrest of the volost executive committees, apply to those who do not fulfill the confiscation of all property. Completely destroy for the benefit of the societies the economy of those persons who will indulge in the non-fulfillment of apportionment. Destroy with an iron hand all the brakes that disorganize your work" [2: 38-39].

The provincial food committee received practically unlimited rights, sanctioned by the provincial executive committee, even the provincial committee remained on the sidelines. Chairman of the Tyumen Extraordinary Commission P.I. Studitov reported to the management about the facts of "criminal work of food agencies", "gross mistakes of the provincial food commissar" [2: 613, 615]. Led by G.S. Indenbaum. From August 31, 1920, he served as the Tyumen Provincial Commissar for Food. Indenbaum distinguished himself by extremely harsh (more precisely, cruel) methods of leadership. When it became clear that it would not be possible to fulfill the surplus appraisal by December 1, he ordered all the appropriations to be completed, without stopping at anything, set a new deadline - no later than December 25: "There must be the most merciless reprisal, up to declaring all the available grain of the village confiscated", the population was allowed to be left "on a hungry norm" [2: 653]. The chairman of the Tyumen Cheka complained about Indenbaum: when Studitov drew the attention of the leadership of the provincial executive committee to the arbitrariness of the food workers, Indenbaum replied: "We will act independently, and if there is a counter-revolution, then we will ask you for liquidation" [2: 614].

To illustrate the methods and style of activity of the provincial food committee, let us cite the characteristic text of the order of this department No. 251 dated November 5, 1920: "The chairman of the village council of the village of Kamenka, Kamenka volost, Tyumen district, comrade. Shishelyakin Aleksey Fedorovich was arrested by me and put on trial by a military revolutionary tribunal for opposing

state permit.

Immediately send a detachment to the Kamenskaya volost, within three days to carry out an apportionment in double the size against the originally imposed one. At the arrested chairman comrade. Shishelyakin to confiscate all his property, consisting of living and dead inventory.

I personally entrust the implementation of this order to Commissar of the Tyumen food office Comrade. Sychev and the chairman of the executive committee of the Kamensk volost. This fact is widely published in the local press.

I warn you that those who oppose the apportionment will be punished by me in the most merciless way. Provincial Food Commissioner Indenbaum" [2: 42].

Equally indicative is the text of the order of Ya.Z. Mayers as a volost commissioner for conducting appraisals in the Ishim food district. Comrade Indenbaum in December 1920 instructed local food workers: "There is nothing to stand on ceremony, you have to be extremely hard and cruel and seize the bread that is spread around your volost. You must firmly remember that appraisals must be carried out, regardless of the consequences, up to the confiscation of all the grain in the village, leaving the producer with a hungry norm" [2: 59].

Any Soviet worker could be accused of the notorious "opposing the deployment" and severely punished. In practice, this was not uncommon. Chairman of the Churtanovskiy volost executive committee of the Ishim district G.I. Znamenshchikov was arrested by the food detachment, put in a cold basement with other arrested people. At this time, the property in his farm, working cattle were confiscated without observing any rules, all the grain, including seed grain, was raked out, leaving the family not even a norm. They did not pay attention to the presence of infants in the family [2: 56-57]. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the ranks of the Tyumen rebels and their leaders, there were often former employees of local Soviet and military bodies. If the state

the authorities treated the workers of their own administrative apparatus in this way, who was in their eyes an ordinary citizen - a peasant?

Local authorities were placed in conditions where the failure to fulfill the tasks of the higher leadership, regardless of the objective conditions and the possibility of their implementation, was declared criminal. However, among the local workers there were many who not only carried out the instructions received, regardless of anything, but also showed even greater initiative and zeal - arbitrariness and lawlessness in the localities

have become commonplace.

Soviet authorities in uyezds and volosts, accustomed by higher authorities to orders in the military tone of orders and circulars in food policy, quickly adopted such methods. Thus, on November 24, 1920, the head of food office No. 20 of the Tobolsk uyezd sent an order to all uyezd volost executive committees: the volost executive committees should present a categorical demand to all those who do not fulfill the apportionment, without accepting any excuses from them; if someone clearly does not want to fulfill the apportionment, then the most severe measures should be applied to him, up to the confiscation of property and bringing him to court, otherwise all responsibility will be assigned to the chairman of the volost executive committee, up to bringing him to the court of the Revolutionary Tribunal [2: 47].

In December 1920, in Ishim uyezd, a uyezd emergency troika was created with the participation of the leaders of the uyezd committees of the party, the executive committee and food supplies. The troika received emergency powers to carry out food allocations. In the order of Troika No. 1, it was required to complete all the apportionments for the district by the end of the first seven days of the new year 1921. No excuses for not fulfilling the apportionments were accepted, all the more categorically it was forbidden to send walkers, delegations with a request to extend the period or reduce the apportionments. The latter were threatened with arrest and assignment to forced labor. In order to ensure the fulfillment of grain allocations within the specified period, all mills in the Ishim district (steam, water, wind), with the exception of mills grinding state grain, were closed and grinding grain for personal consumption was prohibited [2: 84].

On the ground, emergency troikas, heads of food offices, food committees, food commissars, and emergency commissioners commanded and gave orders. The workers at their own discretion dispersed and arrested volost executive committees and village councils, declared one or another volost under martial law, and created revolutionary committees.

Bread was taken without leaving the norm. The Extraordinary Commissioner of the Provincial Food Committee in the Ishim Uyezd, Nikifor Ababkov, ordered the Dubynsk Volunteer Executive Committee to fulfill the state apportionment at any cost, without observing any norms, leaving food only for the first time for the consumer. pudu with a little grain. Arriving in the village of Berdyuzhye, he beat the head of the Berdyuzhinsk food office. During his stay in the village of Uktuz, Ababkov beat up a member of the Uktuz volost executive committee and representatives of local authorities. Ababkov's food detachment inflicted beatings on all those arrested; by order of Ababkov, almost all of the 56 arrested peasants were beaten, some had fractures in the head. challenges

While waiting for interrogation, Ababkov did not allow anyone to explain himself for the sake of an excuse, he immediately beat him, and then ordered him to be sent to a cold barn, taking off his winter clothes, sheepskin coats, which Ababkov took away and distributed to the Red Army men of his detachment. Another representative of the provincial food committee, Ababkov Ivan, gave orders to the soldiers of the food detachment to shoot over the heads of the crowd, beat women with rifle butts, and carried out mass arrests without charge [2: 70, 82, 112-113].

M. Maltsev, a representative of the provincial emergency troika, used to take a revolver out of its holster and threatened with executions. G. Korepanov, regional food commissar of the Berdyuzhsky district, arrested 5 members of the village council of the village of Uktuz, Uktuz volost. The village council in the village of Pesyany, Bezrukovskaya volost, was arrested by the military commissar Markov. The arrests were carried out by commissars of food detachments, commissars of internal and regular troops [2: 71, 73, 83].

Batalov and Orlov, instructors in the surplus appropriation of the Uspensky volost, Tyumen district, confiscated all 200 sheep for failure to carry out the apportionment for wool in the village of Uspensky. On December 17, the commissar of the levlevo food office, K. Krutikov, arrived in the Nerda volost of the same county with a detachment to organize the woolen apportionment. The commissioner ordered searches to be carried out on those who did not complete the wool appraisal. When the food detachments came to the house of Aptulla Atmaitandinov, he did not have any wool. Despite the fact that Atmaytandinov was a poor man, Commissar Krutikov took the sheepskin coat that hung on the wall. After leaving, Krugikov put this sheepskin coat on himself, and ordered to hand over his own torn one to the levlev food office, but the torn commissar's sheepskin coat was not accepted [2: 68, 69]. The peasants were deprived of clothes and shoes.

The taking of hostages before the apportionment was completed, the confiscation of property without observing any rules, even from the families of Red Army soldiers, became a common occurrence in the activities of the authorities. The bread was raked out completely, neither marital status nor the presence of infants was taken into account.

Tyumen bread harvested in 1920, which was notable for low quality, often fell down with snow and ice. Most peasants had grain in stacks, especially in the Red Army families - there was no one to thresh bread, the male population served in the Red Army or performed labor duties, especially in the procurement of fuel.

The middle peasantry, as the main stratum of the Siberian peasants, was the most efficient payer of permits; many sons volunteered for the Red Army. It carried the main

clearance cargo. The costs of the military communist food policy affected the middle peasantry most painfully. In addition to many types of apportionment, the burden of labor duties rested on the middle peasantry. To perform labor duties, especially horse-drawn, logging, peasant horses, carts, as well as their own fodder were required. According to the norm of the grain forage surplus, the peasants had a supply of fodder only for the maintenance of horses and for sowing, for logging by the food agencies there was no fodder left for working horses. In the producing counties, a vicious circle was obtained: fodder was not issued for the performance of labor service.

V. Sokolov, the Extraordinary Plenipotentiary in the Ishim Uyezd, without any reason, confiscated horses from middle peasants, including the families of Red Army soldiers, since they were fists in his eyes. The People's Courts turned out to be inundated with similar statements of peasants with complaints about the arbitrariness of the authorities. One of the investigators informed the Ishim Chekists: "I don't know what to do... besieging the population with such complaints" [2: 64].

On the farm of Olkov, a middle peasant with many children, from the village of Bolshe-Bokov, Gotoputovskaya volost (seven children, including one in the Red Army), all cattle were confiscated, although the apportionment was carried out, and at the expense of the farm. On behalf of Marfa Olkova, a competent neighbor wrote a letter to the Ishim district food commissar: "What should Soviet Russia exist in the future," the peasant woman of the food commissar asked, "if you are now completely ruining the average economy, which is the stronghold of the republic?" [2: 61].

All available grain, including seed grain, was collected at the bulk points. At a meeting of food workers in the Petukhovsky district of the Ishim district in December 1920, S. Dadurin, authorized by the regional food committee, made a statement: "Even now we cannot say with certainty that the bread is no longer burning, since there is no way to check it with a probe, because the probe cannot be driven even 3 arshins deep, because the bread is frozen below. The situation was no better with other products, in particular, with meat and furs [2: 69].

In case of non-fulfillment of the apportionment by the appointed date, the non-payers were imposed a double size of the apportionment. The arbitrariness of food detachments and food workers was accompanied by the use of weapons and whipping. One of these cases was appealed by the Bolshe-Yarkovsky village council.

Kazan volost of the Ishim district - the fact of illegal actions of the head of the food detachment Gulyaev and the Ishim regional food commissar I. Gushchin, who used weapons and whipping [2: 58].

In the province, following the example of the Ishim district, mutual responsibility of rural communities was established: in the event that hidden bread was found from one member of the society, it was confiscated from the whole society, regardless of any measures. One of the characteristic examples of punishment is associated with the Yurga volost, Yalutorovsky district, which was guilty before the provincial food committee, for which the apportionment was arbitrarily increased by an additional 50% [2: 105-106].

The arrested hostages were released only after the entire society had completed the apportionment. In 8 volosts of the Ishim district (Loktinskaya, Teplodubrovskaya, Larikhinskaya, Kazanskaya, Aromashevskaya, Razhevskaya, Usovskaya, Bolshe-Sorokinskaya) in December, everyone who was classified as a kulak was arrested as hostages until the entire district completed the allocation plan. A. Bratkov, authorized for surplus appropriation, issued a circular to the village councils of the Lokta volost with a warning: in case of uprisings, the villages would be burned [2: 49, 51, 53, 57, 59, 88-89, 90, 97].

The grain fodder apportionment in the Ishim district, based on forcible-order methods, was carried out on January 5, 1921. The next day, the Tyumen provincial food commissar Indenbaum telegraphed to the People's Commissariat for Food about the shock implementation of the state appropriation of bread and grain fodder by the Tyumen province by 102 percent (6600 thousand tons). poods) January 6 at 2 p.m. The allocation of oilseeds was overfulfilled - 150 percent. 130 most distinguished workers of the province were rewarded with costumes [2: 97, 100, 109].

In connection with the implementation of the grain allocation, the hostages were released. On January 10, 1921, the Ishim Uyezd Food Committee issued an order: to release, in view of the fulfillment of 100% of the grain allocation, the chairman of the Pesyanovsky village council, comrade Chistyakov, members of the council Serebrennikov, Chalkov, Ugryumov and Varaksin, who were arrested for refusing to fulfill the state allocation, and citizens of the same village arrested as hostages, vols. Korotaev, Overin, Kargapolov and Maltsev since this date [2: 107].

The provincial authorities came up with a beautiful political setting for the occasion of the implementation of the grain surplus appropriation, designed for public outcry. At the suggestion of the Provincial Food Collegium, the peasants arrested in the process of surplus appropriation received an amnesty - this act was carried out as a general provincial event with political overtones - a demonstration of the humane will on the part of the state in relation to the peasantry: the release took place at the set time - January 20, 1921 at 6 pm . During the large-scale development

In its wake, the Soviet government could not forget about its own class nature either: a small part of the cases that were supposed to result in a high-profile judicial and political trial were allocated to a separate proceeding [2: 113].

The report on the successful early implementation of the state grain apportionment overshadowed the failure of the plan for internal appropriation, designed to provide for the poor: meat internal apportionment was completed by 79%, egg - by 47%, butter - 43% [2: 131-132] .

On January 22, 1921, the Tyumen provincial executive committee and the provincial food committee issued a resolution on the internal distribution of bread. In fact, the solution to the problem of providing the poorest peasantry with bread descended to the county level: each county food committee was obliged to independently withdraw the necessary amount of bread to supply the poorest population from the volosts through internal allocation and redistribute the grain among the needy volosts. This order contained a crafty wording about the existence of an inexhaustible source in the countryside: the rural prosperous population is not subject to any actual accounting - a kind of allusion to an unused reserve for internal apportionment.

Ishim and Yalutorovsk uyezds, which completed the state appropriation, were declared self-supplying - this meant that these uyezds could not count on the allocation

bread from the provincial fund. The same rule applied to volosts in other uyezds that had completed the state appropriation of grain [2: 114-115]. It turned out that the shock regions, which had stretched out the state apportionment, found themselves in the position of being punished - the whole burden of the additional internal appropriation was placed on them.

Before other Tyumen counties, the Ishim county showed the initiative. On January 10, 1921, the county food committee decided: in order to increase the sown area in the county in 1921 by 25%, to withdraw all seed material from the volosts. To do this, it was necessary to establish a planned indicator for the collection of seed material for each volost. The calculation was based on the area planted in 1920, increased by 25%. The Ishim district leaders were oriented to apply the same administrative methods that were used in the conduct of the state food distribution [2: 107].

In mid-January 1921, the order of the Tyumen provincial sowing committee appeared. The next food campaign was headed by the influential Gubernia Food Commissioner Indenbaum: under the order of the sowing

ma, along with the chairman of the provincial executive committee Novoselov, his signature was listed. The order determined the measures related to the increase in the sown area of all crops in the Tyumen province in 1921: all seed material located in individual peasant farms was subject to seizure and delivery to public grain storage facilities, for which a distribution was made by counties, volosts, villages and individual farms according to the attached statement. Citizens were obliged to hand over the seed bread within the limits of the allocation to public barns within three days. Mutual responsibility of all rural societies for the safety of seed stocks was established; penalties were prescribed: confiscation of all seeds, live and dead implements, as well as sown fields in favor of the state. The timing of the allotment for the extraction of seed grain was determined from January 25 to February 10, 1921 [2: 110-111].

On February 4, a circular signed by the secretary of the Tyumen Provincial Committee of the RCP (b) S.P. Aggeev and Provincial Commissar G.S. Indenbaum, sustained in the traditional power vein: it was announced that after the implementation of the state surplus appropriation [6.6 million poods], the sowing campaign becomes the most important issue - first of all, the collection of seeds in public barns in the amount of 9 million poods. As before, the grain apportionment, the seed assignment for volosts and villages was not subject to any change. For the duration of the sowing campaign, food workers were assigned the status and rights of authorized sowing committees. The main method of implementing the sowing campaign was coercion up to armed force - it was required to act, as before, firmly and decisively, without hesitation [2: 128-130].

The collection of all seed material in public cesspools doomed the peasants to the impossibility of future sowing - the prospect of famine loomed ahead. The province was simply not ready to organize work on seed sorting: hundreds of specialists were required for this, and there were only 4 such specialists in the entire system of the provincial food committee [2: 133].

The announcement in January 1921 of the seed distribution, which coincided with the beginning of the intensive export of grain from internal bulk points to the railway line and its subsequent shipment to Central Russia, became the immediate cause of spontaneous and mass peasant protest. The order of the Tyumen Gubernia Food and Beverage Committee determined the deadline for bringing all the grain to the railroad until January 20, 1921 [2:98].

These events served as an impetus for a spontaneous explosion, objectively synchronized the actions of the population of a number of regions. Pervona

Initially, the centers of local armed outbreaks were settlements where there were food offices, as well as large railway stations.

It can be assumed that the provincial leadership did not expect such a sudden and powerful turn of events. This is evidenced by the following circumstance: the presidium of the Tyumen provincial executive committee at a meeting on January 21, 1921 (that is, only ten days before the start of

uprising) decided that the time had come to abolish martial law on the territory of the Tyumen province, which had remained since the passage of the front through the territory of the province in the war with Kolchak. The Presidium filed a corresponding petition to Moscow, substantiating its own decision to abolish martial law with a number of arguments: "steady and firm", according to the Soviet leadership of the province, the position of power; the successful implementation of the food campaign, which did not necessitate the use of mass repression; the absence of conspiracies, uprisings or actions of counter-revolutionary elements [2: 114].

However, behind this decision of the provincial leadership, there is a desire to embellish the real state of the province in front of the central government. Undoubtedly, the members of the presidium were informed from the reports of the Cheka, internal troops, local authorities about the facts of armed clashes and actions of the peasantry in November-December 1920. and Sadomskaya, Aromashevskaya volost, on the basis of the food allocation, there was a clash between the food detachment and the peasants, accompanied by bloodshed. A detachment was sent to suppress the authorities. The territory of the volost was declared under a state of siege, volost and rural revolutionary committees were created, repressive measures were taken, dozens of peasants were arrested [2: 46]. There were many such reports to Tyumen from different parts of the province, especially from the Ishim district. Armed and bloody clashes with peasants were reported by the headquarters of the 61st rifle brigade of the VNUS troops on November 26, by the headquarters of the 181st regiment on December 27; - Sorokinskaya, Uktuzskaya. The Ishim authorities expressed serious concern about the alarming sharp change in the attitude towards Soviet power on the part of the middle and poor peasantry: from benevolent it became hostile [2: 48,

73, 76, 81].

The West Siberian uprising began almost simultaneously in several places: the first outbreaks arose independently of each other in different areas of the Ishim, Yalutorovsky, Tyumen, Tyukalinsky districts of the Tyumen province. Peasant unrest was the response of the peasants to the actions of the food detachments and local authorities to "pump out" bread from the villages at the expense of the surplus appropriation. The beginning of a major uprising in the province became known from reports from various sources that reported on armed uprisings by peasants against food detachments and military formations. On January 31, 1921, a report was received through the line of the Cheka to the Tyumen gubchek from the Ishim district about an uprising in the north of the district - in the Churtanovskaya and Chelnokovskaya volosts. On the same day, it became known about the uprising of the peasants in the Larikhinsky volost - in the villages of Pesyanskoye, Staro-Travninskoye, Novo-Travninskoye, Nizhne-Travnoye. On February 1, the provincial authorities received information from the VNUS troops about the uprisings in the villages of Abatskoye and Vikulovo [2: 122, 85, 91, 97]. Later, on February 5, 1921, through the Cheka, reports were received from the Yalutorovsky district about uprisings in the Slobodo-Beshkil, Ingalinsky, and Petropavlovsk volosts [2: 136]. In other counties, where there were no food detachments or troops, in January there was an accumulation of insurgent forces.

Telegram from the chairman of Sibrevkom I.N. Smirnov to Lenin on February 9, 1921 testifies to a clear underestimation of the scale and strength of the uprising. The head of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee undertook to restore the interrupted railway communication within the next two days. He reported that the uprising was of a spontaneous nature, caused by the severity of the surplus appropriation and horse-drawn duty. The peasant movement was characterized as harmless. The last reassuring formulation of the assessment of the situation in the province was repeated by the Tyumen Provincial Committee of the RCP(b) in its decision on February 17 [2: 160, 224].

The rebels paralyzed traffic along both lines of the Trans-Siberian Railway for three weeks - Sibrevkom did not fulfill its promise to Lenin. During the period of greatest activity, the rebels captured the county centers: Petropavlovsk, Tobolsk, Kokchetav, Berezov, Surgut and Karkaralinsk, fought for Ishim, threatened Kurgan and Yalutorovsk, approached Tyumen at a distance of several tens of miles.

The three-week interruption of the railway communication between Central Russia and the Trans-Urals created a real danger for the dictatorship of the proletariat: the Soviet Republic was deprived of the opportunity to receive bread from Siberia, which at that time, along with the Northern

The Caucasus is the main source of food. In addition, due to the territorial remoteness of the rebel territory from the center, it was more difficult to suppress the uprising.

By mid-February, the uprising in a short time covered most of the volosts of the Ishim, Yalutorovsk, Tobolsk, Tyumen, Berezovsky and Surgut districts of the Tyumen province, Tara, Tyukalinsky, Petropavlovsk and Kokchetav districts of the Omsk province, Kurgan district of the Chelyabinsk province, the eastern districts of Kamyshev and Shadrinsk counties of Yekaterinburg province. It also affected five northern volosts of the Turin district of the Tyumen province, Atbasar and Akmola districts of the Omsk province. The rebel territory in the spring of 1921 covered a vast area from Obdorsk (now Salekhard) in the north to Karkaralinsk in the south, from Tugulyk station in the west to Surgut in the east [2: 7].

Rebel detachments were created and replenished through the mobilization of the population. In the Ishim district, from the beginning of February 1921, citizens aged 18–35 and non-commissioned officers under 40 were mobilized.

The organization of the insurgents was built on the model of a regular army: fronts (Siberian, Northern, Southern, Southwestern), armies (Eastern, Southern, Western, People's Insurrectionary, People's Peasant), divisions (Kurganskaya insurgent, for example), regiments, battalions, companies, platoons, squads.

Thus, the Southern Army was divided into regiments according to the names of settlements. The 2nd and 3rd Liberation Regiments each had 3 battalions or detachments, 9 companies, 27 platoons, 54 squads - a total of 3 thousand people. With battalions - a cavalry squadron of 60 sabers. The command staff consisted of former non-commissioned officers, ensigns. The units had convoys. The volost military staffs carried out economic, organizational, and informational tasks. In the rear villages, commandants were appointed with a small guard detachment, who were also responsible for communication with the front. Telephone communication was used. In the military formations and rear of the rebels, they tried to maintain discipline: they fought against moonshiners and excessive consumption of moonshine - the perpetrators were punished and brought to justice [2: 323, 343].

There was not, and could not be, a program on the social and political structure of Russia among the peasantry, especially at the conceptual level. There was also no unity of views and political aspirations. The rebels from different regions were united only by their general rejection of the communist regime [2: 18, 19]. The rebels did not create a single central authority for the entire territory covered by

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uprising due to lack of time for this event and the vastness of the territory.

The slogan "For Soviets without Communists" most fully reflected the aspirations of the vast majority of the rebellious peasantry, who had hopes for a better life with the Soviets without dictate from the communist authorities. In the insurrectionary regions, the peasants strove to realize this slogan in practice, creating Soviets without communists as governing bodies. Volost and village councils were created in the territories controlled by the rebels. Cases of joining the former village councils and volost executive committees to the rebels have been established. A peculiar example of the new peasant power was the Tobolsk Peasant City Council - a self-government body of the city of Tobolsk and the Tobolsk district (Tobolsk was under the rule of the rebels from February 20 to April 8, 1921).

The appeal of the Tobolsk main headquarters of the People's Insurgent Army to the population on March 16, 1921 (the newspaper "Voice of the People's Army" was published in Tobolsk) contained the following appeal: "The Communists are spreading a rumor among you that the White Guards rebelled against them: the remnants

Kolchak's army led by gold-chasers - generals and officers. The Communists tell you that the landowners, capitalists, kulaks and priests have rebelled against them; They also say that the insurgent counter-revolutionaries want to drown the gains of the October Revolution in the blood of the workers and peasants...

Do not believe them... the working people deceived by them, the working peasantry itself, rebelled against the communists. It does not march under the leadership of generals and officers, but it marches under the guidance of its own conscience and its own anger against those who, by deceit and unrealizable promises, have drawn our ignorant and gullible people onto the path of state disorder and economic ruin. The people rose up against the communists, who drowned the workers and peasants in the blood. We, the insurgent peasants, who once waited with hope and faith for the communists, who promised us a free system, brotherhood and equality, are now convinced of the unfulfillment of their promises and the ruinousness of their policy for the people. And we now understand that they, the Communists, then brought serfdom to us in a form never seen before in the history of all mankind. Driven to despair by the deceit and cruelty of the communists, we peasants raised the banner of revolt against them, our true oppressors" [2: 353].

The appeal of the Tobolsk headquarters of the rebels to all the inhabitants of Siberia on March 25, 1921 contained an even more complete text of the peasant demands

visions and hopes:

"... Until now, all the same, the Communists do not want to understand in any way, or deliberately write that it was not the people who had become unbearable to live, but that some generals, gold-chasing officers, Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries rebelled. They still hide to this day that the entire nation, which they consider to be a gray unrequited beast, has rebelled. Communists still believe that the people can only be robbed, robbed and shot, and that the people are incapable of rising up to defend their human rights.

We are striving for real Soviet power, and not communist power, which until now has been under the guise of Soviet power. We want everyone to breathe freely, so that everyone can live freely, so that everyone can freely do the work that he wants, so that everyone can freely dispose of their property, so that no one has the right to take away what is acquired by hard work, so that everyone can freely dispose of what he has earned with his laboring hands. We want every person to believe as he wants: the Orthodox in his own way, the Tatar in his own way, and that we all would not be forced to believe in the commune. In a word, we want a free life, without any restraints and violence, without requisitions, "fives" and other inventions.

Here, in Tobolsk, we have already elected a district peasant-city council, which included two people from the volost, 70 people in total, and 18 representatives from the city. Volosts chose their representatives freely, without any coercion, chose those people whom the population knew and trusted. The communists forcibly forced to choose communists whom the population did not know, who robbed the same population.

We have also re-elected new councils in our volosts on new principles.

And when we have cleared the entire province of communists, the people will elect a provincial council, and when our troops unite with the rest of the partisans of other provinces, we will elect a Siberian council...

Citizens, the sooner we finish our struggle, the sooner we get back to our usual work. Citizens, join us. Arrest your communists. Organize uprisings, organize peasant detachments, choose your peasant chiefs, attack the enemy and help us to destroy him completely. All to fight! Long live Soviet power without communists! Long live the free peasantry. God is with us and victory!" [2: 391-393].

The rebels put forward slogans: "Down with food requisition, labor service!", "Long live Soviet power and the Siberian peasant-

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goodness!" The insurgents declared that they did not want bloodshed, not speaking out against Soviet power, for which they fought against Kolchak, but they opposed the policy of the communists. This protest expressed the insurgents' dissatisfaction with the government, "not meeting the needs of the people." To organize the new government, the peasantry wanted to elect representatives from the population.

The demands of the insurgent peasantry were expressed in numerous appeals of the insurgents to the population, to the Red Army soldiers, and to local Soviets. In parallel with the hostilities, a kind of propaganda war unfolded - both opposing sides tried to prove their own innocence.

In the appeal of the Ust-Lamensky insurgent garrison of the Ishim district to the Glubokovsky, Burlakovsky, Goglinsky, Zubarevsky rural Soviets on February 18, 1921, it was said:

"The moment came when the peasant, driven out of patience, took a cudgel in his callused hands and with it stood up for the defense of his vital interests, for the defense of his labor and freedom. This moment was terrible at first, to dare, wave before the height. Trotsky, surrounded by cannons and machine guns and thousands of his devoted communist slaves, who, recognizing nothing: neither holiness, nor truth, nor law, torment everyone who dared to express a word against the dictatorship, shoot everyone who concealed his work, your bread, acquired with your calloused hands and sweat. They stripped, robbed, and then forced the hungry and cold peasant to fulfill all the lusts of the communists, tearing him away from the plow and from his direct work, on which the welfare and life of the whole country depended. In a year and a half, they brought the country to complete ruin and starvation. And the peasant, driven out of patience, took a club in his callused hands and went with it to the cannon and machine guns, urged on by no one: neither officers nor superiors, and he goes fearlessly. And everything breaks under his mighty onslaught. He drives the communists away from him.

Whoever joins him and robs him, do not interfere with his work, do not interfere with his life, do not mock him. Everyone goes with the hope of defeating his enemy, and he will defeat him. Death from the enemy cannot be terrible when it is inevitable. Who, out of cowardice, is afraid to sacrifice his life in the fight against the enemy, he must understand that he remains under the yoke of the Communists, in a year or more he will die of hunger, and starvation is much more terrible than combat, because the country has been brought to starvation in a year and a half. And what lies ahead?..." [2: 233-234].

The command of the rebels of the Golyshmanovsky district of the Ishim district in February 1921 twice turned to the Red Army. In the air

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On February 10, the motives for the uprising were explained: "Comrades, Red Army men. We are not going against the Soviet power of the peasants and workers, for we are fully convinced that the Soviet power is really a power that stands entirely in defense of the interests of the working people. We are going up against the communists, the representatives of the Kolchak gangs, who have infested all our government offices and are bringing confusion to our masses, trying in every possible way to undermine our Soviet power. We are going against those communists who have raked out every last grain from us and rot it in barns, and if there was not enough bread to fulfill the apportionment imposed on the peasants, then they confiscated all property; against those communists who, with an unbearable woolen allocation, forced us to shear coats and sheep in the winter, which caused the sheep to die from frost. They also didn't hear anything good from them, except for threats and forced labor, and if a peasant began to defend himself, then his property was ordered to be burned, regardless of entire villages. Long live freedom!" [2: 169].

In another appeal in mid-February 1921, the Golyshmanov rebels called on the Red Army to join the rebels: "Brothers, the bloody glow of the insurgent fire is dimly visible to you from afar. In the depths of vast, mighty Siberia, the fire of the insurrectionary movement is spreading. Brother soldiers, robbed, hungry, holding back streams of bloody tears,

gritting our teeth from mental pain, we march with sticks in our hands against guns and machine guns. The oceans of our blood are flowing, but there is no return to the former, behind the grave. At the decisive moment, we stretch out our hands to you so that they do not look indifferently at this terrible massacre of the people. The communists are bloodthirsty and seek to destroy us. Waiting for you. Know that this is the decisive moment. Woe to those who will not go to the voice of their people" [2: 211].

Similar motives sounded in the appeal of the Tobolsk main headquarters of the People's Insurgent Army to the Red Army on March 6, 1921: "... They ask us: what are we fighting for? We say openly and honestly that it is no longer possible to live the way the communists force us to. After all, you yourself know that they took away all the bread from us in the first allocation. But this seemed to them not enough. They also took away all the seed bread and poured it into the barns, where they rot it. They cut our fur coats and our sheep's coats in the winter, which are now freezing. The people, exhausted, robbed, oppressed, could not endure the communist yoke and rose up as one man. The Communists, furnishing themselves with machine guns and guns, mocked vilely at the poor Russian people, feeling themselves strong behind the backs of the Red Army men they had fooled.

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We peasants want man to become man, so that everyone can live freely. We want to restore the worker-peasant Soviet government from honest people who love their disgraced, spat on, long-suffering motherland. Communists say that Soviet power cannot exist without communism. Why? Can't we elect non-Party people to the Soviets, those who have always been united with the people and have suffered for them? What did the communists give us? They promised us almost a heavenly life, promised freedom in all respects, but, having taken power into their hands, they gave us prisons and executions, they mocked us, and we silently bent our backs. But after all, all patience comes to an end, and we, the peasants, having given the communists everything we later got from the land, decided: it is better to die from a bullet and a bayonet of the communists than to die a slow, painful death of starvation or rot in prisons.

Red Army brothers, come to your senses! Come to us, beat your commissars and communists, and we will end fratricide, establish our worker-peasant power, stand at the benches, take up plows, harrows and live by peaceful labor. Come to us!! Old people and brothers are waiting for you. Remember that you are not shedding the blood of landlords, officers and generals, but your own blood - peasant blood!!!

Long live the people's Soviet power! Down with the communists!!! Long live the freedom of the people!!! We are people's representatives from 22 volosts and we speak on behalf of the people!!!!" [2: 304-305].

Cases are known that not only individual Red Army soldiers, but entire military units went over to the insurgents. Part of the Red Army soldiers of the combat-ready Kazan regiment went over to the rebels and joined the People's Army. The motivation for such a decision by the soldiers of the regular Red Army was explained in the appeal of the former Red Army soldiers of the Kazan Rifle Regiment to non-party Red Army soldiers on March 21, 1921 from Tobolsk: "... Comrades! It is not the White Guards and not the Kolchak officers who are fighting against the communists, our simple, gray peasant is fighting, our brother and father are fighting. What is he fighting for and against whom is he fighting?

He recognizes Soviet power and Soviet institutions, but he cannot reconcile himself to the bondage and the disenfranchised, bestial life that the Communists have arranged for the workers and peasants. The peasant earns bread by hard work, which is then taken from him by force and squandered in the granaries. The peasant raises cattle only for the Communists to rot the meat in their warehouses. Finally, the peasant himself found himself in the position of a serf slave: he had to chop winter and summer, carry and melt firewood, dangle in all sorts of carts, and spend winter and summer in hard work.

The peasant for the time being endured and was silent. The cup of patience overflowed when the communists began to take away seed bread and pour it into those barns where dozens of

thousand pounds of previously selected bread. Seeing that he would not even have seeds for sowing, the peasant could not bear it: he armed himself with a club and rushed furiously to exterminate the communists.

Comrades! We are all peasants too. Our brothers, our fathers are also ruined, spat on and also taken into back-breaking serf labor.

Comrades, brothers! Who are we to support? Is it the Communists, whom we all hate, or the fathers and brothers? The answer is clear.

Take an example from the Petropavlovsk garrison, which with its own hands gave the city of Petropavlovsk into the hands of the people!..” [2: 380-381].

Peasants and Cossacks of Siberia and the Urals acted jointly in the uprising. The protest moods of the peasantry were intensified by the dissatisfaction of the Siberian Cossacks, who were deprived of the policy of decossackizing their traditional social status and way of life: the Cossacks of the Petropavlovsk and Kokchetav districts stubbornly sabotaged the surplus appropriation, although its size was not as burdensome for them as for the peasants of the Ishim district.

The uprising of the Siberian peasantry was predominantly spontaneous in nature: there was no unified leadership among the rebels of Western Siberia. But peasant uprisings were massive: peasants belonging to all social groups took part in the uprising. Nevertheless, the bulk of the peasants and Cossacks did not support the rebels, although many sympathized with them [2: 16, 17]. Many refused to openly rebel against the communist regime for fear of retribution for participating in the uprising: the population had already experienced the punitive power of the Soviet system from their own experience. The one who decided to rebel was aware of the consequences that awaited him and his family. All property of the participants in the uprising was subject to confiscation.

The insurgents, as a rule, were led by local initiative people who enjoyed the trust and authority of the population, possessed military knowledge, combat experience or social work skills, while their social status did not play a decisive role. Such was, for example, a peasant from the village of Smirnovskoye, Lokta volost, Grigory Atamanov, one of the main leaders of the rebels in the Ishim district, commander of the rebel corps, commander of the front of the rebels in the Ishim district (his brother Ivan Atamanov was a communist and fought against the rebels as part of the CHON detachment). Rodin Vladimir

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Alekseevich, a teacher in the village of Beloe, Sokolovsky volost, Ishim district, a lieutenant of the old army, from February 10, 1921, commanded the Nalobinsky, then Petropavlovsk rebel combat site, from February 18 he was the commander of the Siberian Front.

The leaders or initiators of the uprisings in Ishim uyezd were representatives of the peasantry: Kalinin Vasily, Yaroslavtsev Maxim (Vikulov volost), Nazarov Evgraf (v. Nazarovo, Chelnokovo volost), Resonov Moses, Sitnikov Timofei (Churtan volost), Tetyaev Kirill (Sumy volost); in the Yalutorovsky district: Alferov Nikolai (Emurtlinsky district), Filimonov E. (Suerskaya volost), Kostryukov Egor, Pershakov Vasily (Ingalinskaya volost). The peasant environment nominated the commanders of the rebel detachments in the Yalutorovsky district: Gavriil Zlomanov, Vasily Kobelev, F. Borovkov, Arkhip Loparev, Alexander Maltsev; in the Ishim district: Ivan Bukarin, Osip Vishnyakov, Afanasy Kadyshnikov, G. Pisarev, Andrey Klimov.

The years of the World War and service in the old (tsarist) army formed among the peasants a significant layer of junior command staff - non-commissioned officers and ensigns. Here is a short list of rebel commanders.

Zheltoovsky Vasily Maksimovich from the peasants of the village of Zheltovskoye, Kugaev volost, Tobolsk district. Member of the First World War, sergeant major. At the beginning of 1921 he served

clerk of the military registration and enlistment office of the Kugaev volost and had a peasant economy below the average. He was one of the main military leaders of the rebels of the Tobolsk district.

Danilov Stepan Ilyich - a resident of the village of Taratukhina, Karachinsky volost, Tobolsk district. Participant of the First World War, organizer and commander of the rebels of the Karacha volost, then commander of the South-Western Front of the Tobolsk district.

Shevchenko Petr Semenovich - a middle peasant in the village of Bolshoy Kuseryak, Ishim district. The initiator of the rebellion in his native village: on February 8-9, 1921, he mobilized about a thousand people under his command. Later he commanded an insurgent regiment and detachment. One of his brothers served in the Red Army, the other was killed by the rebels, the sister was with the rebels.

Sikachenko Ivan Lukyanovich - a middle peasant in the village of Aromashevo, Ishim district, former chairman of the volost executive committee. The rebels had P. Shevchenko as their deputy.

Andreev P. - a peasant in the village of Glubokoe, Sokolovsky volost, commander of the Petropavlovsk combat sector (direction) of the rebel

tsev of the Ishim district.

Bulatov Nikolai - a peasant in the village of Kurtan, Kurgan district, ensign of the tsarist army, instructor of general education of the Red Army, commander of the 2nd Liberation Regiment of the Kurgan rebel division, then head of the 1st Yalutorovsky liberation detachment.

Gorbachev Nikon Vasilievich - commander of the Eastern Army of the Southern Front of the rebels of the Ishim district.

Gubanov Petr - commander of the cavalry regiment of the rebels of the Nalobinsky volost of the Ishim district, then commander of the Siberian Front.

Danilov Stepan Ilyich - Commander of the Southwestern Front of the People's Insurgent Army of the Tobolsk District.

Dolin Petr Lavrentievich - commander of the 2nd Corps of the People's Peasant Army of the Razhevsky district of the Ishim district.

Evseev L. - a resident of the village of Lapushinskaya, Kurgan district, head of the Kurgan liberation division.

Timofei Lidberg, former military commissar and chairman of the cell of the RCP(b) of the Troitsk volost of the Petropavlovsk district, head of the rebel detachment.

Inozemtsev Nikolai - former assistant to the military commissar of the Gotopu-tovsky volost of the Ishim district, chief of staff of the volost rebels.

Korotkov Alexander is a former employee of the Ishim district military commissariat, leader of the rebels in the Churtanovskaya volost, commander of the Northern Front of the Ishim district.

Mikhail Rusakov, former head of the Petukhov food office in the Ishim district, one of the main organizers of the rebels in the Petukhov region.

Slinkin Fedor - commander of the Northern Front of the rebels of the Tobolsk district [2: 670-738].

Civil armed confrontation determined the brutality shown by both sides. In February 1921, the Tyumen Provincial Executive Committee warned the population in a special leaflet: "Comrade peasants! Our patience may be running out. Yes, we pity, unlike your leaders, village huts, innocent people, women and children. But we have enough guns to raze villages and villages to the ground in case of stubbornness. If senseless

the unrest will continue and prevent us from arranging a peaceful life, with pain in our hearts, but for the sake of the good of tens of millions of workers and peasants, we will be forced to take more decisive measures" [2: 227-228].

On the other hand, in the order for the Southern People's Insurgent Army of the Ishim district on February 22, 1921, it was stated: "There will be no mercy for the enemies of the working people. Persons seen in opposition to the People's

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army, destroy on the spot, and take away property, and take families hostage and destroy them in case of treason. The fight is to the death. There will be no mercy for anyone, either with the people or against them" [2: 258].

Threats were put into practice. The number of losses among the rebels exceeded the losses of the Red Army by an order of magnitude. According to official police reports, in Tobolsk uyezd, in one of the police districts, the ratio of the number of those killed and shot by the insurgents, on the one hand, and the number of those killed and shot by the Soviet troops was 1:10, in another area the ratio was even more different - 1:19 [2: 454, 459].

The main part of the losses of the rebels were the losses among the local population. The reasons lay in the policy of the communist authorities not so much towards the rebels, but towards the civilian population. The orders of the Soviet command contained demands to shoot on the spot without trial everyone captured with weapons in their hands, to take and shoot hostages for destroying the railway line and telegraph communications, for helping the rebels, to burn and destroy with artillery fire entire villages that supported the rebels or put up stubborn resistance. The commander of the 115th rifle brigade, Polisonov, on April 2 gave the order: to burn the villages of Borovaya, Yarkovskoye and Bigila (Gilevolipovskaya volost) [2: 403].

Executions without trial of civilians were widespread. Hence such colossal losses in the rebel territories. Characteristic in this regard is the appeal of the rebels of the regiment P.S. Shevchenko to the communists in July 1921, which contained a direct threat: "Comrades, we first of all inform you that, namely, that you do not carry out brutal reprisals against partisan families, otherwise we give you our word of honor that you and partisans will destroy your families to the root. And we will carry out such a short reprisal that it cannot be worse. In a word, we will turn everyone, as they say, into cabbage. Enough to pardon you, enough to forgive you for your atrocities. So, take note" [2: 500].

Violence and military action remained the main means of resolving the conflict. The command of the Red Army units threatened the commanders and commissars who showed peacekeeping initiative with severe punishment. The order was in effect: not to enter into any negotiations with the bandits, to reject all negotiations with the rebels, not recognizing them as an equal side. The rebels were put forward only one condition: complete and unconditional surrender.

The liquidation of the uprising was led by the authorized troika created on February 12, 1921 by the Siberian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). It included the chairman of Sibrevkom I.N. Smirnov, Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Republic for Siberia V.I. Shorin, representative of the Cheka in Siberia I.P. Pavlunovskiy. On February 14, Smirnov again telegraphed Lenin about the uprising.

The assessment of the uprising by the Siberian leadership underwent a radical change after mid-February. The situation became alarming. The command of the Soviet armed forces of the Tobolsk combat sector telegraphed this to the commander-in-chief for Siberia (similar telegrams were sent to the Siberian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), the Ural Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), the Tyumen provincial committee of the party, the commander of the Urals military district). In the text of this telegram, attention is drawn to the confession: they did not attach serious importance to the movement - they did not foresee that the situation would change dramatically. The command demanded urgent

help [2: 269]. On February 24, the Tyumen Provincial Committee of the RCP(b) requested additional armed forces from the center [2: 273-274].

On March 11, 1921, the leadership of the Tyumen province sent a telegram to the Central Committee of the RCP (b), the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic E.M. Sklyansky. The text of the telegram testified to the confusion of the provincial leadership: "Within the Tyumen province, we have no real force, no weapons, no uniforms, no ammunition at our disposal. The regiment sent from Kazan turned out to be incapable of combat, and in parts goes over to the side of the enemy in full armament. The situation is becoming serious, since the liquidation of the unrest has assumed a protracted character: this year in the province we will have to admit the collapse of the sowing campaign ... logging work, the deprivation of the center of Russia of grain supplies, fish, furs, and so on.

We insistently, resolutely demand from you that you immediately take all the necessary measures for the quickest possible liquidation of the disturbances in the sense of the appropriate influence on the Siberian military command, in the sense of direct assistance from you. We need real forces, weapons, uniforms, ammunition. Help is needed by the party forces, the party-Soviet apparatuses have been destroyed, in many volosts the members of the party have been completely destroyed, 75% of the entire composition of food workers has been destroyed ... without the help of the center, all attempts to establish the party-Soviet life of the province again are hopeless. uncertainty and uncertainty exacerbate the severity of the situation" [2: 330-331].

The 21st rifle division of the VNUS troops, the Simbirsk and Kazan regiments, specially formed from cadets and selected units, 4 armored trains were transferred to Siberia to suppress the uprising. All troops of the Priuralsk Military District were placed under the command of Commander-in-Chief for Siberia V. Shorin, a member of the emergency troika of Sibrevkom. .

The punitive measures ranged from military operations against insurgent groups to decisive and brutal measures against the population in the territories that were engulfed in rebellion.

On February 12, 1921, the Siberian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), by a secret decision, assigned responsibility, in case of damage to the railway, to the nearest villages located at a distance of 10 versts from the line of the railway bed. For the destruction of bridges, rails, nearby villages were subject to destruction [2: 186].

The Ishim executive committee issued an order: the responsibility for the safety of the railway should be assigned to the volosts along which the highway passes. In nearby villages, it was ordered to take hostages in advance - in case of damage to the road, they were to be shot. A mutual guarantee was established for rural communities: for participation in the uprisings, property and equipment were confiscated in every tenth household, for every executed communist and Soviet worker, ten local peasants were shot. No mercy - demanded by the leadership of the county - up to the destruction of individual villages with the use of machine guns and guns, the use of repressive measures [2: 157-158].

As follows from these decisions, the safety of the railway line was of particular concern. In addition to the organs of Soviet power, merciless measures were taken by the military leadership. Brigade commander Rakhmanov, commander of the armed forces in the Omsk-Tyumen region, on February 15 gave the order: to divide the Omsk-Tyumen and Omsk-Chelyabinsk railway lines into certain sections. To assign responsibility for the safety of each section adjacent to the 10-verst strip on both sides of the railway to the local population, from which hostages should be immediately taken. Announce to the inhabitants of the villages included in the indicated zone that in the event of a repetition of raids on the railway, the hostages will be shot without trial. This order was prescribed to be widely distributed among the local population, posting it in prominent places [2: 206].

On February 14, 1921, a member of the emergency troika of the Sibrevkom, the plenipotentiary representative of the Cheka in Siberia, I. Pavlunovsky, issued an instruction

the decision to the local bodies of the Cheka "On the application of capital punishment in the area covered by the uprising." In accordance with the instructions, the following were to be shot: leaders of the movement; those who held command positions in the rebel units; insurgents taken prisoner and released, if they were taken prisoner for the second time in battles with Soviet troops; those who did not surrender their firearms after the order to surrender their weapons was issued; convicted of arson, damage to railway tracks and railway structures, telegraph wires [2: 203].

On March 5, the Tyumen provincial executive committee announced the confiscation of the property of those involved in the uprising [2: 297]. The visiting sessions of the Revolutionary Tribunal raged.

In late February - early March 1921, the Omsk-Tyumen and Omsk-Chelyabinsk railways were cleared of rebels. In late March - early April, the main centers of the uprising were crushed. In May 1921, the punitive detachments of the Red Army finally defeated the main forces of the rebels. In June, the period of operational hostilities was basically over. Relentless terror was unleashed against the rebels. In the area of the uprising, revolutionary troikas and revolutionary committees created by the Soviet command raged, and the system of hostage-taking and execution of hostages was actively used.

However, the fight against the insurgents in April-May did not end: it passed into a new phase - the guerrilla war and continued until the beginning of 1922. Knowledge of the native area allowed the insurgent detachments to remain elusive. The Tyumen rebels used effective guerrilla tactics: when regular troops approached, the detachments broke up into small groups, dispersed, their members hid in the forests, in the villages under the guise of villagers, if necessary, united again to carry out swift raids. Guerrilla tactics showed the ineffectiveness of the operational actions of regular troops.

A sympathetic attitude towards the rebels and support from the local population made it possible to obtain shelter, timely information about the approach of regular troops. The population supplied the rebels with food, horses and household supplies.

The peasants regarded the rebel leaders as tax protectors. The grain they seized from the plundered chute points was divided among the peasants (a similar practice was carried out, for example, by Shevchenko, Sikachenko, Varaksin, Bulatov with their detachments). Residents of villages and villages refused to help military units and authorities in the fight against

The following documentary evidence is noteworthy in this connection. Commander of the Soviet troops of the Tyumen province G.A. On May 7, 1921, Burichenkov sent a telegram to I.N. Smirnov, Deputy Commander for Siberia V.I. Shorin and the Tyumen provincial executive committee. The commander reported: "The peasants of the Ishim district, on the basis of hunger, gather in crowds and plunder the grain yards. Part of the peasants, with whom the local volost executive committees and party organizations also go hand in hand, categorically refused to provide carts for the export of grain, demanding first the satisfaction of the hungry peasants. And even in some places special meetings of the peasants were convened, together with the volost executive committees and committees, at which appropriate decisions were made, after which bread was distributed to the starving without permission. An attempt by our military detachments to take bread by force did not lead to anything, maybe. open demonstrative shooting at the crowds that surrounded the grain stores and tried to plunder them had no effect, and the peasants, on the contrary, took their wives and children, together with whom they again surrounded the grain stores, urgently demanding that they be shot all along with children and wives, and then only to take out bread from them. This state of affairs has a detrimental effect on our units, since the Red Army, naturally, seeing such pictures, will not open combat fire on the peasants, and in the end, to fulfill the order of the center, and in order to force the peasants to give bread and the Red Army to take such a force, it will be necessary to carry out a mass of executions both among the peasants,

and among the Red Army. Bringing to your attention about the situation that has developed, I ask you to urgently instruct me, since in order to fulfill the order of the center I will have to open combat fire on the same Soviet government that I myself belong to, that is, to shoot volost executive committees, committees, peasants, Red Army soldiers "[2: 442-443].

The combat commander of the Red Army, always ready for decisive combat operations in an open battle with the enemy (this will be discussed below), was confused when he saw the working masses as a conditional "enemy", hence his call "urgently instructed
beat me."

In the summer of 1921, numerous organized detachments existed in the Yalutorovsky and Ishimsky districts, uniting 300-500 people. According to the Tyumen gubchek, in the Yalutorovsky district the total number of rebels reached three thousand people [2: 498, 501].

The replenishment of the detachments with fighters and provisions was explained by the dissatisfaction of the peasantry with the methods of collecting tax in kind: the collection of food tax in

The year 1921 was reminiscent of the surplus appraisal of 1920. The poor peasantry, like the middle peasants, had to give away the last grain and potatoes acquired from the sale of the last horse or clothing as a tax in kind and were doomed to starvation. Significant undersowing due to lack of seeds was exacerbated by crop failure due to drought. Determination of the tax on the area of the peasant allotment, which had nothing to sow, gave rise to discontent, especially among the poor. The middle peasantry expressed dissatisfaction with the horse-drawn service due to the lack of fodder, harness, lubricants and the exhaustion of horses.

The term "banditry" did not define the real nature of the insurrectionary movement. Of course, among the rebels there were many criminal elements engaged in robbery, robbery, but they did not make up the majority. Many detachments were distinguished by discipline and organization, strict obedience to the leaders. Noteworthy in this regard is the text of the order of the commander N. Bulatov on the 1st Yalutorovsk rebel liberation detachment, issued in September 1921 to establish a strict military order following the example of regular troops, the unit commanders were charged with the duty to make their unit combat-ready and disciplined. The detachment consisted of up to 450 horsemen [2: 532, 536].

The need to eliminate the insurgent movement in the Tyumen province took on an extraordinary character: the sowing campaign and the collection of food taxes in the province, as well as the possible blocking of the railway communication between Tyumen and Yekaterinburg or Tyumen and Omsk by the rebels, were under threat. The rebels killed Soviet employees, food workers (tax inspectors) and also communists. At a meeting of the presidium of the Yalutorovsk executive committee on July 1, 1921, the concern of the county Soviet leadership was expressed: attempts to restore the Soviet apparatus ended in new murders of Soviet party workers, as a result, not a single responsible worker wants to go to restore revolutionary committees in these volosts, because dangerous environment, there is no way to work there [2: 485].

In the summer of 1921, the provincial leadership realized the insufficiency of the military nature of the struggle against the partisan tactics of the rebels supported by the local population. This is evidenced by the political report of the Tyumen Gubernia Committee, sent in August to the Central Committee of the RCP(b). The report criticized the position of the military command, which "fights according to all the rules of strategy, advances, conducts reconnaissance of all kinds, and nothing comes out of it except senseless

chasing the bandits from place to place, who today are in front, tomorrow in the rear, the day after tomorrow next to the village in which our detachment is stationed, they rob the distribution center, and a few days later they rob the food transport between the two detachments" [2: 519]. To effectively combat the insurrectionary movement, economic and political means had to be put into action.

Economic events were of particular importance. On the territory of the Tyumen province, the peasants got the opportunity to exchange, buy, sell and transport grain and grain fodder and potatoes, free movement with goods and products was allowed. Food barrier detachments were removed from railways, waterways and horse-drawn roads. Devastated by food and seed distribution, the counties received, albeit insignificant in volume, seed material from the provincial fund. This applied to counties and volosts previously declared self-supplying, primarily Ishim county. 300,000 poods of seeds were distributed to Ishim Uyezd [2: 407, 414, 438].

The political measures included the following: peasants arrested for food offenses against the authorities (failure to fulfill the apportionment, concealment of bread, failure to fulfill labor duties) were released. Amnesty recipients | May 1921 the confiscated inventory was returned for non-payment of the surplus appropriation. In September, the Gubernia Executive Committee made a clarification: only immovable property was subject to return. Such a decision was made in the interests of the poor, otherwise the confiscated property given to the poor would have to be returned to the owners - the poor peasantry would have been extremely dissatisfied in this case [2: 425, 497, 531-532].

In the summer of 1921, the Soviet authorities changed their position regarding the voluntary appearance of the rebels. During the period of the uprising (March-April), the Soviet leadership announced its policy to the population: the voluntary appearance of the rebels would earn the forgiveness of the authorities, those who laid down their arms would not be punished, with the exception of the instigators and leaders of the uprising [2: 326, 349]. The two-week period of voluntary appearance and surrender of weapons announced in July (July 5-20, the period was extended for another seven days - until July 27) provided that there would be no division into active and ordinary, mobilized (forced) participants in the uprising - the attitude to all the same. The inviolability of the personality of those who came, the return of real estate to them was guaranteed. A prerequisite was the surrender and registration of weapons, as well as registration with the Cheka and the police. It was noted that the voluntary turnout in July 1921 gave a positive result, but

However, the returned rebels did not give up much - they mostly returned without weapons [2: 471, 474, 502-505, 518]. The VChK ordered to draw up lists for all those who voluntarily appeared with detailed data for each, including indicating the social status - poor, middle peasant [2: 494]. Those who did not appear after a fortnight were threatened with the most severe measures of persecution and eradication.

The long history of the insurgent movement on the territory of the Tyumen province actually deprived it of local authorities. During the uprising, about 5 thousand party and Soviet workers were killed [3: 764]. Elected by the population from among local peasants, members of rural and volost executive committees often provided assistance to the rebels themselves (for example, such facts took place in the Uporovsky, Labinsk, Pletnevskaya volosts of the Yalutorovsky district). In the Uporovskaya volost, the local population, with the help of the rebels, disarmed the military unit [2: 485].

The bitterness of the authorities and military units in the fight against the insurgents was growing. At a meeting of the Ishim Uyezd Committee of the RCP(b) on September 3, 1921, brigade commander Burichenkov (the same commander who in May demanded him to consult on how to deal with the peasant crowd) reported: Shevchenko and 111 other bandits were hacked to death, while emphasizing that they didn't take the living: "everything that came to hand was chopped ... the treatment was the most cruel" - they found the rebels at home according to the captured lists. A total of 130 people were hacked to death [2: 525. — Authors' italics].

Requisitions, confiscations and looting of military units were accompanied by cases of executions of those who voluntarily appeared. The brutality of the communist partisan detachments from the local population, created for self-defense against attacks, was noted. Communist detachments, subordinate to no one, distinguished themselves by looting. So, on the facts of unauthorized confiscations and excesses of one of the detachments in the Yalutorovsky district, the issue was considered in the provincial committee of the RCP (b) [2: 490, 521].

The Tyumen provincial executive committee and the command of the Soviet troops of the Tyumen province issued an order on October 15, 1921, severely punishing for supporting the rebels: "Persons caught in contact with them, voluntarily harboring them, in supplying food, as well as informing the bandits of information about movement of the troops of the Red Army, are subjected to the highest measure of punishment - execution. Failure to take measures to protect and fence state institutions and enterprises, bulk points, as well as to save the lives of officials of the Soviet government, food workers and communists in case of encroachment

armed raids of bandits should be considered as sympathy and aiding the robbers, and therefore the inhabitants of those villages and villages where such cases will take place, should be taxed - in general, on all - with indemnity in cash and in kind with confiscation of property" [2: 539].

This document was supplemented by a separate order of the commander of the Soviet troops of the Tyumen province - the head of the 57th division, who established "severe punitive measures" against the population for their sympathetic attitude towards the bandits, "not stopping at nothing": taking hostages, visiting revolutionary tribunal sessions, executions of accomplices, burning of entire villages. The command of the armed forces even came up with an exotic form of punishment: the military garrisons responsible for a certain territory where manifestations of banditry will occur will be transferred to feed at the expense of the population of these territories [2: 556].

Nevertheless, in the autumn of 1921 the insurrectionary movement had not yet lost its organization. If necessary, separate groups could gather in a combat detachment of up to 500-700 people, with a convoy of up to a hundred carts [2: 566]. Before the onset of winter in the territory of the Tyumen province, the total number of constantly active rebels reached up to 500 fighters [2: 566].

On November 19, 1921, the leadership of the troops of the Tyumen province changed. The new leadership was subordinate not to the Siberian military leadership, but to the headquarters of the Urals Military District - operationally, this circumstance had significant advantages. Since that time, the military tactics of the Soviet troops against the rebels have changed dramatically.

The entire territory of the Tyumen province was divided into three combat areas (Tyumensko-Tobolsky, Yalutorovsky and Ishimsky) with districts along the administrative borders of counties. Each combat unit had its own headquarters headed by a chief. The combat sectors were divided into battalion, battalion - into company or garrison, according to the deployment of the garrisons.

The new method of struggle was based on the restoration and strengthening of firm power in the localities: garrisons were posted in the districts, consisting of at least a company, and revolutionary committees were organized to organize power in the localities.

From the territory of the province, the Soviet command withdrew undisciplined military units, under the threat of severe punishment of category

rically banned unauthorized executions and looting.

The mobility of active insurgent detachments and groups was opposed by the newly created flying cavalry detachments - for this purpose, a separate cavalry regiment of the 29th division was transferred to the command of the Tyumen province.

A network of permanent undercover intelligence was created, as well as military intelligence, in order to prevent and promptly eliminate the possibility of resistance to the authorities in areas. The amnestied rebels were involved in operations to eliminate and capture the leaders. There were cases when former rebels, having received an amnesty, betrayed their former leaders [2: 519, 567-567, 297].

By the end of December 1921, after the defeat of the detachments of Varaksin, Sikachenko, Bulatov, there were no more organized detachments in the Tyumen province. Independent small groups remained in the areas

according to the place of their origin (in the Yaloturovsky district, for example, their total number was no more than 50 people) [2: 569-570, 576].

December 15-30, 1921] the second fortnight of the voluntary appearance of the insurgents took place. The authorities promised not to take repressive measures against the returnees. At the same time, the surrender of weapons was declared an indispensable condition for appearance. Those who did not appear and did not hand over their weapons were declared outlaws with the use of capital punishment. On January 5-20, 1922, a special fortnight was held for the voluntary surrender of weapons. After January 20, those responsible for concealing weapons were punished according to the laws of wartime [2: 563, 574-575].

The West Siberian uprising by its nature is typologically identical to the Antonov uprising in the Tambov province and the Kronstadt uprising. It revealed a deep crisis in the policy of war communism, the dissatisfaction of the entire peasantry with the Soviet government as the bearer of this policy.

Sources and notes:

1. A detailed and reliable assessment of the West Siberian uprising is presented in the works of Siberian historians. See: Tretyakov N.G. West Siberian uprising of 1921 Abstract. diss... cand. ist. Sciences. Novosibirsk, 1994; Shishkin V.I. On the characteristics of socio-political moods and views of the participants in the West Siberian rebellion of 1921 // Humanitarian sciences in Siberia. Series: Domestic history. Novosibirsk, 1996; He is. On the issue of a new concept of the history of the West Siberian uprising of 1921 // Humanities in Siberia. Series: Domestic history. Novosibirsk, 1997; He is. West Siberian rebellion of 1921: circumstances and causes arose

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2. For Soviets without Communists: Peasant uprising in the Tyumen province. 1921: Sat. documents / Comp. IN AND. Shishkin. Novosibirsk, 2000.

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CONCLUSION

The revolutionary entry into the new world in Russia after 1917 meant the rejection of the old world. Oblivion was a condition for acquiring a new identity. Such historical transformations are always accompanied in the peasantry by feelings of heavy and irreparable loss and hopeless disorientation. In this sense, such historical trials are certainly traumatic. But in such situations, the consequences of the traumatic experience often turn out to be much more dramatic: for example, in the new reality of the revolution and the Civil War in Russia, people irrevocably lost their former identity and were replaced by a new historical and cultural identity. A social trauma of this kind will always be carried by a social group (society, people, peasantry) after the historical process has forced it to face it. The new identity is largely constituted by the trauma of the loss of the former identity, and this is precisely its main content.

Peasant revolution 1917-1918 transformed into a peasant war against the policy of war communism. The peasant war, which began in the second half of 1918, acquired a full-scale character in 1919-1922. The nature of the peasant war in 1918-1922. in Soviet Russia as a civil war in its content, allows us to make a statement about the typological commonality of the peasant protest throughout the country.

The typological characteristics of the protest peasant movement reflect identical features, patterns and trends, which makes it possible to define it as a peasant war. The commonality manifested itself in

388

the ranks of the uprisings, the driving forces and composition of the participants in the insurrectionary movement, the ideological basis of the peasant protest, the slogans, the military organization of the insurgents and the partisan tactics of fighting, as well as the methods and actions of the Soviet state to suppress the uprisings. The explanation for such a picture lies, firstly, in the nature of the peasant community itself, and secondly, in the implementation of a unified state policy throughout the country - the policy of war communism, based on the Marxist vision of building a new social order. The commonality of conditions created a characteristic identity of protest on the part of one and the same subject in the face of the peasant population. The social environment and similar economic conditions in different places gave rise to the same methods of dealing with the authorities.

The spontaneous, but mass movement of protest on the part of the peasantry was supplemented by the principle of the predominantly voluntary nature of the participation of all peasant strata. In this regard, it seems unlawful to reduce the peasant protest movement to a common denominator of a "third force". Local and isolated forms of resistance embodied the peasant protest. The widespread dissatisfaction of the peasant masses was a response to the policy of military communism on the part of the Soviet state, based on the grain monopoly, which developed into an emergency food dictatorship, food distribution, the militaristic nature of the organization of labor, which manifested itself in labor duties that were difficult for the rural population. . The initial promises of the Soviet state (Decree on Land, Decree on Peace), which gave rise to hopes and expectations among the peasantry, were replaced by deep disappointment and alienation from the Bolshevik authorities.

The socialization of the land expected by the working peasantry was transformed within the framework of state policy into nationalization. But this was not the end of the matter. The product of peasant labor (bread in the first place) was subjected to alienation from the producer in the form of the notorious "pumping". At the same time, the expectations generated by the Decree on Peace were embodied in practice in disappointment associated with the transition to general mobilization in the form of forced recruitment into the Red Army.

The policy of war communism gave rise not only to a systemic economic crisis, but also to an acute political crisis, creating opposition to the ruling power: the main part of the country's population expressed both passive and active opposition to the policy of the Soviet state.

the endowment, which resulted in mass and long-term armed peasant uprisings throughout the territory of the Soviet Republic.

Among the main reasons that caused the protests of the peasantry in Russia was the dissatisfaction of the peasants with the policy of military communism (surplus appropriations, mobilization, labor duties), which did not take into account the real interests and opportunities of the peasantry, as well as indignation at the methods of implementing this policy. . The documents of the Soviet government had harsh wordings: those guilty of evading the payment of the surplus appropriation, as well as representatives of the authorities who did not ensure the fulfillment of tasks, were subject to imprisonment in concentration camps as traitors to the cause of the revolution with confiscation of their property. To carry out tasks, food detachments were sent to the village, as well as the armed forces.

No detailed accounting of grain in the village, which was considered "surplus", was carried out. At the disposal of the People's Commissariat of Food there were no statistical data on sown areas and yields, since during the years of the revolution and the Civil War, statistics were not dealt with. Surplus appraisal plans were calculated on the basis of preserved pre-revolutionary data, which

the Russian village, bled dry by wars and revolution, during the lean years of 1920-1921. was unable to EXECUTE.

The actions of local bodies of Soviet power were regulated from above: after determining the apportionment for each village separately, the state and internal apportionment for individual farms was carried out according to household lists: detailed personal lists were compiled (indicating the rural society, name, surname, the amount of bread to be delivered), receipts were issued with the determination of the delivery date. The list of names was submitted to the nearest collection point, a copy was sent to the volost executive committee. Members of volost and rural executive committees were personally responsible for the implementation of all the above activities.

The policy of war communism placed its burden primarily on the main stratum of the rural population, the middle peasantry, undermining the incentives for agrarian management. It was possible to force the producer to give away grain and not to reduce agricultural production at the same time only by strengthening the measures of coercion and violence. The middle peasant was the most efficient payer of permits; many sons volunteered for the Red Army. He bore the brunt of the assignments. In addition to many types of apportionment, the burden of labor duties rested on the middle peasantry. To perform labor

vyh duties, especially horse-drawn, logging required peasant horses, carts, as well as their own fodder. According to the norm of the grain forage surplus, the peasants had a supply of fodder only for the maintenance of horses and for sowing, for logging by the food authorities, no fodder was left for working horses. In the producing counties, a vicious circle was obtained: heavy and burdensome labor duties were established, but fodder was not issued for their performance.

Dissatisfaction with the authorities was also expressed by a significant part of the peasant poor. Often it was the poor, not burdened with personal property, who became active insurgents. Such a phenomenon is quite understandable. The poor rural population, which did not have its own stocks of grain, had to be provided at the expense of internal appropriation - the surplus left by more prosperous peasants in excess of the standard for state apportionment and their own consumption. Of course, not a single strong owner was burning with the desire to voluntarily part with the "surplus" both from the state appropriation and from the actual re-appropriation - internal. All the grain coming from the internal apportionment of the volosts was first to be concentrated in the volost center, only then, under the control of the volost executive committee, could it be given out to the poor population, and only at a certain time. In the peasant environment, the peasant "ration" was called the "hungry norm": it was enough only for half-starvation food. The peasant poor had to get to the volost center in order to get bread, stand in line at the food office, deliver the received bread home - all this wasted a lot of time and effort, so necessary in the field season.

The food authorities have come up with administrative tools to carry out the allotment. One of them was called "commodity blockade". One and the same body responsible for the surplus appraisal—the provincial food committee—concentrated in its hands the distribution of essential commodities necessary for the peasantry—salt, matches, kerosene, soap, nails, shoes, and so on. The essence of the commodity blockade boiled down to the following: rural communities or volosts that completed all allocations by the deadline in full could receive a commodity ration in an increased amount; those who completed various types of apportionment in a partial amount (for example, 25-50% of grain, or meat, vegetables, poultry, raw materials, hay), received a limited amount of commodity rations. If the percentage of apportionment completed in rural communities or volosts turned out to be less than those established from above, the goods are not sold.

were given. The increased rate (rather meager in itself) was evidence that the authorities foresaw in advance the impossibility of 100% completion of all tasks - it was impossible. So, in the Russian provinces, in addition to the apportionment for bread, grain fodder and oilseeds, appropriations for potatoes, honey, poultry, cattle and small cattle were introduced,

pigs, leather and wool, flax fiber, hemp and other agricultural products. Tasks for tobacco, bristles, horns, hooves, tails, manes were deployed. In total, by the beginning of 1921, for example, in the Tyumen region, there were 34 types of apportionment, which placed an unbearable burden on the peasantry. Each deployment was accompanied by the same instruction in terms of settings: deployment - combat order. As a result, peasants cut the wool on their fur coats to perform the woolen apportionment. There was no other way out: fur coats, hats, felt boots were taken away for failure to carry out the apportionment.

Any Soviet or party worker could be accused of the notorious "opposing the deployment" and severely punished. In practice, this was not uncommon. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the ranks of the insurgents and their leaders there were often former employees of local Soviet and military bodies. Local authorities were placed in conditions where the failure to fulfill the tasks of the higher leadership, regardless of the objective conditions and the possibility of their implementation, was declared criminal. If the state authorities treated the workers of their own administrative apparatus in this way, who was the ordinary citizen, the peasant, in their eyes?

No excuses for non-fulfillment of the allocations were accepted, all the more so it was categorically forbidden to send walkers, delegations with a petition for an extension of the period or reduction of the allocations. The latter were threatened with arrest and sent to forced labor. In order to ensure the fulfillment of grain allocations within the specified period, all mills (steam, water, wind) were closed, with the exception of mills grinding state grain, grinding grain for personal consumption was prohibited.

On the ground, emergency troikas, heads of food offices, food committees, food commissars, and emergency commissioners commanded and gave orders. The troops of the VNUS took part in the food campaign and carried out confiscations for non-fulfillment of apportionments. The taking of hostages before the apportionment was completed, the confiscation of property without observing any rules, even from the families of Red Army soldiers, became commonplace in the activities of the authorities. The arrested hostages were released only after you the fulfillment of the allocation by the entire rural society - there was a kind of mutual responsibility.

As a rule, numerous popular uprisings did not put forward political demands. The peasants were committed to the struggle for their native village, volost, district, when their immediate interests were affected. There was no unity of views and political aspirations. But the rebels were united only by a general protest rejection of the state regime. However, separate policy documents are known: the Program of the Antonov Union of the Working Peasantry in the Tambov province, the resolution of the garrison assembly of the rebellious Kronstadt on March 1, 1921, the Declaration of the Revolutionary Military Council and the commander of the army "Will of the People" (Declaration of Serov-Dalmatov), the political program of F.K. . Mironov.

The Bolshevik interpretation of the peasant uprisings as "kulak", "Socialist-Revolutionary", "White Guard" was due to ideological considerations, as well as the desire of party, Soviet, military leaders, bodies of the Cheka-GPU-OGPU to shift the blame for their own miscalculations. Groundless are assertions about the decisive role played in the preparation of the uprising by counter-revolutionary conspiracies, about the serious influence of local peasant unions as organizers of counter-revolutionary work, relying on the kulaks in the countryside. The surviving remnants of representatives of non-Bolshevik parties (Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks) were regi
Chekists.

The peasant understanding of a just social order, expressed in the protest movement, was reduced to the slogan "Soviets without communists." Peasant protest was expressed not against the Soviets, but against the policy of war communism, which in the peasant consciousness was identified with devastation, lack of rights, violence, famine and other disasters. The attitude towards Soviet power was characterized by the perception of it as a "true", people's power, close to the interests of the working people. In the rebel territories, this slogan was embodied on

practice through the creation of volost and rural peasant soviets. Among the peasantry, the opinion gradually developed that the organs of popular power, won as a result of the revolution and the Civil War, degenerated into bureaucratic instruments of state violence, led by false communists and former oppressors. To organize a new government, the peasantry wanted to choose representatives from the population.

The typology of the peasant protest movement was supplemented by the armed formations created by the rebels according to the principle of organization.

regular army (similar to the Red Army), including political departments and political committees. The regiments were divided into battalions, companies, platoons, squads. Rebel detachments were created and replenished through the mobilization of the population. The units had convoys. Volost military headquarters carried out economic, organizational, informational tasks. Commandants were appointed in the rear villages. In military formations and in the rear of the rebels, they tried to maintain discipline: a fight was carried out against moonshiners and excessive consumption of moonshine - the perpetrators were punished and brought to justice.

The military leadership was mainly carried out by the command staff from the peasant environment, trained and hardened in the battles of two wars - the First World War and the Civil War. The command staff consisted of former non-commissioned officers, ensigns. There were many cases when former commanders of the Red Army (commanders of divisions, regiments), including those awarded in battles with the White Orders of the Red Banner, became the leaders of the rebels. The peasant commanders were opposed by much more qualified and experienced commanders of the Red Army, who had risen to high officer ranks in the old army. These circumstances emphasize the absurdity of statements about an officer conspiracy as the cause of peasant uprisings.

The confrontation was distinguished by bitterness (and cruelty) on the part of both sides, significant losses, including civilians. The peasant, who, according to the turn of his natural mind, was accustomed to a pragmatic approach to any business, deciding to take a desperate step - to rebel against state power - was aware that there might not be a way back, he was well aware of the consequences of the uprising in the event of its liquidation, not only in relation to oneself, but especially in relation to the family, relatives, native village. This factor forced the rebels to desperately resist. The number of losses among the rebels exceeded by an order of magnitude the losses of the punitive troops. The main part of the losses of the rebels were the losses among the local population. The reasons lay in the policy of the state power not so much towards the rebels, but towards the civilian population. The orders of the Soviet command contained demands to shoot on the spot without trial all those captured with weapons in their hands, to take and shoot hostages for destroying roads and communications, for helping the rebels, to burn and destroy with artillery fire entire villages that supported the rebels or offered stubborn resistance. Executions without trial of civilians became widespread.

The disastrous prospect of the insurrectionary movement was a foregone conclusion and natural. Participants in the protest movement, even in neighboring regions, differed in their behavior, scale of activity, size and composition. Insurgency, in its significance in the life of the peasantry and its relations with the authorities, was inferior to the behavior of the "silent majority": conservatism, as a characteristic archetype of the peasant consciousness, was based on the unwillingness and fear of radical changes. The legitimacy of the central government in the peasant worldview was reinforced by the idea of the sacredness of power. Many refused to openly rebel against the authority of the state for fear of revenge for participating in the uprising: the population had already learned from their own experience the punitive power of the state military and administrative system. The one who decided to rebel was aware of the consequences that awaited him and his family. All property of the participants in the uprising was subject to confiscation. The disunity of protest manifestations was intensified by various colors (food, religious, national).

To suppress major uprisings, the headquarters of the Red Army sent regular military units: rifle, cavalry, armored. The punitive measures included both military operations against insurgent detachments and decisive and brutal measures against the population in the territories that were engulfed by the uprising. The areas of hostilities with the insurgents were divided into combat areas, each of which was assigned a special task. However, knowledge of the native area allowed small insurgent detachments to remain elusive. The rebels used effective guerrilla tactics: when regular troops approached, the detachments broke up into small groups, dispersed, their members hid in the forests, in the villages under the guise of villagers, if necessary, united again to carry out swift raids. Guerrilla tactics showed the inefficiency of the operational actions of regular troops.

A sympathetic attitude towards the rebels and support from the local population made it possible to obtain shelter, timely information about the approach of regular troops. The population supplied the rebels with food, horses and household supplies. The peasants regarded the rebel leaders as tax protectors. The grain they seized from the plundered sacking points was often shared among the peasants. Residents of villages and villages refused to help the military units and authorities in the fight against the rebels. Thus, the term "banditry" did not define the real nature of the insurgent movement.

zheniya. Many detachments were distinguished by discipline and organization, strict subordination leaders.

After the introduction of the NEP, the Soviet leadership realized the insufficiency of the military nature of the struggle against the partisan tactics of the rebels supported by the local population. To fight the insurgency effectively, economic and political means had to be brought into play. The methods of suppression and elimination of peasant uprisings and uprisings by the organs of the Soviet state demonstrated, in addition to repressive measures, a complex of operational-military, economic, and political measures.

Economic events were of particular importance. With the transition to the NEP, the peasants got the opportunity to exchange, buy, sell and transport grain and grain fodder and potatoes, free movement of goods and products was allowed. Food barrier detachments were removed from railways, waterways and horse-drawn roads. The political measures included the following: peasants arrested for food offenses against the authorities (non-fulfillment of apportionment, concealment of bread, non-fulfillment of labor duties) were released. Actions of voluntary appearance and surrender of weapons were announced, including rebel commanders. The organs of the Soviet state took into account the important circumstance that the organization and discipline in the rebel detachments were largely based on the authority of the people's commanders. The decision to end the resistance, taken by the commander, meant the liquidation of the entire detachment. These economic and political measures were a forced concession of the state in relation to the peasants, generated by the transition to the New Economic Policy.

The departure of peasants to the rebels reduced labor resources in the countryside. Meanwhile, no one reduced the tasks for food supplies to the center. Strict instructions continued to come from above demanding that tasks be completed on time. To solve these problems, working peasant hands were required. The military goal - the suppression of the uprising and the destruction of the Povetans - was contrary to economic considerations. In the deserted peasant volosts (some were killed, others were repressed, others went to the rebels), the economic policy of war communism reached a dead end: there was no one to take the "surpluses" from - there were neither surpluses nor their producers. There was no one to perform labor duties: to deliver bread, to procure fuel. The peasants had neither horses nor fodder left. Reduced in comparison with the surplus, the plan for the tax in kind in 1921 turned out to be unbearable for the peasantry due to the costs

the policy of war communism (reduction of crops and the number of workers, devastating uprisings, devastation), crop failures and drought.

The mobility of active insurgent detachments and groups was opposed by specially created flying cavalry detachments. A network of permanent undercover intelligence was created, as well as military intelligence, in order to prevent and promptly eliminate the possibility of resistance to the authorities in areas. The amnestied rebels were involved in operations to eliminate and capture the leaders. There were cases when former rebels, having received an amnesty, betrayed their former leaders.

The period of peasant uprisings revealed a deep crisis in the policy of war communism, forced the leadership of the Soviet state to look for ways out of the deep crisis. However, the transition to the NEP could not be carried out immediately: the consequences of the policy of war communism manifested themselves for many more months, giving rise to the reproduction of new protest phenomena. Only in 1922 did the peasantry feel the real advantages of the new economic policy. At the end of 1922, the peasant war in Russia ended.

The collective identity of Russian society after the end of open civil confrontation was a collection of scars in the collective Russian soul. The scars were left by the forced rejection of the former identity. They still cause a long and endless pain among the people, which is known as the "pain of Prometheus." Thanks to this pain, Russian civilization constantly remembers the "lost worlds" that it was forced to abandon in its history. The resistance of the peasantry to the policy of the state, based on violence, did not allow the destruction of the owner in the peasant, which would mean the liquidation of the peasant himself as such. The armed resistance of the peasantry against the violent policy of war communism created an obstacle to the expansion of state coercion in line with the communist doctrine of a single nationwide production and distribution in the system of a non-commodity national economy, the elimination of classes and estates - the destruction of the farmer as an owner.

CONTENT

INTRODUCTION ID 3

TRANSFORMATION OF PROTEST PHENOMENA INTO A PEASANT WARa.aaaaanna 6

ANTI-RELIGIOUS POLICY OF THE SOVIET STATE: CAUSES AND FORMS OF RESISTANCE 42

MAKHNOVSHCHINA: A DREAM OF FREEDOM

PEASANT'S PARADISE..... 61 GRIGORIEVSHCHINA, ill. linlini, ii liiliiniiniililiiniilinininiya 93 PEASANT UPRISINGS IN THE VOLGA REGION 103 "CHAPAN WAR".... lily iinini, 107 "FORK MOVEMENT "..... aan. 116

THE PHENOMENON OF THE PEOPLE'S REBELLION IN THE VOLGA REGION: FROM THE "ARMY OF Pravda" (Sapozhkovshchina) TO THE "ARMY OF "VOLINAROD" (SEROVSHCHINA)..... 129

PEOPLE'S REBELLION MOVEMENT IN THE SOUTHERN OF RUSSIA e 143

THE PEOPLE'S REBELLION MOVEMENT IN SIBERIA: THE APOGEE OF THE POLICY OF WAR COMMUNISM (1920 — BEGINNING OF 1921)..... 157

TAMBOV VENDEA: ANTONOVSHCHINA 177

CAUSES AND FACTORS OF PEASANT REVOLTS

IN THE TAMBOV PROVINCE il liililililinininiya 177 SR PARTY IN PREPARATION

OF THE PEASANT UPRISING IN THE TAMBOV REGION:

MYTHS AND REALITY... 186 TRANSFORMATION OF PEASANT REVOLTS IN THE TAMBOV REGION
INTO A PEASANT WAR..... 202 PEASANT WAR UNDER THE LEADING

A.S. ANTONOV... 233 ORGANIZATION OF THE GUERRILLA ARMY

TAMBOV REGION... 238

PROMOTIONAL ACTIVITIES OF THE UNION OF LABOR PEASANTS AMONG THE POPULATION

OF THE TAMBOV REGION... 258 SUPPRESSION OF THE PEASANT REBELLION

IN THE TAMBOV REGION or AA. 284 THE DEFEAT OF THE GUERRILLA ARMY

OF THE TAMBOV REGION lilies 306

NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PROTEST MOVEMENT IN THE REGIONS OF
RUSSIA 327

THE WEST SIBERIAN UPRISING OF 1921: FOR SOVIETS WITHOUT COMMUNISTS yene eilinin 354

CONCLUSION ate ON 388

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